The Silver Shields: Philip's and Alexander's Hypaspists. | Michael

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The Silver Shields: Philip's and Alexander's Hypaspists. | Michael THE WARRIOR The Silver Shields Philip’s and Alexander’s Hypaspists IN THE LATE SUMMER OF 318 BCE, IN THE SPUTTERING EMBERS OF THE FIRST BLOODY WAR OF THE ‘SUCCESSORS” (DIADOCHOI) OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT, EUMENES OF CARDIA SHELTERED SOMEWHERE ON THE ANATOLIAN PLATEAU IN THE HEART OF CAPPADOCIA WITH SOME 2,500 ‘FRIENDS’ AND ALLIES. EUMENES HAD, WITHIN THE LAST YEAR, BEEN DEFEATED IN THE FIELD BY ANTIGONUS MONAPHTHALMUS, A FORMER GENERAL AND SATRAP ©฀Johnny฀Shumate OF ALEXANDER WITH THE GLINT OF EMPIRE IN HIS ONE EYE. ‘Silver฀Shield’฀with฀sarissa฀and฀ pelte,฀ equipped฀ for฀ duty฀ with฀ By฀Michael฀Park the฀Macedonian฀phalanx. Eumenes’฀ position,฀ unprepossessing฀ mentally฀deficient฀Philip฀III.฀Apart฀from฀ additional฀ money฀ he฀ requested฀ for฀ at฀best,฀was฀improved฀markedly฀by฀the฀ appointing฀him฀“General฀of฀the฀Argead฀ the฀ raising฀ of฀ mercenaries”฀ (Diodorus฀ arrival฀ of฀ a฀ letter,฀ from฀ Polyperchon฀ House”฀ in฀ Asia,฀ ฀ ฀ the฀ letter฀ carried฀ an฀ Siculus฀18.58.2-3). in฀ Macedonia,฀ the฀ guardian฀ of฀ and฀ authorisation฀ for฀ Eumenes฀ to฀ draw฀ Displaying฀ great฀ faith฀ in฀ his฀ royal฀ regent฀ for฀ ‘the฀ kings’:฀ Alexander฀ five฀hundred฀talents฀from฀the฀treasury฀ letter,฀ Eumenes฀ –฀ ‘friends’฀ in฀ tow฀ IV฀ (Alexander’s฀ infant฀ son)฀ and฀ the฀ in฀ Cyinda,฀ Cilicia,฀ and฀ “whatever฀ –฀forced฀marched฀to฀Cyinda.฀That฀faith฀ Ancient Warfare 25 THE WARRIOR was฀ rewarded฀ when฀ he฀ was฀ joined฀ would฀indicate. the฀ hypaspists฀ or฀ the฀ royal฀ hypaspists฀ by฀ three฀ thousand฀ intimidating฀ old฀ The฀ Macedonian฀ Silver฀ Shields,฀ or฀ and฀acted฀as฀the฀king’s฀guard฀when฀he฀ sweats฀of฀the฀campaigns฀of฀Alexander฀ Argyraspids,฀ were฀ an฀ elite฀ corps.฀ They฀ fought฀on฀foot.฀It฀is฀under฀these฀names฀ and฀ Philip.฀ Having฀ come฀ “from฀ a฀ are฀ described฀ by฀ Diodorus฀ (17.57.2)฀ as฀ that฀ we฀ find฀ them฀ operating฀ under฀ considerable฀ distance฀ in฀ obedience฀ to฀ “being฀ distinguished฀ by฀ the฀ brilliance฀ Alexander฀in฀every฀set฀piece฀battle฀and฀ the฀letters฀of฀the฀kings”฀(Diod.฀18.฀59.1),฀ of฀its฀arms฀and฀the฀bravery฀of฀its฀men”฀ most฀ every฀ other฀ action฀ described฀ by฀ the฀three฀thousand฀Macedonian฀Silver฀ and,฀at฀the฀great฀battle฀of฀Paraetecene฀ the฀ Alexander฀ historians฀ of฀ antiquity.฀ Shields฀ (so฀ named฀ for฀ the฀ silver฀ arms฀ in฀317,฀as฀“undefeated฀troops,฀the฀fame฀ They฀ are฀ always฀ in฀ close฀ attendance฀ provided฀ them฀ by฀ Alexander฀ at฀ the฀ of฀ whose฀ exploits฀ caused฀ much฀ fear฀ upon฀the฀king฀whether฀in฀the฀phalanx฀ beginning฀of฀the฀Indian฀campaign),฀led฀ among฀the฀enemy”฀(18.28.1).฀As฀well฀they฀ line฀or฀around฀the฀king฀when฀he฀fought฀ by฀ Antigenes฀ and฀ Teutamos,฀ billeted฀ might฀have฀for฀many฀of฀these฀veterans฀ on฀foot฀or฀led฀various฀assaults. themselves฀ within฀ the฀ royal฀ general’s฀ had฀served฀both฀Philip฀II฀and฀Alexander฀ camp.฀This฀was,฀as฀events฀would฀show,฀ of฀ Macedon.฀ They฀ were฀ the฀ picked฀ Elite warriors the฀signally฀important฀outcome฀of฀the฀ corps฀of฀the฀Macedonian฀foot฀and฀had฀ The฀ ‘regular’฀ hypaspists,฀ as฀ is฀ letters฀to฀Eumenes.฀It฀was฀also฀a฀deadly฀ rendered฀ a฀ lifetime฀ of฀ professional฀ reasonably฀ attested,฀ were฀ brigaded฀ double฀edged฀sword. service฀ to฀ the฀ Macedonian฀ kings.฀ into฀ three฀ chiliarchies฀ (units฀ of฀ 1,000)฀ Indeed,฀ Justin฀ describing฀ Alexander’s฀ and฀were฀selected฀for฀inclusion฀on฀the฀ At฀this฀time฀the฀youngest฀of฀the฀ invasion฀army฀of฀334฀notes฀that฀he฀took฀ basis฀ of฀ skill,฀ physique฀ and฀ quality.฀ Silver฀ Shields฀ were฀ about฀ sixty฀ men฀ not฀ “in฀ the฀ flower฀ of฀ their฀ age,฀ What฀set฀this฀unit฀apart฀was฀its฀calibre:฀ years฀ old,฀ most฀ of฀ the฀ others฀ but฀veterans,฀most฀of฀whom฀had฀even฀ this฀ was฀ a฀ unit฀ where฀ inclusion฀ was฀ about฀ seventy,฀ and฀ some฀ even฀ passed฀ their฀ term฀ of฀ service,฀ and฀ who฀ based฀ solely฀ on฀ merit;฀ departure฀ was฀ older;฀ but฀ all฀ of฀ them฀ were฀ had฀ fought฀ under฀ his฀ father฀ and฀ his฀ occasioned฀ by฀ death฀ or฀ retirement฀ by฀ irresistible฀because฀of฀experience฀ uncles;฀so฀that฀he฀might฀be฀thought฀to฀ the฀king.฀Theopompus฀(FGrH฀115฀F฀348)฀ and฀ strength,฀ such฀ was฀ the฀ skill฀ have฀chosen,฀not฀soldiers,฀but฀masters฀ describes฀ them฀ as฀ “the฀ largest฀ and฀ and฀ daring฀ acquired฀ through฀ in฀ war”฀ (11.6).฀ These฀ “masters฀ of฀ war”฀ most฀ powerful฀ men”.฀ These฀ warriors฀ the฀ unbroken฀ series฀ of฀ their฀ had฀ also฀ managed,฀ after฀ Alexander’s฀ were฀ to฀ prove฀ themselves฀ equally฀ battles. death,฀to฀keep฀their฀corporate฀identity฀ at฀ home฀ alongside฀ the฀ units฀ of฀ the฀ and฀were฀as฀ferocious฀in฀guarding฀that฀ phalanx฀ in฀ pitched฀ battle;฀ assaulting฀ Diod.19.41.2 corporate฀reputation฀as฀they฀were฀their฀ fortified฀ positions;฀ acting฀ in฀ support฀ king: of฀ cavalry฀ and฀ in฀ rapid฀ skirmishing฀ The฀ wider฀ effects฀ of฀ this฀ corps฀ of฀ alongside฀lighter฀infantry฀units. veterans฀ joining฀ the฀ ‘royal฀ general’฀ But฀ the฀ Argyraspids฀ disdained฀ Much฀ ink฀ has฀ been฀ spent฀ in฀ the฀ wide฀ cannot฀ easily฀ be฀ overstated฀ and฀ the฀ all฀ leaders฀ in฀ comparison฀ ranging฀ debate฀ over฀ just฀ exactly฀ how฀ reaction฀–฀from฀both฀Egypt฀and฀Phrygia฀ with฀ Alexander,฀ and฀ thought฀ these฀troops฀were฀armed;฀much฀of฀that฀ –฀was฀immediate.฀ service฀ under฀ other฀ generals฀ ink฀on฀the฀shield฀itself฀and฀its฀size.฀This฀ Ptolemy฀ sailed฀ to฀ Cilicia฀ with฀ his฀ dishonourable฀to฀the฀memory฀of฀ due,฀in฀no฀small฀part,฀to฀the฀name฀‘shield฀ fleet฀ and฀ engaged฀ in฀ a฀ determined฀ so฀great฀a฀monarch.฀ bearers’.฀ There฀ are฀ strong฀ arguments฀ effort฀ to฀ convince฀ the฀ Silver฀ Shields฀ that฀ rather฀ than฀ being฀ armed฀ in฀ the฀ to฀ desert฀ their฀ general.฀ In฀ the฀ words฀ Diod,฀14.6.7฀฀ fashion฀of฀the฀Macedonian฀phalangite฀ of฀ Diodorus,฀ he฀ was฀ ignored฀ as฀ “no฀ the฀hypaspist฀corps฀was฀fielded฀in฀the฀ one฀ paid฀ him฀ any฀ attention฀ because฀ This฀was฀an฀attitude฀that฀saw฀its฀most฀ hoplite฀panoply:฀cuirass฀or฀breastplate,฀ the฀ kings฀ and฀ Polyperchon,฀ their฀ lethal฀ expression฀ when฀ the฀ Silver฀ greaves,฀ two฀ and฀ a฀ half฀ metre฀ (eight฀ guardian,฀ and฀ Olympias,฀ the฀ mother฀ Shields’฀ general฀ Antigenes,฀ among฀ foot)฀ thrusting฀ spear฀ with฀ butt-spike,฀ of฀ Alexander,฀ had฀ written฀ to฀ them”฀ others,฀ murdered฀ the฀ arrogant฀ and฀ helmet฀ and฀ aspis.฀ This฀ is฀ likely฀ true฀ in฀ (18.62.2).฀ Antigonus,฀ too,฀ sent฀ agents฀ aggrandising฀marshal฀Perdiccas.฀These฀ many฀ situations.฀ For฀ instance,฀ during฀ to฀ Eumenes’฀ camp฀ to฀ entreat฀ with฀ coldly฀ professional฀ veterans’฀ loyalty฀ the฀ attack฀ on฀ the฀ Malli฀ town฀ in฀ India,฀ the฀ commanders฀ of฀ the฀ Silver฀ Shields.฀ had฀been฀given฀to฀the฀best:฀Philip฀and฀ when฀ Alexander฀ leaps฀ down฀ into฀ the฀ Promising฀ rewards฀ or฀ retribution,฀ he฀ Alexander฀ and฀ they฀ did฀ not฀ suffer฀ town฀from฀the฀battlements฀he฀defends฀ too฀was฀roundly฀rebuffed. ‘pretenders’฀lightly. himself฀with฀a฀shield฀that฀is฀unlikely฀to฀ The฀ corps฀ that฀ became฀ the฀ Silver฀ have฀been฀a฀phalangite฀pelte-฀a฀‘lighter’฀ Origins Shields฀ had฀ grown฀ from฀ the฀ noble฀ shield฀ of฀ some฀ two฀ feet฀ in฀ diameter฀ Allowing฀ for฀ rhetorical฀ exaggeration฀ bodyguard฀ unit฀ of฀ the฀ Macedonian฀ and฀ designed฀ to฀ hang฀ over฀ the฀ left฀ of฀ the฀ ages฀ (it฀ is฀ more฀ likely฀ that฀ the฀ monarchy,฀ the฀ pezhetairoi฀ or฀ foot฀ shoulder.฀Peucestas฀and฀the฀other฀royal฀ bulk฀will฀have฀been฀in฀their฀fifties฀and฀ companions.฀As฀that฀name฀came฀to฀be฀ hypaspists฀ with฀ him฀ will฀ have฀ been฀ sixties),฀it฀is฀readily฀apparent฀that฀these฀ applied฀to฀the฀Macedonian฀infantry฀as฀ armed฀similarly. troops,฀3,000฀strong฀and฀part฀of฀a฀force฀ a฀ whole,฀ most฀ likely฀ under฀ Alexander,฀ This฀ is฀ also฀ likely฀ to฀ be฀ true฀ in฀ the฀ numbering฀ –฀ at฀ this฀ stage฀ –฀ fifteen฀ the฀ unit฀ became฀ the฀ hypaspists฀ or฀ many฀ instances฀ when฀ the฀ hypaspists฀ thousand,฀ were฀ of฀ an฀ importance฀ far฀ shield฀ bearers”.฀ The฀ original฀ noble฀ are฀assaulting฀other฀fortified฀positions฀ beyond฀that฀which฀their฀mere฀numbers฀ nucleus฀ continued฀ as฀ the฀ agema฀ of฀ using฀ scaling฀ ladders฀ or฀ when฀ –฀ as฀ 26 Ancient Warfare THE WARRIOR historians฀of฀Alexander,฀writing฀for฀an฀ audience฀ who฀ will฀ have฀ needed฀ little฀ explanation,฀ provide฀ the฀ best฀ and฀ the฀most฀frustrating฀–฀in฀terms฀of฀the฀ detail฀that฀moderns฀would฀like฀–฀guide฀ here.฀ In฀ every฀ set฀ piece฀ pitched฀ battle฀ the฀hypaspists฀are฀stationed฀on฀the฀far฀ right฀ of฀ the฀ taxeis฀ (battalions)฀ of฀ the฀ phalanx.฀In฀this฀position฀they฀abut฀the฀ king฀ and฀ his฀ Companion฀ Cavalry.฀ This฀ is฀ so฀ at฀ the฀ Granicus฀ River,฀ Issus฀ and฀ Gaugamela฀ as฀ well฀ as฀ the฀ Hydaspes฀ where฀ these฀ are฀ the฀ units฀ that฀ cross฀ the฀ river฀ upstream฀ with฀ the฀ King.฀ The฀ foremost฀reason฀for฀this฀positioning฀is฀ that฀it฀is฀the฀remit฀of฀this฀unit฀and฀–฀a฀ fortiori฀ –฀ its฀ agema฀ to฀ keep,฀ as฀ much฀ as฀is฀possible,฀in฀close฀contact฀with฀the฀ king.฀ The฀ counter฀ argument฀ is฀ that฀ the฀ hypaspists฀ are฀ stationed฀ here฀ so฀ as฀ to฀ guard฀ the฀ otherwise฀ vulnerable฀ flank฀ of฀the฀phalanx.฀To฀perform฀such฀a฀task฀ the฀ hypaspists฀ then฀ must฀ be฀ armed฀ in฀ the฀ more฀ ‘agile’฀ hoplite฀ fashion฀ and฀ not฀ burdened฀ with฀ heavy฀ saris- sae.฀ As฀ well,฀ this฀ will฀ enable฀ the฀ royal฀ hypaspists฀ to฀ perform฀ the฀ tasks฀ of฀ the฀ hamippoi฀ –฀ light฀ infantry฀ trained฀ to฀ operate฀ among฀ the฀ cavalry.฀ Whilst฀ this฀might฀be฀so,฀it฀entirely฀misses฀the฀ fact฀ that฀ Craterus,฀ the฀ great฀ infantry฀ commander฀ of฀ the฀ left,฀ is฀ afforded฀ no฀ such฀protection฀to฀his฀immediate฀left฀in฀ any฀of฀these฀battles.฀In฀fact฀this฀end฀of฀ the฀line฀is฀only฀granted฀the฀Thessalian฀ and฀allied฀cavalry฀protection.฀The฀work฀ ©฀Johnny฀Shumate of฀ the฀ hamippoi,฀ one฀ suspects,฀ will฀ more฀ likely฀ have฀ been฀ performed฀ by฀ the฀lighter฀armoured฀and฀multi-javelin฀
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