The Epistemology of Science: Acceptance, Explanation, and Realism
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF SCIENCE: ACCEPTANCE,EXPLANATION, AND REALISM Finnur Dellsen´ A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences. Chapel Hill 2014 Approved by: Marc B. Lange John T. Roberts Matthew Kotzen Ram Neta William G. Lycan c 2014 Finnur Dellsen´ ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT FINNUR DELLSEN:´ The Epistemology of Science: Acceptance, Explanation, and Realism. (Under the direction of Marc B. Lange) Natural science tells a story about what the world is like. But what kind of story is this supposed to be? On a popular (realist) view, this story is meant to provide the best possible explanations of the aspects of the world with which we are all acquainted. A realist also thinks that the story should in some sense provide explanations that are probable in light of our evidence, and that these explanations ought to fit together into a coherent whole. These requirements turn out to be surprisingly hard to satisfy given the received view of how scientific theories are evaluated. However, I argue that if scientific theories are eval- uated comparatively rather than absolutely for explanatory purposes – optimifically rather than satisficingly – then we can provide a fully realist view of the connections between explanation, probability, and coherence. It is one thing to say what science’s story of the world ought ideally be like, it is another to say that the story as it is actually being told lives up to this ideal. Do we have good reasons to believe that the picture as it is currently being presented to us is true, at least for the most part? “Yes,” answer realists, “as long as our theories are empirically successful.” Anti-realists respond that success is a poor guide to truth, appealing to the rather depressing history of successful theories that turned out to be false. Although I count myself among realists, I argue that realists have done themselves a disservice by focusing too much on empirical success in arguing for the correctness of the current scientific world- view. Instead I argue that one of the major reasons why currently accepted theories should (typically) be taken as true concerns the fact that they enjoy a certain kind of privileged status within scientific communities. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Although philosophy is for me a mostly solitary activity, there is hardly a single thought in this dissertation that hasn’t been greatly improved in response to the comments and criticism of many thoughtful and knowledgable people. Most importantly, I have benefit- ted enormously from interactions with my three dissertation advisors: Marc Lange, John Roberts and Matt Kotzen. It was John Roberts who more than once recognized some barely viable seeds of philosophical ideas – hidden in a forest of confusion and irrelevancies – and generously helped me transform them into some of the central theses and arguments herein. To Matt I owe special thanks for both encouragement and inspiration at crucial moments, though most importantly for extremely constructive criticism. My greatest thanks go to Marc, however, who has repeatedly made me suspect that the platonic form of dissertation advisors is located here in the material world. Numerous others have helped me develop the ideas herein with their support and intel- ligent feedback. These include nearly all of those who have passed through the philosophy department at UNC Chapel Hill since I began my graduate studies in 2009. Among the UNC faculty, Ram Neta, Bill Lycan and Keith Simmons deserve special mention for their encouragement and helpful comments both early and late in the process. A good chunk of the current version of the dissertation was written in the good company of Miroslav Losonsky, Jen Kling, Megan Mitchell, and Tigo, all but one of whom provided intelligent comments that were much appreciated. Special thanks are also due to Craig Warmke, Luke Elson, Lindsay Brainard, Kate Nolfi, Wesley Sauret, Nate Sharadin and Huginn Thorsteins- son, for very helpful discussions at various stages, and to Elanor Taylor and Katie Elliot for being my official and not-so-official graduate student mentors earlier in the dissertation writing process. Finally, I would like to thank audiences at four Work-in-Progress presen- tations at UNC Chapel Hill, at the North Carolina Philosophical Society annual meeting iv (Spring 2014), and at the symposium on scientific realism at the University of Iceland’s Hugvisindathing (Spring 2014). On a more personal note, work on this dissertation began shortly after the birth of my dear daughter, Katr´ın Anna. It is my hope that Katr´ın will someday read this and realize how all the joy she has brought me made me capable of spending so much time on the frankly esoteric topics herein. My mother Snjolaug´ has assisted me in various capacities while working on this dissertation, just as she has throughout my entire life. My greatest debt, however, will always be to my beloved Erla. Any attempt to express my gratitude to her for all that she has done is sure to fail, completely and miserably. I hope I will be forgiven for not even trying. v TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 PROLOGUE ............................................................................ 1 2 REAL(IST(IC)) ACCEPTANCE ....................................................... 5 2.1 Introduction ........................................................................ 5 2.2 Realism: Reconstructing the Debate.............................................. 6 2.2.1 Distinguishing Acceptance and Belief..................................... 8 2.2.2 Realism Redefined .......................................................... 10 2.3 Two Anti-Realisms ................................................................ 13 2.3.1 Empiricism and Manifestationalism ....................................... 13 2.3.2 Empirical Adequacy and Prediction ....................................... 16 2.4 Accepting and Explaining ......................................................... 19 2.5 An Argument for Realism ......................................................... 22 2.6 Explanation and Reasonable Belief............................................... 25 2.6.1 Explanatory Moore-Paradoxes ............................................. 26 2.6.2 Empiricist Alternatives ..................................................... 28 2.7 Conclusion ......................................................................... 31 3 EXPLANATORY ACCEPTABILITY ................................................. 33 3.1 Introduction ........................................................................ 33 3.2 Preliminaries ....................................................................... 35 3.3 The Threshold View ............................................................... 37 3.3.1 The Preface Paradox ........................................................ 39 3.3.2 Improbable Explanations ................................................... 42 3.3.3 The Lottery Paradox ........................................................ 44 vi 3.3.4 Deductive Cogency ......................................................... 46 3.4 Satisficing versus Optimizing Views ............................................. 49 3.5 The Optimality Account........................................................... 51 3.5.1 Explanatory Rivals.......................................................... 52 3.5.2 Probabilistic Optimality .................................................... 54 3.5.3 From Local to Global Acceptability, and Back Again .................... 56 3.6 Escaping Paradox .................................................................. 58 3.7 Inference to the Likeliest Explanation ............................................ 60 3.8 Conclusion ......................................................................... 63 4 REALISM AND THE ABSENCE OF RIVALS ...................................... 64 4.1 Introduction ........................................................................ 64 4.2 Underdetermination through Underconsideration................................ 68 4.3 Evidence and Absence ............................................................ 72 4.4 Determining Underdetermination................................................. 77 4.5 The New Induction ................................................................ 83 4.6 The No-Privilege Argument....................................................... 88 4.7 Conclusion ......................................................................... 91 5 EPILOGUE.............................................................................. 93 A APPENDIX: PROOFS OF THEOREMS .............................................. 96 A.1 Proof of Theorem 1 ................................................................ 96 A.2 Proof of Theorem 2 ................................................................ 102 A.3 Proof of Theorem 3 ................................................................ 104 REFERENCES ............................................................................. 105 vii 1 PROLOGUE Natural science tells a story about what the world is like – perhaps the most magnificent story ever told – and in so doing, it appeals to some of the most bizarre posits ever con- ceived. This story promises to explain most, and perhaps ultimately all, aspects of the world with which we are acquainted. But what kind of story is