Meeting China's Food Safety Challenge
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Paulson Policy Memorandum Meetng China’s Food Safety Challenge John Kojiro Yasuda April 2017 Paulson Policy Memorandum About the Author John Kojiro Yasuda John Kojiro Yasuda is assistant professor in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at Indiana University’s School of Global and Internatonal Studies (SGIS). He specializes in contemporary Chinese politcs. Yasuda’s research includes the study of regulatory reform in developing countries, governance, and the politcs of insttutonal integraton. He has published artcles in the Journal of Politcs, Regulaton & Governance, and The China Quarterly. His book, On Feeding the Masses, which examines the politcal roots of China’s food safety crisis, is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press. Prior to joining SGIS, Yasuda was a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for the Study of Contemporary China. He received his PhD in Politcal Science from the University of California, Berkeley, an MPhil in Comparatve Government from Oxford University, and his BA in Government from Harvard University. Cover Photo: Reuters/Aly Song Paulson Policy Memorandum Introducton ith over 240 million farmers, Why is China’s food safety system failing one million processors, and and, indeed, becoming worse? Wmany millions of distributors, China has struggled to develop a This policy memorandum argues that natonal food safety regime that can China’s safety-related food failures are efectvely integrate diverse interests a result of the challenges of governing a within a common framework of system of such massive scale. governance. Interviews with Chinese food safety experts reveal a system in In large-scale systems, such as China’s, disarray. Despite concerted state eforts regulators must harmonize local best to fx it, microbiological hazards remain practces with natonal standards, unchecked, supply chain management is coordinate actors in diverse global weak, and policies supply chains, are uncoordinated and navigate across disparate jurisdictonal levels of complexity government. within a farfung bureaucracy. In The number efect, China’s of adulterated challenge is to food complaints develop a coherent recorded by the governance China Consumer framework Associaton in Photo: Flickr/Mitch Altman in a large, 2011 increased by 22 percent from heterogeneous context—one in which 2010.1 Chinese statstcs artfcially regulators must routnely make trade- defate the number of poisonings and ofs afectng feasibility, policy design infate food inspecton pass rates, yet and the applicability of policy to diverse a recent survey conducted by the Pew local conditons. Their choices may well Research Center shows that in 2012 solve some problems but invariably 41 percent of respondents identfed create new ones.3 food safety as a “serious problem”—up from just 12 percent in 2008.2 Food To be sure, all countries face these safety now represents one of the top challenges in policymaking. But in China, three governance concerns of China’s the trade-ofs are more pronounced populaton, along with inequality and because of the country’s sheer size corrupton. and complexity. This memorandum Meeting China’s Food Safety Challenge 1 Paulson Policy Memorandum contends, therefore, that the Chinese capacity, mismatched standards state’s overreliance on straightorward between politcal sub-units, and centralizaton or decentralizaton principal-agent problems between the (rather than the more complex federal central government and the periphery.5 approach we see in other countries) to But China difers from these other large address regulatory crises exacerbates polites in some important ways. these difcult trade-ofs.4 For one thing, China’s producton base is China faces a situaton where its system more extensive and less developed than its must simultaneously provide for exactng Western counterparts.6 Chinese producton standardizaton (which, in turn, requires practces vary signifcantly from province high levels of centralizaton) while also to province when compared to the EU accommodatng the extensive local and the US.7 Moreover, unlike these diversity of food producton (which other large-scale systems, China lacks a requires high levels of decentralizaton). federal framework that would provide Thus China’s food safety problem a clearer template for regulatory portends a new dynamic in central–local integraton among diverse localites.8 relatons: neither centralizaton nor decentralizaton is sufcient to address Not surprisingly, China has struggled the problem of scale. For instance, a to develop a food safety management decentralized strategy without the strong strategy that can cope with the country’s coordinatng hand of the center will fuel sheer scale. One result is that China’s contnued interprovincial disputes; yet a food safety regulatory system has centralized approach to food safety, by evolved largely as a reacton to recurrent contrast, will be too disconnected from crises. An ad hoc mix of centralizing and local food safety realites. decentralizing policies has emerged, but these ofen end up at cross-purposes, In short, the scale and complexity of further fuelling regulatory conficts. the food safety challenge implies the need for a new multlevel division of This policy memorandum focuses on labor in China between Beijing and local the four dominant strategies currently governments to assure more efectve being employed in China’s food safety and efcient regulatory control. system, all of which have produced lackluster results: (1) the use of China’s food safety system shares many coordinaton bodies, (2) locally directed of the pathologies of scale experienced model producton bases (MPB), (3) in other regulatory systems, such as top-down food safety propaganda the European Union (EU), the United and mobilizaton campaigns, and (4) States (US), and India, which also are regulatory segmentaton that has characterized by stretched regulatory created a less than coherent system. Meeting China’s Food Safety Challenge 2 Paulson Policy Memorandum Each policy is encountering diferent The memo frst examines the factors challenges: for the coordinaton bodies, that are fueling China’s food safety crisis, the problem is an unclear template putng the emphasis on the problem of for regulatory coordinaton; for the scale. It then turns to each of the four MPBs, it is integraton with a natonally dominant food safety policies the state coherent strategy and standardizaton has employed, ofering a critcal view program; for the campaigns, the of the recent history of implementaton principal shortcoming is poor and efectveness. Finally, it ofers some insttutonalizaton; and for regulatory policy recommendatons for China to segmentaton, the problem is the improve its regulatory system for food narrow applicability of policies. safety. Meeting China’s Food Safety Challenge 3 Paulson Policy Memorandum The Anatomy of China’s Food Safety Crisis opular media accounts regularly newly re-vamped China Food and Drug assert that China’s food safety Administraton (CFDA).12 Pproblems are due to a lack of political will or insufficient investment Most critques of China’s food safety in food safety. Yet recent reforms failure focus on run-of-the-mill suggest otherwise. In the last ten governance problems. Some highlight years, the Chinese state has actually the pervasive role of corrupton in spent the equivalent of more than eroding the food regulaton system, $800 million to upgrade monitoring not least because of collusion between facilities, build laboratories, and hire ofcials and local entrepreneurs more food safety personnel.9 who seek to circumvent standards and monitoring, the buying of safety Alarmed by the increasing social unrest certfcatons, and the manipulaton that has resulted from widespread food of food safety audit reports.13 Others contaminatons, both central and local emphasize weak media oversight in ofcials are highly wary of the potental China, or the stll underdeveloped role for massive food safety-related of courts in tort liability as root causes protests. That means for China’s food safety they have strong The sheer size of China’s bureaucracy problems.14 politcal incentves to results in weak monitoring practices address food safety that, in turn, give rise to corruption Stll other critques focus issues. And global and other pathologies of governance. on the problematc scandals involving role of independent Chinese products shipped abroad have regulatory agencies in an authoritarian placed additonal pressure on central state, fragmentaton of the food safety government ofcials to ensure that bureaucracy, and local obstructon that China is not exportng its regulatory resists centralized authority.15 More problems.10 broadly, it has been observed that a general lack of social trust contributes to One result is that China has revised an environment of non-compliance.16 its performance evaluaton system to severely punish ofcials for mass This memo does not suggest that food poisonings. The State Council, China’s food safety problems have China’s cabinet, has created two special nothing to do with corrupton, a lack commissions led by senior leaders to of state capacity, or weak social trust. address food safety issues.11 And in 2013, But it aims to highlight another, ofen the central government established a overlooked dimension—scale—as Meeting China’s Food Safety Challenge 4 Paulson Policy Memorandum another reason for China’s food safety food was valued at 954.6 billion yuan failures. The sheer size of China’s