Green Militarism and Its Effects on Local Inhabitants ______

Green Militarism and its Effects on Local Inhabitants ______

Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations

Author: Flynn Nash Supervisor: Michael Eze Student Number: 1159885 Second Reader: Luc Fransen

22, June 2018 Word Count: 17,582

Contents Acknowledgements: ...... 3 Abstract: ...... 4 Abbreviations: ...... 5 1. Introduction ...... 6 2. Literature Review ...... 9 3.0 Theoretical Framework ...... 13 3.1 Conservation ...... 14 3.2 Neoliberal Conservation ...... 15 3.3 Conservation Security ...... 19 4. Research Design ...... 20 4.1 Methodology...... 20 4.2 Case Selection ...... 22 4.3. Data ...... 24 5.0 Case Study ...... 24 5.1 Historical Overview of the Conflict in the DRC ...... 24 5.1.2 Belgian Congo 1885-1960 ...... 25 5.1.3 Independence ...... 26 5.1.4 Congolese Wars ...... 27 5.1.5 Present Day Crisis ...... 28 5.2 International Involvement and Influence ...... 29 5.3 Natural Resources ...... 30 5.4 Virunga National Park ...... 31 5.4.1 History ...... 31 5.4.2 Funding ...... 32 5.4.3 Militarization and Legitimization ...... 33 5.5 Neoliberalizing Conservation in Virunga National Park...... 35 5.6 Militarization and Increase in Displacement, Refugees and Attacks ...... 36 6.0 Analysis ...... 38 6.1 Creation of Virunga brought Profound Change ...... 38 6.2 Present Resistance and Growing Distrust ...... 41 6.3 Local Inhabitants and Armed Groups ...... 43 6.4 Further militarization ...... 45 6.5 Effects on Aid ...... 47

7.0 Conclusion ...... 49 8.0 Bibliography ...... 51

Acknowledgements:

I would like to express my gratitude to my Professor, Michael Eze, for his support, patience, knowledge and invaluable feedback throughout my studies. I am also grateful to my fellow classmates in the African Renaissance research project, for their support and friendly advice. Lastly, I would like to thank Mom for her unrelenting love and encouragement, without her my studies abroad would not have been possible.

Abstract:

In response to the loss and destruction of biodiversity, we have witnessed an rise in green militarization, also known as armed conservation, which refers to an increase in the use of military tactics and methods by nature conservation groups in 'defense of the environment'. Green militarization primarily takes place in protected areas that are already experiencing internal conflict and violence. Yet, how does this ongoing militarization affect local inhabitants and communities? This thesis examines the historical and contemporary drivers of the conflict in the eastern region of the Democratic of the Congo, and what led to the militarization of Virunga National Park. I follow up with an in-depth analysis of the adoption of green militarization undertaken by Park management in response to conflict with various armed militia groups, as well as the consequential impacts this has had on local inhabitants in and around the Virunga area.

Abbreviations:

AFRICAN CONSERVATION FUND ( ACF)

ALLIANCE DES FORCES DÉMOCRATIQUES POUR LA LIBÉRATION DU CONGO (AFDL)

ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES (ADF)

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)

EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC)

FORCES ARMÉES DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO (FARDC)

FORCES DÉMOCRATIQUES DE LIBÉRATION DU RWANDA (FDLR)

INSTITUT CONGOLAIS POUR LE CONSERVATION DE LA NATURE (ICCN)

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (IO)

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE (IRC)

MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES (MSF)

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION (NGO)

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (PPP)

PROTECTED AREAS (PAS)

RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF)

RWANDAN ARMED FORCES (RAF)

UNITED NATIONS (UN)

1. Introduction

In response to the destruction of biodiversity, green militarization, also known as green violence, armed conservation or the militarization of conservation, has been increasing at an unparalleled rate, especially in Africa (Verweijen and Marijnen, 2016; 1; Lombard, 2015; Lunstrum, 2014). Green militarization refers to the increase of military tactics and methods used by nature conservation groups in defense of the environment (Lombard, 2015; Lunstrum 2014; Duffy 2014). However, we have seen a shift in these conservation groups, from ‘defenders of the environment’, to a war by conservation, in which an evolved militarized response has put these groups on the offensive instead of the defensive (Duffy, 2014). Scholarly descriptions of green militarization often show two distinct groups of people involved. The first group is comprised of militarized actors or protectors of biodiversity, such as Park guards or other armed forces, who use varying kinds of authority and violence in pursuit of ‘saving the environment’. The second group consists of local inhabitants who are usually the victims of this control; they are uprooted from their homes and lands and are forced to face new inexplicable challenges (Duffy, 2014; Lombard, 2015). This aggressive militarized response has expanded beyond protected areas (PAs), into the local communities that surround it (Duffy, 2014). In such descriptions, the effects of armed conservation on local inhabitants is devastating, and only reinforces a prevailing narrative that prioritizes the livelihood of biodiversity to the lives of local inhabitants (Lombard, 2015). Engagement between these militarized actors and local inhabitants generally include descriptions of use of force, dispossession of land and resources, the redrawing and enforcement of borders and other objectives relating to control and power that connect economic benefits to conservation practices (Lombard, 2015). Green militarization draws upon techniques from imperialism, in which a militarized response to conservation is normalized and justified through a narrative of security and through establishing control over military matters (Marijenen et al, 2016). My research aims to answer “how and why are local populations affected by a green militarized response to conservation?” To answer the main question, I will also seek to answer supporting research questions:

a) How did green militarization emerge? b) What actors are involved in green militarization? d) Who benefits from green militarization?

e) How is a militarized response to conservation legitimized?

The study of green militarism is relatively new literature that has gained more traction and interest amongst scholars, however, it remains a much-needed area of academic exploration and analysis. As such, an in-depth review of green militarization literature will be undertaken, including its counterinsurgency strategies, training tactics, and its implementation and enforcement of borders. I will present my theoretical framework, building upon the neoliberalization of conservation and what it means for conservation practices and approaches. I will also introduce conservation security, which can be seen as a way to legitimize and justify green militarization. My methodology will then be presented, including its conceptualization and operationalization. This will be followed by an elaborate case study, where I will examine the historical and contemporary drivers of the conflict in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Subsequently, I will undertake an in-depth evaluation of the adoption of green militarization by Virunga National Park management in response to the conflict, as well as its consequential impacts on local inhabitants in and around the Virunga area. I will present my findings in the analysis section, in which I will show how green militarism has negatively affected the livelihood and security of local inhabitants and their communities. I will specifically analyze how local inhabitants respond to and resist militarized conservation practices, and how their opposition stems from lack of access to land and resources. Lastly, I will conclude. This research is important for a variety of reasons. First, conservation success is often dependent on local support, which is deeply contingent on the perceptions of the negative or positive impacts of conservation practices experienced by locals. Local communities who perceive conservation practices to be harmful to their livelihood, may resist or refuse to cooperate with conservation authorities nor engage in their practices (Holmes, 2013). Second, it has been researched elsewhere (Lunstrum, 2014; Lombard, 2015, 2016; Verweijnen et al, 2016) that the green militarization response to biodiversity destruction further fuels violence and conflict in protected areas. This not only has negative consequences for the environment, but also for local inhabitants’ safety and well-being. Furthermore, the effects green militarization has on local inhabitants can provide insight and knowledge for improving conservation practices and policies on a global level.

2. Literature Review

According to Duffy, we are currently witnessing a new phase of conservation, which she refers to as a ‘war by conservation’ (2016). This phenomenon merges concerns about the loss of biodiversity with distresses about global security (Duffy, 2016). War by conservation, is notably not an entirely new occurrence, as the use of violence against local communities to protect biodiversity and the militarization of endangered areas has been well recorded and observed throughout history (Duffy, 2014, 2016; Pelusa and Vandergeest 2011; Crosby, 1986). It is instead, indicative of a more forceful response to the endangerment of biodiversity; as the threat to wildlife has increased, so has the sense that conservation groups need to engage in a more assertive approach to protect it, which has become widely known as “a war to save them” (Duffy, 2016; Pelusa et al 2011; Lunstrum 2014). Military roots have been embedded in conservation throughout history, however, an intensification of militarized methods occurred during the 1980s due to an increase in heavily armed poachers (Lunstrum, 2014). Many African governments began supplying park guards with more stringent militarized training, more deadly weapons, and allowed the use of more lethal force (Büscher, 2013; Lombard 2015). Although the militarization of protected areas is not completely unique, an escalating pattern of militarization of conservation practices has evolved throughout the world (Lunstrum, 2014). National armies, rebel groups, and some other armed forces have taken on a key role in launching conservation practices, which often involve use of force and violence (Lunstrum, 2014). Green militarization was first coined by Lunstrum in 2014 (p. 817), in reference to “the use of military and paramilitary (military-like) actors, techniques, technologies, and partnerships in the pursuit of conservation.” Green militarization is most prevalent and intense in protected areas (PAs) (Verweijen et al, 2016), where armed conflict, wildlife poaching and other illegal activities, that lead to further endangerment of the environment exist (Duffy and Büscher, 2015). Many of these PAs are national parks in Africa, where Park guards and other armed forces (including rebel groups and national forces) play an important role in protecting the vulnerable biodiversity. Increasingly, Park guards and armed forces in PAs are taught and trained by Western foreign military actors and private security companies (Verweijen et al, 2016). This provides guards with a multitude of weapons and surveillance equipment and in some cases, allows cooperation with other armed rebel groups who are similarly dedicated to a war in the name of conservation (Duffy et al, 2015).

As various scholars have pointed out, these developments have resulted in an ever- increasing connection between conservation and paramilitary methods and tactics, which have strengthened a connection between environmental authority and military governance (Verweijen et al, 2016; Pelusa et al 2011; Lombard, 2015). The strengthening of this link fosters conflict, that in turn reinforces and subjects local inhabitants to “violent enclosures” (Dressler and Guieb, 2015). Specifically, when park guards use military authority and environmental governance to manage land and resources in PAs that also host conflict and suppression, the prospect for violent enclosures increases; these enclosures restrict access to land, redefine social relations, and promote a power struggle over access to resources that are central to the livelihood of local communities (Dressler et al, 2015). In PAs where resources are abundant, military actors typically redefine boundaries, as mutual reinforcing enclosures, increasing distress, intimidation and violence to control the area and its resources (Peluso et al, 2011). In other words, PAs have evolved into areas of violence, where human rights violations and violence against humans is accepted “in defense of the environment”, legitimizing and normalizing the militant response (Neumann, 2004; Pelusa et al, 2011). The literature relating to green militarization examines various facets of the conjunction of counterinsurgency methods and conservation. Green militarization and counterinsurgency methods and tactics share violent discourses, in which practices such as “shoot to kill”, property demolition, intimidation, displacements, dispossession, surveillance and coercive patrolling are frequently utilized (Verweijen et al, 2016; Büscher and Ramutsindela, 2016; Dunlap and Fairhead, 2014). It is important to note, there exists a distinction between hard and soft counterinsurgency approaches that are used in relation to green militarization. A hard counterinsurgency approach to conservation refers to overt violence carried out by military actors or other armed forces committed to the war for biodiversity (Dunlap et al, 2014). This approach consists of violent campaigns, arrests, armed conflict, and other enforcement tactics that fund ‘community-based policing’ (Lombard, 2015). A soft counterinsurgency relies on the camouflage of positive social investments, or more accurately described as ‘development schemes’ propelled by private investment (Verweijen et al, 2016). This soft approach is characterized by ‘community- based programs’, such as an allocation of goods through NGOs that build hospitals and schools, or providing foreign aid to conspire with elite actors (Dunlap et al, 2014). These programs are aimed at extending control over local communities and encouraging them to internalize hegemonic values (Verweijen et al, 2016). The ultimate goal is to create a consciousness toward wildlife,

10 in which local communities will not object to the management, securitization, development and control of natural resources by Western actors (Dunlap et al, 2014; Lombard, 2015). Four key similarities between counterinsurgency and green militarism methods and practices have been highlighted by academics (Lunstrum, 2014; Verweijen et al, 2016; Duffy, 2014). First, the spatial aspects that lay the foundation for militarization, specifically the drawing and enforcing of borders, labelling of actors, and methods used to securitize a defined area, are also implemented in conservation efforts in PAs (Dressler et al, 2015). For instance, Verweijen and Marijnen note that “both counterinsurgency and conservation are driven by framings that draw boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate forest dwellers, legitimate and illegitimate resource and land use, and legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence” (2016, p. 3). This multifaceted boundary drawing results in distinct areas where different moral codes can be applied, and the use of violence and force becomes validated (Pelusa et al, 2011). Second, green militarization and counterinsurgency both control local communities and their movements, including access to use of land and natural resources (Hochleithner, 2017; Lunstrum, 2014). PAs have a strong influence and connection to the livelihood of local inhabitants, which is commonly accompanied by displacement and limitations on cultivation, hunting, fishing and farming (Hocleithner, 2017). Whatever the ultimate objective, altruistic or not, this tactic generally relies on blocking local populations from their homes and resources, which has many direct consequences relating to their livelihood. Third, green militarization and counterinsurgency similarly use violence, whether it be a minimalist conception of violence, tangible violence, or the broader definition of violence, structural violence (Verweijen et al, 2016; Büscher et al 2016). For example, in response to an increase in poaching in South Africa’s Peace Parks, Büscher shows how this militarized response of Park guards and other armed forces has resulted in a social and linguistic form of violence (2011). A fourth commonality, is that both counterinsurgency and green militarization have evoked resistance from local inhabitants, due to loss of access to land and resources, as well as issues with legitimacy of actions (Verweijen et al, 2016). Scholars have also given attention to the relationship between green militarization and poaching (see Lunstrum, 2014; Duffy, 2014; Lombard 2015). Poaching teams have become highly militarized and arrive heavily armed, with a multitude of weaponry that would not typically be used for illegal wildlife tracking, such as automatic weapons and other weapons used for combat (Lunstrum, 2014). As poaching teams have become increasingly more aggressive and militarized, so have ‘protectors’ of PAs, which encompass national defense forces, park rangers and guards, foreign actors, foreign states and NGOs. More simply put, as

11 commercial poachers become more heavily armed and advanced in their methods, protectors of PAs follow suit, rinse and repeat (Lunstrum, 2014). Both state actors and poaching teams enter a PA ready and inclined to engage in deadly use of violence and force, which produces a vicious cycle of military buildup where soldiers, wildlife, local inhabitants, poachers, rebel groups, and other armed forces are in constant contention with each other (Dressler et al, 2015). Furthermore, as both sides become increasingly more forceful and aggressive, the value of wildlife parts (such as ivory, rhino horn, mountain gorillas), increases correspondingly, creating even more reason to poach and to fight using violent tactics, ensuing further militarization from state actors, resulting in more conflict and death (Pelusa et al, 2011). Despite this militarized response state-side and an increase in arrests and killings of poachers, a stubborn fact remains: poaching across Africa continues to intensify and increase (Welz, 2013). Although wildlife would of course be at greater risk without anti-poaching efforts, other facets concerned with improving biodiversity have been ignored, such as improving justice systems, and initiating efforts to weaken demand for wildlife (Welz, 2013). Several scholars have also analyzed the linkage between poaching, the loss of wildlife and global security matters (see Duffy, 2016; Pelusa et al, 2011; Lunstrum 2014). Poachers are typically framed as terrorists, creating a link between poaching and organized crime, in which worries and distresses about the environment are voiced by various powerful global actors, that include nation states, armed forces, private security companies, militaries, IOs and NGOs (Neumann, 2004; Duffy, 2016). Additionally, the relationship between poaching and terrorism has influenced decisions about a suitable response to the loss of wildlife; this creates a discourse in which powerful states and Western actors can call for a more forceful course of action (Duffy, 2016). For instance, Duffy notes in her 2016 study, there exists mounds of evidence that wildlife trafficking and poaching is being funded by armed rebel groups, including groups such as Al Shabaab, Boko Haram and the Janjaweed “which threaten the stability and security of many countries in Africa” (p. 242). She goes onto argue “the discursive link between poaching and terrorism is used to further the interests of the US- led War on Terror and has meant that conservation has been integrated into much wider sets of policy debates and initiatives linked to global security” (p. 242). Scholars have paid close attention to the rationalities that lay the foundation for legitimizing and normalizing the process of green militarization (Duffy, 2014; 2016; Neumann, 2004). The evidence of a connection between poaching and terrorism is becoming a vital point in legitimating the arguments of green militarism for policy networks,

12 specifically within powerful Western government circles; it normalizes and legitimizes the militarized response to the loss of biodiversity and wildlife, which in turn allows the use of heavy weaponry, further surveillance and use of deadly force (Duffy, 2016). The discourse surrounding the association between poaching and terrorism, allows one to exploit concerns about global security threats, and legitimizes military action for identified targets for the ‘War on Terror’ (Duffy, 2014; 2016; Neumann, 2004). Authors have also suggested green militarization further fuels violence, by contributing to its normalizing and legitimization (Hochcleithner, 2017; Neumann 2004; Lunstrum 2014). This can be seen through a poaching vs. anti-poaching narrative in which a kind of ‘arms race’ has ensued, contributing to further destabilization of relations between park guards and locals (Lunstrum, 2014). Until now, scarce attention has been paid to the direct and indirect effects of green militarization on local inhabitants’ communities and livelihoods. While some academics have explored green militarization effects on local inhabitants’ access to resources and dispossession of land (Lombard, 2015; Verijwen et al 2016; Büscher and Whande, 2007), it seems an over-emphasis has been placed upon the convergence of conservation, violence, and poaching and not enough attention has been given to the ways in which local communities are affected over a long period of time. The intensive dual militarization by both park guards and poachers creates a space in which innocent bystanders, caught in the middle, become incidental victims (Lunstrum, 2014). I argue that more attention needs to be given to the direct and indirect effects green militarization has on local inhabitants in and around PAs.

3.0 Theoretical Framework

This section presents a theoretical framework for thinking about how neoliberal conservation and conservation security have helped not only produce green militarization, but also to legitimize and justify it. Furthermore, through a critical analysis of a neoliberalist conservation framework I aspire to answer the central research question in this thesis: “how and why are local populations affected by a green militarized response to conservation?” By examination of the theory of neoliberal conservation, I will explore: what is conservation? What actors are involved in conservation and green militarism? Who economically benefits from conservation practices? How has neoliberal conservation been a driving force behind militarizing conservation? I will subsequently move on to conservation security, which

13 examines how green militarization is a normalized and justified response to conservation loss.

3.1 Conservation

Environmental conservation refers to “the protection, preservation, management, or restoration of natural environments and the ecological communities that inhabit them” (WDFW, 2018). Generally, conservation is thought to encompass the control and management of human access and consumption of natural resources (Morrison, 2014). Conservation efforts emerged as early as the 1600s, but conservation knowledge and practices gained profound Western traction in the early 19th century (Morrison, 2014). Since then, we have witnessed the evolution of conservation knowledge, practices and strategies. According to Foucault, knowledge is generated between human actors, through rhetoric, narratives and discourses (Singh and Houtum, 2002). In this context, various disciplines of conservation knowledge should then be seen as an outcome of environmental discourse and narratives, which are influenced by the beliefs and ideologies of researchers (Singh et al, 2002). Discourses and narratives connect ideas and methods, and can be used to influence various branches of power. Expert knowledge through discourses, generate ‘truths’ that influence policies and regulations that not only empower states, but also empower the one’s producing the knowledge (Sing et al, 2002). Producers of environmental knowledge (biologists, conservationists, ecologists), have long corroborated ‘truths’ for powerful states and other Western actors (NGOs, transnational institutions, etc.). As such, Western and European environmental ideas and practices have been used to understand and control the ‘developing’ world (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, 1986). One of the indirect effects of this process is that local inhabitants’ environmental knowledge and authority is disregarded, which leads to the marginalization of the very people who are in need of ‘developing’ (Snow et al, 1986). By placing conservation knowledge in the nexus of Western academic groups, institutions, NGOs and transnational organizations, conservation has marginalized non-western knowledge, so that these ‘other’ knowledges become discredited and incorrect (Singh et al, 2002). This has expanded Western powers reach of control, through conservation interventions. These conservation interventions and practices include the controlling access to land, natural resources and controlling local communities (Igoe, 2010). More recent evolution of conservation practices

14 incorporates neoliberalist ideas, that marketize, privatize and commodify ecosystems, biodiversity and its goods and services (Igoe, 2010).

3.2 Neoliberal Conservation

Neoliberalism is currently a hot topic of debate for many scholars, however, it remains very rarely talked about in relation to conservation on a global level, much less the militarization of conservation (Brockington, 2008). Yet, conservation, specifically in Africa, has increasingly revolved around “ways for nature and wildlife to pay their way so that local and global communities can benefit from their sustained conservation” (Büscher, 2011, pg. 85). This ‘imposing conservation’ has continued, no longer through colonial force, but through the market (Neumann, 1998; Büscher, 2011). This process is embedded in imperialist thinking, as conservation discourse revolves around the subjugation of the so-called ‘developing’ world by the ‘developed’ world. The narrative of ‘underdevelopment’ allows the ‘First World’ to retain and strengthen their control and power over the ‘Third World’ through obtaining land and resources via the market for conservation. Neoliberal conservation both finances and supports violent approaches to conservation, such as green militarization (Marijnen et al, 2016). In the last 30 years we have seen the expansion of neoliberal conservation reflected in the proliferation of conservation groups and donors, as well as in the increase and rapid growth of protected areas (Duffy, 2016). Protected areas have become symbols for neoliberalism’s metaphor of the world as a never-ending pie, a world that has the potential for a win-win-win solution, no losers, and little necessity for compromise (a trifecta win, for the environment, investors and locals) (Igoe et al, 2007; Büscher, 2011). Increasingly, the militarization of conservation is presented as a desirable solution, and as argued by Marijen and Verweijen, “as they become part of publicity and marketing, and are anchored in everyday consumer practices, the narratives productive of marketization and commodification become ‘normalized’, thereby contributing to transforming social relationships, identities and worldviews” (2016, pg. 275). In the neoliberal conservationist world, every environmental problem becomes a chance to profit or an opportunity for financial growth for corporations, national economies, environmentalists, conservation groups, Western consumers and local inhabitants (Igoe et al, 2007a). However, juxtaposed to this promising scenario, a much more complex situation arises. Due to conservation regulations, local inhabitants are increasingly stripped of their

15 land and property, even when those commodities are protected under the law (Igoe et al, 2007a). Another example of the problems these regulations pose for native inhabitants, is exhibited in Igoe’s study in Tanzania, which found various problems surrounding a community-based nature reserve, including the arrest and jailing of a group of local inhabitants on suspicion of attacking a tourist camp; the charges were later dropped, but the sour taste it left in the local community never wavered (Igoe et al, 2007). Büscher and Dressler also investigate the unlawful displacement of local communities in Mozambique near Limpopo National Park, where corporations from South Africa were allowed land usage which economically benefited them under the guise of a business venture, camouflaged as a “community-based wildlife management area” (Dressler and Büscher, 2008). Issues of this kind are mostly masked by the “discursive blur” (Dressler et al, 2008), or the process of obscuring and convoluting local problems and grievances to the higher ups of development policy organizations (Dressler et al, 2008; Igoe et al, 2007; Duffy, 2016). This process of communication usually contains information and intel that is oversimplified, not understood, or simply incomplete; this makes the communication between global, national and local levels incredibly inefficient (Igoe et al, 2007, 2010; Duffy, 2016; Lombard, 2015). Furthermore, Igoe and Brockington argue “this blur has a value of its own, as ideas such as participation, sustainability, and win-win-win solutions are used by competing networks of people to mobilize resources as efficiently and quickly as possible” (2007, pg. 435). However, this win-win-win scenario doesn’t reflect local realities, and there is minimal incentive to explore the negative effects of conservation in relation to local inhabitants in their actual environments (Igoe et al 2007, Dunlap et al 2014). Yet, negative impacts of neoliberal conservation regulations mostly affect local inhabitants, and are usually accompanied by “eviction and exclusion from customary land and natural resources such as grazing land, firewood, bushmeat, medicinal plants, timber, and culturally important resources and places, with implications for both monetary income and non-monetary livelihoods, health and physio-psychological wellbeing, as well as culture and cultural survival” (Holmes and Cavanagh, 2016, pg. 200). Similar to the use of green militarization as a conservation strategy, regulations too are sometimes enforced in a violent, corrupt and unjust way, and result in proclamations of human rights abuses (Holmes et al, 2016; Marijnen et al, 2016). Other negative effects are more indirect. They include social disturbance and upheaval precipitated by a rapid increase in tourism and its services (Holmes et al, 2016).

Most of these negative impacts are intertwined with and “imbricated within Eurocentric notions of ‘wilderness’, and the corresponding desire to territorialize conservation spaces that are insulated from human impacts, habitation, and influence” (Holmes et al, 2016, pg. 201). These spaces are imposed through boundary-drawing and ‘territorialization’ and have resulted in the proliferation of new protected areas around the world. Under neoliberalism, territorialization has expanded, as seen in the spread of PAs (Igoe et al, 2007). The boundary drawing or territorialization, puts a price on sovereignty, making it an available and worthy asset which can be used to orchestrate alliances and deals with investors and other actors (Dressler, 2015). This then contributes to the legitimization of Western led interventions that involve land appropriation and natural resources (Igoe et al, 2007). Westerners bring money and assurances of jobs, which officials from poor states are in desperate need of, a form of silent but powerful oppression. This process creates an acute urgency for impoverished states to produce PAs so that they can gain a competitive advantage in the tourist economy, which is more consistent with a neo-protectionist agenda; nonetheless, it creates a dynamic of dependence of impoverished states on Western actors and countries (Büscher, 2011; Dressler, 2015). An additional cause for concern are the ‘environmental’ networks in place. For instance, corporations who consistently break environmental regulations (such as Monsanto, Exxon or Chevron), can be environmental donors, and many of the higher ups in these companies sit on major conservation projects as members of the Board of Directors (Igoe et al, 2007a). Conservation groups, corporations and financial groups are increasingly entwined by money, individuals and ideas (Holmes et al 2016; Igoe, 2010). Neoliberal conservation has made war by conservation possible; conservation organizations collaborate with private military and security companies due to such strong relations with the private sector (Duffy et al, 2015). Additionally, while most conservation organizations present themselves as courageously fighting to save the environment and protect biodiversity from the growth of human activity and economies, most conservationists certainly have more political ties, resources and finances than the local and adjacent rural communities whose lives they directly impact (Holmes et al, 2016). Furthermore, present day conservation practices increasingly result in violence, as seen in the case of green militarization, which continues to be permitted and justified through this boundary drawing and territorialization, or neoliberalization of conservation (Neumann 1998; Dressler, 2015). This boundary drawing of PAs reflects an imbalance of powers aiming to control African wildlife and biodiversity worth (Büscher, 2011). Neumann (2004)

17 argues that the increase in discursive practices used in militarized conservation relies upon a narrative of African ‘Otherness’. Such notions are driven by discourses of conflict, civil war and the illegal exploitation of natural resources, however such actions are usually explained by using terms like ‘greed’, ‘poverty’ or ‘scarcity’ through video narratives and other productions (Marijnen et al, 2016). These terms and descriptions contain neo-colonialist and imperialist undertones, which portray a narrative of wrongdoing and ‘Othering’ of African actors, which in turn lowers the moral bar for violence (Marijnen et al, 2016; Neumann, 2004). The controlling of Others, becomes more important and urgent when there is a crisis that threatens the way of life for the morally ‘superior’ class, thereby justifying extreme measures including the postponement of standard moral code (Neumann, 1998). Here we see, how neoliberalist conservation has affected the discursive practices and methods of militarized conservation, and how it is deeply intertwined in imperialist thinking. Further, very few local inhabitants actually have success in taking part and economically benefiting from external conservation interventions; rather, the majority simply become ‘disposable’ with no place for them in the conservation free-market economy (Büscher, 2011). They become displaced, and often roam near and far as they look for a feasible place to live and economic fortuity, as they are no longer permitted to fish, hunt or cultivate the land. The majority of locals, increasingly find themselves being criminalized, and are constantly being told where they cannot go (Reynolds, 2010). The popular assumption of neoliberalism is that the free market and the commodification and marketization of conservation will produce results that benefit everyone, without major social and ecological ills. However, neoliberal conservation does not require local inhabitants to benefit in order to succeed (Frame, 2016). In fact, neoliberal conservation does quite well when locals are displaced, as many neoliberal policies can be controversial for actual conservation objectives and for local inhabitants livelihood (Reynolds, 2010). As explained above, neoliberal conservation facilitates the creation of new territories, which brings new opportunities for investors and grievances for local inhabitants. Neoliberal conservation is about the reordering of the world to generate the expansion of the free market through conservation practices, such as green militarization. Neoliberalism in a simple form, puts great emphasis on competition, and local inhabitants do not have the resources to compete effectively (Frame, 2016). Recent literature on neoliberal conservation has investigated how displacement of locals is motivated and encouraged by private actors who work through the state to profit from recently emptied PAs, as we will see in the case of Virunga National Park in the DRC (Lunstrum and Ybarra, 2018).

3.3 Conservation Security

When conservation regulations are forced upon local communities, and when conservation goals are aligned with international security agendas, this is called conservation security (Holmes et al, 2016). Conservation security, refers to the increase of actors treating PAs as sites of security threats (Lunstrum et al, 2018). Conservation security enables justification and legitimization of more stringent and violent conservation approaches (green militarization) through an agenda of security (Lombard, 2015). Through conservation security, we see conservation authorities (both state and non-state actors) policing local inhabitants and treating them as if they were the cause of the insecurity to the PA (Lunstrum, et al, 2018). As PAs began to emerge in the late 1800s, we subsequently began to see massive evictions from them (Neumann, 2004). While colonial displacements from PAs have largely been tied to colonial discourses of wilderness and imagery, independent states have also displaced locals in hope that PAs would help increase development (Neumann, 1998). Once an area of land has been renamed and re-territorialized a protected area, conservation authorities are able to evict locals from that area, and limit or completely restrict livelihood activities, including agriculture, hunting, fishing, gathering, or small-scale resource exploitation (Neumann, 1998). Increasingly, these displacements and evictions are legitimized through a security discourse. There has been an apparent trend in approaching conservation problems as national and international security issues and responding accordingly (Lombard, 2015). This leads to green militarization and the subsequent buildup of military actors, weaponry and tactics in protected areas (Lunstrum et al, 2018). These military actors and strategies are starting to play a key role in relation to the removal of local settlements and communities from PAs (Dunlap et al, 2014). Land tenure rights are ignored based on the argument that local communities are security threats, direct or potential (Fairhead, 2005). Aside from concerns over the rights and safety of already endangered local communities, the displacement of local communities can harm to biodiversity. For instance, local inhabitants may be more likely to turn to ecologically damaging livelihood practices, such as poaching and deforestation in the face of rampant poverty, which is only made worse by displacement and removal, or as direct acts of resistance (Lunstrum et al, 2018). International conservation groups tend to put forth a discourse that promotes participating in conservation practices which can contribute to the US and other Western

19 powers’ security and economic interests, because competition over scarce resources leads to conflict, insecurity and eventually failed states (Duffy, 2014). This is emblematic of conservation security, that there is a connection between “resource scarcity, conflict and instability” (Duffy, 2014, pg. 243). This presents a number of issues. First, merging conservation practices with security concerns places park guards on the front line, although park guards did not necessarily sign up for being active participants in the fight for Western security concerns and economic issues. For many, this will not be acceptable, and may result in conservation organizations losing money if rangers and guards decide to leave. The shift of conservation practice to a form of military-like intervention (that usually extends beyond the borders of Pas) could raise a multitude of issues for local inhabitants who live in these areas (Marijnen 2017). This could be detrimental for the relationships between conservationists and local inhabitants; feelings of alienation have emerged as well as a reduction in local support for conservation in the long term. There also seems to be profound reputational risks for NGOs collaborating with state security services and companies. This problem is a significant issue to local communities who perceive the state to be an oppressive regime rather than a democratic institution that provides security and welfare (Duffy, 2014). Overall, neoliberal conservation has led to combatting biodiversity loss through the green militarization approach, and security conservation has helped to legitimate and justify this response. We see a multitude of actors involved in conservation practices, state and non- state actors such as, donors, military and security companies, foreign governments, NGOs, various state institutions and elite individuals and politicians. We also see a multitude of actors benefiting economically from conservation policies, with the exception of local inhabitants. This becomes legitimized through conservation security and the integration of conservation efforts and security concerns and interests.

4. Research Design

4.1 Methodology

To allow close examination of the effects of green militarization, I have chosen an exploratory mixed methods single case study for my research design. Yin describes a case study research method “as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (1994, p. 83). Although,

20 a case study method can be controversial (Yin, 1994), a case study will permit an in-depth explanation of the social behavior of green militarization and its direct and indirect effects on local inhabitants. This methodology will allow close examination of the community-based problems green militarization poses. Because green militarization is very new literature, quantitative data is quite limited. The examination of reports, interviews, and data of former studies, will permit exploration and a more thorough understanding of the complexities surrounding green militarization. A case study is sometimes considered controversial because of lack of rigor and precision (Yin, 2003). Additionally, biased judgement is thought to sometimes influence the direction of the case study. Another common criticism of the case study method, is that there is an overgeneralization involved in the study of a limited case. However, case studies also have advantages, such as an in-depth study of a new phenomenon (Baxter and Jack, 2008). As green militarization was first recognized in 2014, the phenomenon is only recently a subject of exploration in contemporary studies. Furthermore, Yin (2003) explains that case studies are an important and necessary research method when: • The focus is meant to answer “how” and “why” questions • You cannot change or manipulate the actors or their actions • You want to cover contextual conditions because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study • The boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and the context

My research question is focused on “how” and “why” green militarization affects local inhabitants. I am unable to manipulate any of the actors or any of their actions or behavior, and I must include the contextual conditions of green militarization, as green militarization takes place in mostly violent conflict zones. As my research questions are aimed at and limited to specific events and conditions and their inter-relationships in a newly emerging and fluid context, a single case study is rationalized. I use a qualitative research phase to explore the different facets of my case, and then will support these findings through quantitative data. I have chosen the exploratory case study because exploratory case studies are meant to open the door for further research (Yin, 2003). Yin (2003), defines an exploratory case study as a “type of case study that is used to explore those situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes” (p. 15). As the effects of green militarization are very complex, there is no individual set of outcomes. Establishing this

21 beforehand will allow a more unbiased viewpoint. Additionally, through my exploratory case study I hope to identify and capture the real complexities of the effects green militarization has on local populations, in order to permit a more in-depth study of the phenomenon. As green militarization is a new area of study, the detailed qualitative accounts and descriptions will be vital. This will help to explore, describe and analyze the data and context, it allows us to see the complexities in a real-life situation which may be overlooked in an experimental or quantitative research method. The qualitative aspect to my case study enables exploration of this phenomenon using a wide variety of data and sources; as Baxter and Jack (2008) observe, this permits the case to be studied through not one lens, but multiple lenses. Thus, multiple dimensions of the phenomenon can be unveiled and understood. As green militarization mostly emerges in response to an ongoing conflict in a PA, it is important to describe and analyze the different facets of the conflict itself, as well as the illicit activities that take place. Additionally, one of the main reasons for utilizing qualitative data, is that the study is exploratory, usually meaning that little has been written about the subject at hand (Creswell, 1998). While utilizing a qualitative approach, I also to intend to develop context and the depth of the phenomenon’s effects on local populations by reviewing quantitative data where it exists in the literature. My aim is to show external validation, and to indicate consistency across different studies. By comparing different perspectives of both qualitative and some quantitative data I hope to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the effects of green militarism on locals and their livelihood. I will draw upon samples from the same population, civilians located in the eastern region of DRC, from 1996 to 2018. A review of quantitative research will enable a profile target in which certain trends, such as the number of refugees, displaced persons and violent conflicts can be analyzed. While quantitative data can be used to measure certain trends or behaviors, it cannot necessarily explain the why and how of a phenomenon, which is why the majority of my data will be qualitative.

4.2 Case Selection

My case study will examine the effects of green militarization on local inhabitants within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), specifically, within Virunga National Park area which includes the eastern Congo, Rwindi Plains, Lake Edward and the Rwenzori Mountains. I have chosen the DRC/ Virunga National Park case study for a multitude of reasons. First, Virunga National Park in the DRC is home to many local inhabitants, inside the park and in

22 the surrounding areas, and the treatment and standard of living of these inhabitants has been well observed and documented throughout the years (Camm, 2011). Second, the evolution of the militaristic strategies of the Park has been well documented, by academics, news articles and interviews. Furthermore, the transnational actors involved in the militarization of the park merit the exploration of operationalizing through a security agenda. Virunga National Park, founded in 1925 by the Belgian colonial regime, has adopted a strict militarization approach to conservation (Marijnen, 2017). Park borders have been rapidly expanding, which has had a profound impact on local populations and adjacent communities for whom land access is vital to their very existence (Marijnen, 2017). This case study, will focus on the local population’s reactions to the militant approach adopted by Virunga Park officials, and how these are deeply entangled with livelihood strategies that are operationalized in a complex conflict environment. This method’s objective is to disentangle the involvement of local and transnational actors, including state and non-state actors and elites, and how locals’ opposition to green militarization can be understood and analyzed, and how local’s actions can sometimes be used in a discourse against them. Such situations emphasize conflicts over access to land and resources between elites, foreign powers, locals, park guards and officers and Congolese government institutions. Aside from Virunga National Park, similar tensions arise around the world between parks and local communities who live in and around protected areas that are designated for conservation (Dressler et al, 2008). These conflicts are often embedded in historical continuities, and involve enclosures prioritizing biodiversity, which result in the eviction of prior users and restrictions to resources and livelihood activities (Peluso et al 2011). The conflict in Virunga is representative of the growing tensions emerging from militarizing conservation practices that marginalize and minimize the impact on local communities enmeshed in protected areas. The consequences of this clash tend to encompass removal of local inhabitants from protected areas and the restriction of access to land and resources. Furthermore, the case of Virunga is emblematic of the neoliberal policies adopted through conservation practices. The European Commission (EC) is the main financier of Virunga National Park, and has thus been financing its increasingly stringent techniques and militarized approach (Marijnen, 2017). This neoliberal conservation approach takes place when a natural environment or area becomes a commodity (Büscher, 2013). The end discourse gives a more in-depth understanding of the capitalist market that produces and supports the militarization of conservation.

4.3. Data

This study is mostly based on qualitative material and literature and therefore mostly secondary sources. This includes scientific articles, case studies, surveys, NGO reports, audio files, IO reports, news articles, and questionnaires. The research explores the varying properties of the green militarization phenomenon and its effects on local communities. The analysis will rely on secondary resources, previous scholarly work on the DRC and Virunga National Park, as well as some primary resources (government and NGO trends). Both my qualitative and quantitative data is from the last 25 years, so as to provide the most up to date information available. I will draw upon interviews and surveys conducted in the DRC by academics since 1992.

5.0 Case Study

5.1 Historical Overview of the Conflict in the DRC

To grasp the size and scope of the conflict, a brief history of the major events that took place in the DRC is warranted. The causes of the conflict in this region, are numerous and extremely complex. This next section will provide an in-depth examination of the historical complexities and the chronology of key events surrounding the conflict in the DRC, and what led to the subsequent militarization of Virunga National Park.

5.1.2 Belgian Congo 1885-1960

The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s history has been dominated by various forms of intervention, violence, and exploitation by internal and external powers. The violent Belgian invasion took place under King Leopold II of Belgium in 1885 (Mathys, 2017). King Leopold II gained control of the DRC by persuading other European powers (Britain, Portugal, Germany, France) that Belgium should be in control of the Congo for humanitarian reasons, placing himself on a pedestal above competing powers who had pretensions to the DRC’s vast resources (Camm, 2011). King Leopold II presented his intervention on a platform of peacefulness; he would offer a way to ‘civilize’ the Congolese and to help save them from ‘barbarous’ rule (Everill and Kaplan, 2013). Other European powers agreed as Belgium was too small to pose a threat to the interests of the bigger powers, and this would at least avoid going to war over the vast resource rich lands the DRC had to offer. However, the Belgian invasion was far from peaceful, and inhabitants of the Congo were subjected to various forms of abuse, including starvation, torture, chopped limbs, the burning of villages, slavery and

25 genocide (Camm, 2011). News of the atrocities committed against the Congolese under King Leopold II spread internationally in the early 1900s, which became referred to as the “Congo Horrors” (Dunn, 2003). The “Congo Horrors” were mostly associated with the stringent manual labor policies that the Belgians used to collect natural resources, such as rubber and copper for export (Dunn, 2003). Every Congolese inhabitant, women, men and children of all ages, had to meet quotas for collecting resources for the Belgians personal economic gain, or face death or torture (Everill et al, 2013). Collectively, with disease, starvation and a decreasing birth rate, the Congolese population suffered mass losses. In 1925, under King Albert I, Virunga National Park was founded, the first National Park in all of Africa, formerly named Albert National Park (Virunga National Park, 2018). Created on a platform of once again protecting the Congo’s resource rich land and its people, local inhabitants in this annexed park area were nonetheless continually subjected to many forms of abuse, and resources continued to flow out of the Congo and into Belgium (Camm, 2011). Thus, a pattern began to emerge of systematic exploitation by external powers.

5.1.3 Independence

It wasn’t until 1960, due to rising instability, that the Belgians were forced to leave the DRC, and relinquish control of the country and the Park to the Congolese (Mathys, 2017). During this independence movement, the Congo became known as the ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo’, and Albert National Park became known as ‘Virunga National Park’ (Dunn, 2003). The Congolese proceeded to elect their first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, who would only hold power for a year before being overthrown and then violently executed because the United States and European powers sought a more suitable Cold War ally (and access to the resources that would subsequently become available for their use, rather than for the use of DRC’s people and development) (Mathys, 2017). President Mobutu, backed by the US and Europe, came to power in 1965 and would remain in power until 1997 (Dunn, 2003). During this time, Mobutu followed suit and proceeded to make resources from the Congo cheaply available to Western powers, as well as provide a series of political favors (which is why he was backed by Western powers and Lumumba was not) (Everill et al, 2013). Mobutu renamed the Congo ‘Zaire’, and become notoriously known for his corruption, and for keeping Zaire’s resource profits in his personal pocket, and eventually leading the country into a series of economic downturns (Everill et al, 2013). However, in 1969 Mobutu began to take interest in conservation; he created the first Congolese Wildlife Authority “Institut Congolais pour le Conservation de la Nature” (ICCN), which continues to be in charge of the

Congo’s protected areas to this day (Vogel, 2000). Nevertheless, under Mobutu the region continued to face a series of violent conflicts, the most devastating of which were dubbed the “Congolese Wars” (Vogel, 2000).

5.1.4 Congolese Wars

The First Congo War was prompted in 1994, when fighting between ethnic groups, Hutus and Tutsis, began to spill over from neighboring Rwanda into Zaire (Camm, 2011). The 100-day Rwandan genocide consisted of thousands of Tutsis and Tutsi-sympathizers being killed by the predominantly Hutu authorities, known as the Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) (Camm, 2011). The fighting slowed when the Hutu government was overthrown by the Tustsi- led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (Everill et al, 2011). In the meantime, over 1.5 million refugees fled and settled in Eastern Zaire, seeking the defense of the dense Congolese forest located within Virunga National Park (Dunn, 2003). The refugees consisted of Tutsis who fled the Hutu-led genocide, and Hutus who fled the RFP-Tutsi retaliation; the perpetrators of the genocide were prominent in the latter group. The fighting continued in Virunga National Park as various groups of refugees began retaliation attacks, and President Mobutu began backing the Hutu side of the fight. It was then that the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), the newly formed Tutsi-Rwandan Government and the Ugandan Government together toppled and replaced President Mobutu with Laurent Kabila in 1997 (Mathys, 2017). Kabila reinstated the country’s former name, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in an effort to unify the country. However, the fighting continued, and left the local inhabitants of the DRC, specifically in and around Virunga National Park, in total destruction and disarray (Dunn, 2003). One year after the overthrow of President Mobutu, conflict was sparked yet again between Rwanda, Uganda and the Kabila-led Congolese government they helped put in power (Everill et al, 2011). Kabila was accused of betraying his former supporters, Rwanda and Uganda, by permitting Hutu armies to rebuild themselves in the Eastern region of the country, specifically in resource rich Virunga National Park. Subsequently, Uganda and Rwanda invaded, and in response Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe also invaded and sent in troops in support of the Kabila DRC government (Everill et al, 2011). At least nine African countries became involved in the conflict and a series of Western actors and interventions, the war became known as ‘Africa’s Great War’ (Dunn, 2003). This resulted in numerous ethnic groups, becoming armed and supported in their local grievances by different governments and actors (Camm, 2011). The role of different actors and their reasons for

27 supporting certain groups over others, became fueled by economic incentive and resource exploitation of the Eastern Congo (Mathys, 2017). Laurent Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and his son, Joseph Kabila, became acting President of the DRC. Joseph Kabila proceeded to mediate a fairly fruitful peace treaty that terminated Rwanda and Uganda’s presence in the DRC (Dunn, 2003). A transitional government was implemented by the United Nations (UN) until elections could be held. The elections were deemed fair and free by the UN and Joseph Kabila was officially elected President in 2006 (Camm, 2011). As Joseph Kabila appeared to be a leader in support of democracy and democratic freedoms, it was hoped that development and peace would materialize in the DRC. However, Joseph Kabila remains in power today amid allegations and accusations of defrauding two elections since 2006 (Mathys, 2017). Presently, he refuses to stand down or to hold any further democratic elections, while proceeding to attack and imprison those who oppose him (Mathys, 2017).

5.1.5 Present Day Crisis

The current conflict in the Congo involves more than seventy different armed groups, and primarily takes place in the eastern region, encompassing Virunga National Park area (Mathys, 2017). Presently, more than 4 million people are displaced, 46,000 deaths are estimated monthly and there are over 7 million people at risk for food security (UN, 2018). Since the Second Congo War of 1998, an estimated 5.4 million people have died, the most since WWII (International Rescue Committee, 2017). Despite the presence of 20,000 UN Peacekeepers in the DRC, fighting continues (UN, 2018). These astonishingly high numbers would normally be more than enough to attract the attention of media outlets and powerful world leaders, yet we see no real acknowledgement, much less response to the crisis (Everill et al, 2013). As powerful Western countries remain silent, one wonders if they have something to gain. In order to attain a more comprehensive understanding of the effects that green militarization of Virunga National Park has had on local inhabitants, I will briefly introduce the international component of the conflict and the resultant impact on the militarization of the Park. This militarization of Virunga Park should be understood in the wider context of violence throughout the DRC, which is why it is important to understand key events and to keep the historical context of the conflict in mind. The transition to a war in pursuit of the environment has become profoundly complex, and is grounded in advancing the security agenda by external actors. The fundamental narratives that are usually associated with

28 validations of security, have become operationalized in relation to saving the environment, as we will see below. 5.2 International Involvement and Influence

External interventions and actors have characterized much of the DRC’s development and intensified the present-day crisis. Due to immense natural resources, numerous external powers have sought to gain economic advantage. These include state and non-state actors, such as NGOs, IOs, and private companies. As presented above, external powers since the colonial era have used a platform of ‘saving’ Congolese inhabitants and land as a justification to gain control of the area for their own advantage. Western international involvement in the DRC supposedly focuses on peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and development projects, however, the role of natural resource exploitation has become evident. Shortly after DRC’s independence, it became a cold war proxy between the US and the USSR (Dunn, 2003). President Mobutu’s dictatorship was prolonged by Western powers, which subsequently led to further deterioration of the DRC’s development, economic interest and governmental stability (Camm, 2011). This was justified and operationalized through an agenda of global security, ostensibly because of the Cold War. Additionally, the US military and other American companies have covertly been involved in the Congo since the 1950s, searching for economic advantage, as a former military officer reported to the US parliamentary subcommittee (Dunn, 2003). The west kept backing Mobutu as long as the resource wealth continued to flow and the DRC stayed out of Soviet orbit (Mathys, 2017). Throughout Mobutu’s regime, Western powers allowed his regime to borrow billions, which was later stolen by Mobutu, yet today the DRC is still expected to pay it all back (Camm, 2011). The reason for so many different external actors becoming involved in the Congo Wars is complex, but a pattern of economic advantage is seen once again. Rwanda and Uganda were involved from the beginning and claimed to invade due to border security reasons (Hochleithner, 2017). We also see a shift between state alliances throughout the Congolese wars which appears to center around the need to achieve economic exploitation and national interest (Everill et al, 2013). The UN released a report that stated over 125 external companies or individuals contributed to the Congolese conflicts as well, just adding another layer of complexity (UN, 2003). Throughout the Congo’s history, external interventions have been justified through civilizing missions, through security agendas, or through humanitarian interventions, while the real goals lie in achieving economic advantage

29 through control of the DRC and its lands (Dunn, 2003). Unfortunately, Virunga National Park and the surrounding areas lie at the center of this resource exploitation and thus the conflict itself. By summarizing the international elements of the conflict, I hope to demonstrate the complexity of international actors and their interests. Many international state and non-state actors have benefitted from the chaotic state of the DRC. For instance, had the DRC been peaceful and stable, many actors would not have been granted contracts or agreements (Shah, 2010).

5.3 Natural Resources

The DRC is home to some of the most resource rich lands in the world. Almost every natural resource can be found in the DRC, with an estimated 24 trillion dollars of untapped mineral wealth alone (Shah, 2010). Limitless amounts of water flow through the DRC by way of the world’s second largest river, the soil is rich, and there exists copious amounts of diamonds, cobalt, cassiterite, tin, coffee, coltan and gold (Dunn, 2003). Most of these natural resources are found in the eastern side of the country, specifically in and around Virunga National Park, making it a perfect war zone for resource control (Virunga National Park, 2018). Human rights groups, such as Amnesty International and Humans Rights Watch, have accused multinational corporations from Western countries of profiting from war and violence in the DRC, as well as developing elite networks of important individuals to pillage natural resources in and around the Virunga area (Shah, 2010). The practice of resource exploitation and plunder, as well as a lack of accountability was characterized throughout both the Mobutu and Kabila governments (Everill et al, 2013). The mining and forestry departments had been under the control of civilians throughout the DRC until the First Congo War. Subsequently, these departments were taken over by numerous rebel groups and the national army. The militarization of these departments only brought further violence and catastrophe to Congo inhabitants (Dunn, 2003). During the Second Congo War, resource pillaging increased exponentially due to the many different armed groups needing to finance their operations, and of course due to international actors taking advantage of the war ridden DRC (Camm, 2011). Companies from international state actors began to create ‘front companies’, and in an effort to exploit natural resources they worked with armed groups without actively participating in the conflict themselves (Mathys, 2017).

When we look through the lens of ‘resource wars’, insurgent activity within Virunga National Park becomes criminalized. Because of this ‘criminalization’, the Park becomes situated outside the normal social and moral realm (Lombard, 2015). This causes the violent dimensions of civil-rebel relations to be accentuated, while simultaneously down-playing the livelihood and political facets. For instance, Virunga Park’s chief warden, Belgian Emmanuel de Merode, said in a recent interview the rebel groups were “originally a peasant uprising, which has degenerated into a group that is involved in general banditry” (Verweijen et al, 2016 p. 306). Emmanuel de Merode indicates how insurgency activity and civil-rebel relations are not recognized as being actions that relate to the grievances of inhabitants, therefore they are mostly criminal (Verweijen et al, 2016). Similar reductionism is found in illegal resource plunder. Virunga National Park is situated in an extremely densely populated area of the DRC; the larger part of these local inhabitants are small-scale farmers (Hochleithner, 2017). Due to a history of rural governance favoring advancing the interests of elite actors (characterized in both the Mobutu and Kabila regimes), these small-scale farmers are left with a land and resource shortage and poor-quality soils that threaten their livelihood (Reynolds, 2010; Verweijen et al, 2016).

5.4 Virunga National Park

5.4.1 History

Virunga National Park is one of the most resource rich, and biologically diverse places in the world. More than half of all the biodiversity in sub-Saharan Africa exists within Virunga (Virunga National Park, 2018). The park was founded in 1925 as Albert National Park; it contains two of the world’s most active volcanoes and is home to the endangered mountain gorillas (Virunga National Park, 2018). During the 1930s, the park was greatly expanded due to a state of emergency because of sleeping sickness, a fatal parasitic disease (Virunga National Park, 2018). This permitted the Belgian colonial regime to frame the masses of displaced inhabitants as bringing them to ‘safety’; they were then isolated and after they were cured from the sickness, they were not allowed to go back to their lands and were not given any compensation (Marijnen et al, 2016). Other regions of the DRC that were not yet contagious with the disease were also forced out, so the colonial authorities could ‘control the disease’ (Camm, 2011). This meant that many former inhabitants of Virunga National Park were not allowed to go back to their land, which set the foundation for park officials to adopt

31 a ‘fortress model’ approach (Marijnen et al, 2016). The ‘fortress model’ approach, is a conservation model based on the belief that humans and human activity cause destruction to ecosystems, and therefore protection of biodiversity is best accomplished by creating PAs where there is limited human activity and disturbance (Dressler et al, 2015; Marijnen et al, 2016). Even after the DRC’s independence in 1960, Belgium continued to be meticulously involved in DRC development, conservation and governance. President Mobutu in 1969 appointed Belgian conservationist, Jacques Verschuren, director of the Congo’s state conservation department (Virunga National Park, 2018). Jacques Verschuren praised President Mobutu’s conservation efforts, which included giving the new park management total control and blanket approval to take any necessary measures (Marijnen, et al 2016). Thus, militarized tactics and methods utilized by park guards began, including the creation of one of the first ‘shoot to kill’ policies in Africa (Marijnen, et al 2016).

5.4.2 Funding

After DRC independence, external aid became vital to the park’s sustainability. Particularly, the European Commission (EC) became the dominant aid provider from 1988 onwards (Virunga National Park, 2018). The EC has played a key role in relation to financing the park. Marijnen (2017), estimates over the last 20 years, that at least 30 million euros has been invested (pg. 1574). From 1994 to present, this elite funding and involvement became justified through a ‘state of emergency’ that was put in place after millions of refugees and combatants fled from Rwanda into the park, during the First Congo War (Marijnen, 2017). The arrival and settlement of so many refugees had destructive effects on biodiversity and security (Marijnen, et al 2016) and armed conflict still takes place in the park. Reflecting on these historical continuities, the ongoing conflict situation in Virunga perpetuates the justification of external involvement and overreach. During the first and second Congolese Wars, the EC, the ICCN and DRC government worked together to generate a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) with a British NGO, the African Conservation Fund (ACF), which is now named the Virunga Foundation (Virunga National Park, 2018). The PPP runs until 2040 and allows the Virunga Foundation to receive an excessive amount of EC developments funds; these funds continue to be the main financial sponsor of the foundation (Marijnen, 2017). Other conservation NGOs working in the DRC

32 were bewildered by the favored treatment of the Virunga Foundation by the EC and by how transparent the process appeared to be (Marijnen, 2017).

5.4.3 Militarization and Legitimization

The first assignment the EC sponsored, was elite military training of park rangers and guards by a private security company in 2006 (Virunga National Park, 2018). This means the moment the EC became a sponsor of the park, a hard counterinsurgency approach was almost immediately introduced. The park has adopted a strict law enforcement approach, which consists of arresting and penalizing locals who cultivate, hunt and or fish in the park (Verweijen et al, 2016). This strict approach was enacted in 2008, after new management of the park took control after the PPP. In 2010, Belgian Director Emmanuel de Merode, reduced the number of existing park guards by 80 percent, then began a new recruitment process (Verweijen et al, 2016). New recruits must now complete nine months of training by Belgian ex-military troops and are subjected to intensive military discipline; additionally, park patrols and other armed park rangers were dramatically increased, which consequently caused more arrests and penalizations for locals (Hochleithner, 2017). These changes were enacted from the top- down, as dialogue between park officials and local inhabitants did not appear to be important to the new management of the park (Marijnen, 2017). The EC not only directly funds military activities within the park, but also indirectly funds militarization of the park through a soft counterinsurgency approach. The EC finances numerous development projects that aim at ‘inclusionary control’ over local inhabitants (Igoe and Kelsall, 2005). For instance, the EC has been sponsoring the Virunga Alliance, a development project for the Virunga Park and surrounding area, in which a consortium of public and private investors are stakeholders (Marijnen, 2017). These investors consist of various Western elites, in addition to the EC, but is guided by the Virunga Foundation (Marijnen, 2017). The Virunga Alliance development project intends to build seven hydroelectric plants around the park, with the hope of bringing electricity to certain communities, but a major portion will be sold to Western businesses (Marijnen, 2017). Management for these Virunga Alliance ‘development projects’ have very rarely consulted locals for their opinions or input. Inhabitants are left feeling isolated and controlled, and these feelings are only compounded by the increasing external involvement of the park (Hochleithner, 2017). As these Alliance projects are focused on and incentivized in the cause of economic development, they tend to ignore the feelings of local inhabitants, and the resultant repercussions for them.

The EC claims that improving park security is a necessary precursor for tourism; if tourism grows, then profits and job availability will subsequently increase, which will allow for more spending on economic and physical development (Marijnen, 2017). The current militarized approach of the park becomes a justified and legitimate response, through over- emphasizing a continual state of violence and war throughout the park, which renders a militarized response as a necessity (Marijnen et al, 2016). Additionally, images of war and conflict are often enmeshed with narratives of ‘African Otherness’ that dehumanize and criminalize armed groups, so that a militarized response is even further legitimized (Marijnen et al, 2016). The process of the legitimation of green militarism is very prevalent in Virunga National Park and is embedded within discourses set forth by conservationists. These discourses emphasize a win-win situation, for locals, nature and investors, claiming to offer ecotourism, economic development and nature conservation (Hochleithner, 2017). Legitimation practices involve ‘sensitizing’ local communities to biodiversity efforts, and community-based conservation programs. Sensitizing local communities involves educational seminars held in schools and local villages with native communities, in which Virunga officials inform (and hope to persuade) locals of this win-win discourse. As Hochleithner states in his 2017 study, “staff of the ICCN or cooperating NGOs also point at the ideological value of the Park as a UNESCO World Heritage site, explain how the Park's undisturbed nature provides ecosystem services, such as fresh water, and emphasize the forests' role in climate change, which also affects local agriculture through changing sun and rain seasons” (pg. 8). The community-based conservation projects encompass a variety of soft counterinsurgency and inclusionary control techniques. For instance, very few tribes are permitted in specific areas of the park to collect medical herbs, while they remain prohibited from cultivation, hunting, fishing or settling (Hochleithner, 2017). Other community-based conservation projects include honey beehive and planting projects. However, the most notable community-based conservation project remains the seven hydro-electricity plants (Verweijnen et al, 2016). Another form of legitimation is exercised through claiming that land disputes of the park are not conflicts, but that local inhabitants are manipulating the issue at hand. EC authorities claim that the borders of the park are indisputably legal, yet, the EC refuses to take into account the historical injustice of the creation of the park, which was founded by the Belgian colonial regime and continually expand under it (Baaz et al, 2018). As Marijnen

34 states, “By arguing that one should not listen to the ‘local population’, as ‘they will manipulate you’, authoritative knowledge claims are made with the aim to steer the knowledge production of the Virunga area in such a way to increase donor support to the park, instead of questioning the actual effects of the green militarisation” (2017, p. 1576). Through operationalizing this conservation security discourse, the EC is able to avoid political criticism about funding military tactics in Virunga. Furthermore, there have been numerous studies and articles indicating the local population, that has a more hostile response towards the park, are entirely motivated by economic and livelihood insecurity, resulting in illicit cultivation, hunting, poaching and fishing (Marijnen, 2017; Hochleithner, 2017; Rosen, 2014; Verweijnen et al 2016). Classifying these local inhabitants as ‘criminals’ and their livelihood activities as ‘illegal’ reinforces the EC’s position that a strict militant approach (carried out by Virunga Park guards) is the right solution (Marijnen, 2017).

5.5 Neoliberalizing Conservation in Virunga National Park

Putting monetary worth on conservation, biodiversity and its goods and services, produces a new kind of ‘hybrid environmental governance’, which consists of NGOs, state institutions, foreign governments, and local communities all aiming to manage conservation practices, and thus PAs (Igoe, 2010). We see this in the case of Virunga, where DRC state institutions (the ICCN and Congolese Army), NGOs (such as the Virunga Foundation), external governments (such as the European Commission) and private and public donors are all attempting to maintain their control over the park’s conservation practices and techniques. Furthermore, it is argued this hybrid environmental governance is a network of close alliances between western conservation NGOs and elite corporate and individual donors, that results in the expansion of environmental problems and ignores the problems it causes for local inhabitants (Igoe et al, 2007). Igoe (2010) states, “biodiversity conservation, traditionally portrayed as a bulwark against the environmental ills of capitalist expansion, is now thoroughly implicated in its reproduction” (p. 7). The emergence of conservation social networking, through the convergence of philanthropic donors, NGOs, and other aid donors has become one increasing interaction where any potential donor can join in the ‘fight to save the environment’ (Holmes et al, 2016). Thus, prospective donors are persuaded to provide monetary funds for conservation interventions because of a very specific narrative that is displayed to them, of which are usually distorted versions of reality.

As we see in Virunga, there appears to be a disconnect between those from Western developed countries’ view of nature conservation in contrast to those who are affected by its fortification (Brockington, 2008). Supporters of Virunga National Park management reflect the interests of Western actors who finance the objectives of the park. The expansion of the park is propelled by these actors’ desire for a ‘perfect nature’ or an unspoiled nature for tourism, which has led to physical and economic displacement of local inhabitants (Brockington, 2008). Most commonly, it is state institutions that dictate the legal guidelines and official legal borders of protected areas and parks for biodiversity conservation, thereby giving them the authority and hierarchical power to set policies and procedures for park management practices and techniques. However, the role of the state becomes murky in conflict zones, such as in the eastern DRC. In these contexts, the focus shifts from ownership of property and resources, to access of property and resources (Hochleithner, 2017). This allows spatial enclosures to become a commodity, which permits the localization of PAs to be within the economic market apparatus (Büscher, 2013), causing resource access to become dependent on access to the market (Hochleithner, 2017). Force and violence, used either directly or indirectly as an intimidation tactic, has become an effective tool to use in acquiring and securing control over access to land and resources (Pelusa et al, 2011). This tactic is key in characterizing relations between all actors involved, as well as the practices they exhibit. For instance, Virunga officials legitimize the use of violence against those that violate conservation principles, such as poachers and unauthorized fishermen in Virunga Park, as a space of moral exception (Krieger, 2015). We also see Virunga Park management collaborating closely with private security and military companies to provide services. Through neoliberal conservation, this is made possible.

5.6 Militarization and Increase in Displacement, Refugees and Attacks

Since the hardline militant approach was adopted by park officials in 2003, and even more so again in 2008, we have seen an increase in refugees. As shown below, since 2006 there is an evident spike. Although there could be many factors contributing to this, we do see external validation that the standard of living for native inhabitants has declined.

UNHCR

Number of Refugees

0 2006 2009 2011 2015 2016 2018

Refugees in Congo: UNHCR (Refugee Fact Sheet for DRC) 2006 - 430,741 2009 - 455,900 2011 - 476,700 2015 - 495,724 2016 - 537,000 2018 - 621,711

Furthermore, the number of displaced persons in the eastern region of the DRC also reflects an increase in a lack of livelihood. Again, it is important to note this is not a direct correlation to the militarization of conservation, however, it does show some external validation that the area has become unstable, which has affected locals’ livelihoods and means of support.

4.5

3.5

2.5

1.5

0.5

0 2009 2011 2013 2017

Displaced Inhabitants

Displaced Persons in Congo - Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre IDMC 2009 - 1.9 million 2011 - 2.7 million 2013 - 2.9 million 2017 - 4.4 million

6.0 Analysis

In this section I will analyze the militarizing effects of Virunga National Park on local inhabitants, and examine the profound change and subsequent reactions it has directly and indirectly produced.

6.1 Creation of Virunga brought Profound Change

Local inhabitants in and around Virunga have been subjected to militarization and violent conflict for many years. After WWI, European veterans founded coffee plantations in the Virunga area, specifically in Bwisha, (an area located between Rwanda and the south entrance of the park) which introduced an overwhelming number of sociological and economic transformations (Vogel, 2000). Large segments of land became the exclusive private property of Europeans, since local inhabitants were kept from having plantations

(Vogel, 2000). Mixed with the coercive labor policies enacted by the Belgian colonial regime, mass migration was encouraged to provide more laborers to work the plantations. Consequently, thousands of Rwandans from neighboring territories came to the area seeking work. The negative effects of this campaign can still be found in Bwisha presently, as native Rwandans who migrated there are framed as non-native to Bwisha, and locals of Bwisha are also thought of as Rwandan migrants because they speak (and have always spoken) a language that is found more commonly in Rwanda (Camm, 2011; Verweijen et al, 2016). Apart from the appearance of coffee plantations, the creation of Virunga National Park was another force behind extreme change to the eastern region of the Congo. Originally, the park was limited to a small area that mostly comprised the endangered mountain gorillas living space, but it was vastly expanded due to the parks adoption of the fortress model (Verweijen et al, 2016). The expansion of the park grew from 25,000 hectares to 790,000 hectares and as a result, thousands of locals lost their right to the land and consequentially their livelihood practices, which in turn evoked animosity and resentment (Marijnen, 2017). Virunga is found in one of the most densely populated areas of the DRC, with an estimated 80,000 inhabitants living inside the park, and over 4 million living 25 kilometers from the park (Marijnen, 2017). During the expansion of Virunga National Park, there was no real effort by park officials to confer or negotiate with local chiefs for consent grow the park, nor did they offer any form of compensation for the land that was perceived to be taken from local inhabitants (Baaz et al, 2016). For example, Fairhead (2005) reports that in the southern region of Bwisha, a customary chief (who was picked by the Belgian Colonial regime instead of having tribal lineage), sold a large portion of land without obtaining consent or sharing profits with his sub chiefs. As a result of the way in which the park was founded and controlled, local inhabitants were overcome with outrage and resentment, which in turn fueled extensive resistance. Local inhabitants began to repossess areas within the park so they could continue to farm, hunt and fish (Hochleithner, 2017). Additionally, in the years leading up to independence acts of aggression increased against park authorities, park projects and biodiversity; this was part of the wider resistance movement against what was viewed as an imperialist land occupation and exercise of colonial power by Belgium (Mathys, 2017). In response to the wider resistance amongst local inhabitants, park authorities increased military trainings and methods, surveillance and patrolling increased, and recruitment began from the troops of the colonial Belgium regime (Dunn, 2003). The militant response developed by the park during

39 the DRC’s colonial period was extended when Authoritarian President Mobutu came to power. After becoming so accustomed to violent militant methods during the 1970s and 80s, park guards increasingly became a threat to local inhabitants. Park guards began to make a profit from their authority and control over the park by organizing illegal hunting, fishing and cultivation (Fairhead, 2005). Simultaneously, local communities’ reliance on park resources increased exponentially due to economic, rural and state deterioration throughout the DRC (Fairhead, 2005). Livelihood was also at risk due to land tenure, as during the 1970s and 1980s there was a constant change of land legislation and ambivalence around land rights, which allowed large segments of land around Virunga to fall under the control of elites (Verweijen et al, 2016). Together with the deterioration of the state apparatus, widespread economic downfall, resource and land insecurity, an increase in armed groups, and an increasingly aggressive and predatory approach by park guards, landlords and employers began to profit by exchanging land and resource control for labor (Fairhead, 2005; Verweijen et al, 2016). These occurrences enabled the foundation for a system where insecurity is manipulated as a way to establish control and make profits, and it remains a problem presently (Verweijen et al, 2016). In the 1990s, President Mobutu declared the DRC would become a multiparty Democracy; as such, politicians began to speak out against the park to increase their voter basis and popularity in preparation for local elections (Vogel, 2000). Additionally, grievances between ethnic groups began to increase during this time, along with numerous conflicts over land and resources throughout the Virunga area (Dunn, 2003). In the DRC, land ownership indicates a young man’s ability to provide for his family and to contribute to the community, so the spike in land scarcity and ownership resulted in a consortium of young adult men, who had no land, little income and were low social class (Camm, 2011). When rebel groups began to multiply during the early 1990s, it was this group of men that were heavily recruited, (Camm, 2011; Mathys, 2017) and it was these rebel groups who were at the center of the First and Second Congo wars. During these wars, the park became a refuge for various rebel groups, displaced inhabitants, and refugees. After the Second Congo War, the majority of those that sought refuge in the park, were hesitant to leave as they came to depend on its resources and land for their livelihood (Hochleithner, 2017). A very strict militant approach was embraced by park officials during this time in an effort to expel these people, resulting in tension and conflict between park guards and the seemingly stubborn, immovable native inhabitants (Verweijen et al, 2016).

6.2 Present Resistance and Growing Distrust

After the Second Congo War, the DRC faced political transformation, as DRC civilians began to take part in political activism. Specifically, after the 2003 peace treaty, local populations began attempts to repossess disputed areas of the park, which was often supported by politicians in preparation for the 2006 elections (Verweijnen et al, 2016). Locals expressed grievances that encompassed ambiguity about the borders of Virunga Park, (locals argued the borders had expanded far beyond what was established by Colonial Belgium), and outrage that many ancestral areas of land had been illegally seized (Dunn, 2003). Locals also demonstrated grievances with the park through letters to local and national politicians, and through legal proceedings by issuing lawsuits and petitions against park authorities such as the ICCN (Verweijen et al, 2016). A more violent form of resistance, included property demolition and attacks against park guards, however, this did not reflect a total dismissal of the park itself, it reflected a resistance to the regulations that were being implemented (Verweijen et al, 2016). Additionally, individual and communal unauthorized cultivation of the park’s land occurs as another form of resistance, as locals feel deprived of their livelihood amid rampant poverty. One of the many dimensions of the conflict within Virunga that is increasing grievances between the park and local inhabitants, is that Virunga elites assert a top-down approach, instead of a communicative approach with locals (Marijnen, 2017). Put simply, park guards inform locals where park boundaries exist, which villages must be removed or destroyed, and who is allowed in and out of the Virunga area. The borders are legitimized through a discourse of security, which consequently has fostered a repeated cycle of events, where violent confrontations have increasingly emerged as local inhabitants attempt to regain access to land they believe to be theirs (Marijnen, 2017; Lombard, 2015). The loss of these fertile lands, also directly correlates to the loss of livelihood activities and foods that sustain them. The Virunga area is one the most bountiful and fertile in Africa, so much so it has been protected since 1925 (Virunga National Park, 2018). Yet, anger and seething resentment is prevalent amongst the impoverished local populations of the eastern DRC, who are deprived of access and use of badly needed natural resources (Draper, 2016). Local communities are forced to uproot their lives and relocate to less fertile lands on the outskirts of the Virunga area. Pressing against park borders, subsistence farmers attempt to eke out a living by

41 growing crops as corn, sorghum, cassava and potatoes (Draper, 2016); others trespass inside the park to do so, or in defiance or unawareness of the law, saw park trees down for charcoal or kill or poach park wildlife (Draper, 2016). With 4 million inhabitants struggling to make a living in the Virunga area, some form rebel militias, emerging sporadically in splurges of violence; while others become park abolitionists, vowing to run for elective office and overturn the wrong doings of Belgian colonizers who deceived native communities into giving up precious and exceptionally fertile farmland (Draper, 2016). Predictably, locals feel they have been unjustly and violently forced from their native lands, giving them sound justification to discreetly continue livelihood activities on park property, regardless of park rules and regulations (Verweijen et al, 2016; Marijnen, 2017; Hochcleithner 2017). This ‘guerilla agriculture’ or unlawful cultivation, then gives the park reason for armed attacks and mobilizations to destroy and remove illegal settlements (Marijnen, 2017). Furthermore, land within the park and the surrounding area has spiritual and religious significance to native communities (Lombard 2015; Verweijen et al, 2016). The land is mostly perceived to be protected by ancestral spirits and is believed to be collectively owned, meaning private individual ownership and user rights are not recognized nor understood (Verweijen et al, 2016). Local inhabitants also view the park as being controlled and managed by Western actors, which influences the way in which projects and regulations the park imposes are perceived by those in the Virunga area (Crawford and Bernstein, 2008). It fosters the perception that the park thrusts its will upon those around it, and that locals livelihoods are not taken into account. Together, the park’s colonial past and powerful Western actors’ involvement that has continued since then, has caused distrust of the park to increase. Furthermore, distrust of the park also stems from distrust of the DRC government (Verweijen et al, 2016). The Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature (ICCN), a Congolese governmental institution, works closely with external actors to protect the park (Virunga Foundation). The ICCN is perceived to be part of the corrupt DRC state, and is consequentially affiliated with DRC’s corrupt, predatory, unjust and brutal law enforcement methods. This perception is reinforced through daily interactions between park guards and local inhabitants and the increasingly stringent approach used against locals. For instance, park guards have burned down villages and fields and destroyed farming tools in unauthorized settlements, as well as increased the amount of arrests and financial penalties (Verweijen et al, 2016). As a result, park guards are not thought to protect the interests of local inhabitants, nor are they deemed trustworthy.

In some areas of Virunga, animals from the park (such as elephants) continually ruin fields and crops, which forces inhabitants to stand guard during the night so they can chase them away (Camm, 2011). It has since been reported, that when these local inhabitants contacted park guards, they neglected to help chase the animals away or to implement some sort of barrier keeping the animals away from authorized communities (Verweijen et al, 2016). Furthermore, guards regularly light large areas of grass on fire in and around the Virunga area in an attempt to enhance the quality of grass for elephants to eat, however, there have been various reports these fires have taken place on the property of local inhabitants, destroying their cultivation efforts (Crawford et al, 2008).

6.3 Local Inhabitants and Armed Groups

We also see relations between local inhabitants and armed groups to be increasing, adding another dimension to the conflict in Virunga (Crawford et al, 2008). It is important to note that not all of these relations are voluntary; many local inhabitants are threatened and eventually coerced into cooperation, as numerous armed groups are not hesitant about committing heinous crimes in order to intimidate locals. However, armed groups are also deeply rooted in societal order, due to business deals, marriages, and advocacy-based relationships with prominent individuals (Verweijen et al 2016). Additionally, because of local recruitment tactics, numerous armed groups are founded within local communities. Many members of these armed groups consist of young men who have been expelled from their land and who have lost their livelihood, whether it be fishing, cultivation or hunting. Local recruitment is highly successful because many members believe they are joining a resistance group that is committed to reclaiming their ancestral land and assisting their families to regain access to their former homes (Verweijen et al 2016). Furthermore, Draper (2016) analyzes the complexities within the Virunga area, between park guards, armed groups and local inhabitants. He examines seven young men raised in abject poverty, of whom were involuntary conscripts into M23, an armed militia. While Virunga’s fertile terrain (and the biodiversity it encompasses) is protected for the pleasure of wealthy Western tourists, these seven young local inhabitants struggled simply to survive, which they perceived to be an immense injustice. Against their will, they soon became soldiers for the rebel group known as M23, joining thousands of other young inhabitants in the M23 training camp, some were forced participants, and some were voluntarily joined in act of resentment. During this time, M23 expressed many resentments

43 towards the corrupt state and local government of the DRC, but also pillaged and raped local villages throughout the southern area of Virunga National Park. One and a half years later, in 2013 “the Congolese Army, backed by United Nations troops, routed M23. These seven young inhabitants were among those deemed salvageable by UN peacekeepers and park officials” (p. 10). These seven young men now fill potholes for the park as their livelihood. Yet, the perception of many of their former communities is to be siding with Western elites. This is emblematic of the complexities between locals, rebel groups and park authorities, all of whom are becoming more militarized. Furthermore, it has been reported in the last year alone, 32 new armed groups have sprung up, bringing the total number of paramilitary groups to 127 (Ceballos and Singh, 2018). Further demonstrating the human cost of the internal conflict in Virunga, on April 9 of this year, violent militias operating in the illegal charcoal trade killed five young Virunga park rangers, all in their 20s, trying to protect the gorillas. Charcoal operations are a lucrative source of income for paramilitary groups and local communities, because most of the Congo relies on wood-fuels for cooking; however, producing charcoal often means destroying the very ecosystems that species like the mountain gorilla call home (Ceballos et al, 2018). Many of the armed groups located in the Virunga area, if offered monetary income will enable and protect those partaking in illicit activities, such as unauthorized hunting, fishing and gathering (Crawford et al, 2008). For instance, the armed group known as Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), allows local inhabitants to access land they have occupied within the park for cultivation and hunting purposes in exchange for a small fee per usage (Verweijen et al 2016). Additionally, it was reported that in recent years, locals have paid armed groups for protection while fishing in illegal areas, such as breeding grounds in Lake Edward (UNSC, 2010). These both reflect cooperation between civilians and armed groups, where locals hope to regain livelihood and avoid conflict, and armed groups try to acquire income, medicine and other supplies. This kind of cooperation is not limited to only natural resource exploitation but is also visible in relation to border trade (UNSC, 2010). Many traders pay for protection while crossing borders in an effort to avoid attacks or circumvent ambushes (UNSC, 2010). Armed groups also gather support through political facets; they tend to express grievances that locals hold as well, such as historical injustices, the current state of corrupt politics in the DRC, and the continuity of external involvement and control (Dunn, 2003). Consequentially, politicians and other powerful actors tend to align with and support armed groups in an effort to gain leverage and reinforce their social status (Krieger, 2015). On a

44 local level, officials tend to align with armed groups to offset opponents, resolve local disputes and disregard policies imposed by the park that are perceived to be harmful (Verweijen et al 2016). As armed groups are perceived by some to protect locals’ livelihoods, some authorities attempt to take advantage of this perception. An example is national Parliament member, Muhindo Nzangi, who has grown his popularity and voter base through contesting the borders of the park and pledging to allow dispelled communities back to their land (UNSC, 2011). The perceived change in the loss of livelihood by local inhabitants is thus reflected in mutually beneficial ties between displaced civilians and armed groups, due to the complex history and militarization of the Virunga area.

6.4 Further militarization

In an effort to curb poaching, unauthorized fishing and other illegal activities, Virunga officials have incorporated very strict law enforcement methods and tactics (Crawford et al, 2008). This has resulted in an increasingly aggressive approach by park guards towards local inhabitants. Additionally, because Virunga Park guards are subjected to such intense militant training and are more heavily armed than in the past, guards are less likely to negotiate or have a dialogue with local populations (Verweijen et al, 2016), thus inhabitants are less likely to cooperate with the ICCN or park guards. Park guards and the ICCN have also increasingly been working together with the Congo Army, also known as the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, (FARDC). The FARDC has been tasked with expelling armed groups from the Virunga area; as such, in recent years they have conducted massive military interventions against said armed groups (Verweijen et al, 2016). These interventions only nudged armed groups further into the forest basin of Virunga, resulting in commercial and trade districts to fall under the control of the FARDC (UNSC 2011). Despite these interventions, violent rivalry between different armed groups continued to be rampant, partially because they all compete for their own share in the protection and security markets (Verweijen et al, 2016). The FARDC took over some of the protection market originally controlled by armed groups, such as the exchange of fees to allow unauthorized fishing and protection against park authorities (Verweijen et al, 2016). This led to outrage amongst local communities, as well as an increase in violent crime and retaliation attacks (Crawford et al, 2008). The blatant corruption of the FARDC pushed park authorities to ask the DRC government for hierarchical control of FARDC troops. Park officials then created, with

45 permission from the DRC government, new divisions of soldiers that consisted of a mix between FARDC troops and park guards, known as ICCN-FARDC regiments (UN 2010). Moving forward, FARDC troops could only function in the mixed ICCN-FARDC regiments, under the authority and control of the ICCN and park authorities. These new regiments were created in order to combat corruption committed by FARDC troops. Unfortunately, the creation of this new group only sparked tensions between the FARDC Navy and the FARDC troops, as the navy was not given the same advantages and benefits as the FARDC troops now had (Hochleithner, 2017). Additionally, the FARDC navy feared the loss of their share of the protection market, which was to provide ammunition and weapons to dispelled local fishermen. In an effort to avert this loss, the FARDC began to increase support and ties with different armed groups; eventually the FARDC Navy and some armed groups violently attacked an ICCN-FARDC mixed regiment (Verweijen et al, 2016). The internal rivalry within the DRC military, the competition and collaboration between state and non- state groups, and the mixed regiments of FARDC-ICCN together caused total chaos and substantial uncertainty for local populations (Verweijen et al, 2016). In recent years, the hardline approach of the park has caused even further dismay and confusion to locals, which appears to only be fueling antagonism. For instance, in 2015 a mixed regiment of FARDC-ICCN troops began destroying farms located on the outskirts of the park, but technically within its limits (Marijnen et al, 2016). As local inhabitants rely on cultivation, gathering, and hunting and fishing for livelihood, this only pushed these inhabitants deeper into the park. Specifically, these locals moved into an area controlled by the FDLR armed group, who would then allow small areas of land to be cultivated by locals, in exchange for a fee (Verweijen et al, 2016). This reflects how the militarized approach of the park, has deepened ties between armed groups and civilians. Later, civilians refused to work with the Congolese Army and the ICCN to provide any intel about the FDLR. Local inhabitants began expressing grievances and frustration with the mixed FDLR- ICCN regiments, as the perception of them is that they make life more difficult for locals and greatly threaten their livelihood. These mixed regiments and their hardline approach also provoke retaliatory attacks. For example, near the south point of Lake Edward, an armed group mixed with some civilians tried to regain control of the area, in an effort to allow the local inhabitants to return and to re-permit unauthorized fishing (UNEP et al, 2015). The counterattack ended up killing around 13 troops, and an unknown number of rebels and civilians (UNEP et al, 2015). The boundaries between the park guards and Congolese army have become ever-increasingly

46 blurred and these continuing attacks and counterattacks have resulted in the view that conservation has become completely militarized (Verweijen et al, 2016). These mixed regiments have only fostered an even deeper mistrust towards park authorities and guards, which armed groups take advantage of as it makes local inhabitants wary of collaborating with the park or the army (Lombard, 2016). The effects of green militarization have negative indirect and direct effects on local populations. The strict approach adopted by Virunga Park, has enabled the dynamics that are at the origin of armed conflict and illicit resource exploitation (Hochleithner, 2017). The ongoing facets of the conflict in the Virunga area continue to weaken and destroy already inadequate infrastructure throughout the region, some of which has been built and financed by humanitarian groups and NGOs (Krieger, 2015). Children and adolescents tend to be the most vulnerable, and are at risk for recruitment by armed groups. Various NGOs and humanitarian groups have attempted to thwart this recruitment by providing education, and medical and mental health services (Krieger, 2015). However, park guards often unintentionally, or purposely undermine these efforts by conducting military operations and attacks. In response, children and adolescents join armed militias to provide income, defend their communities or due to sentiments of revenge, outrage or desperation.

6.5 Effects on Aid

The DRC has experienced numerous humanitarian interventions over the course of its existence (Everill et al, 2013). The most prominent interventions took place during the First and Second Congolese Wars, and resulted in the UN sending in peacekeeping troops multiple times (Mathys, 2017). However, intervention remains prevalent as the humanitarian crisis has continued to worsen. The green militarization response by Virunga Park has only intensified existing humanitarian problems. Recent efforts to relieve local inhabitants of despair, human rights abuses and total annihilation come from NGOs and humanitarian groups such as the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). MSF began working in the eastern region of the Congo in 1981 “in response to armed conflict, endemic/epidemic disease and healthcare exclusion” (MSF, 2015, p. 1). These problems remain rampant, despite this region being their ‘largest intervention in the world’ (MSF, 2015). Local populations live in a constant state of fear from the effects of the violent conflict between state and non-state actors (such as displacement, violent abuses and lack of infrastructure). The Virunga area is subjected to the most conflict as the Congolese Army,

ICCN, park guards, and numerous armed groups continue to fight and compete with one another. Furthermore, as park guards persist in increasing their military tactics and harden their response further fueling violence in the region, groups providing humanitarian assistance are negatively affected. Humanitarian groups are not only finding it increasingly difficult to circumvent violence, deliver services, and handle basic logistics, but they also find it more risky and dangerous. In 2013, four MSF staff members were kidnapped by the armed group Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) during an exploratory expedition to estimate medical needs of the North Kivu province, located on the northern border of the park (MSF, 2017). The next day, MSF set up a special unit tasked with finding the abducted members, and after thirteen months of imprisonment only one MSF member managed to escape, however the remaining three members continue their missing status (MSF, 2017). Despite this tragic event, MSF had cautiously continued to provide assistance to civilians affected by violence in the North Kivu province until 2015, after armed attackers attacked an MSF convoy and abducted two additional MSF staff members (MSF, 2017). The Ituri mining region, located on the eastern border of Virunga Park, has faced continuing assaults by armed groups. In 2016, MSF opened a new project in this region, where they provide basic healthcare to 1,100 victims of violence (MSF, 2017). Additionally, displacement numbers have spiked in the Virunga area, with hundreds of thousands of people escaping violence in their villages or being evicted by park guards; an increasing number of civilians are settling in camps. This has forced MSF to expand its intervention through health services, and the provision of basic life necessities (MSF, 2017). Furthermore, the enforcement of the park’s expanding borders, result in various restrictions, such as roads being cut off or blocked, which prevents humanitarian aid groups from bringing supplies to local inhabitants located within park borders (Krieger, 2015). The MSF reported in 2016 that a road leading to their base in Mitwabi, was blocked by officials, meaning MSF could only reach their station by plane (MSF Report, 2016). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has faced similar struggles in the Virunga area. They remain “especially concerned about the depredations being committed against civilians” in the Virunga region of the Congo (ICRC, 2009). The Red Cross also stated in a 2017 report it “is particularly concerned about the 7 million people in need of emergency assistance, more than half of whom have been displaced by violence”, and that “People have suffered unimaginable difficulties, including displacement, separation from family members, abuse, looting, injury or violent death” (ICRC, 2017; p. 3 & 5). To combat

48 these issues, the Red Cross has been offering food and water and other basic necessities to civilians, especially in the Kivu provinces which is home to Virunga National Park. Sadly, to update the status of this both majestic and harrowing place, there was a recent report (Sims, 2018), that after the murder of a young female park ranger and the kidnapping of two British tourists and their driver, Virunga National Park, a major driver of tourism to the DRC, has closed for the year, until 2019. Expectedly, this has hit the local Congolese tourism economy very hard, even catastrophically, as yet again, the inhabitants pay a price.

7.0 Conclusion

This thesis has analyzed the green militarization response to the destruction of biodiversity. This is somewhat conspicuously marked as a ‘war by conservation’ and is becoming embedded in the advancement of a global security agenda, in which biodiversity takes precedence over human lives and livelihood. Key elements that are usually associated with a global security agenda have been used and operationalized in ‘defense of biodiversity’. It is important to explore whether neoliberalizing conservation has made war by conservation possible. The increasing trend of green militarization and the dilemma surrounding the ramifications for local inhabitants remain an area of much needed attention. Until now, it appears the literature surrounding green militarization does not give enough attention to the ways in which local communities are directly or indirectly affected by the green militarization approach. As such, I have also analyzed the effects of green militarization on local inhabitants’ security and livelihood, and examined the impact on attempts to provide humanitarian aid to marginalized locals in and around Virunga National Park. This work contributes to a gap in the literature regarding green militarization, but also opens the door for further in-depth research and analysis. The aggressive dual militarization by both park guards and rebels and poachers creates a violent enclosure or space, in which innocent locals are caught in the middle (Pelusa et al, 2011). These enclosures restrict access to land and resources, redefine social relations and promote a power struggle over access to resources that are integral to the livelihood of local communities. I have examined how the green militarization response of Virunga has resulted in the marginalization of local communities, which encompasses implementing, controlling, and penalizing the actions and cultural livelihood practices of local inhabitants. Restricting access to resources, I argue, has only further angered locals who already have

49 unjust feelings for being uprooted from their ancestral lands during the colonial era; it has resulted in open resistance, and even defiance towards conservation groups and practices in the DRC. Locals resist through continuing unauthorized livelihood practices such as fishing, hunting, cultivation and foraging (Lunstrum, 2014; Lombard, 2015). This has obvious consequences not only for conservation practices, but for locals’ security and wellbeing in the face of existing conflict and entrenched poverty. The creation and expansion of PAs generally result in displacement of local communities, which creates animosity and distrust of conservation enforcers. This distrust is only reinforced through everyday interactions with park guards who regularly utilize use of force and violence against locals. Predictably, this dynamic has led to local inhabitants strengthening ties with armed militias, and alliances formed between them based on the former’s need for protection and in return for the provision of necessities to the latter. Furthermore, this militarization fuels more militarization, and negatively affects aid groups’ access, ability and willingness to provide humanitarian assistance to those in dire need in and around Virunga. However, green militarization is deemed an appropriate response because it is justified through a dialogue of conservation security. This makes displacement, use of violence, limiting access to resources, and shoot to kill practices easier to condone and harder to oppose, simply because it makes it more difficult to for local communities to contest once they are perceived to be ‘threats’ (Lunstrum et al, 2018). Setting aside distresses over the well-being and the human rights of local inhabitants, displacement has continued to increase in PAs (Lunstrum, 2014; Neumann, 2004), despite a general consensus that for conservation practices to be successful, they need to respect, and show benefits to local communities, as it is these communities that have the potential and ability to protect biodiversity, within everyday cultural practices. In 2015, Noam Chomsky, Jonathon Porritt and Ghillean Prance, (notably some of the most famous environmentalists and human rights advocates), pleaded to conservationists to protect endangered natives, in an open letter they stated: “Tribal peoples have managed their lands sustainably for generations. Forcibly removing them usually results in environmental damage. Such removals are a violation of human rights. The cheapest and quickest way to conserve areas of high biodiversity is to respect tribal peoples’ rights. The world can no longer afford a conservation model that destroys tribal peoples: it damages human diversity as well as the environment” (Vidal, 2016). My goal is to open up a discussion and provide an area for future research and analysis in regard to green militarization effects on local inhabitants and their ability to survive. Such research is important for understanding how conservation practices can lead to

50 resistance against conservation, impede cooperation between stakeholders, and ultimately result in harm to all the players, but most especially to local communities. A more holistic understanding of these complex dynamics is needed, and perhaps some consideration of how best to foster inclusion of locals in conservation planning, park design, implementation of regulations, and other ongoing efforts to preserve biodiversity, as these populations are situated so as to be the most impacted, yet also the most contributory. The need for a cohesive approach is critically pressing, as green militarization continues to increase and biodiversity continues to be threatened, while local inhabitants suffer, caught tragically in between.

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