The Grounding of the Imperial St. Clair- a Case History of Contending with Oil in Ice

THE GROUNDING OF THE IMPERIAL ST. CLAIR- A CASE HISTORY OF CONTENDING WITH OIL IN ICE

Capt. C. J. Beckett Canadian Coast Guard Central Region, Transport Canada Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/1979/1/371/1738288/2169-3358-1979-1-371.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5E1E5

ABSTRACT: During mid-morning on December 23, 1976, the oil the seaway, these ice strengthened vessels could be transferred to the products tanker Imperial St. Clair, carrying over 10,400 tons of cargo, work of re-supplying the Canadian Arctic grounded in the approaches to Parry Sound. Located on the eastern With the advent of winter navigation in the Great Lakes it was evi- shores of Georgian Bay in Lake Huron, this port is a central depot dent that only particular vessels would be able to navigate the frozen supplying a large hinterland with petroleum. lakes and that cargoes would have to be quite selective. Consequently, At the time of grounding, new winter ice was present in varying the older vessels selected for use where navigation was possible in the thicknesses and temperatures and winds varied from day to day, carriage of high grade ores were generally the "hard nosers." These resulting in very difficult conditions in which to effect operations. were vessels built with a single stem bar not rounded and "soft" as An estimated 57,000 gallons of diesel fuel and gasoline was lost dur- many of the new bulk carriers. New vessels were designed with heavier ing the initial impact and later during oil transfer operations. The plating and stronger beams in the bows, along the water line, and at methods used to boom off the remaining oil through the winter period the stern. Other considerations were taken into account such as pro- accounted for almost 40,000 gallons of the remainder. tection to propeller and rudder, adequate shaft horse power to push This paper deals with the chronology of events after the grounding, through ice fields and winterized accommodations for crews. the problems encountered with the safety of personnel, methodology The motor tanker Imperial St. Clair is a fitting example of this new of removal under ice conditions and the logistics of the operation. The breed of vessels. Built in 1974 as a company vessel to carry a variety of result was total success, thus safeguarding one of the most beautiful different petroleum or chemical products, her hull was built to ice areas of the Great Lakes. class 1 specifications. She is powered by a diesel engine developing about 6,500 shaft horse power using a variable pitch propeller. Although capable of carrying about 100,000 barrels of oil as a full cargo, the Imperial St. Clair was loaded in Sarnia, Ontario, in mid- December 1976 to 75% of her capacity, bringing her draft to about 22 The designed purpose of the present St. Lawrence Seaway, which feet in fresh water. Her cargo was of mixed petroleum products opened in 1959, was to provide ocean access to the Great Lakes system destined in part for the port of Parry Sound, Ontario, on the eastern on an eight-month basis. A major engineering undertaking between lake shore of Georgian Bay in Lake Hu/on. the United States and Canada, the seaway was predicted to attract a Parry Sound is one of the selected ports in the upper Great Lakes two-way movement of shipping with an original forecast of about 50 which serves as a distribution center. Four major petroleum producing million long tons. At the close of navigation late each fall it was ex- companies have large tank farms in the port and serve a large pected that a marginal movement of some vessels would occur until ice hinterland which stretches as far east as the Abitibi area in western conditions impeded further traffic. Quebec. Entrance to the port from Georgian Bay is made along some However, the economy of the hinterland expanded rapidly and ton- 25 miles of channels between islands and across open bodies of water. nages moved rose with the demand. As a result, the season increased The area is a prime tourist center in all seasons, particularly summer, to one of eight-and-one-half months officially, with extensions and many year-round residents occupy homes on the islands guarding granted by seaway authorities in either spring or fall, depending on the approaches. weather and water temperatures. Furthermore, the movement after the close of the season of con- sumable cargoes by vessels within the upper lakes of Huron, Michigan and Superior presented a very attractive proposition. This area, Grounding of the Imperial St. Clair although not ice free by any means, was not restricted by a series of locks as in the Weiland Canal or St. Lawrence Seaway, with the excep- The Imperial St. Clair arrived off the approaches to the channel in tion of the U.S. locks at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan. the early morning of December 23, 1976. The master decided, due to During the mid-1960's and 1970's, several shipping companies were heavy snow, to anchor until full daylight and improved visibility. rebuilding their fleets along different lines. Previous vessels were Shortly after 0800 hours, conditions had improved, providing clear designed to ply their trade in ice-free waters, limiting their seasonal visibility along the channel, sufficient that the outer ranges were visi- operation both inland and on the east coast, particularly where ble at nine miles. In order to obtain the most recent report on weather domestic cargoes were concerned. But the demand for particular inside the sound, the vessel contacted the Canadian Coast Guard base products was rising along ice-infested waters particularly where towns by radio telephone. were expanding and population centers increasing. Other methods As the vessel proceeded in on various courses, further snow squalls were initially used to transport petroleum products but the carnage of set in, reducing visibility to nil. About an hour after entering the chan- these cargoes by water was both economical and generally unrestricted nel, the vessel entered new ice which did not reduce its speed by specially built vessels. This method of transportation would also significantly. Approximately half an hour later, heavier ice was en- reduce the need to increase stockpiles in major ports which would re- countered which brought the speed down to less than seven knots. quire further capital layout for new tanks as demand increased. Dur- Shortly before 1000 hrs the Imperial St. Clair grounded forward on ing the summer months, when conventional vessels could be used in a shoal patch known as Telegram Rock (Figure 1).

371 372 1979 OIL SPILL CONFERENCE Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/1979/1/371/1738288/2169-3358-1979-1-371.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021

wM&i£r^7i^ Figure 1. Hydrographie chart of approaches to Parry Sound showing areas in which the Imperial St. Clair first grounded and was offloaded

Recognizing that the vessel had ruptured tanks in the bow and ap- spread out up to 150 feet from the bow and a strong smell of gasoline peared to be leaking gasoline and possibly diesel or home heating oil, and diesel was observed. Contact was made with the captain of the St. the captain contacted the Canadian Coast Guard Base in Parry Clair to inform him of the unsafe ice conditions and the heavy and Sound. possibly explosive odor that prevailed in the area, making it unsafe for the helicopter to land. The report from the vessel was that transfer of tanks of diesel fuel from the No. 1 center tank was being effected as Actions taken after the grounding far as possible to allow a "water bottom" to be placed in the tanks, so preventing further loss. At this time, the Canadian Coast Guard's contingency plan for Imperial Oil Limited dispatched a team of four officers to Parry marine emergencies in the central region was enacted, and the Ontario Sound to assist in the operations. In conference at company head- region's major oil spill contingency plan was activated by Imperial Oil quarters it was determined that efforts should be made to do the Limited in Toronto. following: refloat the St. Clair, prevent further product loss, contain Immediate contact was established between both groups, opera- the loss if possible, and effect transfer and delivery of product to tionally lead by Capt. J. Kennedy, Canadian Coast Guard Base, Parry Parry Sound as expeditiously as possible. These decisions were relayed Sound, and J. A. Sproule, Imperial Oil environmental adviser, To- to the Parry Sound Coast Guard base. ronto. Coast Guard dispatched a helicopter from the Parry Sound The Coast Guard, recognizing that the need could arise for a heavy base to effect an initial overflight and also recalled the navigational duty pump to transfer the product, requested a six-inch submersible aids tender CCGS Montmorency from Midland, Ontario, to standby pump and accessories to be brought in immediately from Prescott. in case of necessity. The base itself was put on a red alert and the Pres- The unit would be shipped on board the CCGS Montmorency at Parry cott Coast Guard Base on the St. Lawrence River brought to a yellow Sound and then transferred with an operator to the St. Clair, where it alert condition. would be rigged and able to operate if internal pumping facilities The first reconnaissance flights established the exact location of the could not effect the operation. vessel, the spreading of the oil from the bow area and the thickness of The vessel brought in by the company to assist in the off-loading the ice in the immediate vicinity. From first attempts to land, it was operation was the tanker Arctic Trader belonging to Shell Canada very obvious that personnel would be endangered should any efforts Limited. This vessel, although not a fully ice strengthened ship, was at be made to work on the surface at this time. Oil was noted to have hand and would be assisted in maneuvering by the Montmorency. She CLEANUP TECHNIQUES 373 received orders to proceed to Parry Sound to transfer part of the cargo cessful, but by then it was evident that the first fire would be sufficient destined for the port on the St. Clair. as it grew in strength very quickly." On December 24, the St. Clair continued her internal transfer until As the fire grew in intensity in the non-frozen area where the for- the arrival of the Arctic Trader. During this period, further recon- ward portion of the St. Clair's hull had been, the officers returned to naissance was made using the Coast Guard helicopter which was able base having recorded the situation on film. It should be made clear to land at the grounded vessel. It was established by Capt. Kennedy that the location of the burn was at least 14 miles from the nearest set- that the ice was still in an extremely unsafe condition and would re- tlement and about two miles from the nearest inhabited island. main so until colder temperatures provided a more stable surface. This action proved to have been very timely and effective. Previous On arrival of the Arctic Trader, operations to remove cargo from spills of petroleum products under similar conditions of freezing have the forward compartments to allow the St, Clair to float free were shown that layers of oil can become trapped between successive layers begun. By 1530 hours the vessel eased astern of the shoal and pro- of ice as freezing occurs. Further, it is feasible that because of the heat ceeded inbound two miles further to a position of comparative shelter of the fire some extensive but localized capillary action between the to effect further transfer of the remaining Parry Sound Cargo. main burn area and perimeter pockets occurred. It is possible that if With both the Imperial St. Clair and Arctic Trader secured in fast this action had been delayed, successive snowfalls and the persistent Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/1979/1/371/1738288/2169-3358-1979-1-371.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 ice in the approaches to the main inland body of water known as the re-freezing of lake ice would have incarcerated the heavier oil until the big sound, a second shell tanker, the Lakeshell was requested to assist spring thaw, resulting in heavy, wide-spread slicks in the area. in removing the remainder of the Parry Sound cargo from the St. Following this initial burn, representatives from the Canadian Clair. Ultimately, that portion of the cargo taken on board by the Coast Guard and Imperial Oil Limited met to discuss future action in Arctic Trader to assist in re-floating the St. Clair from Telegraph this regard. This occurred on December 29, six days after the Imperial Shoal also was to be removed by the Lakeshell. That vessel duly ar- St. Clair had grounded. At this meeting, it was decided that the main rived alongside, and although the Coast Guard six-inch pump was concern was to determine the actual extent of the spill. Although the rigged for action, transfer was effected with some loss of cargo from first burn had been very successful, it was evident that other pockets the St. Clair but without undue problem. of oil might be found, some possibly containing a considerable Apparently all piping systems remained intact and operated nor- amount of the product. mally, also, an explosimeter on deck found the vapour content of Accordingly, on December 29 reconnaissance showed that the lower gasoline was borderline on the main deck. In the interest of safety, the temperatures of the past few days had made the ice a more stable plat- portable unit would not be used. While the vessel was in this position, form with the exception of the "burn" area which would not support divers completed their inspection of the two ruptured tanks. The a man's weight. Using helicopters, scoots and ice augers, a team of ship's crew calculated that the following loss had occurred from these men departed from Parry Sound. Their particular task was to deter- two reservoirs: mine the extreme perimeters of the oil and if possible locate any large Diesel oil sg.83 1,322 bbls (46,270 imp. gal) pockets that may remain. Esso 2000 gasoline sg. 75 315 bbls (11,025 imp. gal) On arrival at the "burn" area, it was evident that the ice would not Total: 1,637 bbls (57,295 imp. gal) safely support any concentrated weight. Therefore, the team stayed on Of this amount, almost 40,000 gallons are estimated to have re- the perimeter of the area and began a series of test holes. Only a very mained in the ice field or evaporated after transfer. The transfer of thin film of oil appeared on the surface of the water, with no pockets cargo to the Lakeshell began at 1000 hours on December 25. After a of oil of suitable quantity to support a burn. Further holes were drilled successful operation to off-load cargo, the vessel returned to Parry in the ice in the area of the ship channel and trace evidence of oil was Sound at 1130 hours that day. visible. However, this was expected because most probably the St, With operations complete, the Imperial St. Clair and Arctic Trader Clair had lost some oil during passage from the location of grounding departed the Parry Sound area during mid-afternoon on December to the oil transfer site. Moving further away from the burn area, holes 26. The former was destined for a drydocking operation in Toledo, were augered at 1,500-foot and 3,000-foot intervals. Once again a Ohio, the latter to continue her scheduled operations. The third vessel, trace was evident around the perimeter of the 1,500-foot radius but no the Lakeshell departed Parry Sound the following morning. sign of product was found along the outer perimeter. Throughout this period of high activity on board all three vessels and at the Coast Guard base and company headquarters, public senti- Having established the main area within which the oil was thought ment was rising with respect to the damage and potential damage from to be contained, a decision was made to return with a larger task force the spill or possible spills from other vessels transiting the area. As a the following day. The group would define the area of oil migration result, public affairs officers from both government and industry were under the ice by drilling large numbers of holes around the cir- called on to take a more active part in the dissemination of facts to the cumference of circles at specific distances from the burn area, and at- press and public. The role of two officers cannot be over-emphasized tempt to identify any large concentrations of oil pockets under the ice or ignored, as it provides a platform from which all pertinent facts (Figure 2). may be released as they become available. Further, it gives a "buffer" At this point, a wind shift to the east played a significant part in the to the on-scene commander/coordinator, enabling him to allot his en- operations. Due in part to the creation of the ship channel by passing tire concentration to the mitigation of the problem concerned. vessels and also to the immaturity of the ice, the whole area of ice After the departure of the vessels, it became clear that the con- where the St. Clair had grounded moved away in a southwesterly tinuing drop in temperature was causing new ice to form daily. This, direction about 2,200 feet. A single large floe from the grounding area in effect, would negate any use of conventional skimming devices, and had broken away from the surrounding ice and was itself surrounded would tend to prevent the oil from spreading further afield. This situa- by open water. Consequently, oil had come to the surface in the area tion was discussed at distance by officials who then determined that if particularly within cracks in the large contaminated floe itself. personnel could be mobile on the ice surface, the first action to be Because of the floe's unconsolidated nature, the helicopter pilot de- taken to remove the present surface oil would be burning. cided that any attempt at landing would be unsafe. A further recon- Subsequently, in company with an officer from the Ministry of naissance at the transfer area showed that the easterly winds had Natural Resources of the Province of Ontario, Capt. Kennedy pro- loosened up the pans, allowing oil to rise to the surface in an area ceeded to the site of the grounding. Although air temperatures were about 200 feet by 400 feet. cold (- 10°C), the ice surface was as yet uncertain. To indicate the ac- It was apparent that the milder temperatures would prevent any fur- tion taken by the Coast Guard on-scene commander, the following is ther work on the ice surface for a few da?s. In order to define the area an excerpt from his log. of greatest concentration, a small cedar tree was cut and dropped by "We had taken a bale of straw, diesel fuel, rags and small sticks to helicopter as a reference marker. Persistent poor visibility allowed no make torches and flares in anticipation of it being difficult to start the further overflights to either location for the next few days. On spilled diesel fuel which was saturated in the snow." Wednesday, January 5, however, the situation allowed flying to be "Mr. Macfie (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources) then pro- resumed and, consequently, safe work on the ice surface at both loca- ceeded to light an oil-soaked rag. I had hold of a safety tine which was tions. tied to Mr. Macfie as ice conditions were still uncertain. It was soon Both Canadian Coast Guard and Imperial Oil Company officers evident that a "burn" would be possible as, quite quickly, a small fire proceeded to the sites. Following are excerpts from the company's formed in the area. We then moved on up into the northeastern sec- January 5, 1977 report: tion of the spill in an attempt to start a fire up-wind. This was also suc- "Returned to the ice floe containing the original burn area. The sur- 374 1979 OIL SPILL CONFERENCE

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Figure 2. Schematic layout of oil spill as of December 29, 1976, showing location of test holes used to delineate extent of affected region face varies from clear ice to snow-covered patches to total snow the windward side of the original burn. The new burn spread rapidly cover." over the total area. The heat generated was more intense and seemed "The area of the original burn is still well defined and lies north of to gain in intensity with the result that the snow and ice were melted the tree marker. The ice surface in this area is now free, clear, with downwind from the burn. Oil appeared in this area and was quickly visible signs of oil on the surface. A hole was drilled through the ice in ignited." this area, but there was no evidence of oil under the ice, which led us "This burn continued for two hours and covered an area 100 feet by to believe that there had been complete combustion of the oil in the 10 feet. We calculated that approximately 4,000 gallons of oil could original burn area. We, therefore, were faced probably with a light have been consumed" (Figure 3). layer of oil which had moved under the ice, away from the effects of This was the pattern set by Coast Guard and company employees the burn." throughout the winter months. When visibility and snow cover per- "We then decided to define the area of oil migration westward from mitted, further attempts were made to effect burn off. Some further our marker. Traces of oil were found every 300 feet from the reference drilling of the ice around the track into Parry Sound and the transfer point to a distance of 1,200 feet. Continuing south and eastwards area led to the following conclusions: along the circumference of the 1,200-foot radius, only traces of oil • The estimated loss of 1,000 bbls in the grounding area was fairly ac- were found in the drill holes and nowhere did we strike any pockets of curate. high concentration." • Subsequent losses occurred between the grounding area and "Returning in the afternoon, it was noted that a large oil stain had transfer area but were relatively minor. appeared in the snow in the general area where we had worked in the • Subsequent losses also occurred in the transfer area. morning. We concluded that the heat of the noon sun had melted the • About 80 to 95 percent of the oil lost in the grounding area oil on the ice surface allowing it to wick up into the soft snow." evaporated or was burned in the original or subsequent burns. "We gathered some saturated snow in a pile, covered it with an ab- • The oil remaining under the ice was a very thin sheen covering an sorbent blanket soaked in turbo fuel and ignited it. The heat generated area in radius of approximately 400 to 500 yards in the grounding by the blanket caused the snow to melt forcing the oil out on to the ice site and 300 to 400 yards in the transfer area. surface where it ignited and burned." • The sub-ice oil is not migrating under the ice, but there is evidence "The first fire burned itself out after about 15 minutes. We noticed that it is migrating up through the ice. that the oil was still floating on the melted ice and the border snow was Because of the possibility of a substantial amount of oil remaining still yellow, indicating an incomplete burn." under the solid ice cover at the transfer area, it was decided that where "We attributed this condition to an insufficient concentration of conditions permitted every effort should be made to burn off this oil heat to support total combustion. We decided to re-ignite an area on before break-up. The area was thought to be sufficiently sheltered and CLEANUP TECHNIQUES 375

Preparations were then made by Imperial Oil to have the hardware on hand for an oil skimming operation if possible. Overflights had shown that one of the blasted areas at the transfer point had melted and a large pool of oil seemed to have collected in it. It was also possible that the area could now be reached by boat. After some difficulty the area was approached by boat, and although burning was attempted, it was generally unsuccessful. No migration of the contaminated area occurred, but the break-up of ice in other sections prevented boats from returning to the sites. As break-up continued, oil slicks were sighted moving freely along the channel between the grounding area and the transfer site. The quantity of ice in movement reduced any possibility of the use of skimming devices. Where fast ice still existed, and, could be reached, some unsuccessful burns were attempted. Downloaded from http://meridian.allenpress.com/iosc/article-pdf/1979/1/371/1738288/2169-3358-1979-1-371.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 Because of the possibility of shoreline cleanup being required if any large slicks reached the beaches, more personnel were brought on hand by Imperial Oil. Shoreline surveys and overflight monitoring were to be increased. When conditions permitted, further attempts 'vould be made by boat to reach both transfer and grounding areas. As break-up was now well underway, ice floes prevented any fur- Figure 3. Photograph of burn of mixed diesel oil and gasoline ther attempts to skim or burn remaining pockets. The whole area five minutes after the fire was started would, therefore, be monitored until heavy concentrations were sighted and could be effectively dealt with, or natural dispersion did not have adequate wave action to disperse the oil, thus posing a occurred. potential problem for the surrounding islands. This pattern was established between April 15 through April 25, Throughout the remainder of January and through early March, weather permitting. Some small light slicks were present for short temperatures remained very low, usually sub-zero Fahrenheit. As the periods in exposed coves and large areas of sheen were found along snow cover had also increased substantially, only small attempts at the outer channel area. Successively warmer temperatures and in- burns were made. However, with a mild spell in mid-March, efforts to creased wave action soon dispersed the remaining oil. By the end of burn off surface oil at the transfer site were very successful. Using rags the month no traces were seen. The spilled oil from the Imperial St. as igniters, further burns were made in the grounding area. The burns Clair no longer was considered a threat to the area. were noted to continue into early evening and estimates were that a further 1,000 gallons had been consumed. During the following days, further migration of the oil was evident, and this method was felt to be Conclusions insufficient because of the urgency. The decision was made to use dynamite to clear large holes in the From the foregoing operations, which extended from new ice condi- fast ice and create a collection area for the oil. Accordingly, the tions at the beginning of winter to the spring thaw, a number of con- necessary permission was obtained from the provincial authorities and clusions and recommendations have been drawn. Although they per- initial blasts were conducted in areas thought to retain relatively large tain to the cleanup of diesel fuel in the waters of Georgian Bay, Lake pockets of oil. Huron, many of the facts apply universally. Six charges of 10 sticks of dynamite were set off on March 23. • Oil freezes into the ice and does not remain in large pockets. Fresh Following the blasts, each area was closely inspected but no concen- water ice can contain up to 60 percent oil, but this ice is weak and tration of oil was seen. Several attempts to effect burns were unsuc- will usually melt first in the spring thaw. cessful. All charges were laid in the area around Telegram Rock. A • Burning was the most efficient and effective method under these second run of charges was set off at the transfer site but, as in the conditions. Any burn should be effected either immediately fol- grounding area, no substantial quantity of oil was found. lowing the spill or during the spring thaw, which allows the oil to In the company of representatives from the Coast Guard, Environ- melt out of the ice and form surface puddles. ment Canada and Imperial Oil, the following conclusions were made • Burning of oil is very weather sensitive and was ineffective in very following the blasting: cold and windy conditions. • No substantial pockets of ice were trapped under the ice. • Heat generated by burning oil appears to induce a capillary action • Oil seemed to be frozen right in the ice and burning attempts would on oil within the ice, thus perpetuating the initial burn. be more successful as the ice melted. • Oil of this specific gravity migrates upwards readily in mobile or • Burning and blasting activities should be continued until the whole unstable ice. Under ice, wave movement is minimal and appears to of both areas had been covered. have little effect on dispersion or migration of the oil. At this time, reports were received regarding a possible discolora- • Heavy concentrations of snow prevent successful wicking or burn- tion in a resident's drinking water, piped in directly from the lake. ing of surface oil. Subsequent visits and verification of the area was made, and samples • Blasting with dynamite was effective in determining if oil pockets taken from the local area and from the residents supply system. were present under the ice. Also, these blasted areas melt first dur- Analysis of these showed no evidence of oil. ing the spring thaw. Blasting creates ice surface indentations, allow- Towards the end of March, subsequent days of warm temperatures ing melted water and oil to collect in these depressions. increased the melting process. Periods of warm rain occurred and con- • When ice starts to move in floes, all cleanup methods become inef- siderably reduced the thickness of ice. Further good burns were made fective. Booming is impractical as these devices become ripped by as the oil was released slowly from the melting ice. It was noted that ice. Burning and skimming are also ineffective as the continual the depression in the ice created by the heat of the initial burn formed movement of the ice prevents any local concentrations of the prod- a natural basin into which more oil would flow, so perpetuating the uct from building up. burn. However, due to these mild temperatures the mid-winter ice thickness of 24 to 28 inches was now reduced to less than one foot. It was recognized that the area would soon become unsafe for walking. Although further pools of oil were burned off from the ice surface, Acknowledgments the ice became so thin that further operations were suspended until the anticipated break-up allowed access by boat. It was recognized that The author has drawn on internal reports of a number of different the blasted holes would probably melt first, providing collection pools groups, namely, the Imperial Oil Company, Ltd., Shell Canada, En- for the oil which, if significant, could be burnt or skimmed. On March vironment Canada, the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, the 29 and 30, the final burns were effected from the ice-scoot on the sur- on-scene coordinator's report issued by Canadian Coast Guard Base, face and considerable success was experienced through some 40 small Parry Sound, and on interviews with John D. Latour and Ron E. burns at both locations. Power. This assistance is gratefully acknowledged. 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