Law of Markets and Equilibrium
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A Brief Primer on the Economics of Targeted Advertising
ECONOMIC ISSUES A Brief Primer on the Economics of Targeted Advertising by Yan Lau Bureau of Economics Federal Trade Commission January 2020 Federal Trade Commission Joseph J. Simons Chairman Noah Joshua Phillips Commissioner Rohit Chopra Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter Commissioner Christine S. Wilson Commissioner Bureau of Economics Andrew Sweeting Director Andrew E. Stivers Deputy Director for Consumer Protection Alison Oldale Deputy Director for Antitrust Michael G. Vita Deputy Director for Research and Management Janis K. Pappalardo Assistant Director for Consumer Protection David R. Schmidt Assistant Director, Oÿce of Applied Research and Outreach Louis Silva, Jr. Assistant Director for Antitrust Aileen J. Thompson Assistant Director for Antitrust Yan Lau is an economist in the Division of Consumer Protection of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily refect those of the Federal Trade Commission or any individual Commissioner. ii Acknowledgments I would like to thank AndrewStivers and Jan Pappalardo for invaluable feedback on numerous revisions of the text, and the BE economists who contributed their thoughts and citations to this paper. iii Table of Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 Search Costs and Match Quality 5 3 Marketing Costs and Ad Volume 6 4 Price Discrimination in Uncompetitive Settings 7 5 Market Segmentation in Competitive Setting 9 6 Consumer Concerns about Data Use 9 7 Conclusion 11 References 13 Appendix 16 iv 1 Introduction The internet has grown to touch a large part of our economic and social lives. This growth has transformed it into an important medium for marketers to serve advertising. -
BIS Working Papers No 136 the Price Level, Relative Prices and Economic Stability: Aspects of the Interwar Debate by David Laidler* Monetary and Economic Department
BIS Working Papers No 136 The price level, relative prices and economic stability: aspects of the interwar debate by David Laidler* Monetary and Economic Department September 2003 * University of Western Ontario Abstract Recent financial instability has called into question the sufficiency of low inflation as a goal for monetary policy. This paper discusses interwar literature bearing on this question. It begins with theories of the cycle based on the quantity theory, and their policy prescription of price stability supported by lender of last resort activities in the event of crises, arguing that their neglect of fluctuations in investment was a weakness. Other approaches are then taken up, particularly Austrian theory, which stressed the banking system’s capacity to generate relative price distortions and forced saving. This theory was discredited by its association with nihilistic policy prescriptions during the Great Depression. Nevertheless, its core insights were worthwhile, and also played an important part in Robertson’s more eclectic account of the cycle. The latter, however, yielded activist policy prescriptions of a sort that were discredited in the postwar period. Whether these now need re-examination, or whether a low-inflation regime, in which the authorities stand ready to resort to vigorous monetary expansion in the aftermath of asset market problems, is adequate to maintain economic stability is still an open question. BIS Working Papers are written by members of the Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank for International Settlements, and from time to time by other economists, and are published by the Bank. The views expressed in them are those of their authors and not necessarily the views of the BIS. -
Simple Structural Econometrics of Price Elasticity
Simple Structural Econometrics of Price Elasticity Catherine Cazals Fr¶ed¶erique F`eve University of Toulouse University of Toulouse (GREMAQ and IDEI) (GREMAQ and IDEI) Patrick F`eve¤ Jean{Pierre Florens University of Toulouse University of Toulouse (CNRS{GREMAQ and IDEI) (IUF, GREMAQ and IDEI) Abstact The identi¯cation of demand parameters from individual data may be very di±cult due to the lack of price variation. The aim of this paper is to deliver a simple methodology for the treatment of this kind of data. The approach relies on a simple structural model of consumer behavior wherein demand and expenditure depend on a heterogeneity factor. Using the restrictions created by this structural model, we consider the identi¯cation of the price elasticity of demand. We ¯rst show that the structural parameters are not identi¯ed in the one period case. An extension of the model to a two period case allows to identify the structural parameters and thus the price elasticity of demand over periods. Keywords: structural model, heterogeneity factor, identi¯cation, price elasticity JEL Class.: C1, C2, D1 Introduction The identi¯cation of price elasticity from cross section individual data is impossible due to the lack of price variation in the sample. Even if panel data are available, the slow modi¯cation of tari®s and the usual small number of periods make very hazardous the estimation of the price elasticity. The aim of this paper is to present a simple methodology for the treatment of this kind of data and to show that we can take some advantage from ¤Corresponding author: GREMAQ{Universit¶e de Toulouse I, manufacture des Tabacs, b^at. -
Price and Volume Measurement in Services
Price and volume measurement in services Current Eurostat recommendations for NSIs Paul Konijn, Eurostat – C1 National Accounts OECD Workshop on Services 15-16 November 2004, Paris Outline Introduction General recommendations Retail trade Finance and insurance Telecommunications, software and business services Developing new services price indices Paris, 15-16 November 2004 Introduction December 2001: Eurostat Handbook on Price and Volume Measures in National Accounts Handbook = culmination of several years of work with EU Member States on all topics related to volume measurement Starting point: GDP growth rates sometimes difficult to compare due to different methodologies Paris, 15-16 November 2004 Introduction (cont.) Handbook is elaboration of ESA95 (and SNA93) and gives detailed guidance on deflation of products Main issues also laid down in two legal acts (from 1998 and 2002) Since 2001: implementation of handbook in Member States All Member States have provided Inventory of sources and methods Paris, 15-16 November 2004 Notes on productivity measurement Note: handbook is about national accounts -> focus is on macro picture of the economy Deflation of inputs equally important (and equally difficult) for productivity analysis!! Paris, 15-16 November 2004 A/B/C classification Classification of methods: A methods: ideal B methods: acceptable alternative C methods: unacceptable Move gradually over time from C to B to A C methods “outlawed” by 2006 Generally, input methods are C methods Paris, 15-16 November 2004 -
THE FREE-MARKET WELFARE STATE: Preserving Dynamism in a Volatile World
Policy Essay THE FREE-MARKET WELFARE STATE: Preserving Dynamism in a Volatile World Samuel Hammond1 Poverty and Welfare Policy Analyst Niskanen Center May 2018 INTRODUCTION welfare state” directly depresses the vote for reac- tionary political parties.3 Conversely, I argue that he perennial gale of creative destruc- the contemporary rise of anti-market populism in tion…” wrote the economist Joseph America should be taken as an indictment of our in- 4 Schumpeter, “…is the essential fact of adequate social-insurance system, and a refutation “T of the prevailing “small government” view that reg- capitalism.” For new industries to rise and flourish, old industries must fail. Yet creative destruction is ulation and social spending are equally corrosive to a process that is rarely—if ever—politically neu- economic freedom. The universal welfare state, far tral; even one-off economic shocks can have lasting from being at odds with innovation and economic political-economic consequences. From his vantage freedom, may end up being their ultimate guaran- point in 1942, Schumpeter believed that capitalism tor. would become the ultimate victim of its own suc- The fallout from China’s entry to the World Trade cess, inspiring reactionary and populist movements Organization (WTO) in 2001 is a clear case in against its destructive side that would inadvertently point. Cheaper imports benefited millions of Amer- strangle any potential for future creativity.2 icans through lower consumer prices. At the same This paper argues that the countries that have time, Chinese import competition destroyed nearly eluded Schumpeter’s dreary prediction have done two million jobs in manufacturing and associated 5 so by combining free-markets with robust systems services—a classic case of creative destruction. -
The Relationship Between Capitalism and Democracy
The Relationship Between Capitalism And Democracy Item Type text; Electronic Thesis Authors Petkovic, Aleksandra Evelyn Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 01/10/2021 12:57:19 Item License http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/625122 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY By ALEKSANDRA EVELYN PETKOVIC ____________________ A Thesis Submitted to The Honors College In Partial Fulfillment of the Bachelors degree With Honors in Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and Law THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA M A Y 2 0 1 7 Approved by: ____________________________ Dr. Thomas Christiano Department of Philosophy Abstract This paper examines the very complex relationship between capitalism and democracy. While it appears that capitalism provides some necessary element for a democracy, a problem of political inequality and a possible violation of liberty can be observed in many democratic countries. I argue that this political inequality and threat to liberty are fueled by capitalism. I will analyze the ways in which capitalism works against democratic aims. This is done through first illustrating what my accepted conception of democracy is. I then continue to depict how the various problems with capitalism that I describe violate this conception of democracy. This leads me to my conclusion that while capitalism is necessary for a democracy to reach a certain needed level of independence from the state, capitalism simultaneously limits a democracy from reaching its full potential. -
Demand Curve
Econ 201: Introduction to Economics Analysis September 4 Lecture: Supply and Demand Jeffrey Parker Reed College Daily dose of The Far Side Keeping with the vegetable theme from Wednesday… www.thefarside.com 2 Preview of this class session • Basic principles of market analysis using supply and demand curves are central to economics • Formal conditions for “perfectly competitive” markets are strict and rarely satisfied • We discuss what supply curves and demand curves are • We define market equilibrium and why we expect markets to move there • We consider effects of shifts in curves on equilibrium price and quantity 3 “Two-curve” analysis • Why is it useful? • Two key variables (price, quantity) • One curve slopes up and the other down • Some exogenous variables affect one curve, others the other • Few affect both • Change in any exogenous variable affects one curve in predictable way: • Intersection moves SE, NE, NW, or SE • Predictable changes in price and quantity exchanged https://www.econgraphs.org/graphs/micro/supply_and_demand/supply_and_demand?textbook=varian 4 Demand function • Relates quantity of good demanded to its relative price • Quantity demanded = amount buyers are willing and able to purchase • Relative price is price of good holding all other goods constant • Reflects decision-making by potential buyers • Demand function: QD = D (P ) • Negative relationship • Downward-sloping curve • Need not be straight line https://www.econgraphs.org/graphs/micro/supply_and_demand/supply_and_demand?textbook=varian 5 Demand curves 6 Demand -
Neoliberalism, Higher Education, and the Knowledge Economy: from The
This article was downloaded by: On: 28 September 2010 Access details: Access Details: Free Access Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37- 41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Education Policy Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713693402 Neoliberalism, higher education and the knowledge economy: from the free market to knowledge capitalism Mark Olssena; Michael A. Petersb a University of Surrey, UK b University of Glasgow, UK To cite this Article Olssen, Mark and Peters, Michael A.(2005) 'Neoliberalism, higher education and the knowledge economy: from the free market to knowledge capitalism', Journal of Education Policy, 20: 3, 313 — 345 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/02680930500108718 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02680930500108718 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. -
Theory of Public Goods
Public Goods Private versus Public Goods A private good (bread) exhibits the following two properties: exclusive: A good is exclusive if once you have purchased a good, then you can exclude others from consuming it. rival: A good is rival in consumption, in the sense that once someone buys a loaf of bread and consumes it, then that precludes you from consuming that same loaf of bread. • A rival good is depletable. A technical consequence of depletability is that consumption of additional amounts of rival goods involve some marginal costs of production. A public good (air quality) may exhibit the following two properties: nonexclusive: A good is nonexclusive if no one can be excluded from benefiting from or consuming the good once it is produced. An implication of nonexclusivity is that goods can be enjoyed without direct payment. nonrivalrous: One person's consumption of a good does not diminish the amount or quality available for others. • A nonrival good is nondepletable. A technical consequence of nondepletability is that the marginal cost of providing a nonrival good to an additional consumer is zero. • All public goods exhibit the nonexcludability property but they do not necessarily exhibit the nonrivalrous property. nonrival rival • water pollution in small body of private good excludable water, indoor air pollution pure public good/bad congestible public good/bad • users neither interfere with each • users affect good's usefulness to other nor increase good's others — mutual interference usefulness to each other of users creates negative nonexcludable (free–rider problem) externality (free–access • biodiversity, greenhouse gases problem) • noise, defence, radio signal • ocean fishery, parks • bridge, highway Aggregate Demand Curves for Private and Public Goods 1. -
Markets Not Capitalism Explores the Gap Between Radically Freed Markets and the Capitalist-Controlled Markets That Prevail Today
individualist anarchism against bosses, inequality, corporate power, and structural poverty Edited by Gary Chartier & Charles W. Johnson Individualist anarchists believe in mutual exchange, not economic privilege. They believe in freed markets, not capitalism. They defend a distinctive response to the challenges of ending global capitalism and achieving social justice: eliminate the political privileges that prop up capitalists. Massive concentrations of wealth, rigid economic hierarchies, and unsustainable modes of production are not the results of the market form, but of markets deformed and rigged by a network of state-secured controls and privileges to the business class. Markets Not Capitalism explores the gap between radically freed markets and the capitalist-controlled markets that prevail today. It explains how liberating market exchange from state capitalist privilege can abolish structural poverty, help working people take control over the conditions of their labor, and redistribute wealth and social power. Featuring discussions of socialism, capitalism, markets, ownership, labor struggle, grassroots privatization, intellectual property, health care, racism, sexism, and environmental issues, this unique collection brings together classic essays by Cleyre, and such contemporary innovators as Kevin Carson and Roderick Long. It introduces an eye-opening approach to radical social thought, rooted equally in libertarian socialism and market anarchism. “We on the left need a good shake to get us thinking, and these arguments for market anarchism do the job in lively and thoughtful fashion.” – Alexander Cockburn, editor and publisher, Counterpunch “Anarchy is not chaos; nor is it violence. This rich and provocative gathering of essays by anarchists past and present imagines society unburdened by state, markets un-warped by capitalism. -
A Hayekian Restatement of Free Market Environmentalism
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Research Papers in Economics 1 Liberty, Markets and Environmental Values: A Hayekian Defence of Free Market Environmentalism Mark Pennington Department of Politics Queen Mary College, University of London [email protected] 2 Liberty, Markets and Environmental Values: A Hayekian Defence of Free Market Environmentalism Introduction In recent years the development of ‘free market environmentalism’ has marked a major advance in the relationship between the classical liberal tradition and the challenge to individualist institutions presented by the modern environmental movement. Building on the work of Coase and the New Institutional Economics free market environmentalism has demonstrated that, far from being the inevitable result of market institutions environmental problems are best explained by the absence of these very institutions. Notwithstanding these advances, however, free market environmentalism has failed to have a significant impact on the environmental movement. Indeed, in so far as there has been any reaction to proposals for the extension of private property rights, these have tended to be hostile. One of the reasons for this lack of progress stems from the differing social ontologies adopted by the proponents of environmental markets and the green political theorists and activists who tend to favour command and control models of environmental regulation. The former have a tendency to emphasise notions of rational self interest, utility maximisation and efficiency, whilst the latter focus on communitarian conceptions which emphasise a non-reductionist account of social interaction and a ‘moralistic’ approach to environmental issues that seeks to institutionalise a search for the ‘common good’. -
New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: a General Equilibrium Analysis
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis Harold L. Cole and Lee E. Ohanian∗ Working Paper 597 Revised May 2001 ABSTRACT There are two striking aspects of the recovery from the Great Depression in the United States: the recovery was very weak and real wages in several sectors rose significantly above trend. These data contrast sharply with neoclassical theory, which predicts a strong recovery with low real wages. We evaluate the contribution of New Deal cartelization policies designed to limit competition and increase labor bargaining power to the persistence of the Depression. We develop a model of the bargaining process between labor and firms that occurred with these policies, and embed that model within a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model. We find that New Deal cartelization policies are an important factor in accounting for the post-1933 Depression. We also find that the key depressing element of New Deal policies was not collusion per se, but rather the link between paying high wages and collusion. ∗Both, U.C.L.A. and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. We thank Andrew Atkeson, Tom Holmes, Narayana Kocherlakota, Tom Sargent, Nancy Stokey, seminar participants, and in particular, Ed Prescott for comments. Ohanian thanks the Sloan Foundation and the National Science Foundation for support. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. 1. Introduction There are two striking aspects of the recovery from the Great Depression in the United States.