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Home , Companion cavalry, Cretan archers, Heavy cavalry, Heavy infantry, Hypaspists, Macedonian phalanx

50 PART I I THE ANCIENT WORLD, 2000 ncE-400 cE end of the the industrious Archelaus made organized into territorial battalions. These units some improvements. Nevertheless, based on the gen­ formed a of some 18,000 men, much larger eral of the Macedonians, the Greeks numbered than any Greek state could raise. Philip armed these. them among the barbarians. Yet it was these barbar­ troops with a roughly 15~ 18 feet long. The ians who perfected phalai1x warfare, integrating it sarissa allowed Philip to lighten the armor of his in fan·· into a flexible combined-arms tactical system and try, providing them with a small shield strapped to the using it in campaigns of conquest that carried Greek left arm and only light . The sarissa and civilization far beyond its fifth-century boundaries. lighter armor increased both the mobility and the offensive striking power of the , Philip II and the Macedonian as multiple points now preceded the front line of soldiers into combat. To emphasize the royal nature At no time in Macedonian history clid things look of the in the political structure of the realm, more clismal than in 360 BCE, when Balkan tribes Philip called them his Foot Companions (pezhetairoi). killed the king and overran much of Macedon. But Though their privileges did not match those of the the king's younger brother Philip immediately took noble Companion , the infantry received regu­ control of the kingdom and initiated the reforms that lar pay, which allowed them to maintain their farms by would tun1 the Macedonian army into a well-organized buying slaves or hiring labor, giving the Macedonian war machine. The first step was raising the effective­ the best qualities of citizen and profes­ ness of the peasant foot soldiers. Drawing on funds sional soldiers in one force. from silver mines, Philip introduced standarclized The tactical combination of phalanx and heavy cav­ and the discipline of the phalanx formation. alry could be formidable, with tl1e infantry as an Within two years, he increased the size of the Mace­ anvil, holcling the enemy for the hammer blow of the donian army to over 10,000 and drove out the invaders. Companions. But these two heavy elements alone Not only clid his victory strengthen the power of the lacked flexibility and maintained connection with each monarchy, but the newly effective infantry balanced other only with difficulty. The crucial third nnit of the political influence of the . the Macedonian army was, therefore, an infantry force Using his new strength, Philip introduced over the of 3000 men who formed the Royal Guard-the next twenty years further reforms in bOth organization , or shield bearers. These men cliffered from and weaponry. He forged the Macedonian nobles into a the regular infantry in that they were not organized drilled and disciplined force organized territorially, but were recruited from throughout the by territorial squadrons. He gave them the title Com­ kingdom. Their equipment is a matter of much debate panions ( hetairai) to emphasize their social and politi­ but seems to have included a larger shield than the cal relationship to the king, winning their loyalty to a men of the phalanx carried, a short , and a more centralized military system and reducing their shorter, lighter spear. They were thus more lightly independent influence in the kingdom. They wore armed than the ; their equipment, even armor and carried a shorter version of the infantry more intensive drill, and their smaller units of organi­ sarissa) or , more suited to fighting on horseback. zation made them more mobile tl1an the phalanx. Thus, The Companions formed a mobile offensive strike one role of tl1e hypaspists was to as a link or hinge force the equal in quality if not numbers to the best between the phalanx and the heavy cavalry in set-piece Persian cavalry and unmatched in any Greek army. battles. But their skill and tactical flexibility made the Philip also expanded the heavy infantry further, hypaspists useful for a variety of tasks, and under Phil­ recruiting men from parts of Macedon that tradition­ ip's son Alexander, they became the "special forces" ally had been outside the clirect control of the king, unit of the army. such as the rugged cantons of western Macedon, and Philip also included and tying them to the king with grants of land. Philip's in the regnlar army organization, and he added spe­ intention was to create an army of citize11-soldiers who cialized troops from allies or mercenaries, including derived their status from military service to the king, Thessalian heavy cavalry, , and Agri­ in effect fusing two sources of infantry cohesion: com­ anian mountaineers. Such troops added both fire­ munal ties as developed in the Greek poleis, and power and skirmishing and scouting capabilities to the centrally imposed drill and discipline. The result was army, giving Philip and later Alexander a set of tactical the creation of a large Macedonian infantry force and operational tools that could meet almost any CHAPTER 3 I AND PHALANX: AND MACEDON, 800-200 ncE 51

units largc.i; these . The infa.n­ to the sa and d the alanx, line of nature realn1, tairoi). of the

regu­ ARABIAN ms by PENINSULA donian profes-

Figure 3.2 Alexander's Campaigns alone th each unit of force challenge. And, in fact, one important hallmark of Philip's use of his new army was his ability to coordi­ d-the While he rebuilt the army and royal power, Philip also nate the various types of infantry and cavalry in a ·d from used the Macedonian tradition of polygamy as a dip­ coherent battle plan. TanizCd lomatic tool. One of his wives, Olympias of , ut the Operationally and strategically, Philip emphasized gave birth to his second son, Alexander, in 356 BCE. mobility. He had his troops carry their own supplies debate Philip and Alexander had a tumultuous relationship, and limited the number of pack animals. Unlike the forces of the Greeks, his army could campaign all year in part due to Olympias's claim that Zeus rather than long. Philip also understood the importance of Philip was Alexander's father. But Alexander was groomed for the throne because his elder bother was 1t, even warfare and organized a mobile siege train that included engineers and war engines, some of which clearly less capable. At age 16, he was left in of orgam~ the kingdom and put down a rebellion, perhaps over­ . Thus, were light enough to be used as field in bat­ stepping his charge by renaming the capital of the reb­ r hinge tle. Philip had created a complete war machine. els as Alexandropolis. He received the best Greek et-piece Philip was now ready to take up the challenge of education ( was his tutor for a time), partici­ ade the the pan-Hellenists and lead a great war against the pated in Greek-style athletic festivals, and soaked in er Phil­ barbarian Persians. Unfortunately, the Greeks consid­ Greek culture (the playwright had been res­ forces" ered hi1n a barbarian, too. Therefore, he brought his army into Greece, and in 338 BCE at Chaeronea, ident at the Macedonian court before Alexander's mis hers he defeated an army of Athenians and Thebans, birth). His favorite book seems to have been 's ed spc­ destroying the Sacred Band. During the battle, his . When Philip was assassinated, Alexander assumed cluding son Alexander won distinction at the head of the the throne and immediately proved his effectiveness d Agti­ . By 336, Philip, now hegemon of as a leader, ruthlessly suppressing rebellions in the th fire­ the Greek League as well as king of Macedon and Balkans and at Thebes, where he razed the city, sparing s to the leader of Thessaly, was ready to invade Persia. He only the house of the poet . King of Macedon sent an advance guard to Asia Nlinor, but before he and hegemon of the Greek world, he then turned his could join them, he was assassll1ated. attention eastward (Figure 3.2). 52 PAR.Tl I THE ANCIENT WORLD, 2000 BCE-400 CE

At the end of September 331 ncE, Alexander en­ tered the open plains near ancient Nineveh \Vith_ an army of about 40,000 infaritry and 7000 cav­ alry. He stopped to rest his army overnight, re­ fusing in the meantime a peace oftC:ring fi·om l)arius that \vould have given h:Un half of Darius's kingdon1. Arrayed against hi1n vvas a Persia11 army \Vhose numbers are im­

possible to detcr1nine PERSIANS \vith any accuracy-some D =Darius sources claim up to 200,000, but such a fig­ Figure 3.3 The Battle of Gaugamcla ure is at the outer limits of logistical believability and is probably an exaggeration. In addition, Per­ question. l)arius drew up his army to maximize sian losses at the Granicus and at Issus had reduced his advantages, vvith the and elephants the numbers of elite P'ersian infantry an<.t Greek backed by the Royal Guard cavalry and his mercenaries available to the Great King, \Vho prob­ remaining Greek mercenaries anchoring the cen­ ably had to rely more on provincial levies and the ter, and masses of cavalry_on' the \Vings \Vhose job still effective and numerous Persian cavalry, as well was to envelop the sn1aller Macedonian force as a corps of chariots and a small group of war ele­ (Figure 3.3). phants. In other \Vords, it is certain that the Per­ Alexander disposed his army to counter the siai1s outnumbered Alexander's arn1y significantly, -Persian dcployn1cnt. lic could n<>t possibly n1atch but by ho\v n1uch and \Vith \Vhat quality is open to the length of the Persian line, so, as at Issus, he

Alexander's Campaigns In 334 BCE, Alexander blow. The Persian horse fled, leaving their infantry, launched his great vvar against the Persians-a new including the Greeks, to be slaughtered. , as he may have see11 it, with himself in Alexander recognized tl1at, although he had won the role of a new ai1d greater Achilles-crossing the a significant victory over a Persian army, the Persian Hellespont with an army of about 30,000 infantry fleet could still threaten his communications with and 5,000 cavalry. His first major action was at the Macedon and cause trouble in Greece. He therefore Granicus River, which was defended by 20,000 Per· captured Persian naval bases at and Halicar­ sian cavalry and an equal number of infantry includ­ nassus, the first steps in a larger strategy of neutraliz­ ing a large number of Greek mercenaries. Alexander ing the Persiai1 fleet by capturing the entire eastern used his infantry to pin down part of the Persian Mediterran.ean coast before turning inland to finish forces while concentrating his -cavalry for the decisive off the heart of the en1pire. He secured western Asia CHAPTER 3 I POLIS AND PHALANX: GREECE AND MACEDON, 800-200 BCE 53

refused his left \viog, leading on the right vvith his tCat of the day, Alexander managed to co1nprc-· (~on1panion cavalry and the hypaspists, vvith the hcnd, fi·on1 the 111idst of combat in the rnidtile of a phalanx in the center. 1'hcssalian cavalry covered vast battlefield, the (Linger to his left and center (a the lett flank. In addition, he posted rnixed units of testin1ony to the n1essenger systcn1 that connected light intantry and cavalry behind each \ving, ready AJcxandcr to his subordinates) and then to vviiccl to \vheel outward and counter Persian attcn1pts at the (~on1panions and hypaspists around from cnvelopn1cnt, and posted a unit ofThessalian infi1n­ the fighting they vverc already engaged i11 and try in the rear to guard the Macedonian camp. The charge into the flank and rear of the Persian horse­ fi_)rmation provided capacity both fi)r all-around men. 'I'hc Persians broke, and the entire engage­ defense and for a tactical reserve. n1cnt no\V became a massive pursuit, brc·aking the The Persian army had been up ail night expect­ Persian ar1ny decisively. About 500 Macedonians ing a night attack by Alexander's interior fbrcc, but died; perhaps another 5000 \.Vere \vou11ded.. Alexander did not move until the next n1orning, Persian losses are even harder to dctcrn1ine than October 1. As his arn1y approached the Persian line, their total army size but may \Vell have exceeded it drifted to the right, perhaps intentionally. Persian 50,000. attempts to shift their ovvn more cun1bersomc It is too easy in retrospect to sec the outcon1e at' line resulted in a gap opening in the left-center. Gaugamela as a tOrcgonc conclusion, based on the Alexander seized the opportunity this presented superior fighting qualities of the l\!Iacedonian army. him, leading the Cotnpanions and hypaspists in But the Persians had plenty of elite troops, a sig­ wedge tOrn1ation in a charge into the gap and straight nificant superiority in cavalry, and ideal geography for Darius and his personal bodyguard. l)arius pan­ in \Vhich to deploy their advantages. 1'he same icked and fled, and the entire left and center of the l\!Iaccdonian army under less decisive leadership Persian host began rapidly to give way. could easily have been surrounded, \Vorn do\vn, Alexander could not pursue Darius i1nn1cdi­ and slanghtered. But not only did Alexander ately, ho,vever, because both Persian vvings had unhesitatingly seize the right moment and place to charged \Vhcn Alexander attacked the Persian cen­ attack, in the rush of a_ triu1nphant charge, ter, and the. cavalry on the Persian right \ving had he also never lost sight of the larger dynamics of driven back the Thessalia11s and vvas pressing the the battle. His tactics in the battle at the Hydaspes Macedonian reserves, threatening to get behind (sec Chapter 2) may, in tJ.ct, have been even better, the phalanx and envelope the vvhole Macedonian but Gaugamela \Vas a 1nastcrpiece of Alcxander1s army. In \Vhat was perhaps the inost re1narkablc generalship-one that \Von hi1n an cn1pire.

try, Minor, dividing his forces on the overland marches to posed of some of the best Persian troops including ease his supply problems--close attention to logistics, the Applebearers (descendants of the Immortals), 10Il including advance scouting and arrangement of mar­ Greek mercenaries, and a large cavalry force, Alexander Ian kets, would characterize Alexander's entire career. advanced obliquely, refusing his left flank while ith Next, Alexander moved into Cilicia, preparing to leading tlle Companions and hypaspists against the ore proceed down the coast of . But the Great King, Persian left, which he drove off He then nrrned and :ar­ Darius III, and his army managed to get behind him rolled up the Persian center, hotly engaged with the oz- and cut the Macedonian lines of communication. phalanx; Darius fled, and the Persian army broke. ~rn Alexander turned back and attacked Darius on a nar­ After this victory, Alexander returned to securing ish row plain between the sea and hills at the Battle of the coast. He besieged and captured the Phoenician .sia Issus. Significantly outnumbered by an army com- island city of Tyre using a combination of land 54 PART 1 I THE ANCIENT WORLD, 2000 BCE-400 cE

assaults over an irtificially constructed causeway and motives-was he trying to integrate Macedonians attacks by ship; the causeway eventually silted up and and Persians in the rule of his empire, .or did man­ turned the island into an isthmus, maki4g Alexander power shortages in Macedon force his hand? The one of the few generals to permanently alter geogra­ question is in one sense irresolvable, because Alexan­ phy. By 331, having secured Syria and and der's premature deaili in 323 BCE prevented his plans captured most of the Persian fleet and all their bases, from being fully implemented. But, in a larger sense, Alexander controlled the sea. He was now ready to Alexander had already set in motion a fusion of Greek ( move east. He advanced unmolested to the Euphra­ and Persian civilizations that would shape the mili­ tes, crossed qver, and marched south along the Tigris, tary, political, and cultural history of southwest Asia where fodder was plentiful for his animals and grain and the eastern Mediterranean for centuries. was easily obtainable in undefended villages. Seeking Alexander founded new cities wherever he went, out the gathering Persian army, Alexander defeated many named (including the most famous the forces of Darius on the plains of Gaugamela in the in Egypt) and one named after his horse Bucepha­ final battle for control of the Persian Empire (see the lus. Modeled on Greek poleis and often populated Highlights box "The "). in part by retired Macedonian soldiers, these cities With tl1e defeat of Darius at Gaugarnela, the heart­ carried ilie Greek culture Alexander loved to all cor­ land of the Persian Empire was open to Alexander. ners of his empire. They became the model for mili­ Alexander capnrred Persepolis, the ceremonial capital tary colonies founded by Alexander's leading generals, and treasury, which was then burnt, allegedly by acci­ who became the Diadochi, the successor kings of a dent. Alexander pursued Darius, who was hoping to divided empire; these colonies supported the scarce . fall back and rally tl1e forces from the eastern prov­ Macedonian manpower that was the key component inces; but, along the way, Darius was slain by so1ne of of successor kingdom . This style of army his own nobles. Alexander eventually killed the regi­ went unchallenged until the Roman legions entered cides; he had defeated the Achaemenids and con­ eastern Mediterranean politics a century later (see quered the heart of their empire. Chapter 4). Alexander would continue to move east through The colonists often married Persian or other non­ Afghanistan and into the Indus River valley. These later Greek women, a policy encouraged and practiced by campaigns are characterized by flexibility, boili tacti­ Alexander himself, furthering the cultural syncretism cally and logistically. Alexander successfully altered his these urban foundations inspired. Perhaps even more tactics to suit his enemies, dividing his army to ease important, Alexander fused these cities into a larger logistical problems and concentrating it for battles or conception ofimperial rule, using them as the admin­ , whether against fortified mountain strongholds, istrative co1mection between localities and his king­ Scythian nomads, or Indian armies with chariots and ship. For that kingship, he drew on Persian (as well elephants-his battle at the Hydaspes River against King as Egyptian) notions of divinely supported rule and a Porus was perhaps the hardest of his career (see Chap­ sense of his own divinity, inherited from his mother, ter 2). Alexander continued east, intent on bringing to create a political structure neither fully Macedo­ ilie entire world under his command, until his home­ nian and Greek nor fully Persian, but successful siclc, weary army mutinied at the Hyphasis River and enougb---illld enhanced by the tremendous prestige demanded to return home. After a week-long Achilles­ of Ills seemingly superhuman conquests-to inspire like sulk in his tent, Alexander turned south along the imitation and flattery by later Roman emperors, whose Indus River for ilie trip home. empire also featured divine kingship laid over an urban network of local rule. His model certainly formed Alexander's Impact Alexander returned to Baby­ the ideal of the Hellenistic world he created and lon and began organizing the resources of his empire. reflected at the grandest political level the fusion of He initiated some interesting army reforms, including polis communalism with the resources of centralized the ll1tegration of Persians and other Asians, espe­ kingship. cially horse archers, into the Companion cavalry and If Alexander had a weakness, it was his reckless foot archers and Persian spearmen into the Mace­ courage. He led from the front and was wounded donian infantry. In doing so, he may have taken several times, most seriously in a siege of an Indian advantage of extant Persian institutions for military city when he took an in the lung, a wound that training (see Chapter 2 ). debate Alexander's probably contributed to his death from fever a year