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On Science As a Free Market On Science as a Free Market Allan Walstad University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown The question of whether science may usefully be viewed as a market process has recently been addressed by Mäki (1999), who concludes that “either free-market economics is self-defeating, or else there must be two different con- cepts of free market, one for the ordinary economy, the other for science.” Here I argue that such pessimism is unwarranted. Mäki proposes (see also Wible 1998) that the conduct of economic research itself be taken, self-reºexively, as a test case for any suggested economics of science. While agreeing that we may expect economics to apply to the conduct of economic research itself, I demonstrate that there is a lack of cogency, both in Mäki’s argument for his proposal and in his attempt to implement a reºexivity test. Mäki asks what would be exchanged in the scientiªc “market for ideas” (see also Sent 1997). The answer is that recognition is exchanged for the op- portunity to use another’s research results. The identiªcation of an organized and pervasive system of exchange establishes a ªrm basis for analyzing science as a market process. Introduction To allocate resources in the pursuit of chosen ends is an economic matter: a matter of costs and beneªts, of investments, risks, and payoffs— above all, a matter of choices and trade-offs. Surely, the allocation of cognitive re- sources in the pursuit of knowledge must be a case in point. In science, we may perhaps devote all our efforts to making a few extremely precise mea- surements, or we may achieve a greater number of measurements at the The author is indebted to K. Brad Wray, two anonymous referees, and the editor of this journal for useful suggestions and constructive criticism of this paper. Perspectives on Science 2001, vol. 9, no. 3 ©2002 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology 324 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/10636140160176170 by guest on 01 October 2021 Perspectives on Science 325 cost of poorer precision. We may spend years attempting to solve a partic- ularly signiªcant theoretical problem—at the risk of complete failure—or we may choose safer, less signiªcant problems. There are trade-offs associ- ated with collaboration versus independent work, with the strictness of one’s standards for accepting experimental results and other researchers’ ªndings, and with the choice between adopting a new theory or continu- ing to work within the old: thus, collaboration brings the beneªt of oth- ers’ expertise, but the coordination of multiple efforts takes time and im- poses limits on individual initiative; strict epistemic standards offer the beneªt of minimizing error at the risk of rejecting truth; adopting a new theory involves an investment in learning to use it, the risk that it will prove fruitless, and the opportunity cost of results that might have been achieved with the old; but, there is the potential payoff of achieving revo- lutionary advances with the new one. Of course, “scientiªc knowledge” as an object of human pursuit is not a philosophically unproblematic notion, and there are other goals which will inºuence the actions of individual scientists. Among these, we may be sure in most cases, are professional recognition and ªnancial support for one’s research. Economics as a means-ends analytical perspective on sci- ence, as on any realm of human action, must take into account that indi- viduals choose their goals, choose action in pursuit of those goals, and make decisions based on their own assessment of how well those goals have been, or are likely to be, met. A number of authors have invoked economic concepts in discussing the conduct of scientiªc research. Polanyi (1951; 1962), for example, saw something similar to a market economy in the decentralized structure of science, in the independence of individual researchers whose efforts are nevertheless coordinated and constrained through mutual oversight and the weight of authority of their peers, and in the cohesiveness of science that is maintained, in the absence of central direction, through the mutual oversight of overlapping specialized ªelds. Others have drawn attention to the signiªcance of exchange (Storer 1966), competition (Hagstrom 1965), and the division of labor (Kitcher 1990; Ghiselin 1989). Radnitzky (1987a,b) and Rescher (1989) have em- phasized cost-beneªt considerations. Diamond (1988), Goldman and Shaked (1991), and Wible (1998) have constructed mathematical models, respectively, of theory choice, truth acquisition, and misconduct in sci- ence, based on the principle of utility maximization by individual re- searchers. “Invisible hand” explanations have been promoted by Hull (1988; 1997) and more recently by Leonard (1998). Coase (1974) is among those who have spoken of a scientiªc “market for ideas.” Other economists who in recent years have been taking seriously a comprehen- Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/10636140160176170 by guest on 01 October 2021 326On Science as a Free Market sive economic approach to science include Dasgupta and David (1987; 1994) and Stephan (1996; see also Stephan and Levin 1992). If, from such diverse efforts, a distinct movement has begun to take shape, its critics may have been the ªrst to notice. Mirowski (1997) dis- misses Polanyi’s efforts as a failed example of “playing the economics trump card.” Hands (1997) issues a “caveat emptor” regarding invisible hand explanations (see also Wray 2000). Sent (1997) casts a highly critical “Economist’s Glance at Goldman’s Economics,” focusing on the collabora- tive work of Goldman and Shaked. Mäki (1999) inquires whether eco- nomic research itself may usefully be regarded as a free market process, tentatively arrives at a negative answer, and draws therefrom a broader pessimistic conclusion regarding science as a free market. The emergence of such criticism is to be welcomed as an acknowledg- ment that economics can no longer be ignored and as an opportunity, in responding to objections, to reªne the economic perspective and bring it into the mainstream of analytical perspectives on science. In that spirit, as an advocate of the economic point of view, I would like to address Uskali Mäki’s paper “On Science as a Free Market” (1999). (All page references to Mäki are to that work.) I will examine in turn three components of Mäki’s paper: (1) his argu- ment that an economics of scientiªc research should apply, self-reºexively, to the conduct of economic research itself; (2) the self-explanatory and self-justiªcatory test by which he proposes to judge any “economics of economics”; (3) his application of this test (with negative outcome) to the “free market economics of economics” advocated by Ronald Coase. We shall see that the proposed reºexivity test is not capable of yielding a tell- ing result. I will then proceed brieºy to make a positive case for viewing science as a market process. The Reflexivity Argument Mäki takes note (p. 486) of “the increasing employment of economic con- cepts and models in the depiction of science, including the notion of a free market for scientiªc ideas,” and he questions “the adequacy of the concep- tual resources of economics for this purpose.” He proposes to test that ade- quacy “by putting a version of free market economics to a self-reºective scrutiny.” He asserts (p. 487) that “[i]f economic notions are supposed to help us understand science, we may expect them to help us understand economics itself.” While plausible, this assertion does not follow, as he claims, from considerations regarding the status of economics itself as a science. Mäki states ( p. 487) that “to be taken seriously as...aresource in the study of science in general...economics had better be taken sufªciently Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/10636140160176170 by guest on 01 October 2021 Perspectives on Science 327 seriously as a scientiªc discipline.” Not so. Few would classify philosophy and history among the sciences; nevertheless, these ªelds have contributed much to our understanding of science as a process. Even the rhetoricians believe they have something to offer, and though their claims may be ex- aggerated, proffered insights can hardly be dismissed out of hand on the grounds that rhetoric is not a scientiªc discipline. Mäki contends further (p. 487) that if economics did not apply to itself, then it would be “a peculiar case...unlike most or all other scientiªc dis- ciplines.” But in what sense does physics, for example, apply to itself? There is only the tautological sense, namely, that knowing physics helps one understand physics—but such is true of economics and every other subject. Would anyone demand a “physics of physics” or, say, a “chemistry of chemistry”? We may safely conclude that the ability of economics to shed light on science is not dependent on the status of economics itself as a science, and the status of economics as a science is not dependent on its ability to shed light, reºexively, on itself. Nevertheless, if economics is to be regarded as a comprehensive analytical perspective on purposeful human activity, then we should indeed expect it to apply to the conduct of economic research. What matters in this regard is not the status of economics as a science but our ambitions for its broad applicability as a discipline. The Proposed Reflexivity Test Mäki is not, however, content to inquire whether an economic perspective may provide useful insight into the conduct of economic research. Rather, he demands that an economics of economic research both explain and jus- tify itself, reºexively, as the outcome of economic processes operating in the intellectual milieu of economic research. To quote (p. 491): ‘Is a free market economics able to explain...itsexistence and popularity as an outcome of a free market of economic ideas?’...Is a free market economics able to depict itself as an intellectually op- timal outcome of a free market of economic ideas? A free market economics of economics is expected to support a positive answer to both of these questions.
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