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Party Political Broadcasts Party Political Broadcasts Standard Note: SN/PC/03354 Last updated: 17 March 2015 Author: Isobel White and Oonagh Gay Section Parliament and Constitution Centre This note sets out the current arrangements for party political broadcasts including their allocation, frequency, scheduling, length and content. Details are given of the BBC’s final allocation criteria for party election broadcasts (PEBs) in 2015 as well as Ofcom’s rules on PEBs for commercial broadcasters. Ofcom carried out a consultation in early 2015 about the composition of its list of major political parties, each of which are entitled to at least two PEBs by the commercial broadcasters. On 16 March 2015 Ofcom published a statement on the results of the consultation and the revised list of major parties. UKIP is included on the list but not the Green Party. The term ‘party political broadcasts’ (PPBs) is used generically here to refer to party election broadcasts (PEBs), referendum campaign broadcasts (RCBs) and the party political broadcasts which have been linked to specific political events such as the Budget and Queen’s Speech. The Note also makes reference to the long-standing ban on political advertising in the UK and the questions this raises in terms of freedom of expression and compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary duties and is not intended to address the specific circumstances of any particular individual. It should not be relied upon as being up to date; the law or policies may have changed since it was last updated; and it should not be relied upon as legal or professional advice or as a substitute for it. A suitably qualified professional should be consulted if specific advice or information is required. This information is provided subject to our general terms and conditions which are available online or may be provided on request in hard copy. Authors are available to discuss the content of this briefing with Members and their staff, but not with the general public. Contents 1 Background 3 2 Allocation, length and frequency of PPBs 3 2.1 Introduction 3 2.2 Ofcom rules 4 2.3 Ofcom list of major parties 6 2.4 BBC 7 3 Party election broadcasts in 2015 8 4 Content of PPBs 9 5 ECHR and the ban on political advertising 10 2 1 Background There is a long-standing ban on advertisements of a political nature on TV or radio in the UK. An Electoral Commission factsheet, published in November 2010, provided the following explanation It has traditionally been argued that allowing political advertising in the broadcast media would give an advantage to the best financed candidates or parties and could reduce an election campaign to soundbites and slogans. Political advertising in the broadcast media is therefore prohibited in the UK. Party election broadcasts (PEBs) are designed to offset the differential ability of parties to attract campaign funds. This free airtime is provided prior to elections and other significant events (such as the budget) and allows qualifying parties an opportunity to deliver their messages directly to the electorate through the broadcast media.1 Political broadcasts were first carried by BBC radio prior to the general election of 1924. The BBC took the view that the provision of such broadcasts were a direct consequence of its role as a public service broadcaster.2 Early allocation arrangements were informal, with the BBC making proposals and taking soundings from political parties until agreement was reached. The process became more structured with the establishment in 1947 of the Committee on Political Broadcasting which consisted of representatives of the BBC and the political parties. Televised PEBs were first shown in 1951. Five years later, the newly- established commercial television companies began broadcasting PPBs. Nevertheless, until the Broadcasting Act 1990 became law, there was no legal obligation on any broadcaster to carry PPBs. The BBC has a formal obligation to carry PPBs through its agreement with the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport.3 More detailed accounts of the history of PPBs are given in Robert Blackburn’s The electoral system in Britain (Macmillan, 1995) and in appendix 1 to the Consultation Paper on the Reform of Party Political Broadcasting (BBC, ITC, S4C and Radio Authority, January 1998). A tabular history of allocation arrangements is given as an annex to the Electoral Commission’s discussion paper of December 2001.4 2 Allocation, length and frequency of PPBs 2.1 Introduction Section 333 of the Communications Act 2003 charges the regulator Ofcom with the duty of making rules regarding the allocation, length and frequency of PPBs (including Party Election Broadcasts) and Referendum Campaign Broadcasts for commercial broadcasters with public service obligations. The rules apply to ITV1, Channel 4 and Five, and the national (i.e. UK- wide) commercial radio services Talksport, Classic FM and Absolute Radio. In making such rules, Ofcom must take account of the views of the Electoral Commission. The BBC is also required to carry PPBs by its Charter and Agreement but, in this respect, it is regulated not by OFCOM but by the BBC Trust. S4C is required to carry PPBs under the 1 Electoral Commission, Factsheet: Party election broadcasts and referendum campaign broadcasts, November 2010 2 Fifth report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life: The Funding of Political Parties in the United Kingdom Cm 4057 1999, para 13.14 3 Broadcasting: An agreement between Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport and the British Broadcasting Corporation, Cm 6872, July 2006 4 Party political broadcasting review 2001-02: discussion paper, Electoral Commission, December 2001 3 2003 Act, but is regulated by the Welsh Fourth Channel Authority. Digital channels are not required to carry such broadcasts, but Sky has carried them voluntarily. The broadcasters seek to co-ordinate their allocation policies via the Broadcasters’ Liaison Group. Recent practice was summarised in the Electoral Commission’s 2010 factsheet as follows: The process of allocating PEBs has developed over time and is based heavily on convention. Usually the governing party and main opposition party are allocated the same number of broadcasts, and no party is offered more than five broadcasts in total. The number of PEBs offered to major parties (Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrats, plus SNP in Scotland and Plaid Cymru in Wales) is related to previous electoral support and the number of candidates standing at the election. In addition a minor party standing candidates in one-sixth of the total seats contested qualifies for a PEB. This is modified as necessary for the proportional representation systems for elections to the devolved legislatures and the European Parliament.5 2.2 Ofcom rules The Ofcom rules on party political and referendum broadcasts were last published in March 2013. They reflect minimum requirements which the licensees are required to follow and are not intended to “fetter the discretion” of licensees to exceed these requirements. Each broadcaster is responsible for deciding the allocations made available to a political party or campaign group. However, the broadcasters work together with the Electoral Commission under the auspices of the Broadcasters’ Liaison Group in order to try to ensure a consistent approach. Ofcom’s rules include the following: Services carrying broadcasts 7. General election broadcasts will be carried by all of the Licensees named above (except local digital television programme service licensees). Broadcasts for European Parliamentary elections will be carried by regional Channel 3 services and Channel 5. 8. RCBs will be carried by all of the Licensees named above (except local digital television programme service licensees) in the case of a UK referendum, or by the relevant regional Channel 3 licensee in the case of nations/regions referendums. 9. The regional Channel 3 licensee will additionally carry: local election broadcasts in those UK nations/regions where such elections are taking place; broadcasts in the relevant nations/regions for Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, Northern Ireland Assembly elections; broadcasts for the elections for the London Assembly and Mayor of London and PPBs for the "major parties" in the United Kingdom (see Rule 12) on a seasonal basis (as set out in Rule 20). 10. Local digital television programme service licensees will carry: local election broadcasts in those UK nations/regions where such elections are taking place. The local digital television programme service licensee for London will also carry broadcasts for the elections for the London Assembly and Mayor of London. Political parties / Designated Referendum Organisations 11. PEBs and PPBs may only be allocated to political parties registered by the Electoral Commission. RCBs may only be allocated to organisations as designated by the Electoral Commission. 5 Electoral Commission, Factsheet: Party election broadcasts and referendum campaign broadcasts, November 2010 4 12. The "major parties" for each nation in the United Kingdom are defined in the Ofcom list of Major Parties. Allocation of broadcasts PEBs 13. Before a General Election, and in the case of other elections where appropriate, each major party (referred to in Rule 12) should be offered at least two PEBs, the length of a series offered to a particular party being determined by the Licensee. This includes the SNP and Plaid Cymru on Channel 4 and Channel 5. In every case, the number of PEBs should be determined having regard to the circumstances of a particular election, the nation in which it is held, and the individual party's past electoral support and/or current support in that nation (see Rule 16). 14. Other registered parties should qualify for a PEB if they are contesting one sixth or more of the seats up for election in the case of first-past-the-post, multi-constituency elections such as a General Election.
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