JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND MILITARY STUDIES [JHMS] Copyright © The Author(s), 2019 Volume 5(1): ISSN (Print): 2536-6726 ISSN (Online): 2734-388X Page: 63-91

The Struggle for the Control of Aniomaland in the , 1967-1970

Odigwe A. Nwaokocha

Abstract There are varied works on the Nigerian Civil War. However, not much is known about the outline of the war in the fringe Igbo-dominated section of the old Mid-West Region presently known as Aniomaland. It was geographically on the Nigerian side during the war. The seeming neglect of the index of the war in the area by scholars has not enabled a deeper understand- ing and appreciation of the nature of the war. There was a profound military contest between Biafran and Nigerian military forces for the control of the strategically-located Aniomaland in the war. This work is an attempt to probe into the details of the conflict between the two contending sides in the war from 1967 to 1970. Employing primary and secondary sources, the work delves into explaining the character and reasons behind the military manoeuvres, the nature of the killings, particularly of unarmed civilians by both sides, and what they left be- hind as their after effects. The work posits that the course of the war and the intensive nature of the struggles for the control of Aniomaland made the Anioma people major victims as it left them with many negative consequences to battle with.

Introduction The Nigerian civil war has assumed the status of a watershed in Nigerian historiography. Understanding its various elements – particularly the role and fate of minority groups in it – is essential to an explanation of the forces that have shaped modern Nigerian history. This partly underlines the importance of studying the war in Aniomaland, which was on the Nigerian side during the war. It emerged as a theatre of fighting in the Nigerian Civil War when Biafran forces invaded the Mid-West region through Asaba on August 9, 1967 and federal forces attempted to expel them from the region. It should be noted that the Nigerian Civil War had started on July 6, 1967 and ended on January 12, 1970, while the formal surrender and what is generally considered to be the end of the Nigerian civil war

______Corresponding Author: Department of History and International Studies, University of , , Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019 took place in Lagos on January 15, 1970. began to shrink territorially almost immedi- ately fighting began. By the fourth day of hostilities, Nigerian troops had already marched to Nsukka. Ogoja in the extreme north of the territory had been lost. Despite the loss, Biafra held out but were under intense presure in the same northern sector around Obollo- Afor, the only flank of the war yet open as at July 20, 1967.1 On July 25, 1967 the federal side opened a second flank with an amphibious landing at Bonny by the 3rd Marine Com- mand under Lt-Col Benjamin Adekunle. And, the third flank was opened by Biafra with its invasion of the Mid-West on August 9, 1967.

This brought Aniomaland into the war picture and made it a major battlefront. History re- veals that the Biafran invasion of the Mid-West region changed the tone of the war. The federal response was the hasty formatiom of the Second Division of the Nigerian Army under the command of Lt-Col Murtala Mohammed. The invading Biafran forces on their way to Ibadan and Lagos encoutered federal forces around Ore in Western Nigeria, re- treated and were pushed all the way back to Benin City. From Benin, Biafran forces re- treated to Agbor, then Umunede, and finally, Asaba, all in Aniomaland. From then on they launched resistance to the push of the federal army. This continued in various forms till the end of the war in 1970. A lot has been said about the Biafran invasion of the Mid-West.2 However the account of the war in Aniomaland has been largely ignored by scholars. Though it received some attention in the works of J.O.G. Achuzia and Emma Okocha,3 with the singular exception of Egodi Uchendu’s work that looked at Anioma women in the war,4 it has been overlooked by historians. This work is therefore dedicated to the struggle for the control of Aniomaland between Biafran and Nigerian forces.

The Location of Aniomaland Aniomaland lies in the middle reaches of the lower Niger River’s western bank in Nigeria. It stretches from Onyaa axis in the south to Ebu in the north. Further upland and away from the Niger bank, the territory goes as far as the village of Anioma in Odiani clan. Here, the territory has a common boundary with Esanland in just like it does on the Ebu axis on the Niger Valley. In geographical terms, the relative position of the Anioma area is as follows: it is bounded in the east by the River Niger, with Anambra and Imo states located at the eastern bank of the river. The territory has a huge stretch of boundary with Edo state on its western axis. In the south-west, Aniomaland is bound by Bomadi, Isoko- South, Isoko-North and Ughelli North local government areas of . It shares a boundary with Rivers State in the south.

Modern Aniomaland has nine local government areas. These are Aniocha North, Aniocha South, Ika North, Ika East, Ndokwa East, Ndokwa West, Oshimili North, Oshimili South and Ukwuani. Situated at the western bank of the Niger River, they have been referred to as ‘West Niger Igbo’ in some circles. This descriptive term was employed as a geographical

64 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Female Involvement in the Nigerian Civil War… M. J. Yakubu, A. S. Habeeb & A. O. Gbenga phrase to differentiate them from the Igbo group on the the east of the Niger River. Ani- omaland was in the Western Region between 1946 and 1963; and in the Mid-West from 1963 to 1976. When Delta State was carved out, the Mid-West was re-christened Bendel State in 1976, a name she bore till 1991. At different times, the Anioma people have been called ‘Ika Igbo’, ‘Western Igbo’, ‘Mid-Western Igbo’, ‘Bendel Igbo’ and ‘Delta Igbo’. Ma- jority of Anioma people speak basically three broad dialects of the macro . A minority speak Olukwumi (Yoruba) and Igala. The various Igbo dialects of the Anioma are widespread and virtually all the Anioma people, including the Olukwumi and Igala speakers, communicate in Igbo.

Biafran Invasion of the Mid-West, Dynamics of War and Biafran Retreat The civil war extended to Aniomaland when Biafran forces invaded the Mid-West through the Niger Bridge. The main party landed in Benin on the morning of August 9, 1967. A col- umn had branched out at Agbor and headed for Warri. From Benin, another column headed north to Auchi. There was no fighting initially until federal forces confronted the Biafran troops. The last motorised Biafran columns retreated across the Niger Bridge to the east on October 4, 1967 after some stiff resistance at Asaba.

Details of the Mid-West invasion show that a Biafran battalion under Lt-Col Mike Ivenso was to move through Owo and Akure and take Ibadan. The second battalion under Lt-Col Festus Akagha was expected to move through the centre to Benin and take Ore, Ijebu- Ode and Lagos. The Third Battalion commanded by Lt-Col Humphrey Chukwuka was to move down south through Sapele and Warri, then moving along the coast, join a two- pronged attack on Lagos. The plan failed as the federal reaction frustrated it. This proved to be the turning point of the war as the federal offensive ended up bringing the war to the Anioma people in their home. Before highlghting that, some issues about the Biafran invasion of the Mid-West need examination.

From a military point of view, the Mid-West gamble was a disaster both for Biafra and the Anioma people. The invasion threw up the issue of alleged collaboration between Anioma officers in the 4th Area Command of the Nigerian Army in the Mid-West and Biafra. Lt-Col Conrad Nwawo who commanded the 4th Area Command has denied the conspiracy prop- osition. He pointed out that resistance was impossible as that could not be sustained due to paucity of arms and ammunitions, asserting that ‘you do not fight wars with service pistols.’5 The command had no armoured cars, no artillery or anti-tank weapons. It had four Bren guns and two 81 mm. mortars. The dearth of arms in the command troubled the Mid-West government, which atempted but failed to import its own arms.6 On why top officers of the Area Command crossed the Niger to Biafra when the Mid-West fell to the federal forces, Nwawo insists some of them were already declared wanted by the federal

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Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019 government for sabotage and conspiracy.7 There is a documented evidence to show that Nwawo and Okwechime were called leaders of the ‘collaborators and mutineers’ by the Federal Radio in Lagos at the time.8 An officer of the 4th Area Comand, Captain Asoya said cicumstances beyond their control forced some of them to Biafra, where they felt safer considering the July/August killings in the army. Some non-Anioma officers of the com- mand, including the then Lt Ademokhai, also crossed over to Biafra for the same reason.9

The conspirarcy hypothesis is controversial and difficult to explain. For instance, as the ‘D’ Company of the Biafran 18th Batallion was sweeping to Warri on the morning of the inva- sion, Lt-Col Okwechime was seen driving in the opposite direction between Obiarukwu and Eku. On being arrested, he explained that he fled Benin on hearing of Biafran military activities there.10 It is puzzling that somene who was part of a conspiracy with the invading Biafrans would flee on their arrival. The same Okwechime was declared wanted for collab- oration and mutineering by federal authorities. This accusation formed part of the forces that shaped the war in the Mid-West, particularly in Aniomaland. The situation in the Mid- West was overtly complex. Surveying the situtation critically, an officer of the command, Brigadier S. O. Ogbemudia concluded thus:

… it was natural that Igbo-speaking Midwesterners should turn to Biafra rather than to Nigeria…. Did the Federal au- thorities provide sufficient arms and equipment for the 4th Area Command to engage in sustained combat against a de- termined agressor? And if not, why not? If it was true that the 4th Area Command did not have sufficient weaponary to undertake long term operation against a determined oppo- nent, surrender was a better alternative to a senseless self- slaughter at the hands of a better equipped opponent. Con- sidering the development at that time, it was either they supported “Biafra” and lived, or they found a third country to take them. Certainly, and in the situation that prevailed, the former was a better alternative. Here again, it was obvi- ous that the command lacked the equipment.11

The Biafran occupation of the Mid-West was marked by Biafran missed opportunites and the over-zealousness of some Biafran troops in their relationship with the local popula- tion. This had repercussuons on the Anioma section of the Mid-West. Biafran forces spent much time in Benin. This delayed their movement to Ore, Ibadan, and Lagos and proved fatal for their mission as the element of surprise was sacrificed. The lacuna created room for the federal government to take the initiatve.

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Map 1: A map showing the advance of armies into the Mid-West from the east, north and south. The black arrows represent the initial Biafran incursion while the white arrows indicate the movement of federal troops into the Mid-West and the West

Source: Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-70. Ibadan: Heinemann, 1980, 43.

The Biafran forces captured Ore in the Western Region on August 18, 1967. Around there, they encountered federal forces; lost a decisive battle and retreated, blowing up bridges along their route. Federal forces in hot pursuit detoured into another direction and en- tered the Mid-West from a northern flank. They achieved series of victories against a re- treating ill-equipped Biafran force. Desertions became common place as the military situ- ation became hopeless for Biafran troops. Some officers even rejected commands. Lt-Col Mike Ivenso, Commander of the Biafran 19th Battalion detailed to move through Owo to Ibadan, requested for sick leave and left that front. He was replaced by Lt-Col Henry Ig- boba, who soon refused going back to the front citing the huge numerical advantage of federal forces, paucity of weapons and the ill-trained troops. Banjo, Commander of the Biafran Army in the Mid-West detained him at the Benin prison. Major Odiwo, appointed in his place crossed over to the federal side a few days later.12 The federal army entered Benin from the north on September 20, 1967 after nearly a month of battles.

The negative conduct of some Biafran troops in the Mid-West generated bad blood for Biafra in some sections of the region. Some of them looted and harassed innnocent peo- ple, particularly in the Warri-Sapele-Ughelli axis.13 They were also brutal. A Biafran unit

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Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019 killed a man at the Nigerian Institute for Oil-Palm Research (N.I.F.O.R.) for allegedly writing a letter explaining the general state of things under Biafran occupation.14 The Asaba-born Dr. Nwanze, first Nigerian Director of N.I.F.O.R., was abducted by Biafran troops for al- leged ‘unco-operative attitude and stubborness’.15

As those activies were going on, federal forces advanced steadily towards Benin City, which they eventually entered on September 20 1967. Before that, however, fearing being sliced into two by the federal penetration into Benin and being cut off from the Benin- Agbor-Asaba road and its likely negative consequences for communication with the East, Banjo ordered that his headquarters be moved to Agbor.16 He also ordered Biafran pull out from Benin on September 12. Biafran troops retreated from Benin, destroyed the Osi- omo bridge and massed about a battallion strength on the other side of Osiomo River at Ogan Hill, an area generally considered the boundry between the Edo-speaking people and the Anioma.

Aniomaland as a Theatre of Battles Federal forces were impeded in their eastward push into Aniomaland by the broken Osi- omo bridge. They massed there facing Biafran troops on the opposite hill. The Nigerian civil war entered Aniomaland when, unknown to the Biafrans, a column of federal troops went back to Benin, detoured to Sapele and entred Aniomaland through Obiarukwu. They hit Agbor, turned left towards Benin and attacked Biafran forces from the rear at their Ogan Hill location.17 Biafran troops scattered in different directions and eventually with- drew from Agbor, which was subsequently over-run by federal troops..

Federal advance into Aniomaland was swift. Biafran forces abandoned Agbor for Umunede on September 25. As federal troops approached, they evacuated to Asaba on September 30 without a major battle until federal troops got to the outskirts of Asaba. From Umunede, federal troops fanned out in two brigades. The 6th Brigade approached Asaba through Umunede-Obior-Ubulu-Ogwashi-Ibusa-Asaba road. The 7th Brigade took the Isele-Uku-Okpanam-Asaba road. On approaching Ibusa from Ogwashi-Uku, the 6th Bri- gade could not proceed as the Oboshi bridge was already damaged by some Ibusa youths.18 This forced them to go back and approach Asaba through the Ogwashi-Azagba- Okpanam route. They encountered no resistance till the home stretch approach to Asaba at Okwute-Ugbor on Okpanam road.

Details of some military skirmishes between Biafran troops and federal forces in Ogwashi- Uku and the battles for Asaba will be necessary at this point. The military situation in the old Asaba and Aboh divisions when federal toops entered Ogwashi-Uku from Ubulu-Uku end was unsettled. Retreating Biafran forces had camped at Isa Ogwashi, Ogwashi-Uku’s western satelite settlement. On the approach of federal troops some of them dispersed into the bush and regrouped while others continued their eastward retreat. Desperate

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Biafran forces were still evacuating to the east from the Kwale area on Ogwashi-Uku’s southern flank and necessarily had to pass through Ogwashi-Uku. They needed to avoid being cut-off by advancing federal forces from the Benin and Warri ends. The unimpeded nature of federal advance from Agbor meant Biafran troops were still around Ogwashi- Uku. That was the situation when federal forces entered the hitherto peaceful town of Ogwashi-Uku. They met a near empty town as many inhabitants went into hiding. They then sought out Obi Izediunor in his palace. On their way back, they ran into a fragment of Biafran forces struggling to reach Biafra from the Aboh Division. Some federal troops, including a top commander, were allegedly killed in the attack. Facing superior fire-power, Biafran troops withdrew to the Ogbeumuokowuni-Ogbentiobi axis of the town.19 The de- cisive battle for Ogwashi-Uku was settled between the Post Office and Government (now Ani Nshi) Primary School the next day. Federal troops triumphed with the Biafrans retreat- ing eastward to Ibusa.

The second clash cost the federal side some casualities in addition to the previous day’s losses. Feeling that their losses was the result of a conspiracy between the people and Biafrans, federal troops blew up in anger and a part of the cosequence was the killing of six Onukwu brothers around whose compound the second battle occured.20 The episode sent shivers down the spine of Ibusa people, inhabiting the immediate east of Ogwashi- Uku. This led to the destruction of the Oboshi bridge connecting Ogwashi-Uku and Ibusa by some Ibusa youths in conjunction with Biafra’s retreating 12th Battalion to prevent fed- eral troops from entering Ibusa.21 That delayed federal advance into Ibusa as fedederal troops could not go beyond the broken bridge. Before they reversed at the damaged bridge, the town’s ruling elite led by the the Diokpa (Obi Mordi) of Ibusa – who was over a hundred years old in 1967 – waded through the Oboshi stream to meet federal troops at the Ogwashi-uku end waving the proverbial olive branch. The sight of him and the charm- ing Omu Igbuzo, Madam Nwaoboshi wading through water probably left an indelible im- pression. The spokepersons of the group were Mr G.I. Okonji, an impecable Hausa-speaker and a lengedary school Headmaster, Mr. Stephen Aniemeke. The later also organised plac- ard-carrying school childrend displaying political ‘one Nigeria’ signs at the Ibusa end. When they entered Ibusa, federal troops identified the homes of three Anioma army officers of Ibusa origin, Lt-Col Michael Okwechime, Lt-Col Sylvanus Nwajei and Major and destroyed them.

Federal troops entered Asaba through the Okpanam end after overcoming the Biafrans at Okwute-Ugbor. Retreating Biafran troops from Umunede and other parts of the Mid-West built up a strong defensive position at Okwute-Ugbor and lay in wait for the advancing federal troops. On their arrival, fierce battles ensued. There was an Anioma flavour to the stout defence of Asaba. Asaba was the last place in the Mid-West before the Niger bridge.

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It was defended by a Biafran brigade commanded by the Asaba-born Lt-Col Joe Achuzia. He had set up an operational headquarters at St. Peter’s Primary School days before the arrival of federal troops. He was Mid-West Divisional Commander while the headquarters was still at Agbor. After the withdrawal from Umunede, Achuzia had personally travelled to Enugu on October 2 1967 to see Ojukwu on the Mid-West situation. He requested that a Mid-Western officer be apointed Divisional Commander to salvage the Mid-West opera- tions. Col Nwawo was appointed to resume duties immediately but could not reach Asaba before it fell due to complications occasioned by the federal occupation at 9th Mile, near Enugu. This meant that the buck of defending Asaba still stoopped on Achuzia’s table. For once in Aniomaland, federal troops fought for every inch of teritory they gained in Asaba. At the battle of Okwute-Ugbor, a top federal commander, Col Godwin Alley was shot on the chest and evacuated from the front. Many of his troops thought he was dead. Biafran troops retreated to their St Patrick’s College defensive positon. The superior push of fed- eral troops made continued defence of that position untenable. Biafran troops therefore withdrew from their last dug-in positon in Aniomaland on October 3.22 The fierceness of the battle for Asaba did not temper itself even inside the town. The bullet marks on the Asaba water reservoir, which are still visible to the naked eye today, tell a story of how bullets flew all over. It ended in defeat for Biafran forces who retreated across the Niger to Onitsha in the night of October 4, 1967.

The Biafran defence at Asaba was officially the last in the Mid-West operation. It will also seem that the troops involved in the last figtht were mostly of Anioma origin. Perhaps this passage from Achuzia will clarify this point:

…the federal shelling and mortar had increased in intensity and small arms could be heard on the town’s mainland. The time was 5:30 p.m. I went into my office and ordered the ad- ministrative staff who had already packed to move out to Onitsha while I stayed behind burning the documents that were left out. By 6:00p.m. Col Nsudo and (what) was left of the troops who were doing the rear-guard fighting arrived. I then saw that they were predominatly youths of Aniocha de- scent namely, Asaba, Ibuzo, Okpanam and Ogwashi. So many buildings on the mainland were ablaze. I told Col Nsudo to leave for Onitsha and take the soldiers with him. They turned round and addresed me in our native dialect…. “Diokpa…, we will stay with you and fight.” I thanked them and ex- plained that for us there the battle was over, but in Biafra the battle would continue.23

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As the last Biafran troops crossed the Niger, federal troops raced down to the Asaba end of the bridge and massed there but did not cross into Onitsha. They never did. The follow- ing day, the brigde was blown up by Lt-Col Joe Achuzia, an electrical engineer commis- sioned into the Biafran Army at the start of the war. With the fall of Asaba, the first phase of the war in the Mid-West ended. Despite falling into the federal column, however, Ani- omaland remained a battlefront.

The Nigerian Civil War in Aniomaland after the ‘Liberation’ of the Mid-West Once fighting started in Aniomaland, it did not stop until the war came to an official end on the 15th of January 1970. Between the start of the war and its official end, a whole lot happened in Aniomaland. What is believed to be the last batch of Biafran troops in the Midwest crossed the Niger into the East on October 4, 1967 but the war in Aniomaland continued in various manifestations. The following passage from Madiebo is indicative of an aspect of that: While the battle at Onitsha was going on, the II Division dis- patched a force through Atani across the Niger to Midwest- ern Nigeria to re-occupy places abandoned by Nigeria’s sec- ond division in their bid to capture Onitsha. Once across the Niger, the special force moved northwards, and westwards to take Awaba, Ogwashi-Uku, Ibusa… At the end of a series of counter attacks by the enemy, in the Midwest our troops fell back to the general line of the Ase River. We had suc- ceeded in reestablishing one presence in that region once again.24

There were some other developments within ‘liberated’ Aniomaland capable of throwing light on the totality of the war. These include the continued fighting in parts of Aniomaland in pockets of Biafran controlled territories and the trade across the Niger among the Ani- oma. They left their marks on the land and people in Aniomaland.

Despite the ‘liberation’, Biafran activities in Aniomaland continued in some tracts around the Oko group of villages to the south of Asaba and beyond. This also happned around Ibusa. Also included were like Abala-Unor, Abala-Oshimili, Ewulu, Akpako, Olodu, Isheagu, Osisa, Iselegu, Afor, Inyi, Utchi, Onuaboh, Beneku and Okapi. Most of the territory was swampy, without tarred roads and even well-charted earth roads. The difficult terrain made it attractive to Biafran forces, operating flatly as foot guerillas and unattractive to federal troops. Biafrans capitalized on this huge advantage with their continued presence in the area throughout the war.

As earlier noted, Biafran initial retreat from the Mid-West was not an abandonment of An- iomaland. A few days before Biafran departure, the Anioma-born former Commander of

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Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019 the Midwest-based 4th Area Command of the Nigerian Army, Lt-Col Conrad Nwawo was named Commander, Mid-West Division of the Biafran Army, which the Biafran military high command called the ‘Republic of Benin Division’ (R.O.B. Div.).25 The division was based in Onitsha with the Anioma-born Achuzia, leader of the last Biafran troops that fought for Asaba, commanding its Asaba Contingent. It repulsed three disastrous attempts by Nige- ria’s 2nd Division to cross the Niger to Onitsha on boats from Asaba in October 1967. The division was later re-named the 54th Brigade with responsibility for the defence of the east- ern banks of the Niger between Otuocha in the north and the Oguta-Ndoni axis in the south. Ndoni was geographically on the eastern bank of the Niger but officially Mid-West territory and its people a sub-set of the Ukwuani-speaking people of Aniomaland. In effect, the Biafran army never lost touch with the situation in the Mid-West. A source at Inyi dur- ing the war recollects how Achuzia and his boys were regular visitors to the area.26 There were also other Biafran militia groups operating in the sections of Aniomaland under dis- cussion.27

It will be important to inquire into how these groups of Biafran activists got into the area even with heavy federal presence nearby in other parts of Aniomaland. There were four main categories.

The first group consisted of original members of the Biafran force that had invaded the Mid-West in 1967 and got trapped owing to the swift advance of federal troops into Ani- omaland. Matters were complicated for Biafran troops who could not get back to Biafra through enemy territory as the area was already abuzz with federal troops. Having no place else to go, some of them melted into the Anioma countryside with their arms and continued fighting federal presence. The second category were members of the original invading force of Anioma extraction ideologically committed to Biafra who stayed behind to fight federal troops in Aniomaland. The third group was made up of Anioma people who enlisted in Biafran militia in Aniomaland because they were embittered by the treat- ment meted out to sections of their community by federal forces. The last group com- prised Biafran regulars posted to fight in Aniomaland.

These Biafran fighters operated near parts of Aniomaland under federal control. The spe- cific clusters of these enclaves were Mgboto-Ukpe and Uzor-Umueze at Ibusa; the Oko- Abala axis enclave and the Ewulu-Isheagu-Osisa. The last was the Inyi-Utchi-Okpai-Beneku enclave cluster. The most remote of them was between the Ase Creek and the Niger with communities like Inyi, Utchi, Okapi and Beneku. Most of them were in marshy terrains and were on a continuous stretch of territory. Most of them were in marshy terrains and were on a continuous stretch of territory. The singular exception to the geographical contiguity of the areas under Biafran control was the upland Biafran military camp at Ibusa known as

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Mgboto-Ukpe. However, communication between Mgboto-Ukpe and other Biafran en- claves was regularly oiled by dare-devil messengers risking journeys across federal lines. For instance, the territories of Uzo-Umueze and Mgboto-Ukpe were over twenty kilome- tres apart. However, trade and other contacts continued almost unimpeded between them despite having federally-occupied Ibusa in the middle. From there, other enclaves were reachable.

The phenomenon of Biafran enclaves shows that operating from bush camps suited the guerrilla tactics of Biafran fighters in the area. Some of them employed their knowledge of the local terrain to full advantage. They caused federal troops much anxiety that the 1968 federal attack on Isheagu has been attributed to what federal troops saw as the col- laboration between Isheagu people and Biafran militants against them.28 Sometimes, these Biafran fighters operated in communities under federal control. Around Isheagu, for instance, they planted an bomb which wiped out a column of federal troops near Nsukwa junction. People of Isheagu remember that these groups of Biafrans were led by a certain Enenmo from Asaba and included Anioma adherents like ‘Mota’ Nwanze from Ibusa, Chamberlin from Atani, John Iyama of Isheagu and a certain Malachy from Idumuje.29

The emergence of an enclave in the Oko-Abala axis remains intriguing. This area is quite close to Asaba with its strength of federal troops. Yet it was an area of military rendezvous for regular Biafran troops from across the Niger, who once they dislodged federal troops from that axis, made it their territory for much of the period that the civil war lasted.30 Biafran presence around the Oko-Abala axis managed to achieve link-ups with Biafran mi- litiamen at Uzor-Umueze under the command of one Lt Okolichi. Biafran troops constantly raided federal locations around Ibusa and Ogwashi-Uku in collaboration with the Biafran unit based at Uzor-Umueze.31 The Uzor-Umueze boys who operated in the bushes around the fringes of Ibusa town caused the federal presence there enough harassment. Fighting there led to the town’s remaining civilian population being re-located to the refugee camp at St. Patrick’s College in Asaba. The federal military authorities then at Ibusa explained that the decision was to enable them take on Biafran militiamen without casualties.32

The Uzor-Umueze military camp was situated in the south-east of Ibusa and had very close military ties with Biafra through numerous fast-flowing streams that separated the area from the Niger. It was a major link between Biafra and other enclaves in Aniomaland. For instance, arms and ammunitions were channeled through it to the Ewulu/Isheagu units as well as Mgboto-Ukpe.33 It was also instrumental in the attack launched by the Biafrans on the St. Michael’s Primary school camp of Nigerian troops at Ibusa on Easter Monday (April

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16) 1968. This was confirmed by a Biafran militia who participated in the attack.34 Through- out its existence as a Biafran military camp, Uzor-Umueze lived under the protection of the Biafran military. They saw it as strategic to Biafra’s continued military presence in Ani- omaland as it linked other Biafran outposts in Aniomaland. This can probably explain why it was stoutly defended when federal troops attempted capturing it.35

Beyond all these, it will be important to examine the nature of activities within an enclave that was almost devoid of federal military presence for most of the civil war period. This is the area behind the Ase Creek. This area includes Okapi, Beneku, Inyi and Utchi. Once at the early stage of the war, federal troops led by Captain Ahmadu Ali reached Utchi but were repulsed. Utchi and its immediate surroundings subsequently remained under Bia- fran control all through the war.

The Biafran army was so active around there that Lt-Col Achuzia visited regularly single- handedly picking young men for recruitment into the Biafran Army. These young men were ferried across the Niger to Atani for training and subsequently sent back to Anioma- land as regular Biafran soldiers to mount raids on Nigerian troops located around Kwale from their hinterland hide-out.36 Utchi eventually became a Biafran training depot in Ani- omaland in early 1968. Utchi was also named Republic of Benin (R.O.B.) Strike Headquar- ters under the command of Major Uwalaka. This made Utchi a very strategic outpost in Biafran military calculations.

The Utchi-based strike force was to patrol the length of the western bank of the Niger from Oko to Obalagada, near Aboh in the south with the aim of restricting federal troops’ advance into Anioma hinterland. The dream was to gain a strong foothold and then launch a westward advance into the Anioma heartland and the entire Mid-West. Realising the importance of Utchi to Biafran military ambitions in the Mid-West, federal troops attacked it through Inyi and Onuaboh. Biafra responded hugely. A battalion strength military force canoed across the Niger from the east stormed Utchi on foot wading through swamps and rivers and expelling federal troops from the area. That secured Utchi as a Biafran sphere of influence till the war ended. In fact, most of the Ndosimili interior remained ef- fectively in Biafran hands all through the war years; thanks to Biafran military prowess in the area. According to a source, the Akpuke Bridge deep inside Ndosimili country between the bridgeless Ase Creek and Okapi marked the boundary between the two armies once Biafran troops forced federal forces to retreat behind it.37

The Ndosimili section of Aniomaland also thrived with free-ranging pro-Biafran fighters who built their fighting strategy around raids on federal troops. It was one of such groups that carried out the raid that resulted in the killing of ten Italian Agip oil workers and the abduction of many others at Okapi 3 station on May 5, 1969. The operation eventually fo- cused the attention of the world press on Nigeria momentarily. The leader of the group

74 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Female Involvement in the Nigerian Civil War… M. J. Yakubu, A. S. Habeeb & A. O. Gbenga was Nwabueze Nwankwo, a member of the Mid-West invading force. He had lost his way and ended up at Ewulu in Aniomaland. From fighting federal forces around that axis, the army under him became so rich in arms and ammunitions that at the height of their military success they captured the pay box of Nigerian troops. The Biafran military authorities heard about their conquest and asked for it. Nwabueze Nwankwo’s unit bluntly turned it down. They were declared wanted dead or alive by the Biafran Army headquarters. To save themselves from peril, they stormed Okpai 3 where they killed ten Italian Agip oil workers in their caravan and took thirty people hostage (fourteen Italians, three West Ger- mans, one Lebanese and twelve Nigerians).38

Among the Nigerians was Chief Paul Otuya, Agip Oil’s landlord and major contractor who hails from nearby Beneku. At Oraifite, where they had been detained before being trans- ferred to Okigwe for trial, Lt. Col. Joe Achuzia had threatened to kill them, describing them as ‘grade one enemies of Biafra who were prospecting for oil while we were fighting for freedom’. Among other things, they were charged with economic sabotage. They were discharged, transported to Atani and ferried across the Niger to the Utchi depot in Ani- omaland for training as soldiers.39

The ten slain Italian Agip workers were buried in shallow graves at Okpai. International pressure mounted on the Nigerian government to retrieve the bodies. Nigerian troops could not cross the Akpuke Bridge in Biafran territory. The then Lt. Sanni Abacha, head of federal troops at Kwale contacted Ben Obi, Chairman of the civil defence group in Kwale, who acted as facilitator between them and the Biafrans. He eventually exhumed the de- composing bodies and doctors arrived from Warri to pick them.40

Perhaps the greatest of Biafran enclave in Aniomaland during the war is the Mgboto-Ukpe military camp at Ibusa. Its uniqueness is underlined by the fact of its location within federal territory and speaks volume about the nature of the struggle for Aniomaland. Mgboto- Ukpe is located in the Umuidi family farmland somewhere to northwest of Ibusa sand- wiched between Okpanam, Isele-Azagba and Azagba-Ogwashi. It lies on a semi-plateau as all approaches to it involve ascending to the top. Many Ibusa refugees fleeing from federal troops escaped there and were met by a Biafran militia led by Lt Michael Nwaelum. Its soldiers hailed from all parts of Aniomaland. They lived by raiding federal positions around them. The camp had a powerful link with other Biafran outposts. Some Mgboto-Ukpe in- habitants navigated even across Ibusa under federal occupation on to Uzor-Umueze and then to Biafra across the Niger.41

Many Ibusa families were at Mgboto-Ukpe, Uzor-Umueze and private farms, all, swelling with Biafran militiamen. So while federal soldiers ran the town, they were sorrounded by

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Biafran militiamen who navigated between camps and farms undetected by federal forces. Strategically, the point that Ibusa’s population emptied into Mgboto-Ukpe discom- forted federal troops stationed there, a pain deepened by the fact that Mgboto-Ukpe mi- litiamen attacked their positions often. To stem this, the Commanding Officer of the area, Col. Alley commenced the shelling of the Mgboto-Ukpe location to force the people out of the bush. This caused a lot of friction between himself and the Catholic parish priest at Ibusa, Rev. Fr. John Osia.42 Despite knowing the location of Mgboto-Ukpe, federal infantry shied away from getting bogged down in unfamiliar and uncharted territory against ene- mies at home in the bush. An ex-Nigerian soldier who fought in the area said they knew Biafrans were all around them but were warned not to get into such territories no matter the provocation.43

These outposts were instrumental to Biafran military forays into areas in Aniomaland and kept federal forces in the Mid-West busy while Biafra survived longer than expected. The role of these Biafran outposts in Aniomaland in Biafra’s survival also existed outside the military field but was an integral part of the war.

The Military Angle of the Trade between Aniomaland and Biafra An aspect of the struggle for the control of Aniomaland was instigated by the federal at- tempt to stop the trade across the Niger between Aniomaland and Biafra and the latter’s determined effort to keep it open. At the declaration of Biafra in May 1967, the federal government had imposed an economic blockade on Biafra. This measure was stiffly imple- mented by federal troops during the civil war. Biafra’s early reverses in the war that in- cluded the loss of Bonny, Calabar and later, Port-Harcourt, cut off Biafra completely from the sea. Her ill-fortune was compounded with the March 1968 loss of Onitsha. As Biafra shrank territorially, her economic fortunes dwindled significantly. The need for Biafra’s survival in the face of the rising scarcity of basic commodities necessitated the desperate trade with her neighbours. The Anioma people who live on the west across the Niger from Biafra’s western boundary bounced into the picture. A market in essential commodities consequently boomed between the Anioma and Biafra. It was popularly called ‘ashia ataak’, ‘ashia nmgbo’ and ‘ashia nmgbuka’.

The trade was characterized by the procurement of goods from riverine Anioma commu- nities in daytime and their dangerous and prohibited ferrying into Biafra at night. The items of trade included food items, drugs, petroleum products, motor and machine spare parts, tobacco, cigarettes, clothings, soap, glue, stationery items and Nigerian newspapers.44 It involved virtually all Anioma communities on the bank of the Niger stretching from Ebu in the north to the south of Aboh. It also involved some hinterland communities. The articles of trade were received in Biafra by traders at Atani, Idenmili, Umunankwo, Osomala and Ndoni.

76 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Female Involvement in the Nigerian Civil War… M. J. Yakubu, A. S. Habeeb & A. O. Gbenga

For the Biafran military, medical supplies, particularly anti-biotic drugs were critical in the treatment of injured soldiers. For Biafra, it was a desperate situation. On the federal side, stopping the trade was a major component of general war strategy. It was a weapon of war. Instant death penalty was imposed on culprits. Some of the traders were shot by federal troops.45 Despite the stiffness of the penalty, the trade rolled on partially for rea- sons not unconnected with its lucrative nature. In some cases, profit margins were over two hundred percent.46

Though traders traded directly with Biafra, around the Aniocha and Ndosimili axis, Isheagu emerged as the hub of the trade, particularly after the destruction of the Onitsha market on October 12, 1967 and the fall of Onitsha into federal hands on March 31, 1968. Her rep- utation as the new market that fed Biafra with needed goods had exploded to a level where it could no longer be ignored by federal forces. Traders from both sides of the Niger flocked there. Again because the trade with Biafra was covert, the booming market at Isheagu became dangerous in military terms as many combatants masquerading as trad- ers flocked there. Somehow, this compromised the security of federal troops. Also, the bushes behind Isheagu, quite close to the Niger creeks held a large number of Biafran sol- diers and militiamen. They were major threats to the safety of the Nigerian 102 Battalion based at Isheagu. In some instances, some suspected Biafran partisans planted an Og- bunigwe bomb that killed many federal troops near Nsukwa junction in Isheagu.47 Unable to access the hinterland between Isheagu and the Niger because of its difficult terrain to stop the trade, federal troops attacked and sacked Isheagu on May 2, 1968 to stop the market and Biafran surreptitious military presence in the area.

However, the federal dream of keeping Biafrans away from the Isheagu area failed. Bia- fran outposts lay hidden in a long stretch behind Isheagu and other neighbouring commu- nities to the north and south. In June 1968, while the Biafrans were on the offensive to regain Onitsha, they laucnhed into that part of Aniomaland with their 11th Division under the command of Col Ogbugo Kalu from Atani across the Niger. The idea was for the force to move northwestwards to capture places like Oko, Ibusa, Ogwashi-Uku and their envi- rons.48 Coming a few weeks after the sack of a market that helped Biafra’s survival, it is hard not to imagine that those forays represented Biafra’s attempt to keep the trade routes open and protect Biafra’s over-all national interest in Aniomaland. If it was a coin- cidence, it is too glaring to ignore.

It is possible that the last maneuvers of the war were made in Aniomaland. As at 1969 when Biafran territory in the east of the Niger kept shrinking, Biafran strongholds in Ani- omaland remained quite alive with constant confrontations between them and federal forces. In early March, 1969 there was a battle involving Biafran gunboats that had crossed

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Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019 the Niger from the Atani area in the east to the Umuebuh-Umuolu axis in Aniomaland.49 It is particularly instructive to learn that even with the heavy presence of federal troops around Asaba, Biafran troops made series of landings from across the Niger into the Oko area, just south of Asaba. For instance, on Wednesday March 5, 1969, federal troops clashed with Biafran forces at Oko-Ogbele and Abala-Oshimili.50 In fact the capture of about twenty-nine oil workers, including eighteen foreigners at Okpai in May 1969 and their unimpeded transportation across the Niger to Biafra demonstrated the strength-in- depth of Biafran forces in Aniomaland even when Biafra was finding it difficult to keep afloat at home. To drive home this point, a Biafran jet bomber bombed a refugee camp at Thomas’ College, Ibusa in June 1969 killing an expectant mother and injuring about eight- een other people.51 The relative strength of Biafra in the area is accentuated by the fact that Biafran military forces in the interior of Ndosimili area were on the move to attack Warri from the rear when news got to them that Biafra had officially surrendered to the federal authorities in Lagos.52

Anioma Atitudes to Fighting Forces in the War The Nigerian civil war witnessed varied levels of relationships between the Anioma and two armies they came in contact with. On one hand was the relationship with the Igbo- dominated Biafrans, with whom they shared cultural affinity. On the other was their rela- tionship with federal forces, perceived as bent on humbling them. This feeling was an- chored on the killings of Anioma people in Warri, Sapele, Benin City and Auchi. The Anioma faced a dilemma when the Biafrans were expelled by federal forces.

Given the history of the blood-stained relationship between the Anioma and the federal army in other parts of the Mid-West before they arrived Aniomaland, they acted ambiva- lently towards them as a consequence. Obasanjo has noted that the advance of the fed- eral army into Aniomaland encountered Biafran resistance and the hostility of the civilian population.53

The Anioma were not unanimous in their reaction to federal forces. Some ran into the bush for safety. Others for the same reason, cheered the federal troops and shouted ‘one Nigeria’. This was the scenario in Asaba that failed to endear the people to the federal troops. In terms of what informed the relationship between the Anioma and the two groups, Chief J. U. Dike throws light on the issue: ‘…we embraced the Biafrans because our people were killed in Warri, Sapele and Benin. When federal troops came we were forced to embrace them, too for fear of being killed.’54

This theme of fear is important in an understanding of the politics that played out in the struggle for Aniomaland in the war. Many Anioma fought the battle for survival with their heads and brain. Even when they identified with federal forces, they still retained their sympathies for Biafra. An ex-solider in Owa told an interesting story of his life as a double

78 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Female Involvement in the Nigerian Civil War… M. J. Yakubu, A. S. Habeeb & A. O. Gbenga agent during the war. He joined the Biafran army in Benin City. When they were pushed out of Benin, he went back to his village and actively colloborated with the Biafrans. When they were expelled from the Ika region, he joined the Nigerian Army as a driver but never lost his contact with his Biafran compatriots, who he continued to feed with vital infor- mation through their agents in Owa.55 It must be pointed out that not all Anioma people were involved in this high-wire politics of choice that proved quite costly.

Despite the cost of the Anioma game of choice, they bore the pains. It created distrust for them from federal forces. The dangerous angle of the game was that the federal forces in Aniomaland sensed it and treated the people viciously for being politically slippery. Some federal troops employed the expression ‘one Nigeria for mouth, two Nigeria for belle’ (verbalising support for Nigeria while supporting Biafra) in explaining their perception of the general Anioma attitude.56 Whether that was correct or not, it produced its own rip- ples. The consequences included the frosty Anioma-federal troops’ relations and its bloody consequences for unarmed civilians. This game of choice remained a constant var- iable in the fight for Aniomaland and greatly coloured the war in the area. The ‘mouth’ and ‘belle’ controversy was a hard choice and it was about the identity of the Anioma group within the larger Nigerian context.

Consequences of the Military Struggle for Human Population in Aniomaland The struggle for control of Aniomaland left behind its own unique consequences. Broadly, these are: social dislocations and the killing of unarmed civilians. The first troops to arrive were the Biafrans and they mostly fed off communities they operated in. Their food needs overstressed the food supply sytem and destroyed a vital part of it. At Inyi and Iselegu, Biafran presence marked the beginning of the end for the eshi Igbo (hornless local cow) population as they consumed most of them.57 Such livestock were a great souce of wealth in Aniomaland prior to the war. This will however, appear insignificant when viewed against what happened to the same animal population with the arrival of federal forces. Hence, the arrival of the federal forces led to the demise of the cow stock in most of Ani- omaland. With federal presence, these cow became direct victims of war and were shot for some reasons. An eye witness said the cow were sometimes shot and left to rot away, for allegedly being mystical Biafran spies.58

The fight for control of Aniomaland produced a refugee crisis whose sheer dimension is difficult to capture. Some were displaced within their communities; others relocated to neighbouring communities, while some were forcefully moved outside Aniomaland. A large chunk fled to Biafra. The crisis was inspired by fear of federal troops and the conse- quences of actual fighting between the contending forces. Commander O. Z. Chiazor, commander of the Biafran Navy around Warri during the Biafran occupation of the Mid-

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West witnessed the fear factor in operation. On the federal conquest of Benin about a week before they reached the old Aniocha Division, he departed Warri for his Atuma vil- lage in Aniomaland. As he got close to Atuma in his car, he saw a flock of people migrating eastwards towards Asaba. He described the situation in these words:

… I saw a long queue of people moving towards Asaba. The road was jam-packed. They told me they were going to Onit- sha. Some men were carrying mats, mattresses and other things on their heads. Some were dragging their goats. A lot of women had children strapped to their backs. Some men carried kids on their shoulders; some rode on bicycles heavy with household items. It was like the children of Israel moving out of Egypt. When I asked why all the commotion, they told me they were afraid of ndi Awusa (Hausa people).…59

The startling history of what happened to Anioma people in other parts of the Mid-West under federal control travelled ahead of them to Aniomaland. The people responded to the basic human instinct of staying alive and moved. This fear drove many of them into Biafra before the blowing up of the Niger bridge. Others crossed by canoes and boats after that.60

The main Anioma refugee challenge of the war ocurred in Aniomaland. It followed the realities of the war. The intensity of the federal push to flush out Biafrans from Anioma- land produced its own contradictions that enlarged the scope of the crisis. In Asaba, for instance, federal efforts to erase Biafran influnces resulted in sad stories for the civilian populace, forcing many inhabitants to leave for safer communities like Achalla and Ibusa.61

Ibusa itself eventaully experienced a refugee crisis that nearly verged on the disastrous. Persistent Biafran assault and federal reprisal attacks on unarmed civillians forced most of the town’s people to the bush refugee camps at Mgbotor-Ukpe and Uzor Umueze, both of which eventually became Biafran outposts. With two Biafran military camps, Ibusa was a war zone. Attacks on federal troops got worse with most of the town’s population away.62 To handle the Biafran threat while curbing civilian casualties, the federal army gathered Ibusa’s remaining population at the Sacred Heart Primary School and St. Thomas’ College in the town. Biafran militiamen based at Mgbotor-Ukpe launched two audacious raids on the town, killing some rfugees at Sacred Heart Primary School.63 The federal army resorted to shelling Mgbotor-Ukpe to render it unsafe, force refugees back to town and make the militiamen there less effective. The shelling policy failed but killed some people.64 The federal army moved the town’s remaining population to the refugee camp at St Patrick’s College, Asaba in May 1968.

80 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Female Involvement in the Nigerian Civil War… M. J. Yakubu, A. S. Habeeb & A. O. Gbenga

If Ibusa refugees were a challenge while out in their various camps, the task of managing them as returnees proved tasking. Mgbotor-Ukpe lost its soul when the Commandant died in late 1968. Feeling unsafe soon after that, many fled the camp and sorrounding farm- steads.65 They went back to the St Thomas’ College refugee camp.66 According to one ac- count, over two thousand people returned from the bush at Ibusa.67 From St Thomas Col- lege the refugees were moved to the old United African Company (U.A.C.) compound be- hind the old High Court building in Asaba. After about a month, they were taken back to St. Thomas’ College, Ibusa where they spent about six months.68

Moving civilians away from their homes and converting them into refugees in order to effectively address military threats was a regular feature of federal strategy in Anioma- land. It was applied to some Ndosimili territories behind the Ase Creek in the Kwale axis. In 1968, the activies of Biafran troops neccessitated measures to contain the situation. Federal forces moved the frontline communities of Okpai, Inyi and Onuaboh to Kwale, Obinomba and Benin City ostensibly to deal with the challenge.69 About one thousand five hundred people from Utchi, Onuaboh and their neighbours suspected of pro-Biafran sym- pathies were moved to Benin City “to learn some lessions”.70 It is difficult comprehending how a people facing the psychological trauma of war were moved all the way from Kwale to Benin City. They were transported back to Obiarukwu in 1969 and then moved to the former Obinomba Model School. They stayed there till the end of the war.71

Fighting also had devastating effects on schools. For the low-lying districts of Aniomaland close to the Niger, where resistance to federal presence was stiff, schools remained closed for most of the war period starting with arrival of federal forces around October 1967. In some cases, schools were transferered to calmer communities. St Patrick’s College, Asaba was transferred to St. Anthony’s College, Ubulu-Uku. Its vast compound became a refugee camp. Students had dispersed shortly before the arrival of federal troops in Asaba.72 An- glican Girl’s Grammar School, Asaba was moved to Igbodo. St Thomas’ College, Ibusa re- located to Issele-Uku.73 St Agustine’s Grammar School, Ibusa was transferred to St Martin De Porres College, Onicha-Olona.

Fighting in the Nigerian Civil War in Aniomaland witnessed massive shelling of communi- ties though retreating Biafran troops offered little or no opposition in most cases. In- tended to drive off Biafran forces and ease federal infantry movement, they were so mas- sive that an informant said that the sound of shellings formed part of his unforgettable memories and greatest nightmare of the war.74 It is known that heavy artillery shelling killed innocent civilians in their homes in Asaba75 and Ubulu-Uku.76 Even Onicha-Ugbo77 and Issele-Uku,78 where fighting was low, deaths from shelling were also witnessed. The sound of the artillery bombardment witnessed by Anioma communities got etched in the

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Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019 memory that its onomatopoeic sound was written into a post-war song about the war by students of Mary Mount College, Agbor.79 The indiscriminate nature of bombings Anioma- land witnessed during the war disrupted normal life. The fear of death from shelling kept many off farms.80 This contributed to the scarcity of food in Aniomaland during and after the war. It also destroyed many houses and made post-war accommodation challenge daunting. Some of the houses were not re-built more than two decades after the war.

An aspect of the struggle for military mastery of Aniomaland was the regrettable massive slaughter of non-combants. The two occupying forces were culpable.

On invading Asaba on April 9, 1967, Biafran troops stormed the Ogbe Awusa (Hausa Quar- ter) abode of most of Asaba’s Northern residents in Cable Point. The increase in the num- ber of Northerners in Asaba dates back to the hey days of the Royal Niger Company be- tween 1886 and 1899 when the town served as the administrative headquarters of the Royal Niger Company and Nigeria. Biafran soldiers attacked this community in Asaba, killig many of the residents.81 Brigadier Alabi-Isama, who was the commander of the contingent of the 4th Area Command in Asaba before the Biafran invasion believes the killings had some links with the Asaba killings we will encounter shortly. 82 Biafran troops also killed an American catholic missionary, Brother Roman Wicinsky, who was the Principal of St Pat- rick’s College, Asaba at the Ogwashi-Uku Post Office where he had gone to pick up the school’s mails, alleging he was a merceneary on April 17, 1968.83 It seems Biafran troops were set to take out their revenge on all Northerners they saw in the Mid-West operation. At Ogwashi-Uku84 and Ubulu-Uku, they killed Northern cattle herders they met.85 Such kill- ings soon dominated the Nigerian civil war in Aniomaland particulary when the tide turned and federal troops took charge.

The killing of civilians in Aniomaland by federal troops in the course of the war is an epi- sode which its story has been told from different prisms. A few examples will illustrate the tragedy of it all for the people of Anioma. At Utagba-Unor, the Okpala-Uku and his entire chiefs were killed at the Okpala-Uku’s house where they gathered for a meeting with the federal army. The only survivor of the attack was the Okpara-Uku-in-Council’s Secretary. Federal troops claimed that they assisted Biafrans to attack them.86

The federal attack on Isheagu of May 2, 1968 claimed an estimated three hundred people. The dead included the town’s traditional ruler, Obi John Izechinor Onyema. Isheagu was targetted for allegedly collaborating with Biafran troops to attack the federal army. Virtu- ally all the houses in the town were destroyed and those with zinc roofing sheets had them removed and taken away.87

The attack actually wiped out the old Isheagu. A visit to the town reveals that a new town arose from the ashes of the old town. No house sighted appears older than 1970. A source

82 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Female Involvement in the Nigerian Civil War… M. J. Yakubu, A. S. Habeeb & A. O. Gbenga at Isheagu pointed out that an Ewulu couple (the wife was pregnant) were shot dead by federal troops – who accused them being Biafran spies – on their way to Isheagu after the killings.88 The nature and consequences of the Isheagu attack was simply too vicious and deep in its larger ramifications to have been just aimed at giving the federal side an ad- vantage in its struggle with Biafra for Aniomaland.

Earlier on, Ogwashi-uku had witnessed the killing of civilians with devastating conse- quences for the Onukwu family. Federal troops had raced to Ogwashi-Uku from Umunede without opposition. However, they encountered Biafran resistance at Ogwashi-Uku in their contest for contol of the town and suffered some casualties in two days of fighting. Feeling that their losses were the result of a conspiracy between the people and Biafrans, federal troops blew up in anger and turned on unarmed civilians. It is impossible to re-call the consequences of taking the area of least resistance on Ogwashi-Uku. But we, at least, know the permanent marks it left on the history of the Onukwu family of Ogwashi-Uku. Babatunde Onukwu and his five brothers – all sons of Mrs Onwuegbuzie Onukwu – were lined up and shot before her by federal soldiers. She ran mad and never recovered. Be- tween that ugly day in 1967 and when Mrs Onwuegbuzie Onukwu died in the late 1990’s she was the mentally deranged woman the people of Ogwashi-Uku called Onwuegbuzie.89 A researcher has fittingly called the Onukwu episode ‘a family waste’.90 For the Anioma, who the federal troops identified with Biafra, it was one more chapter of a bloody book on their travails in a conflict that put them right in the middle of hell which the war became for them. Such bloody episodes stuck fear into even highly placed Anioma personalities. The story of Afamefuna Elue, the retired government printer and Secretary of the Og- washi-Uku Development Union is instructive. Abducted by federal forces for pro-Biafra sentiments and later found dead, his son reportedly asked the Obi why he did nothing to save his father. The Obi responded in the following words: ‘When they went to Isheagu they buried the chief alive. I’m sorry about your father. I was not just ready for that kind of death.’91

When federal troops entred Ibusa, individuals were not attacked. However, because of the traditional accusation of Anioma people being pro-Biafra by federal troops which had resulted in deaths at Ogwashi-Uku to the west and Asaba to the east, many families fled to the bush, driven by fear. Meanwhile, unknown to federal troops, the bushes around the town became major centres of opposition to federal presence in Ibusa. The Biafrans, who were still very much around particularly deep in the challenging swampy terrain of the towns like Uzor Umuze, had seized the opportunity of so many people in the bush to re- cruit massively into their army and militia groups. For the time being, all was quiet as events unfolded with the lapse of time. On Easter Monday (April 16), 1968, a Biafran squad slipped in and attacked the St. Michael’s Primary School federal camp. They were beaten

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Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019 back after inflicting some casualities on federal troops. Angry federal troops went to town destroying homes and killed about twenty people.92 Another occurrence of killing at Ibusa involved two senior bankers of Barclays Bank, Asaba, Joseph Onyemen and Emmanuel Anuchi-Ogbolu. They were Branch Manger and Accountant, respectively. According to re- ports, shortly before the Easter of 1968, three soldiers arrived at the bank and asked the Accountant to handover the keys to the safe to them. He refused and was seized alongside the Manager. Their corpses were later discovered on the Asaba- Ibusa road.93

What ranks as the greatest tragedy of the war in Aniomaland took place at Asaba. The extent of civilian massacres there involving troops of 2nd Division Nigerian Army will always remain difficult to put into words. There is a suspicon that it was the battle of the re- sistance at Asaba that culminated in the vicious attacks. Federal soldiers were known to have complained that Asaba people allowed Biafran troops to attack them.94 The truth of the matter is that the 2nd Division fought their first real battle in Aniomaland in Asaba. It is possible that the cumulative anger arising from some of these drove federal forces into visitig their frustrations on scape goats they held responsible for their hitches. Between October 5 and 7, 1967, over four hundred unarmed and defenceless civilians were killed by Nigerian soldiers in Asaba. Emma Okocha has drawn up a list of four hundred and seventy- two persons killed in bizarre circumstances.95 Olusgeun Obasanjo has tried to make light of the tragic Asaba episode by claiming that it was:

… an event involving some fifty civilians … in Asaba without the knowledge of or approval of senior or superior officers. Troops of 81 Brigade… carried away for execution those civil- ians whom they suspected to be spying on them on behalf of the rebels after these federal troops had suffered heavy cas- ualties from surprise attacks by the rebels.96

The conflicting figures do matter. That over four hundred men, women and children were spying for Biafra in one town is improbable. The facts of the killings show that in some instances, the people were invited to pre-arranged welcome ceremonies for federal forces, but uinstead, they were shot. Some were killed in their homes. The calibre of the victims suggests some of them were targetted killings. The list of the Asaba dead include Mr. Leo Okogwu, retired top colonial civil servant and father of Maryam Ndidi Babangida, L.G. Gwam, former Director of the National Archives, Ibadan and Dr. Eugene Akwule, Chief Medical Officer of the Asaba General Hosptial and one of Nigeria’s leading althletes of that era, Sydney Asiodu.

The killings in Asaba suggest that the soldiers were armed with a master list of who must die. Professor Stanley Okafor, who accompanied his father to the Asaba Police Station, stated that names were called out from a list and people who responded to their names

84 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Female Involvement in the Nigerian Civil War… M. J. Yakubu, A. S. Habeeb & A. O. Gbenga were taken behind the building and executed.97 For some indignes of Asaba, what hap- pened to them in the wake of the killings went beyond description. The words of Chief Nwanukwu, who lost two sons is heartbreaking:

I prefer not to have anything remind me of my two sons. That war, as I see it was a war waged against me, personally. Oth- erwise why should I lose two bright boys of that tender age when I was not in the military and they were too young to be enlisted into the army? I shall mourn the deaths of my sons all the days of my life and when I die the sorrows of their pas- sage will follow me to the next world.98

The pain of the Asaba killings in the heat of struggle for control over Aniomaland endures for most families. It is on record that Nigeria’a war-time Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, apologised for the Asaba war-time episode. An excerpt from his apology reads thus:

… accept my apologies on behalf of the Federal Military Gov- ernment on the activities of the soldiers in Asaba during the civil war … I’m sorry for what happened especially to those people who lost families. It was not out of malice but an ac- cident of war. Forget the past and face the future. I hope Asaba people will accept this apology even if it is belated…. I felt very touched…. Certainly, it is not something I would have approved of whatsoever. I was made ignorant of it…’99

The fight for Aniomaland was tough and brutal. It left the land in disarray. The totality of the Anioma dilemma in the war was summed up by Wole Soyinka in the following words:

The most vulnerable Nigerians at that time were the Mid- West Ibos, especially ever since the Mid-West invasion. They had been hounded, hunted and killed since that event and were considered greater security risks than the real Ibos themselves…Asaba Ibos required ten positive acts of loyalty to one of the rest of the nation to prove themselves human beings.100

Conclusion The military struggle for Aniomaland was hard. It was harsh on the people and made vic- tims out of them. The uniqueness of the struggle for Aniomaland accentuates its strategic value for both groups. It was characterised by fear, suspicion and a level of vengefulness boardering on viciousness. The war took the fight to the Anioma in their home. The federal

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Journal of History and Military Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Dec. 2019 push to flush out Biafran troops from Aniomaland resulted in complicated military con- frontations which exposed Anioma to the vagaries of war. Though the people of Anioma tried to be ambivalent in their choices, they suffered the consequence of being stereo- typed as ‘collaborators’. Having exhausted all possible options with no place to turn to, they went into hiding and became refugees even in their villages.

For the Anioma people, the war was ruinous. Over two thousand non-combatants died in the hands of soldiers. Countless houses were also destroyed. The Anioma were scape goats in the war. That essentially explains the tragedy that befell them. Given what took place around them, the war left them with a huge mountain and many walls to climb. It marked the end of a war and the beginning of another struggle with the forces thrown up by the war all around them. For them, therefore, the war did not quite end. Indexes of the war for Aniomalnd can help deepeen our understanding of the larger war by explaining what occurred in fringe communities. The features and consequences of the war in Ani- omaland are pointers to the fact that wars are, indeed, tragic occurrences.

86 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Female Involvement in the Nigerian Civil War… M. J. Yakubu, A. S. Habeeb & A. O. Gbenga

Endnotes

1Alexander Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980), 123-144. 2 John de St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War (london: Hodder andStoughton, 1972), 147-175; J.O.G. Achuzia, Requiem Biafra (Lagos: Steel Equip Ltd., 1986), 11-45; Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command: An Account of the Civil War, 1967-1970 (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1981). 37- 43; Alexander A. Maidebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, 156-161; Chinua Achebe, There was a Country: A Personal Account of Biafra (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 128-136. 3 Achuzia, Requiem Biafra, 33-36; Emma Okocha, Blood on the Niger: The First Black-On-Black Genocide (New York: Gomslam Books), 2012. 4 Egodi Uchendu, Women and Conflict in the Nigerian Civil War (Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press, 2007). 5 Interview with Conrad Nwawo, age 74, Onicha-Olona, 28/12/2009 6 Nowa Omoigui, ‘The Mid-West Invasion of 1967: Lessons for Today’s Geopolitics’. A keynote speech delivered at the Nigerian Independence Day Celebration on October 3, 1998 in Columbia, South Carolina, U.S.A., 4. 7 Interview with Conrad Nwawo. 8 de St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War, 160. 9 Interview with H. A. Asoya, age 70, Okpanam, 30/12/2010. 10 Fola Oyewole, The Reluctant Rebel (Akure: Olaiya Fagbamigbe, 1978), 44. 11 Ogbemudia, Years of Challenge, 95. 12 Omoigui, ‘The Mid-West Invasion’, 20. 13 Oyewole, The Reluctant Rebel, 48; Wale Ademoyega, Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup. Ibadan: Evans Brothers, 1981)167. 14 Interview with Ikediashi Okafor, age 62, Benin City, 12 December 2012. 15 Interview with G. C. Mgbeze, age 57, Benin City, 14 September 2009. 16 Nelson Ottah, Rebels Against Rebels (Lagos: Manson and Company, 1981), 31. 17 Interview with Chuks Eboka, age 60, Benin City, 03 April 2010. 18 Interview with Nosike Ikpo, age 78, Ibusa, 06 January 2008. 19 Emma Okocha, Blood on the Niger, 36-37. 20 Interview with Okafor Udegbue, age 68, Ogwashi-Uku, 21 April 2011. 21 Interview with Nosike Ikpo. 22 Achuzia, Requiem Biafra, 33-35. 23 Ibid., 35. 24 Alexander. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, 259. 25 Ibid., 46. 26 Interview with David Nwabueze, age 73, Kwale, 03 August 2011. 27 Interview with John Uzoronicha. 28 Interview with Pius Unoshai, age 75, Isheagu, 29 December 2009 29 Ibid. 30 Interview with David Nwabueze. 31 Interview with John Uzoronicha 32 Interview with John Kunirum Osia, age 72, Lagos, 22 March 2012. 33 Interview with F. U. Oyana, age 63, Benin City, 09 November 2007. 34 Interview with Okeleke Okolo, age 69, Asaba, 19 March 2008.

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35 Interview with F. U. Oyana. 36 Interview with David Nwabueze. 37 Interview with Paul Otuya, age 76, Kwale, 03 August 2011. 38 Emma Okocha, Blood on the Niger, 129-131. 39 Interview with Paul Otuya. 40 Interview with Ben Obi, age 72, Utagba-Ogbe (Kwale), 03 August 2011. 41 Interview with Sir F. U. Oyana. 42 Interview with John Kunirum Osia. 43 Interview with Ibizugbe Osarenkhoe, age 71, Benin City, 30 March 2007. 44 Interview with F. U. Oyana. 45 Interview with Enebeli Olise, age 67, Iselegu, 30 October 2010. 46 Interviews with Sir F. U. Oyana and Enebeli Olise. 47 Interview with Pius Unoshai. 48 Alexander A. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War, 256-259. 49 The Nigerian Observer, Thursday, March 6, 1969, 1. 50 The Nigerian Observer, Saturday, March 8, 1969, 1. 51 The Nigerian Observer, Tuesday, June 10, 1969, 1; , Saturday, June 10, 1969, 693. 52 Interview with Cyril Augustine Azubuogor, age 71, Okpanam, 30 December 2010. 53 Obasanjo, My Command, 39. 54 Interview with J. U. Dike, age 75, Utagba-Ogbe (Kwale), 04 August 2008. 55 Interview with Anonymous informant, age 75, Boji-Boji Owa, 17 November 2010. 56 Interview with Paul Chidi Okpor, age 73, Utagba-Ogbe (Kwale), 03 August 2011. 57 Interviews with Enebeli and David Nwabueze. 58 Interview with Nwanze Nwaobi, age 87, Ibusa, 03 January 1994. 59 Interview with O. Z. Chiazor, age 80, Atuma, 24 December 2006 60 Interview with John Uzoronicha. 61 The Guardian on Sunday, August 11, 2013, 22. 62 Interview with John Osia. 63 Ibid. 64 Interview with Okonkwo Elege, age 56, Ibusa, 10 October 2009 65 Interview with Gbonu Ajumeze. 66 Interview with John Osia. 67 Interview with F. U. Oyana. 68 Interview with Mrs. Theresa Nwafulueze Agokei, age 57, Lagos, 14 June 2011 69 Interview with Chief David Nwabueze, 70 Interview with Chief J. U. Dike. 71 Ibid. 72 Interview with G. N. Mgbeze. 73 Interview with Osealuka Okwudishu, age 59, Ubulu-Uku, 04 June 2009. 74 Interview with Nwanze Nwaobi. 75 Emma Okocha, Blood on the Niger, 80 76 Interview with Osealuka Okwudishu. 77 Interview with Patricia Obi, age 67, Benin City, 29 June 2009 78 Interview with Achasia Nwose, age 70, Issele-Uku, 08 April 2009 79 Interview with Anthonia Abuah, age 52, Ibusa, 01 January 2005. 80 Interview with Enebeli Olise.

88 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY) Female Involvement in the Nigerian Civil War… M. J. Yakubu, A. S. Habeeb & A. O. Gbenga

81 Emma Okocha, Blood on the Niger, 56-57. 82 See Bigadier-General Godwin Alabi Isama’s interview in the Nation on Saturday, November 24, 2012, 20- 21. 83 B. U. Okonji, ‘A Brief History of St. Patrick’s College, Asaba’ in St Patrick’s College, Asaba Old Boys’ Association of Nigeria, 10th Biennial Convention 2006 Brochure, 25-29. 84 Emma Okocha, Blood on the Niger, 128. 85 Interview with Michael Ikediashi, age 80, Ubulu-Uku, 24 September 2009. 86 Interview with Paul Chidi Okpor. 87 Interview with Pius Unoshai. 88 Interview with Alice Ofili, age 69, Isheagu, 29 December 2009. 89 Interview with Okafor Udegbue. 90 Emma Okocha, Blood on the Niger, 116-117. 91 Ibid., 104 92 Interview with Nosike Ikpo. 93 Interview with Larry Ogbolu, age 58, Benin City, 14 February 2011. 94 Interview with Evans Uti, age 70, Asaba, 15 March 2012. 95 Emma Okocha, Blood on the Niger, 89-94. 96 Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command, 39-41. 97 Stanley I. Okafor, “The Nigerian Army and the Liberation of Asaba: A Personal Narrative”, in Eghosa Osaghae, Ebere Onwudiwe and Rotimi Suberu (eds.), The Nigerian Civil War and Its Aftermath (Ibadan: John Archers Publishers, 2002), 293-300. 98 Emma Okocha, Blood on the Niger, 120. 99 Guardian, Friday, September 21, 2000, 1. 100 Wole Soyinka, The Man Died, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1990), 76.

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