Dillon's Rule
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PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATOR’S MUNICIPAL DESKBOOK | 6th Ed. (2020) Dillon’s Rule – State Primacy Over Local Governments Ideally, the state-local relationship is harmonious, with both levels of government working in concert to achieve mutually compatible goals. Some discord, however, seems inevitable and, perhaps, desirable. (“Honest disagreement is often a good sign of progress.” Mahatma Gandhi.) A local government, in its desire for autonomy, may be confronted with the Commonwealth’s assertion of state supremacy. This concept of state supremacy is embodied in a fundamental precept of municipal law holding that municipalities are creatures of, and subject to the plenary power of, the state. This tenet is embodied in what is known as Dillon’s Rule. For over a century, this general principle has explained the relationship between the state and its local governments. Judge John Dillon wrote in a now famous 1868 opinion that the powers of local governments must be sanctioned by the state: It is a general and undisputed proposition that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: first, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation—not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of a power is resolved by the courts against a corporation, and the power is denied.1 This doctrine was adopted by Pennsylvania in Philadelphia v. Fox,2 and it remains fundamental for the evaluation of local government powers.3 1 Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Missouri River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455 (1868) (emphasis supplied). 2 64 Pa. 169 (1870). 3 See Hydropress Environmental Services, Inc. v. Township of Upper Mount Bethel, County of Northampton, 575 Pa. 479, 491 (2003) (quoting from Commonwealth v. Ashenfelder, 413 Pa. 517 (1964) that “it is well settled that . political subdivisions of the Commonwealth . possess only such powers as have been granted to them by the legislature, either in express terms or which arise by necessary and fair implication or are incident to powers expressly granted or are essential to the declared objects and purposes of the [political subdivisions] . .”). See also 22A Summ. Pa. Jur. 2d, Municipal and Local Law § 13:2 (2d ed.)(20204 (2014) (“Dillon’s Rule is the law of Pennsylvania.”) citing Warner Cable Communications, Inc. v. Schuylkill Haven, 784 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (Dillon’s Rule has been adopted by the Courts of Pennsylva- nia.); Herbert v. Commonwealth, 632 A.2d 1051 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 607 (1995). However, see also, Pa. Const. art. 9, § 2 (“A municipality which has a home rule charter may exercise any power or perform any function not denied by th[e] Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly . .”); City of Philadelphia v. Schweiker, 579 Pa. 591, 605 (2004) (municipalities operating under home rule do not need “express statutory warrant” to enact ordinances). 9 | Pennsylvania General Assembly ∙ Local Government Commission .