Notes and References
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Notes and References 1. Introduction 1. Seasonal variation and the division of labour among hunter-gatherers receives detailed attention in Chapter 5 (see also Condon, 1983). The particular point in this passage comes from the ethnographie film entitled People ofthe Seal, by Asen Balikci (see also Balikci, 1970). The famous Northwest Coast potlatch does not receive detailed treatment in this book, but some traditional analyses as weIl as new findings should be mentioned. Some traditional sources include: Boas, 1897, 1966; Drucker, 1955, 1965; DeLaguna, 1972; Oberg, 1973; Sapir and Swadesh, 1939; Codere, 1950; Mitchell and Donald, 1988. The fact that post-contact Northwest Coast economies encompass a complex mix of organisational features is documented by Donald (1984) and Mitchell 1984 (see also Isaac, 1988). The literature on the Trobriand Islands is substantial. The specific reference here is to Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacifie (1922) and Coral Gardens and Their Magie (1935); see also Uberoi (1962). For material on the Dani see Karl Heider (1979). Barbara Myerhoff's book, Number Dur Days (1978), is the reference for the elderly Californian. On the Mudurucu see Murphy and Murphy (1974). The description ofthe Mexican grand mother's multiple roles is in Friedlander (1976). 2. Patch exploitation refers to optimal foraging models of hunter-gatherer economies. I deal more extensively with elements of optimal foraging models in Chapter 4. Discussions of classical political economy (Adam Smith and others) and of marginal utility economics (Alfred Marshall and others), I leave to the historians of economic thought. I elaborate the meaning of the concept of institution in the discussion of the institutional paradigm in Chapter 3. Cultural systems are treated here in ethnographie, historical and evolutionary contexts, and I am operating on the assumption that the central mission of anthropology is to describe and explain pattern and variation in human cultural systems. If cultural systems were all alike, then the discipline of human biology would suffice to explain the behaviour of homo .I'apiens (see Kaplan and Manners, 1972). 3. The discipline of anthropology has contained C.P. Snow's two cultures: the humanistic and the scientific. The approach I take in this book derives from the scientific tradition. This tradition originated with Marx, Weber and Durkheim and continued with Leslie White, V.G. Childe and Julian Steward. This tradition is anti-relativistic and comparative in emphasis. Cultural relativism began in anthropology as an antidote to ethnocentrism and to the racist notions of nineteenth century evolutionism and Social Darwinism. By arguing that individual cultures must be understood as unique and distinct entities, the moral and political purpose was accomplished at the expense, in part, of the scientific one. As Kaplan and Manners point out, however, comparison is explicit or implicit in all anthropological work: 'Even the single 179 180 Ndtes and References ethnographic monograph involves comparison, since the ethnographer can hardly help comparing the culture he is studying with those of a similar type that he has either read about or experienced. To describe any society one must use categories, terms and concepts wh ich transcend the individual case' (1972:7). 4. The comparative method has been an important part of anthropological theory since its origins (Durkheim, 1964b; Leach, 1968; Schapera, 1953; Evans-Pritchard, 1963; Y. Cohen, 1968b). For a discussion of structural types and the comparative method, see Kaplan and Manners (1972:8-11). For discussions of large-scale comparisons, see Barry and Schlegel (1980), and Levinson and Malone, (1980). With specific reference to economics, see Murdock and Morrow, (1980). 5. By the term 'evolutionary' here, I do not me an to take on any of the meanings or the controversies that were part of the development of the social sciences in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see Kaplan and Manners, 1972:38-43). Rather, I mean to use evolutionism in the more contemporary sense (Steward, 1955; Service, 1962; Sahlins, 1968; Fried, 1967). 6. This interpretation of Polanyi is based on the analysis of his masked Marxism. Chapter 3 elaborates the point at length. I should mention that this interpretation is new and has not been weil understood by economic anthropologists, many of whom have rejected Polanyi's work because of its dual-economy model (Prattis, 1987). 2. Paradigms for Studying Economies across Cultures 1. In the last five years, the subfield of Economic Anthropology has become focused and institutionalised. The recently founded Society for Economic Anthropology (SEA) with annual proceedings (Ortiz, 1983), and Research in Economic Anthropology (REA), first edited by George Dalton and now by Barry L. Isaac, have provided both topically and geographically organised volumes. Isaac has made a special point about incorporating archaeological research into economic anthropol ogy (1984: 3-4,1986,1988). 2. There is a large literature here, much of which is organised in the LeClair and Schneider reader (1968). See also Tax, 1953; Firth, 1967; Burling, 1962; LeClair, 1962; Firth and Yamey, 1964; Epstein, 1968; Salisbury, 1962; Pospisil, 1963a, 1963b; Nash, 1966; Hili, 1963; Schneider, 1974. 3. I should note here that some of the earliest Marxist writings are very dose to Polanyi's substantivist position (Godelier, 1966, 1978a and b; Meillassoux, 1972) and cite Polanyi's work quite liberally. 4. I discuss some elements of Anglo-Marxist economic anthropology in this piece, induding the problem of articulating modes of production (Halperin, 1982). 5. Thomas Kuhn (1962) could have had a field-day with the subfield of economic anthropology. The paradigms are very much in the process of forming. Notes and References 181 6. It should be noted, however, that while the theoretical foundations of people operating within the formalist school were somewhat shaky, many ethnographers did manage to collect significant amounts of data, particu larly quantitative data. For example, Sol Tax's book, Penny Capitalism, contains a fair amount of data on land tenure and labour organisation, as weIl as the kinds of goods that circulated within Panajachel, including those between Panajachel and the larger regional economy. 7. It should be noted that Polanyi's categories of reciprocity, redistribution and market exchange have been used taxonomically (Codere, 1968), but this created problems such as identifying economies which had the right kinds of reciprocity. The various kinds of reciprocity and the fact that reciprocity as Polanyi defined it formally can be found in almost any economy or at least in many prevented this taxonomy from being of cross-cultural use. 3. The Institutional Paradigm in Economic Anthropology 1. An earlier version of the paper appeared in Halperin (1984). Georges Duby's book on Medieval Economy in France is one of the best case studies of a rural economy. Rural Economy and Country Life in the Medieval West ranks very high as an example of an historical ethnogra phy that uses the institutional paradigm. 2. Anthony Giddens' definition of institution is not too different from this, although he attempts to incorporate awareness on the part of individuals in it (1979). 3. The dialectic in Polanyi is more problematic. Discussion of it requires an understanding of Lukäcs. Polanyi was engaged in a constant defining and redefining of concepts. 4. In my article on redistribution in Chan Kom (1977b) I demons~rated that Polanyi's concept of redistribution is useful in understanding the allocation of land and labour in a Maya village. 5. It is interesting to note that Trade and Market is read and cited almost exclusively by anthropologists and a few historians. The Great Transformation has a much wider readership. See Stanfield (1980). 4. The Formal Paradigm 1. An earlier version of this paper appeared in Halperin (1985a). Maurice Godelier's landmark book, Rationalite et irrationalite en economie (1966) draws very heavily on Weber's concepts (Halperin, 1983). 2. The best compilation of key articles on the formalist-substantivist debate is the volume edited by LeClair and Schneider (1968). 3. See, for example, Nash, 1966; Pospisil, 1963a, 1963b; Tax, 1953; Burling, 1962; Cook, 1966; Schneider, 1974; Epstein, 1968. Cyril Belshaw (1965) used terms such as capitalist and entrepreneur universally and thus generalised these economic roles across cultures. 4. Formal analytical models and paradigms in linguistics and social organisation have existed for some time (Hammel, 1965; Goodenough, 1956; Lounsbury, 1964; Burling, 1964; Hammer, 1966; Banton, 1965; 182 Notes and References Chomsky, 1963). Social theory has also dealt in formal analysis. The importance of Levi-Strauss (1963) and his concerns for formal models has been discussed extensively by Hugo Nutini (1965,1968); see also the essays by Hughes (1970), Scholte (1966), Sontag (1970). 5. There may be other types and it would not be difficult to subdivide further into subtypes the two kinds of formal models described below. 6. There is also the assumption of what Durkheim (1964a) called mechanical solidarity in formal atomistic models, that is, that all units are identical to all other units and the whole is equal to the sum of its parts. Therefore, the system consists of the parts in the aggregate. 7. Durkheim's concept of organic solidarity is pertinent here. In this model the parts are differentiated and interdependent. For arecent and rather extensive discussion of the assumptions and scientific limitations and potentials of different kinds of analytic units, see Lewontin et al. (1984). In this book, the organic vs. mechanical dichotomy is recast in terms of contemporary debate. 8. It should be noted that even Adam Smith's brand of randomness assumed an order, naturally created by the invisible hand of the market system. This was an assumed institution al order, which seems to have been forgotten entirely by the formalist school of economic anthropology. In short, Adam Smith probably designed the first formal processual model, but with elements offormal atomistic models.