On Science As a Free Market

Allan Walstad University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown

The question of whether science may usefully be viewed as a market process has recently been addressed by Mäki (1999), who concludes that “either free-market economics is self-defeating, or else there must be two different concepts of free market, one for the ordinary economy, the other for science.” Here I argue that such pessimism is unwarranted. Mäki proposes (see also Wible 1998) that the conduct of economic research itself be taken, self-reºexively, as a test case for any suggested economics of science. While agreeing that we may expect economics to apply to the conduct of economic research itself, I demonstrate that there is a lack of cogency, both in Mäki’s argument for his proposal and in his attempt to implement a reºexivity test. Mäki asks what would be exchanged in the scientiªc “market for ideas” (see also Sent 1997). The answer is that recognition is exchanged for the opportunity to use another’s research results. The identiªcation of an organized and pervasive system of exchange establishes a ªrm basis for analyzing science as a market process.

Introduction To allocate resources in the pursuit of chosen ends is an economic matter: a matter of costs and beneªts, of investments, risks, and payoffs— above all, a matter of choices and trade-offs. Surely, the allocation of cognitive resources in the pursuit of knowledge must be a case in point. In science, we may perhaps devote all our efforts to making a few extremely precise measurements, or we may achieve a greater number of measurements at the

The author is indebted to K. Brad Wray, two anonymous referees, and the editor of this journal for useful suggestions and constructive criticism of this paper.

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cost of poorer precision. We may spend years attempting to solve a particularly signiªcant theoretical problem—at the risk of complete failure—or we may choose safer, less signiªcant problems. There are trade-offs associated with collaboration versus independent work, with the strictness of one’s standards for accepting experimental results and other researchers’ ªndings, and with the choice between adopting a new theory or continu- ing to work within the old: thus, collaboration brings the beneªt of others’ expertise, but the coordination of multiple efforts takes time and im- poses limits on individual initiative; strict epistemic standards offer the beneªt of minimizing error at the risk of rejecting truth; adopting a new theory involves an investment in learning to use it, the risk that it will prove fruitless, and the opportunity cost of results that might have been achieved with the old; but, there is the potential payoff of achieving revo- lutionary advances with the new one. Of course, “scientiªc knowledge” as an object of human pursuit is not a philosophically unproblematic notion, and there are other goals which will inºuence the actions of individual scientists. Among these, we may be sure in most cases, are professional recognition and ªnancial support for one’s research. Economics as a means-ends analytical perspective on science, as on any realm of human action, must take into account that individuals choose their goals, choose action in pursuit of those goals, and make decisions based on their own assessment of how well those goals have been, or are likely to be, met. A number of authors have invoked economic concepts in discussing the conduct of scientiªc research. Polanyi (1951; 1962), for example, saw something similar to a market economy in the decentralized structure of science, in the independence of individual researchers whose efforts are nevertheless coordinated and constrained through mutual oversight and the weight of authority of their peers, and in the cohesiveness of science that is maintained, in the absence of central direction, through the mutual oversight of overlapping specialized ªelds. Others have drawn attention to the signiªcance of exchange (Storer 1966), competition (Hagstrom 1965), and the division of labor (Kitcher 1990; Ghiselin 1989). Radnitzky (1987a,b) and Rescher (1989) have emphasized cost-beneªt considerations. Diamond (1988), Goldman and Shaked (1991), and Wible (1998) have constructed mathematical models, respectively, of theory choice, truth acquisition, and misconduct in science, based on the principle of utility maximization by individual researchers. “Invisible hand” explanations have been promoted by Hull (1988; 1997) and more recently by Leonard (1998). Coase (1974) is among those who have spoken of a scientiªc “market for ideas.” Other economists who in recent years have been taking seriously a comprehen-

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sive economic approach to science include Dasgupta and David (1987; 1994) and Stephan (1996; see also Stephan and Levin 1992). If, from such diverse efforts, a distinct movement has begun to take shape, its critics may have been the ªrst to notice. Mirowski (1997) dis- misses Polanyi’s efforts as a failed example of “playing the economics trump card.” Hands (1997) issues a “caveat emptor” regarding invisible hand explanations (see also Wray 2000). Sent (1997) casts a highly critical “Economist’s Glance at Goldman’s Economics,” focusing on the collabora- tive work of Goldman and Shaked. Mäki (1999) inquires whether economic research itself may usefully be regarded as a free market process, tentatively arrives at a negative answer, and draws therefrom a broader pessimistic conclusion regarding science as a free market. The emergence of such criticism is to be welcomed as an acknowledg- ment that economics can no longer be ignored and as an opportunity, in responding to objections, to reªne the economic perspective and bring it into the mainstream of analytical perspectives on science. In that spirit, as an advocate of the economic point of view, I would like to address Uskali Mäki’s paper “On Science as a Free Market” (1999). (All page references to Mäki are to that work.) I will examine in turn three components of Mäki’s paper: (1) his argument that an economics of scientiªc research should apply, self-reºexively, to the conduct of economic research itself; (2) the self-explanatory and self-justiªcatory test by which he proposes to judge any “economics of economics”; (3) his application of this test (with negative outcome) to the “free market economics of economics” advocated by Ronald Coase. We shall see that the proposed reºexivity test is not capable of yielding a tell- ing result. I will then proceed brieºy to make a positive case for viewing science as a market process.

The Reflexivity Argument Mäki takes note (p. 486) of “the increasing employment of economic concepts and models in the depiction of science, including the notion of a free market for scientiªc ideas,” and he questions “the adequacy of the conceptual resources of economics for this purpose.” He proposes to test that adequacy “by putting a version of free market economics to a self-reºective scrutiny.” He asserts (p. 487) that “[i]f economic notions are supposed to help us understand science, we may expect them to help us understand economics itself.” While plausible, this assertion does not follow, as he claims, from considerations regarding the status of economics itself as a science. Mäki states ( p. 487) that “to be taken seriously as...aresource in the study of science in general...economics had better be taken sufªciently

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seriously as a scientiªc discipline.” Not so. Few would classify philosophy and history among the sciences; nevertheless, these ªelds have contributed much to our understanding of science as a process. Even the rhetoricians believe they have something to offer, and though their claims may be ex- aggerated, proffered insights can hardly be dismissed out of hand on the grounds that rhetoric is not a scientiªc discipline. Mäki contends further (p. 487) that if economics did not apply to itself, then it would be “a peculiar case...unlike most or all other scientiªc disciplines.” But in what sense does physics, for example, apply to itself? There is only the tautological sense, namely, that knowing physics helps one understand physics—but such is true of economics and every other subject. Would anyone demand a “physics of physics” or, say, a “chemistry of chemistry”? We may safely conclude that the ability of economics to shed light on science is not dependent on the status of economics itself as a science, and the status of economics as a science is not dependent on its ability to shed light, reºexively, on itself. Nevertheless, if economics is to be regarded as a comprehensive analytical perspective on purposeful human activity, then we should indeed expect it to apply to the conduct of economic research. What matters in this regard is not the status of economics as a science but our ambitions for its broad applicability as a discipline.

The Proposed Reflexivity Test Mäki is not, however, content to inquire whether an economic perspective may provide useful insight into the conduct of economic research. Rather, he demands that an economics of economic research both explain and jus- tify itself, reºexively, as the outcome of economic processes operating in the intellectual milieu of economic research. To quote (p. 491): ‘Is a free market economics able to explain...itsexistence and popularity as an outcome of a free market of economic ideas?’...Is a free market economics able to depict itself as an intellectually optimal outcome of a free market of economic ideas? A free market economics of economics is expected to support a positive answer to both of these questions. But why would an economics of economic research be under any more obligation to explain itself and its degree of popularity, than to explain anything else? In the absence of a compelling answer to that question, we have only been offered one possible research topic among many. There are, after all, any number of aspects of economic research, into which economic concepts might be called on to shed light; the choice of topics surely be- longs with those who are interested in pursuing an economic approach. A

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general demand for self-justiªcation appears to be without any basis at all: to propound any given model of economic research—as, say, a free marketplace of ideas—commits us neither to endorsing the circumstances hy- pothesized in the model, nor to obtaining outcomes that we regard as positive. Nevertheless, let us brieºy take up these questions of self-explanation and self-justiªcation. In the ordinary economic marketplace, how is the existence of any given product to be explained? The individuals who have brought that good to market did so because they anticipated a payoff—probably a ªnancial one, but perhaps also fame, the satisfaction of creating something useful, the excitement of the technical and entrepreneurial challenge, the vindication of an idea that they are convinced has merit. And how is the relative popularity of competing goods in a market economy explained? It is explained on the basis of judgments by many individuals regarding the payoffs to them of adopting those products. Similarly, it is anticipated payoffs, broadly conceived, which explain why theories are promoted in the marketplace of ideas, and why they are accepted or not. The mixof payoffs may be different, but the basis of explanation is the same. There remains, of course, much more to the analysis of any particular case; but again, we have seen no reason why the emergence of an economics of economic research should take precedence over other cases that might be investigated. With regard to self-justiªcation, if we expect good outcomes from a free marketplace of ideas, and if a free market economics of economic research is regarded as a good outcome, then of course we would hope that a free market economics of economic research would arise and become accepted in a free marketplace of economic ideas. Supposing that one advocates a free marketplace of ideas in economics, is it then an embarrassment if a free market economics of economic research is not popular among economists? Not at all. There might be non-free aspects of the cur- rent marketplace of economic ideas, or external inºuences on it, that mili- tate against appreciation of the market perspective. For example, the availability of inºuential, high-paying government positions in regulatory agencies might foster regulationist or collectivistic attitudes in the profes- sion. But let us suppose that the marketplace of ideas in economics is quite free of such inºuences, and nevertheless a free market economics of economic research has not yet attained popularity. Is that an embarrassment for the free market advocate? No, because despite economists’ penchant for equilibrium analysis, the real world is a world of processes, not merely of optimal end states. (Recall the joke about the economist who thought it impossible that a $20 bill could be lying on the sidewalk, because some-

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one would have picked it up.) Entrepreneurial opportunities arise during the course of economic development, and it takes time for them to be recognized. Proposed innovations are often met with resistance or indiffer- ence, until the inadequacies of entrenched alternatives can no longer be ignored. Persistence and persuasion may be required before success is achieved. But persuasion, particularly in a competitive intellectual marketplace of ideas, means persuasion regarding merit. If one believes that economic research is characterized by a free market of ideas, and if one believes that free markets tend to reward merit, then one may expect a well-formulated free market economics of economic research to achieve wide acceptance eventually. In that sense, the self-justiªcation demand is satisªed: that is, one is “able to depict [a free market economics of economics] as an intellectually optimal outcome of a free market of economic ideas.” But the issue of reºexivity is now seen to be superºuous, as it has merely taken us back to the general issue of merit.

The Application to Coase Much of Mäki’s paper is devoted to discussing the economics of Nobel laureate Ronald Coase (regarding which he has written several times pre- viously) in light of the proposed reºexivity test. Mäki intends to use “Coasean economics” to illustrate what may be wrong with a free-market economics of economic research, thereby casting doubt on science as a free market. We shall use the discussion of Coase to illustrate what is wrong with the reºexivity test. Three elements of Mäki’s portrayal of Coase are relevant for our purposes: 1. Coase favors the use of economic concepts in understanding science, and he favors a free marketplace of ideas. 2. Coase is critical of what he calls “blackboard economics”, that is, the generation of abstract mathematical economic models that he regards as inadequately grounded in experience. He condemns these as unrealistic and advocates instead a more realistic approach rooted in case studies. 3. Coasean economics emphasizes transaction costs. It is his view, according to Mäki (p. 493), that “the relatively optimal institutions (such as the market and the ªrm) that emerge and prevail are transaction-cost efªcient arrangements.” Mäki suggests that blackboard economics has lower transaction costs than Coasean economics, which may explain the prevalence of the former over the latter in the marketplace of economic ideas. This reveals, he

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claims, a basic inconsistency in Coase’s views, in that Coase has retreated from his free-market commitment and resorted to “regulationism” by en- gaging in “non-economic” criticism of blackboard economics (e.g., as being unrealistic). To quote (p. 497): [T]ransaction cost considerations seem to suggest that blackboard economics is closer to the optimum than Coasean economics...[b]ut Coase does not like this conclusion. It is here that his reliance on economics for an answer has to break down. Other resources have to be invoked to characterize the intellectual optimum....Indeed, this is what actually happens: the bulk of the metatheoretical commentary provided by Coase on economics has not been in the form of meta-economics. Most of it has consisted of levelling traditional methodological criticisms against conventional economics....Itisthis regulationist element...that ultimately undermines [Coase’s] free market economics as a fully self-justiªed endeavor. Two observations are relevant here. First, there are no economic values or goals per se, against which to judge goods and services in the ordinary economy or theories in a market for ideas. Economics is a discipline which seeks to understand what happens when humans pursue their own values, their own goals. Second, transaction costs would be reduced to zero if we never engaged in transactions. We bear costs in order to obtain beneªts. Reducing transaction costs, or any costs, beyond some level may leave us with shoddy goods that serve our purposes poorly. That is a perfectly valid economic observation. Thus, a commitment to economic analysis and to a free market of ideas does not disqualify one (on grounds of consistency) from criticizing “blackboard economics” as poorly serving a goal that one would hope is shared by all scientists—namely, to understand the world around us. If mathematical economics is insufªciently grounded in experience, perhaps it is not so much cost-effective as merely cheap. Rather than abandoning or undermining the free marketplace of ideas, Coase might well be por- trayed as participating in it, entrepreneurially, by seeking to convince his fellow economists that the beneªts of “Coasean economics” are worth the additional costs. Then Mäki’s discussion of Coase becomes an example of the point we made earlier in a general way, that the demand for self-justiªcation of a free market economics of economic research can do no more than take us back to the general issue of merit, and is therefore superºuous at best. Mäki seeks to block this outcome, in effect, by removing Coase’s argu- ments for the relative merit of his approach out of the marketplace of ideas

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and placing them in the realm of “regulation”. But that patently will not do, for persuasion is not regulation. The point here is not to defend Coase, and certainly not to engage in competitive hermeneutics of his writings. Indeed, Coase has not (as Mäki admits) sought to develop an economic theory of scientiªc research, and it seems peculiar that his few remarks on that subject, remarks which appear in other contexts and border on the fragmentary, should be the object of such intense scrutiny as Mäki has focused on them. The point is, rather, that Mäki’s whole line of argument, one which has all the ºavor of an at- tempted reductio, cannot be carried through to discredit the use of economics, including the market concept, as an analytical perspective on the conduct of scientiªc research. With that issue out of the way, in what follows I shift from criticism of Mäki’s paper to a very brief laying of foundations for science as a market process.

The Nature and Scope of Economics I take it as indisputable that individuals make choices in the pursuit of their goals—indisputable, because the very act of disputation would serve as an example of what was denied. One would be making choices (of argument, of rhetorical phrase, of venue) in the pursuit of a goal (to convince others that the assertion in question is false). Suppose, then, that we seek to work out general consequences of choice in the pursuit of goals: what should we call such an investigation? The Austrian-school economists, going back to Mises ([1949] 1996), have called it praxeology. Economics as traditionally conceived is only the application of praxeology within a limited sphere of human activity; nevertheless, as Mises emphasized ([1949] 1996, pp. 3, 10, 232–4), no strict de- marcation can be drawn to separate the realm of traditional economics (or “catallactics,” in Austrian terminology) from the larger realm of praxeology that encompasses it. As the term “praxeology” has not attained general usage, Kirzner (1976) suggests that we simply identify the praxeological perspective with the economic perspective, broadly deªned. That is the position I am adopting with regard to the nature of economics. On this view, economics is an analytical perspective with wide-ranging applicability indeed. As the pursuit of goals necessarily entails seeking to acquire and effectively utilize the means to attain those goals, goal-oriented choice subsumes the more common means-ends conception of economics. As we may be sure that individuals will pursue material goods, at least up to a point, it equally subsumes the classical economists’ vision of their ªeld as a science of material wealth. Given that the pursuit of individual goals is facil- itated by specialization and exchange, often involving a common medium

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of exchange, the conception of economics as having to do with money transactions is subsumed as well. If one thinks to characterize successful attainment of goals in terms of some hypothetical measure of satisfaction, “utility,” then goal-oriented action might be viewed in terms of “utility maximization”—a concept that lends itself to mathematization and leads down the path of mainstream neoclassical economics. That is not a path that the Austrians themselves are willing to trod, but the debate over op- timization and mathematical modeling lies far beyond the scope of this paper. Sufªce it to note that a rich body of Austrian theory and applications was developed in the traditional realm of economics, including the work which earned a Nobel Prize for F. A. Hayek in 1974. Ironically, however, Austrians did not take the lead in applying an economic perspective more broadly, even though it is their view of the nature of economics that lends itself most readily to that move. The extension of economic thinking outside its traditional realm is most famously associated with two other No- bel laureates: James Buchanan of the Public Choice school, and Chicago economist Gary Becker. Public Choice theorists have focused on the interaction of politicians, bureaucrats, and special interests in the political arena. Becker and his followers have addressed a diverse array of issues, from criminal behavior to family matters. Such applications are not universally welcome; indeed, they seem to have stirred up resentment. This may be due in part to an unfortunate tendency, among some proponents as well as critics, to portray extended economic analysis as an invasion of other social sciences. Radnitzky and Bernholz, for example, edit a volume of essays entitled Economic Imperial- ism: The Economic Approach Applied outside the Field of Economics (1987). Buckley and Casson write enthusiastically on “Economics as an Imperial- ist Social Science” (1993). Mäki (p. 498) refers rather less enthusiastically (ostensibly echoing Coase) to “extreme forms of what may be called economics expansionism” (emphasis in original). One gets an impression of disciplinary empires warring over subject matter turf, with economics the aggressor at this time. May I suggest an alternative vision? Social science disciplines are rather like different windows through which to view the world of human activity. Where the views from two or more windows overlap, none has “juris- diction”; the availability of multiple perspectives need not be cause for conºict, but may be an opportunity to see more clearly. If proponents of extended economic analysis claim to have drawn back the curtains from the window of economics, revealing a much broader perspective than was heretofore appreciated, why is that “imperialist”? What is “extreme” about it?

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It may well be that one window offers a clearer and closer view of any particular object. Perhaps, once we have fully taken in the view from one window, there is little or nothing left to be learned from another window that opens onto the same scene. Two different perspectives on the same subject may suggest radically different conclusions regarding its nature, of which one may indeed be false or misleading. Those are issues to be settled on their merits, not through bombast or innuendo. I cannot deny the possibility that diverse theoretical perspectives might converge under a common paradigmatic umbrella. An anonymous referee suggests that there has in fact been a convergence of the many disciplines that treat human behavior, with the rational actor model playing a central role. Reference is made to the bold claim of Cooper (2001), that even seemingly a priori formal logic ultimately reduces, through behavioral evolution, to population biology. Still, even if we were in possession of a fully uniªed theory, it is not clear to me that the distinct disciplinary perspectives could be abandoned. To invoke an analogy from physics, Newto- nian mechanics remains a compelling and useful theoretical paradigm within its realm of applicability, despite having been superseded in principle by relativity and quantum mechanics.

Note Added on the Scope of Economics I am indebted to another referee, as well as the editor of this journal, for stressing the importance of clarity regarding the scope of economics envi- sioned here. To say that economics is broadly applicable is not to claim that it displaces, subsumes, or renders superºuous other disciplinary approaches. It is to assert, rather, that economic analysis offers a distinct contribution to our understanding of human activities in general, beyond those realms of endeavor which have traditionally been regarded as “economic.” David Friedman (2000, p. 8) offers a striking example from law. Let us suppose that in a state where the penalty for murder is life imprisonment, a proposal is under consideration to raise the penalty for armed robbery to life imprisonment as well. Legal scholars may argue over whether the proposal is constitutional. Philosophers may argue over whether it is just. An economist looks at the resulting structure of incentives: if the penalty for robbery is made as great as the penalty for murder, the number of robberies may decrease but we may also expect the number of murders to increase, as more robbers murder their victims to avoid being identi- ªed. Applied to science, economics cannot tell us whether a theory is correct, how to work out its consequences, or how to test it experimentally. It does not supply rules for logical deduction or consistent argumentation. It

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does not explain why some individuals show a special talent for scientiªc research. Let us however make the assumption that individual scientists are mo- tivated, not only by genuine curiosity, but also by a desire to see their work recognized as having a positive impact on the progress of science. Then regardless of the scope of their curiosity, we may expect them to specialize, and to specialize more narrowly the greater the number of their fellow researchers; for, the wider the range over which one seeks to contribute, the larger is the proportion of one’s time that must be devoted to acquiring background knowledge and skills to reach the frontier, the smaller the time available for original, recognition-earning research, and the greater the number of direct competitors. We may expect scientists to collaborate in pairs and groups in order to make faster progress and improve their chances of being the ªrst to achieve new results; and, at the same time, we may expect that collaborations among equals will be limited by problems of coordination and credit-sharing. We may expect that an individual scientist’s choice of which theory or model to pursue will depend not only on an assessment of which is more likely to be correct, but also on how well it matches one’s acquired technical expertise or the experimental apparatus at one’s disposal. Where there are many competing researchers, we may expect that any attempt to implement methodological prescriptions (such as developed by philosophers) for choosing among theories will encounter rapidly diminishing returns; for, even if one possesses an infallible method, if it takes time to acquire the necessary information and carry out the analysis, other researchers who have merely stumbled on the right choice will enjoy a head start. These insights, and many more (Walstad 2002), stem from what I take to be the essence of economic analysis: that is, to trace out implications of individual choice in the pursuit of goals, under assumptions regarding the nature of the goals, their relative importance to the individual, and the circumstances under which they are pursued. My purpose in this paper is to defend the validity and value of economic thinking, not to claim any intellectual hegemony of economics over other disciplines. I doubt that economics can tell us all we might hope to learn about human endeavors; most likely, it will carry more of the predictive and explanatory load in some realms than in others. Inevitably, there will be competition among proponents of various approaches; my interest lying with the economic, it is not my responsibility to make a case for the relevance of other approaches, be they, say, sociological or philosophical. Nevertheless, I hope all readers will concede that the vision presented here is not an “imperialist” one.

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Science as a Market Process What I am advocating is not just an economic perspective, but an understanding of science as a market process. This is no metaphor. A market is an arena, an institution, an organized system or set of options for voluntary exchange. Rather than attempt to fulªll their needs in isolated self-sufªciency, individuals ªnd it advantageous (indeed, essential) to engage in specialization and exchange. Scientists are highly specialized, and they engage in a great deal of exchange, as when they trade advice, data, and equipment. In particular, they participate in a well-deªned system of exchange in which recognition is exchanged for the opportunity to use another researcher’s results. This system is institutionalized primarily, though not exclusively, in the practice of citation. In the common-law tra- dition of customary right and obligation as it has evolved in academic research, when one makes use of the work of others one is obligated to cite that work. Citation is a payment, the culmination of an exchange that be- gan when research results were offered in the “market for ideas.” The pervasive role of this system of exchange in facilitating and coordinating the conduct of scientiªc research provides us with a solid rationale for analyzing science as a market process. An anonymous referee reminds me that this system of exchange involving recognition works only because recognition possesses value to the individual scientist. I am indebted also for the suggestion to emphasize the signiªcance of priority in the assignment of recognition. Reference is made to Stephan (1996, pp. 1201–2), who in turn cites Merton’s (1957) classic study of priority in science. All, or nearly all, recognition tends to accrue to the ªrst researcher or team that obtains a result or makes a discovery, even if competitors were close behind. The efforts of the also-rans may have possessed merit, but they go unrewarded. It is suggested that what we see here is precisely an example of the Coasean tendency toward selection of institutions with low transaction costs. Any attempt to acquire and disseminate reliable information about the progress achieved by a multitude of researchers, for the purpose of assigning credit more broadly and “fairly,” would surely require a vastly greater expenditure of time and effort than the system we actually ªnd in science. Apart from citation, there is another familiar institution through which recognition is exchanged for the use of another’s work. This is the academic research team consisting of a professor and one or more postdoc- toral fellows and graduate students. In addition to the experience they gain from their work under the professor’s direction, the postdocs and students obtain recognition from junior coauthorship of papers as well as the professor’s recommendation (another form of recognition) for future positions. The professor, in return, obtains their assistance to complete sub-

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stantial research projects in a timely manner. All parties stand to beneªt from the exchange. That the market for ideas differs in certain respects from its traditional economic counterpart may explain why Mäki and others have found the concept dubious, even as a metaphor. In traditional economics, a market is associated with buying and selling, with a medium of exchange and prices in terms of that medium (money). In the market for ideas, these features are absent. In particular, recognition does not, in my opinion, serve as a currency or medium of exchange (contra Barnes 1985, p. 43–7). Further- more, I do not think it useful to characterize published research results as the “intellectual property” of their author (contra Ravetz 1971, ch. 8; also Dasgupta and David 1987). The results of research just completed may be submitted for publication, consigned to the ºames, or stashed away at the scientist’s discretion (assuming that no obligation to the contrary has been accepted, perhaps in return for ªnancial support). At that point these results are the researcher’s property, in the sense that one owns one’s personal effects, whether papers or computer ªles, say, and has the right to permit or deny others access to them. Submission of the results for publication initiates a process of exchange that is completed by the accrual of citations from other researchers. Once this process has been initiated—once the ªndings have been published, i.e., “made public”—the author’s control over them is gone. No one else can be excluded from using them, and the right to receive citation cannot be transferred to others. That is why the research ªndings, having become a research contribution, can no longer be viewed as the author’s property. Furthermore, even though citation plays the role of a payment, it does not circulate as a medium of exchange and there is no haggling over price; the “price” to use someone’s published work is to cite it, and that is all. Let us now address Mäki’s conclusion (p. 486) that “either free-market economics is self-defeating, or else there must be two different concepts of free market, one for the ordinary economy, the other for science”. Earlier, we disposed of the ªrst horn (the proposed reºexivity test) of the dilemma. What of the second? There are indeed signiªcant differences between the scientiªc market of ideas and the conventional market economy, but it is worth asking why such differences should cause concern. Within the ordinary economy, after all, there exists a diverse array of markets: one thinks of the grocery market, the stock market, the market for personal services, etc. Such diversity does not undermine the economic approach; it provides scope for its application and demonstrates its versatility. Mäki asks “what precisely would be exchanged in the market for ideas?” (Emphasis in original; see also Sent 1997, pp. S147–8.) We have answered that question as it

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pertains to science. If an organized system or set of options for voluntary exchange constitutes a market, then we have demonstrated that markets and market processes lie at the heart of the social practice of scientiªc research. Now of course, if one were to insist on limiting the concept of the market to transactions involving money, then the “market for ideas” in schol- arly research would be only a metaphor. Mäki does not endorse a particular deªnition, but his concern about “two different markets” raises effectively the same issue: if the processes occurring in the market economy and in science have too little in common, then our use of the term “market” is gratuitous. This issue can only be settled on the basis of how fruitful a broad conception of the market proves to be, when applied systematically to science. Elsewhere, I have written at length on science as a market process (Walstad 2002). I ªnd that the market concept ªts integrally within a broad economic approach to understanding science and that economics not only offers considerable insight into the conduct of scientiªc research, but also serves well as a critical perspective on logical methodology, Mertonian sociology, and other approaches. It is only through such work, and criticism of it, that the signiªcance of market processes in science may be assessed.

Conclusion Economics offers a distinct and valuable contribution to our understanding of human endeavors, extending far beyond the scope of activities traditionally regarded as “economic.” The conception of economics from which I begin is that of the Austrian school: individuals make choices in pursuit of their goals; economics is the discipline which traces the consequences of that fact. I go further to suggest that a broad conception of the market naturally goes along with a broad conception of economics. Individuals pursue their goals at least partly through interaction with others. A term is needed to refer to the array of options for voluntary exchange, whether mediated by money or not. “Market” is the appropriate choice. In this paper, I have argued that a means-ends economic perspective must have something to say about the conduct of scientiªc research, because scientists have ends to which they allocate means. I have argued for the existence of an organized system of exchange—a market—in science. These conclusions have been offered in the context of an examination of concerns raised by Mäki (1999) regarding the prospects for a useful economic perspective on science. Mäki’s doubts about the consistency of an economic approach are not well-founded. His question as to what is exchanged in the market for ideas has been deªnitively answered: recognition is exchanged for the opportunity to use another’s research results. The

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differences between this market and the ordinary market economy need not discourage us from pursuing a market approach. Regarding a broad applicability for economic thinking, I have suggested dropping imperialist metaphors in favor of likening various analytical perspectives to different windows on human activity. A priori debate over how informative a view we may expect to ªnd, through any given window, must soon yield negative returns when we consider the opportunity cost of persisting in such contentious speculation—namely, the forgone beneªt of simply drawing the curtains wide and taking a good look.

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