Selected Documents on the 1948 Palestine War Author(S): Walid Khalidi Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol

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Selected Documents on the 1948 Palestine War Author(s): Walid Khalidi Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Spring, 1998), pp. 60-105 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537835 Accessed: 24-07-2015 20:24 UTC

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This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR

SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BY WALID KHALIDI

The 1948 PalestineWar, whose fiftiethanniversary occurs thisyear, fell into two major phases: the first,the civilwar phase, began soon afterthe UnitedNational General Assembly(UNGA) partitionresolution of 29 November 1947 and lasted until15 May 1948,the formalend of the BritishMandate. The second, the regular war phase, lasted from15 May (when the Stateof Israel was also declared) until the various Arab-Israeliarmistice agreements were concluded in 1948-49. Most Westernliterature on the PalestineWar deals with the second phase, while the predominantsingle image of the war in the Westernmind is thatof a tiny,poorly armed and pacific Israel attackedin its cradle and withoutprovocation by the overwhelmingforce of the regulararmies of the neighboringArab states. In fact,of the two phases, thefirst was the more climactericand decisive.It was duringthis phase thatthe vastly larger forces at the disposal of theJewish Agency, infinitelybetter armed, organized, and led than anythingthe Palestinianspos- sessed, launched theirlong-prepared and contemplatedmajor offensiveunder Plan Dalet. The timingof the offensive(the firstweek of April1948) took advan- tage of the alreadyadvanced stage of disintegrationof Britishrule, although Brit- ain was to remainthe sovereignpower in the land until15 May. The objectiveof Plan Dalet was the establishmentby forceof armsof theJewish state in theJewish and Palestinianlands assigned to it by the UNGA partitionrecommendation and the conquest of as much additionalterritory (particularly Jerusalem) as possible. Strikinglyunavailable to the Westernreader has been contemporaneousmate- rial reflectingPalestinian or Arab conditions and perspectivesduring this first phase of the 1948 Palestinewar. The followingnine documentspertain to the last days of the Mandate fromthe end of Marchonward. They have been chosen for theirintrinsic worth and because theyreflect widely differing perspectives. Except for the second document,which has already appeared in printin Arabic,the othershave not to the best of myknowledge appeared beforein extenso in either Englishor Arabic. Read in sequence with my introductoiynotes and footnotes,they affordin- sightsinto several key aspects of the firstphase of the 1948 war: the asymmnetryin thebalance of power between thetwo sides, contemporaneousArab perspectives of thisbalance of power, the ignominiousbehavior of the Britishauthorities, the disarrayin Palestinianand Arab militaryorganization (but also the dedicationand courage of the Palestinianguerrillas), the militarystrategy and tactics of the Haganah and the "dissident"Irgun, the cause of the Palestinianexodus, the death

Walid Khalidi, a founderof The Institutefor Palestine Studies and itsgeneral secretary, is a formerprofessor at OxfordUniversity, the American University of Beirut,and HarvardUniver- sity.

Journal of Palestine Studies XXVII, no. 3 (Spring 1998), pp. 60-105.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR 61 throesof the Palestiniancommunities of Jaffaand Haifa,the trueattitude of the Jewishauthorities to the exodus fromthe lattercity, the methods by which the Jewishauthorities implemented the UNGA partitionresolution, and the circumstances thatinevitably led to the interventionof the regularArab armiesafter 15 May 1948. The documentsselected are as follows:

The Military Situation in Palestine on the Eve of Plan Dalet "A BriefReport on the Situationin Palestineand ComparisonBetween the Forces and Potentialof Both Sides," by General Ismail Safwat, General OfficerCommanding, Arab League MilitaryCommittee, Da- mascus, to JamilMardam Bey, PrimeMinister of Syriaand Chairman of the PalestineCommittee of the Arab League, 23 March 1948 ...... 62 The Fall of Qastel and the Death of 'Abd al-Qadir An EyewitnessAccount by Bahjat Abu GharbiyyaExtracted from The Memoirs of a Freedom Fighter,1916-49, Institutefor Palestine Stud- ies, Beirut,1993 (in Arabic) ...... 72 The Fall of Haifa Arab NationalCommittee of Haifa,Letter to General Stockwell,Military Commander,North Sector, Haifa, Concerning His Statementof With- drawal,22 April1948 ...... 90 Arab NationalCommittee of Haifa,Aide-Memoire of the MeetingBe- tween General Stockwelland the Arab Representatives,22 April 1948 ...... 92 The Haganah Command,Terms for a Truce BetweenJews and Arabs in Haifa,22 April1948 ...... 93 The Arab NationalCommittee of Haifa,Letter to General Stockwell SummarizingHis Positionat the 22 AprilTown Hall Meetings, 23 April1948 ...... 95 Arab NationalCommittee of Haifa,Letter to Haifa MayorShabatai Levy, 23 April1948 ...... 97 Arab NationalCommittee of Haifa,Letter to General Stockwell, 25 April1948 ...... 98 The Fall of Jaffa Reportto Fawzi Qawukji, Commanderof the Arab LiberationArmy (ALA) CentralFront, from Captain Michel Issa, Head of the Ajnadin Battalion,6 May 1948...... 99

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THE MILITARY SITUATION IN PALESTINE ON THE EVE OF PLAN DALET

"A BRIEF REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE AND COMPARISON BETWEEN THE FORCES AND POTENTIAL OF BOTH SIDES," BY GENERAL ISMAIL SAFWAT, GENERAL OF- FICER COMMANDING, ARAB LEAGUE MILITARY COMMITTEE, DAMAScuS, TO JAMIL MARDAm BEY, PRIME MINISTER OF SYRIA AND CHAIRMAN OF THE PALESTINE COMMITTEE OF THE ARAB LEAGUE, 23 MARCH 1948. As thepolitical situation in Palestine deterioratedfollowing the UN Special Committeeon Palestine'srecommendation ofpartition on 3 September1947, the Political Committeeof the Arab League Council based in Cairo appointed a Tech- nical Committeeof militaryexperts to reporton the militarysituation in the country.In the wake of the UNpartitionvote on 29 November1947, the Techni- cal Committeewas transformedinto the 'MilitaryCommittee" in overall charge of militarymatters in Palestine. Headquartered near Damascus, the committee had as its mandate to "ascertainthe defense needs of Palestine"and coordinate Arab effortswithin thatframework. General Ismail Safwat,the former Iraqi chief of staffwho had dominated the Technical Committee,was made its chairman. Fightingbetween Jewish and Palestinianforces broke out in the wake of the partition vote. The Palestinians were loosely organized in an irregularforce called Jihad Muqaddas (Holy War) under Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni,a charis- matic and highlypopular guerrillaleader and nephew ofHajjAmin al-Husayni, the exiled leader of theArab Higher Committee-thehighest Palestinian political body. The MilitaryCommittee, while reflectingthe Arab League's antipathyfor Hajj Amin and by extensionfor theforces allied to him,at the same time was sincerelyand deeplyskeptical on principle of the efficacyof guerrilla action. Its position,repeatedly expressed in reports,memoranda, and oralpresentationsto the Arab League's highestbodies, was that only the regularArab armies could counter theZionist onslaught. In his effortsto mobilize theArab states,General Safwat wrotea seriesof esca- lating reportsnoting thegrowing Zionist militarystrength and Arab weakness and stressingwith increasing urgencythe need for a massive and coordinated Arab effort.His firstreport, dated 9 October1947, recommended,among other things.the immediaterecruitment, training, and arming ofArab volunteers;the deploymentnear Palestine's bordersof regularArab troops,the establishmentof an overallgeneral Arab command;and theallocation of moneyand thedispatch ofarms in set quotas. TheLeague countriesbalked at Safwat'srecommendations. Money was sent to theMilitary Committee, but an overallgeneral command was notset up and riflesand arms weresuppliedfar below thequotas set outforeach country. But volunteersdid begin to arrive in Damascus, numberingabout 1,000 by the end of December 1947. AnotherIraqi, General Taha Hashimi, a former primneminister then in exile in Syria,was appointed inspectorgeneral to super- vise,in conjunctionwith the Military Committee, recruitment and mobilization. A trainingcenter was set up near Damascus, and the volunteerswere organized

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into the 'Arab LiberationArmy" (ALA). ALA unitsbegan enteringPalestine as of earlyJanuary. By February,the total number of volunteerstrained and organized by the MilitaryCommittee was about 5,000. 800 Palestinians,3,000 Syri- ans, 300 Lebanese, 800 Iraqis, 50 Egyptians,and 34 YugoslavMuslims. The documentreproduced below is Safwat'sfourth report to theArab League's Palestine Committee,formed shortly after the partition resolution to take overall charge of affairsrelating to Palestine. The Palestine Committeecomprised representativesof theLeague memberstates, mainly at the level ofprime ministeror foreign minister,and was chaired byJamil Mardam Bey,prime ministerand later defense ministerof Syria. Throughoutthe report,distinction is made between "volunteers,"meaning men recruited by the Military Committeeand formed into ALA units,and "guerrillas,"meaning membersof Abd al-Qadir al- Husayni'sJihad Muqaddas. The reportwas submittedon 23 March 1948 but not considered by the Arab League Council until 10 April. By that time, the Haganah's Plan Dalet had already been launched. The reportwas translatedby Jenab Tutunjiand Walid Khalidi.

[Stationeryletterhead: General Command of the Palestine Forces]

To: His Excellency,Chairman of the PalestineCommittee' From: The General Command Date: 23 March 1948 This reportis to complete previousreports and verbal explanationspresented to thePolitical Committee of theArab League duringthe meetings ending 15Janu- ary 1947 and 2 February1948. I. Armed Forces A. JewishForces We have received no informationto contradictour previous informationthat Jewishforces in Palestinenumber no less than 50,000 fighters,which is the com- bined strengthof the Haganah, Stern,and Irgun. Half these forces were fully armed,equipped, and combat readyseveral months ago, while the otherhalf was thenin the process of being armed and equipped and was to be readyto join its unitsshortly. By now itis probable thatthis second halfhas completedits prepara- tions,and we can safelyassume thatthe entireforce is now readyto take partin battlewhenever the timecomes. It should be noted thatthe Haganah forcesinclude the Palmach armoredfor- mation,estimated to have 5,000-6,000combatants. This is a highlytrained mobile formationwhich theJews themselvesconsider an elite commando force. The latestinformation indicates that in the last few days-i.e., afterthe recent fightingbegan-the Jews have organized local forcesfrom among the colonists. Called "Local Defense Forces,"these have been distributedamong the colonies to

1. Syrianprime ministerJamil Mardam Bey.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 64 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES defendthem against Arab attacks. Such forces are estimatedto be about20,000- strong,almost a thirdbeing young women.

B. Our Forces Ourforces currently consist of the following: 1. Regularunits (or, moreaccurately, semiregular units) consisting of volunteersfrom various Arab countries who havecompleted their training at the Qatana camp.2 2. Regular(or semiregular)units or contingentsconsisting of volunteers from specificareas, such as theDruze and Circassians,most of whomhad previously servedin regulararmies. 3. Armedgroups of Palestinianguerrillas [mujahidin] enlisted on a full-time basisand receivingregular pay. Thetotal of the units and contingents mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 aboveis about5,200. Of these, some 4,000 have already entered Palestine, including cont- ingentsfrom Jabal Druze. Contingents from Majdal Shams al-Din3 are aboutto ;: -;:f f .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...... i;0.,..; .

; .: ...... : X s |i ! | | i * k. 1 ......

ALA troops stationed in central Palestine, March 1948. (Before Their Diaspora, Institutefor Palestine Studies) enterPalestine. The remainingunits are stillundergoing training and are in the processof formnation.The planis to forma reserveforce out of theseremaini-ng unitsand to deploythem in thearea ofTubas village in centralPalestine.4

2. The MilitaryCommittee's training camp nearDamascus. 3. A Druze villagein Syria. 4. Tubas villageis about 20 kilometersnortheast of Nablus.

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The totalnumber of Palestinianguerrillas registered up to now is about 2,500. This raises the totalof our combat forcesto no more than 7,700 fighters,though we intend to increase the number of registered Palestinian guerrillas to 5,000-6,000if the requisitearms and equipmentbecome available. It is clear fromthe above figuresthat there is no comparison between our forcesand theJewish forces, and thatthe differencebetween themis vast.

II. Weapons

A. LightArms The Jews possess greatquantities of lightweapons such as riflesand machine guns as well as inexhaustiblesupplies of ammunition.All these are of good modern make, eitherBritish or American. Our side possesses only a few thousandrifles of various makes-French, Brit- ish, Canadian, German,and Austro-Hungarian.Most are antiquatedand unfitfor modernwarfare. For some weapons, such as the Canadian and Austro-Hungarian rifles,no ammunitionat all is available.Our machineguns, few in number,are not much betterthan our riflesin termsof compatibilityand age and are totallyun- suited to the requirementsof modern militaryorganization. As for ammunition, our supply is extremelylimited whereas the battlesand constantskirmishes require unlimitedquantities. If we do not receive adequate stores of ammunition verysoon, thereis no doubt thatthe catastropheof the totalexpenditure of our presentsupply will soon be upon us, renderingour riflesno betterthan walking sticks.

B. Mortars The Jews have large quantitiesof mortarsand are using themin almost every battle,especially againstour garrisonsin Jaffa,Haifa, Jerusalem, and elsewhere. We have only a verysmall numberof mortars,no more than fourteen,which we took fromthe Syrianarmy and gave to some units.But the town garrisonsdo not possess a single mortar,although they are in dire need of such artilleryto enable themto withstandthe Jewish attacks that are intensifyingby the day.

C. LightField Artillery We do not know how many fieldguns the Jews have. It is not far-fetchedto assume thatthey have sufficientquantities but have not yet used them,as so far therehas been no greatneed forthem and in ordernot to draw in Britishforces. As forour forces,we possess eightold cannons of various makes withlimited ammunition.These are quite inadequate and lackingin ancillaryequipment and have been assigned to the NorthernCommand.5 At present,we are unable to use themfor fear of Britishintervention.

5. The MilitatyCommittee divided Palestine into three zones. The NorthernFront, under Adib Shishakli(later to become presidentof Syria)comprised the Galilee. The CentralFront, under theLebanese officer Fawzi Qawukji,included the rest of tlhecountry except the Negev (the SouthernFront), theoretically under the Egyptians, and theJerusalem area, which was under 'Abdal-Qadir Husayni's command.

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D. Armored Cars and Tanks The Jews have a large number-in the hundreds-of armoredcars, some of Britishmanufacture and othersmade in Palestine.They are using armoredcars intensivelyin almostevery battle, in patrols,in protectiveconvoys and communi- cations.They also have a not insignificantnumber of lighttanks, mostly made in Palestine(tractors converted into tanks). They have made onlylight use of themso far,but our guerrillassaw themin action when theJews attackedFaluja and de- stroyeda numberof buildings.6The latestreports indicate that the Jews have 150 armoredcars and 100 tanksin Tel Avivalone. As forus, we have neitherarmored cars nor tanksand not a single antitankor antiarmorweapon. The readyavailability of such weapons to theJews and theirtotal unavailability to our side have begun seriouslyto affectthe activitiesof the volunteersand the guerrillas.This lack has particularlyaffected the morale of the civiliansin our cities and villages,such thatwe are being deluged by appeals forhelp fromeverywhere.

E. Aircraft That the Jews have aircrafthas been establishedbeyond a doubt. We do not know their precise number or their makes: What we do know is that they purchased twenty-oneaircraft from the Britisharmy,7 and it is not far-fetchedto believe thatthey have othersas well. Up untila shorttime ago, theywere using these planes for communicationsand reconnaissance.Recently, however, they have fittedthe planes withmachine guns and are usingthem to attackthe guerrillas fromthe air.Still, their use in combatremains very limited at present,a factthat we attributeto Jewishfear of Britishintervention.

III. Capabilities and Morale

A. Jewish Forces We have not yet been able to assess the Jewishforces' level of trainingand fightingcapability, as our forceshave not yet engaged themin wide-scale battle. However,it is clear beyond a doubt thatseveral thousand fighters among theJew- ish forceshave served in European armiesand the U.S. armed forces.Moreover, severalyears ago, theJews began givingintensive military training to theiryoung men. It would thus be foolhardyto underestimatetheir training and capabilities. Furthermore,they have demonstratedan excellentcapability in demolition,which requiresprecision and technicalexpertise. ConcerningJewish morale, events indicate so farthat it is not high and that Arab morale is betterin termsof courage and valor (except fora fewJewish ter-

6. On 14 March1948, Haganah armored cars attacked Faluja, a villagein southernPalestine some 40 kilometersnortheast of Gaza, killingthirty-seven villagers and demolishinga number of buildings,including the municipal building and post office. 7. These lightAuster planes were purchasedin earlyJanuary 1948.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR 67 roristswhose convictionsmake themimpervious to thefear of deathin thepursuit of theirobjectives).8

B. Our Forces The level of trainingamong the volunteerunits is less thanmiddling, and their fightingcapabilities are low due to the dearthof officers:some unitsand subunits are commanded eitherby retiredofficers or youthsor noncommissionedofficers. Furthermore,military discipline is very weak, as can be expected among units composed of volunteerswho do not feelbound by rulesand regulationsand who are not subjectto the punishmentthat would be normalin regulararmies. As to the guerrillas,whether full-time salaried fighters or those participatingon an occasional basis out of a sense of patrioticduty or underthe forceof necessity or circumstance,9they have no militarycapability. Nonetheless,morale in both thevolunteer units and the guerrillagroups can be said to be good, seeing as the Arabs stilltend to look down upon and depreciate the Jews. The Arab sense of patriotismalso makes them courageous in battle. Otherwisethey would not have been able to hold out againstthe deadlyweapons of theJews.

IV. Military Plants, Workshops, and Maintenance Facilities The Jewshave manyfactories of varioussorts where theymanufacture armored cars, lighttanks, small arms ammunition,mortars, and spare parts for all their weapons. They also have numerousfully equipped maintenancefacilities for their vehicles and weapons, which are runby engineers,technicians, and skilledwork- ers. Our side has nothingof the sort,not even a single small repairshop. At the moment,we are using repairshops belongingto the Syrianarmy to make neces- saryrepairs, but thisentails considerable difficulties, especially in termsof trans- portingweapons and vehicles back and forthfrom Palestine to Damascus. This involvesloss of timeand delay of operations.

V. Transport There is no comparisonbetween the numerousmeans of transportavailable to theJews and our own meager and weak capabilitiesin thisdomain.

VI. Reserves and Reinforcements A. If theJews declare a generalmobilization of all males and femalesbetween the ages of eighteen and fifty-five,they can mobilize a large reserve force in Palestine,especially in view of the factthat most Jewish immigrants are able-bod- ied young men, the proportionof childrenor old people among them being

8. Beforethe launching of Plan Dalet in earlyApril 1948, fighting had gone relativelywell for thePalestinian guerrillas, who appearedto have theupper hand on theintelnirban roads and in thecountryside. 9. Palestiniantownsmen and villagersoften joined the fighting near their homes on an impro- visedand voluntarybasis, returning home aftereach engagement.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 68 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES small.10Considerable reinforcements are available to theJews from overseas, par- ticularlyfrom Cyprus1I and the Black Sea Coast12and variouscountries of Europe and the Americas,where tens of thousandsof would-be immigrantsare waiting impatientlyfor the day to immigrateand are totallyprepared to do so at the first opportunity. The Jews can also bring large quantitiesof arms and equipment including heavy arms,aircraft, and tanksinto Palestine within a veryshort period ifthe em- bargo is lifted.If theyare freeto importwhat theyneed, theycan do so withthe help of the influenceof worldJewry and thevast sums of moneyat theirdisposal. Even at present,despite the armsembargo and all the restrictionsand obstacles in theirpath, they are able to use theirwide influenceand theirexcellent capabilities to continue to smuggle arms and equipment into Palestine.The shipmentsthat were discoveredand confiscatedin America,France, and Iran are only the tip of the iceberg.13 B. Consideringthe difficultieswe experiencedin enlistinga fewhundred Pales- tinianvolunteers, and given that a not insignificantnumber of those receiving trainingran offto join on theirown the forcesthat were enteringPalestine,14 and given thatothers rebelled before completing their training and returnedto where theyhad come from,it is clear thatwe have no hope of recruitinglarge numbers of Palestinianvolunteers even thoughthe Arabs in Palestine faroutnumber the Jews. As forthe Palestinianguerrillas who have enlistedon the basis of regularpay and certainconditions,15 they are more numerousand it is easier to recruitthem, but theyare of limitedusefulness within a narrowsphere. And even these guerrillas do not numbermore than a few thousand,if one sticksto factsrather than fancifulexaggerations. As forthe volunteersfrom the variousArab countries,it is possible to recruit, thoughwith some difficulty,a few thousandmore on conditionthat we obtainthe necessaryarms and means to trainand equip them.It should be borne in mind,

10. Haganahhad organizedthe movement of illegalimmigrants since the mid-1930s. As of the partitionplan, its criteria for their selection, as spelledout in theofficial History of the Haganah, was thatthey be "youngand readyupon disembarkationat Tel Avivto joinlimmedi- atelythe combatunits of Haganah"[Toldot HaHitnadvut (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-ZviPublishing, 1983),p. 1463. 11. It was to campsin Cyprusthat the British navy transferred the illegal Jewish immigrants takenoff the vessels they intercepted en routeto Palestine.At the end of 1947,some 35,000-40,000were internedthere. 12. On New Year's Day, 1948,15,000 illegal Jewish immigrants from Romania were broughtto Farmagustaon boardthe Pan Yorkand thePan Crescent.These two ships,intercepted by the British,had sailed fromthe Bulgarian port of Balcic on theBlack Sea. Safwatprobably had this case in mind. 13. For theAmerican shipment, Safwat is probablyreferring to thediscovery on 3 January 1948 of 65,000pounds of TNT destinedfor Haganah being loaded aboarda Palestinian-bound freighterat a JerseyCity pier. 14. ManyPalestinian volunteers, not wanting to waitfor orders, left the training camp earlyto join ALAforces sent into Palestine. 15. Principally,that they serve in theirown regionsof Palestine.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR 69 however,that the volunteers and guerrillasneed a largenumber of officersto lead them.So far,we have not been able to obtain more than a verysmall numberof officers,mostly from the Syrianarmy. So much forpersonnel. Withregard to armsand equipment,the situationis farworse, and thereis even more cause to expect failureand disappointment.The Arab countrieshave so far not deliveredwhat theypromised in termsof armsand equipment,even though the quantitiesset were foremergency aid only,not as armssufficient for sustaining long-termcombat.16 Concerningarms purchases from overseas, we have not receiveda singledeliv- eryas yet,and, consideringthe numerousobstacles in the way, we have no idea how successfulour contactshave been and when any deliveriescan be expected. In thisconnection, we muststress what we said before,that the quantityof ammu- nitionavailable to us is about to run out given the daily consumptionin the con- stantbattles. Unless we take the necessarymeasures immediately,the inevitable resultwill be catastrophe. VII. The Situation of the Jewish Colonies It has become clear thatall Jewishcolonies, large and small,are well fortified. They are surroundedby barbed wire and strongemplacements. Many of them have bunkersfor mortars and machine guns and are stronglydefended. Events have shown thatit is impossibleto overcome and occupy the colonies withlight arms.Furthermore, the proximityof these colonies to one another,the communi- cation linksbetween them,and the possibilityof theirrescue witharmored cars and Jewishlorried forces make it impossibleto isolate and besiege themindividu- ally.Finally, British army units tend to intervenequickly whenever the situationof any particularcolony becomes critical. VIII. The Situation of Our Garrisons We have establishedstatic garrisons in the citieswhere the danger is greatest. However,these garrisonsare conspicuouslyweak everywhere,particularly since, possessing only antiquatedrifles and hand grenades and a few machine guns each, theycome under attackfrom Jewish armored cars, mortars,and machine guns.I am dubious about theircapacity to hold out againstattack from the Jewish forces,which are superiorboth in equipmentand in numbers,were it not forthe Britishunits that intervene whenever battles intensify and fightingreaches a cer- tainlevel. IX. The Internal Situation in Palestine A. As we made clear in our memorandum7/S of 11 March 1948 addressed to yourExcellency, there are armed forcesand groups in various partsof Palestine thathave no contactwith the General Command.The commandersleading these

16. Quotasset by theMilitaty Committee for rifles, for example, were 2,000each forEgypt, Iraq,Syria, and SaudiArabia, and 1,000each forTransjordan and Lebanon.By 8 Febrniay1948, neitherSaudi Arabia nor Transjordan had delivereda singlerifle, Egypt had delivered300, Iraq 1,260,and Lebanon550. OnlySyria had fulfilledits full quota of 2,000.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 70 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES groups have not communicatedwith headquarters and do not recognizeit, claim- ing to have been appointed by a certainparty and insistingthat they take orders only fromthat party.17 These groups are using forceto compel people to recog- nize themand to obey theirorders and wishes. This situationhas led to a rise in factionalismand local alliances among Pales- tiniansand has pittedthem againstone another.The latestreports indicate that some Palestiniansare armingnot to fightthe Jews but to prevailover theirArab opponents or to defendthemselves against those Arabs theyconsider theirene- mies-and thisat a timewhen thereis the mostpressing need forunity and forthe closing of ranks. We have exertedevery possible effortand shown all forbearanceand tolerance in tryingto end thispainful situation, but all our effortshave been futile.Thus the situationis worseningand becoming more alarmingeach day, and its continua- tionwill surelylead to the gravestconsequences and the worstpossible outcome. B. Differencesamong Palestiniansand the increasingfactionalism among them have facilitatedthe spread on a wide scale of certainrumors that are not compati- ble withthe interestsof Palestine.It cannot be excluded thatthese rumorsmay lead to the actual interventionof certainparties,18 which will pose dangersto the General Commandand createproblems from which only the enemywill benefit. Note: We hope thatthe agreementrecently reached [withHajj Amin]that all guerrillaforces be placed underthe GeneralCommand will, if carried out in good faith,address these potentialdangers and lead to unityand solidarity.

X. Comparative Summary It is clear fromthe above comparisonthat the Jews at presentenjoy significant superiorityover us in termsof manpower and arms.This being the case, the following question comes to mind:Why have not theJews embarkedon wide-scale operationsand struckas hard as theycould at the Arabs,considering that they have the forcesnecessary to do so? I believe the answer can be summarizedas follows: 1. Despite the factthat skirmishes and battleshave begun,the Jews at thisstage are stilltrying to containthe fightingto as narrowa sphere as possible in the hope thatpartition will be implementedand a Jewishgovernment formed; they hope thatif the fightingremains limited, the Arabs will acquiesce in the faitaccompli. This can be seen fromthe factthat the Jews have not so farattacked Arab villages unless the inhabitantsof those villages attackedthem or provoked themfirst.19 2. Theirfear of theintervention of Britishforces prevents them from using large forcesor heavy arms on a wide scale. 3. The Jews expect that-followingthe end of the Mandate, of course-the Arabcountries will mobilize large forcesto wage majorbattles and significantop-

17. Hajj Aininal-Husayni. 18. Safwatwas mostprobably referring to KingAbdallah of Transjordan,whose relationswith Hajj Aminwere exceedinglystrained. 19. Thisis inaccurate,as is clearin Safwat'sown report(section II.D above).

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR 71 erations.They thereforeconsider it to be in theirinterest to save the strengthof theirbasic forcesfor the anticipatedbattles. In additionto the above considerations,the position of the Jews has not become criticalyet, and theirmilitary position does not requireresort to significant force.20 This is the situationat present.Nor is thereanything to indicatethat our side will have superiorityin the days and monthsahead unless the regulararmies of the Arab statesintervene with the fill force of theirarmaments and equipment. The last fivemonths have amplydemonstrated that if we continueto operate on the currentscale, we will remainweak and allow theJews to retaintheir vast s'upe- riority.This becomes veryclear ifwe considerwhat the Jews are receivingand can expect to receive fromoverseas in termsof unlimitedreinforcements and aid, as we pointed out in an earlierreport and in SectionVI above. Atthe same time,the currentsituation seems to indicatethat the Arab stateswill continueto limittheir supportand assistanceto the level theyhave providedto date,which is insignifi- cant in view of the severityof our situationand the realitythat faces us.

XI. The Current Military Situation It is our dutynot to be complacentor relyon whatis being reportedin theArab press,which amountsto charlatanismand wildlyexaggerated claims. Despite the factthat the Jews have onlyused a smallpart of theirforces, the operationalinitia- tive lies withthem in miostparts of Palestine.Our relativelystronger garrisons in Jaffa,Jerusalem, and Haifa are strictlyon the defensive,and I doubt theirability to hold out againstthe Haganah, which is being held back only by fearsof British intervention.As forthe othersmaller garrisons, they can be easily overrunif attacked by largeJewish forces. This weakness of our garrisonsis not due only to the small numberof fightersdefending them, but also to the inadequacy of the weapons-a few old riflesof various makes and a verysmall numberof machine guns-and the shortageof ammunition. As forour forcesdeployed in variousother regions, they do not have sufficient strengtheither in numbersor in weaponry to be able to undertakeany serious actionon a large scale, and theyhave restrictedtheir activities so farto surround- ing and harassingsome of the colonies. Althoughdeployed, it is doubtfulthat these forces will be able to undertakeany serious or significantactions as long as theyare so shorton arms and officers.

XII. Conclusion A. Our forces in Palestine-whethertrained volunteers or armed Palestinian guerrillas-cannotachieve a decisive militaryvictory. All theycan do is prolong the fightingfor a certainperiod in accordance with the reinforcementsthey receive and the arms available to them.

20. Safwatcould notforesee that the Jewish forces would go on theall-out offensive before theend of theMandate, as theydid withinless thantwo weeks of thisreport, when Plan Dalet wentinto operation on 5-6 April1948.

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B. Preventingthe formationof a Jewishgovernment and compellingthe Jews to submitto Arab demands requiresa forceat least equivalentto theirown. And thatis impossible,given the level at which we are operating. C. We are stillof the opinion,which we expressed previously,that if we wish to achieve a decisive militaryvictory, the regulararmies of the Arab statesmust intervenein the fightingwith the fullforce of theirarmaments and equipment. D. The regularArab armies have many logisticaldeficiencies. Unless these shortcomingsare promptlyaddressed and mobilizationtakes place forthwith,they will not be ready to act when the Mandate expires, and we will lose the race againsttime, as we have lost it in the past. [signed] Ismail Safwat Major General Commanderin Chiefof the PalestineForces G.O.C. (general officercommanding), Military Committee

THE FALL OF QASTEL AND THE DEATH OF 'ABD AL-QADIR

AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT BY BAHJAT ABU GHARBIYA EXTRACTED FROM THE MEMOIRS OFA FREEDOoMFIGHEER, 1916-49, INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES, BEIRUT, 1993 (IN ARABIC). The Palmach attack on the strategicPalestinian village of Qastel on 3 April 1948 heralded the launching on 6 Aprilof OperationNachshon, thefirst operation ofPlan Dalet, theHaganah's militaryplan for securingthe state assigned to theJews by the UN partitionplan and for conquering as much of the area assigned by theplan to theArabs as possible. The specificgoal of OperationNach- shon was to occupyand cleanse thePalestinian villageson bothsides ofthe Jaffa- Jerusalemroad, therebyassuring theJewish forces' access toJerusalem from the coast and at thesame timesplitting the centralmass of thestate assigned to the Palestinians under the UN plan. Officially,by acceptingpartition, the Jewish Agencyalso had accepted the exclusion ofJerusalem (which was to be placed under UN trusteeship)from the Jewish state. In fact,as OperationNachshon and theBattle of Qastel show, thiswas only a verbal stance. By the time Operation Nachshon was launched, units of the ALA had been deployed in northernand central Palestine, and operations were theoretically under theALA command and coordinatedby theArab League MilitaryCommit- tee in Damascus. TheJerusalem area, however,was placed by theMilitary Com- mitteeunder thecommand of Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni,the Palestinian guerrilla fighterand leader of the Palestinian irregulars,the Jihad Muqaddas. An ALA company about 120-strongstationed in Jerusalem was also under Abd al- Qadir's command. Thefollowing is an eyewitnessaccount of thefighting at Qastel and thedeath of Abd al-Qadir by Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya.Abu Gharbiyya,a school teacher in Jerusalem originallyfrom Hebron, had fought with Abd al-Qadir during the

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1936-39 rebellion against the British and was part of his Jihad Muqaddas formed in the wake of thepartition resolution. In lateryears, he was a member of the Palestine National Council. The account is takenfrom his memoirs Fi Khidamm al-Nidal al-'Arabi al-Filastini:Mudhakkarat al-Munadil Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya(1916-49) etc. [The memoirs of a freedomfighteT; 1916-49j, published in Arabic by the Institutefor Palestine Studies,Beirut, in 1993. The text thatfollows was translatedby Walid Khalidi.

The village of Qastel lies at a distanceof ten kilometerswest ofJerusalem on a strategicsummit overlooking the Jerusalem-Jaffa road. The heightof the summitis 750 metersabove sea level, whereas the road thatpasses by Qastel, skirtingthe villagein a semnicircularfashion, is only500 metersabove sea level.The onlyother location on the outskirtsof Jerusalemof comparable militarysignificance is the summitof the Nabi Samweel village northwestof the city. Atthe top of Qastel are to be foundthe house of the mukhtar,a small mosque, a cemetery,and the remainsof an ancientfort; indeed, the village's name derives fromthe Latin"Castellum," which means "fort."The groundslopes down fromthe summitin terracestoward the north,south, and east. On the westernside is situ- ated a thickforested area, while to the southwestthere is a lower summitwith no buildingson it. To the east of Qastel, looking towardJerusalem, lies the Jewish colony of Motsa and the Jewishsanatorium Arza. The Jewishcolony of Qiryat Anavim(the formerPalestinian village of al-Dilb) is one kilometerto thewest, and a shortdistance beyond is the Jewish colony of Ma'ale Hahamisha.1The large Jewishquarry of Eliyesherlies to the south,at a distanceof 1.5 kilometers. In 1948,Qastel was a smallvillage whose populationdid not exceed 300. There was no militarygarrison there, though some of the villagersowned theirown rifles. On Saturday,3 April1948, a largePalmach force in armoredcars and supported by mortarsoccupied Qastel aftera shortengagement with the villagers.After oc- cupyingthe village, the Palmach expelled all the inhabitantsand proceeded to fortifyitwith barbed wire and bunkersof reinforcedconcrete. They surroundedit with mine fieldsand used it to store large quantitiesof explosives and military equipment.Although the Britishhad issued clear ordersto both sides not to appear armedon theJerusalem-Jaffa road-an orderthey repeatedly enforced upon theArabs-their forces in the neighborhooddid not interveneto preventthe Jews fromoccupying Qastel and expellingits inhabitants. The occupationof Qastel aroused greatconcern in Jerusalem and the surround- ing villages,as well as in Damascus and the otherArab capitals.'Abd al-Qadiral- Husayni,commander of Jerusalem, was at the timeon a visitto the MilitaryComn-

1. BothQiiyat Anavim and Ma'ale Hahamisha,together with Neve Ilan a littlefarther to the west,were Palmachbases. The forcesstationed in themaccompanied the Jewish convoys from Tel Avivto JeiLisalemalong the stretchof road fromthe latter to Bab al-Wadin thewest. A vastunderground depot connecting Qityat Anavim to Ma'ale Hahamishawas one of Palmach's majorarms storage installations.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 74 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES mnitteein Damascus. As soon as he heard news of the fallof Qastel, he sent us a brieforder: "Reoccupy Qastel. Qastel is Jerusaleii."At the same time,he urgedthe MilitaryCommittee to supply him with the weapons he needed, which had become even more essentialafter the fallof Qastel and the urgentneed to recoverit fromthe Jews. The Palestinianforces of 'Abd al-Qadir in the Jerusalemarea moved toward Qastel. Some came fromthe headquartersof 'Abd al-Qadirin Birzeitand the villages of Ramnallahdistrict. Others, under the commandof SubhiAbu Jbara, took up positionsin the village of Kolonia just east of the Motsa colony to cut offcontact betweenthe Jewish forces in Qastel and inJerusalem. Others, under the command of IbrahimAbu Dayyeh,came fromthe Jerusalem garrisons in Qatamon2by way of the village of 'AynKarem south of Qastel, and stillothers under the command ofAbdallah al-Umari arrived from the village of BaytSafafa southeast of Jerusalem. Forces also came fromthe village of 'Ayn Karem itselfunder the command of Khalil Mannun, fromthe Old City of Jerusalemunder the command of Hafiz Barakat,and fromthe village of Abu Dis east ofJerusalem under the commandof Kamil Urayqat.3Supervising all these operationsand coordinatingbetween them was the lawyerAnwar Nusseibeh,4 secretary of the NationalCommittee in Jerusa- lem. On 4 April,the Palestinianforces began an offensivefrom the southagainst the Jewishforces in Qastel. Fightingcontinued throughout the 4th and 5th of April, withthe Arab forcesoccupying considerable ground. On 6 April,the Palestinian forcesoccupied theJewish Eliyesher quarry and blew up its militaryfortifications and installations. But the Jews broughtin reinforcementsand counterattacked.They advanced fromthe neighboringcolonies to preventour reinforcementsfrom reaching their destination.A Jewishplane attackedour positionsaround Qastel. On the 6th of April,Jewish forces occupied the Palestinianvillages of Dayr Muheisinand Khulda lyingto the west of Bab al-Wad where the road startsclimbing eastward.5 They were able to breakthrough our defenseson the mainJaffa-Jerusalem road and got a convoy of reinforcementscomprising forty large trucksthrough to Jerusalem. Our situationat Qastel became critical,and KamilUrayqat was wounded and had to returnhome to his village Abu Dis. We began to runshort of ammunition,and

2. Qatamonwas a Palestinianresidential quarter in WestJeiusalem. 3. A seniorlieutenant of 'Abd al-Qadirand fatherof Saeb Urayqat[Erakat], the currentPales- tinianAuthority negotiator. 4. LaterJordan's ambassador to Londonand defenseminister, he is thefather of SariNus- seibeh,president of al-QudsUniversity. 5. These were thefirst villages to fallunder Operation Nachshon, the first operation of Plan Dalet.Their capture was synchronizedwith the capture of Qasteland theother villages on the mainJaffa-Jerusalem road lyingon thestretch of thisroad fromBab al-Wadeastward to Jerusa- lem.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR 75 our appeals forhelp to theALA and theTransjordanian Arab Legion forcesnearby went unanswered.6 In the meantime,our leader, Abd al-Qadir,was in Damascus tryingto persuade General Safwatand his colleagues to supply us withthe arms he had requested. He appealed to theArab leaders then in Damascus, particularlyRiad al-Solh,prime ministerof Lebanon; Azzam Pasha, secretarygeneral of the Arab League; and Ahmad Sharabati,the Syriandefense minister.In additionto the effortsof these gentlemen,Hajj Arninal-Husayni and othermembers of theArab HigherCommit- tee also triedto sway the MilitaiyCommittee.7 Despite all these efforts,the Military Committeecontinued to claim thatit did not have the weapons. When 'Abd al-- Qadir asked forsome of the artillerythat had been supplied to Qawukji,the Mili- taryCommittee persisted in its refusal.It also refused'Abd al-Qadir'srequest that Qawuikji'sartillery be orderedto come to Qastel's aid.8 As a result,the talksin Damascus became extremelytense. On the eveningof 6 April,with the two sides exchangingbitter recriminations, 'Abd al-Qadir strode out of the meetingin a stateof extremeanger and frustration,shouting in thefaces of the membersof the MilitaryCommittee: "You're all traitors,and historywill recordthat you lost Palestine!" Earlyon Wednesday,7 April,at 5 A.M., my brotherS-ubhi woke mneup. He had just arrivedfrom Damascus, where he had been treatedfor wounds he had suf- feredwhen shot at fromthe Jewish quarter in the Old Cityand fromwhich he was stillrecovering.9 The injuryhad affectedhis memoryand his speech, but he was able to tell me thathe had come with 'Abd al-Qadir and a numberof fighters.I immediatelyasked whetherthey had broughtany weapons withthem. He said he did not know. But I understoodfrom him that'Abd al-Qadirwas at the house of his brotherFarid Bey al-Husayni,which was close to my house in Herod's Gate. I immediatelywent to Farid Bey's house and foundAwad al-Tarmasawi,'Abd al-Qadir's personal bodyguard,standing at the entrance.I asked him about the weapons theyhad broughtwith them, particularly as 'Abd al-Qadirhad promised mnesome beforeleaving for Damascus. Awad said theyhacd brought nothing but theirown personalweapons and some Britishand Germanammunitiorn, as well as a fewarms for some individualswho had asked forthem. I was shocked and coulcl not believe what I had heard,although I knew thatAwad was a brave and trust- worthyfellow. "Where is Abu Musa10?"I asked. "He is resting,asleep. We've been

6. The ALA forces referredto here were part of the centralsector under Qawukji. The Arab Le- gion at the time was under the directcommand of the Britishforces in Palestine, and some of its units were stationed near Bab al-Wad close by. 7. Hajj Amin al-Husayni,banned by the Britishfrom entering Palestine, constantlycommuted between Cairo, Beirut,and Damascus. 8. See Safwat's report,section II.C. 9. Haganah and Irgun had garrisonsin theJewish quarterinside the OlcdCity, which theyused as a base fortheir operations. 10. That is, 'Abd al-Qadir, so called afterhis father,Musa Kazim Pasha al-Husayni,the elder statesmanof Palestinian politics in the 1920s and early 1930s. 'Abd al-Qacliralso is the fatherof Faisal Husayni, the Palestinian leader in East Jerusalem.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 76 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES travellingall night.We leftDamascus verylate. He said he wanted to sleep two hours."I was extremelyupset. 'Abd al-Qadir had promisedthat he would bring machineguns, antitank weapons, mortarswith their shells, and sufficientammuni- tion forour mixed assortmentof rifles-British,German, French, Italian-as well as ammunitionfor our AmericanBrowning machine guns. Two hourslater, I returnedand Awad told me that'Abd al-Qadirwas expecting me. I went in and greetedhim, noticing his stateof extremeagitation. He immedi- atelysaid, "I wantyou to do somethingno one else can. I wantyou to go to Kamil Urayqat.He has, I am told,captured an armoredcar and some machineguns after the battlewith the Haganah near KfarEtzion.11 These belong to headquartersand are not anybody'spersonal property. I wantyou to get them."He did not say why he wanted themimmediately nor anythingabout what had happened in Damas- cus. Our meetinglasted only a few minutes,and therewas no opportunityto en- gage him in conversation.I said I would do what he asked and left.I sensed he had cut shortour meetingto avoid embarrassingquestions about his promiseto bringarms from Damascus. Given his mood, I did not want to broach the subject since I alreadyknew thathe had returnedempty-handed. I immediatelywent to KamilUrayqat at Abu Dis. I foundhim in bed, recovering fromthe wounds that he had sufferedat Eliyesherquarry the day before. His wounds were not serious enough to require hospitalization,but he was clearly exhausted.We were friendsdespite disagreementsbetween us. Kamil had not heard about 'Abd al-Qadir'sarrival from Damascus. It took me a long time,including eating lunch withhim, before I could get round to the matterof the Jewish armoredcar. But I succeeded in my mission.The armoredcar was in excellent condition.And the machineguns were six in number,of differentmakes the likes of which we did not have. The Haganah soldiers,who had surrenderedto our mien,had tamperedwith all of thembefore handing them over, but the damage was reparable.I drove the armoredcar to FaridBey's house in Jerusalembut was told that'Abd al-Qadirhad leftfor Qatamon. I telephonedIbrahim Abu Dayyeh's headquartersin Qatamon only to be told thatIbrahim and 'Abd al-Qadirhad al- readyleft for Qastel. Meanwhile,the Jews had been activein my sectorof Jerusalem. Because of its importance,'Abd al-Qadirhad givenme strictorders not to leave itand not to take partin any operationsoutside it. So I decided I would wait untilthe nextmorning and then play it by ear. That night,the 7th of April,'Abd al-Qadir reached the site of the destroyed Eliyesherquarry after a strenuouscross-country trek and occupied it. There he ralliedhis men. What followsis the versionof eventsas relatedto me threedays laterby IbrahimAbu Dayyeh as he lay wounded in an improvisedfield clinic at

11. The KfarEtzion bloc, betweenBethlehem and Hebron,comprised four Jewish colonies and had strongHaganah garrisons that dominated the road betweenHebron and Jer-Lsalem. On 27 March,a largeHaganah convoy returning to Jerusalem was ambushedby Jihad Muqad- das guerrillas.Seventy Haganah soldiers were killed,and Britishtroops intervened to arrange forthe surrender and rescueof thesurvivors.

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Herod's Gate,which I had set up in the house of IsmailBey al-Husayni.Later, this was to become OrientHouse. Abu Dayyehtold me how theyhad drawnup a plan forthe recaptureof Qastel and organizedthemselves into three groups. The plan was to begin thebattle with shellingfrom our moortars.Hafiz Barakatwas to lead the rightwing, approaching fromthe southeast.Harun Ben Jaziyah,the Transjordanian bedouin fighter,was to lead the leftwing, approaching fromthe southwest.Ibrahim was to lead the center. 'Abd al-Qadir himselftook up his command post at the Eliyesherquarry at a distanceof 1.5 kilometersfrom the summitof Qastel. He did not allow anyone to staywith him at his post except fora few elderlyadministrators. He even ordered his personal bodyguard,Awad, to accompany IbrahimAbu Dayyeh because he [Awad]had a Bren machine gun in good workingorder. At midnight,when it was pitchblack, Abu Dayyeh told me, our fightersbegan to shell Qastel withthe fourmortars they had. Two were two-inchmortars, and two were three-inch.They depended mostlyon the latterbecause of theirlonger range,but one of themwas of local make and did not fireunless the triggerwas pulled froma distanceby a cord attachedto it. Once they had fired the few shells they had, the fighters-about 200 in number-moved in under the cover of machine gun fire.The men were not trainedin nightfighting, and the shellingwas not heavy and thereforenot very effective.Nevertheless, the Jews realized the seriousnessof the attackand, being themselvestrained in nightfighting, withdrew from the lower reaches of the village to itssummit in a defensivetactic known as the "uncrushablenut." They were concentratedaround the mukhtar'shouse, a solid buildingwith very thick walls, and in the adjacent mosque and cemetery.The mosque and mukhtar'shouse domninatedthe slopes around the summit.The withdrawalof the Jews fromthe lower slopes enabled our fightersto enterthe village and reach verynear to the top of the summit,except forthe rightwing which fellbehind. The leftwing tried to stormthe mosque in a bold move but was repulsed,suffering losses in martyrs and in wounded, thus reducing its role in the fighting.The center under Abu Dayyehgot veryclose to the cemeter-yand the mukhtar'shouse butwas unable to stormthese positions.After a while,his men got pinned down and could advance no further.He preparedan attackwith two mines,each containing40 kilogramsof TNT. These were carriedby fourof his men to blow up the mukhtar'shouse. They managed to climb over the outer wall surroundingthe house, but as they advanced towardit, were all killed. Atthis stage, the offensiveground to a halt.Our fightersneeded to save ammu- nitionso theyreduced theirfire, and the attackturned into a desultoryexchange of shots throughthe night.With the approach of dawn, therewas a danger that our positionswould be exposed, threateningcatastrophe because of the enemy's dominatingposition at the summit.Moreover, reinforcements from the colonies west of Qastel were continuallyreaching the Jews at the summitvia the forest.At thisstage, Ibrahim sent a messengerto 'Abd al-Qadirexplaining his criticalsitua-

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...... ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~......

'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni (standing center) poses with some of his men in Jerusalem,February 1948. Among those with him are his bodyguard,Awad al-Tarmasawi (kneeling, second from left),Kamil Urayqat (standing third from left,next to 'Abd al-Qadir), Ibrahim Abu Dayyeh (kneeling third from left),and 'Abd al-Halim al-Gilani (kneeling fifthfrom left). (Before Thweir Diaspora, Institutefor Palestine Studies) tion and asking him to order Barakaton the rightflank to advance toward the summitto increase the pressureon the enemyand forcethem to withdraw. Abu Dayyeh does not know what happened afterthat, but manyreports con- firmthat 'Abd al-Qadirleft his commandpost at about thistime and enteredQas- tel,intent upon reachingthe rightwing forceto urge it to advance. It is reported thatthose who were withhim cautionedhim not to enterthe village in these circumstances,but he brushedthem aside and insistedon going in alone. As dawn broke and more reinforcementsreached the Jews via the forest,Abu Dayyeh's position and thatof his men became increasinglyuntenable. There were many losses in dead and wounded, and he himselfwas severelywounded. When the rightwing did not advance, he decided to pull back. Upon reachingthe command post at the quarry,he was told that'Abd al-Qadir had enteredthe village in the directionof his force,to which he replied:"He did not reach me. I have not seen him." By now, it was clear that'Abd al-Qadirwas missingor surroundedin the village. Frustrationovercame the fighters.They could not advance againstthe village in the daytimeand were runninglow on ammunition,so theysent messengersin everydirection, appealing forhelp to save 'Abd al-Qadir.

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Messengersswiftly left for Jerusalem, Ramallah, Hebron, Ramla, and all the sur- roundingvillages, urging fighters to rallyand to bringreinforcements to Qastel. FromJerusalem came the ALA garrisoncommanded by JamalRashid,12 the contingentunder my own command fromHerod's Gate, and the contingentcom- manded by Muhammad'Adil Najjar from Wadi Joz quarterin the northof the city. Fightersfrom the villages east of Jerusalemcame under the command of Rashid Urayqat.The special guardsof the Haram came underthe command of Hajj 'Abd al-Majidal-Madani. From Hebron came a contingentunder the command of 'Abd al-Halimal-Gilani, and fromRamla a contingentfrom Hasan Salameh's forces.13 The totalnumber of the fightersassembled exceeded 500. It was thusthat, on the morningof Thursday,the 8thof April,a messengerhad arrivedurging me to rushto the rescue of 'Abd al-Qadirwho "was surroundedin Qastel." I was shocked, and set out quickly aftergiving orders to my forcesin Musraraand Saad al-Said14not to leave theirpositions under any circumstances and -toremain in the higheststate of alert.I gatheredtogether thirty of my best fightersat Herod's Gate and took withme two Browningmachine guns and four Bren machineguns. Before I set out,Dr. Mahdi al-Husayniand his wifealong with a male nursewho worked in his clinic,all dressed in whiterobes withRed Cres- cent arm bands, asked to accompany me to Qastel. We climbed aboard the armoredcar thatI had takenfrom Urayqat and a large lorry.I drew up my plan based on my long familiaritywith the terrainaround Qastel, which I knew intimatelyfrom scouting and school expeditions.I decided to approach Qastel fromthe northvia thevillages of Biddu and BaytSurik. Travel- lingthis road by vehicle,I could get theremore quickly,increasing the elementof surprise;the otherforces, I knew, would be approachingfrom the south via the usual route fromQatamon to 'AynKarem-a rugged road impassable except by jeep. We set out at 10 A.M. Those accompanyingme included LieutenantShafiq Nashashibi of the Herod's Gate force,the martyrIsmail Sharabati(an excellent marksmanwith his Browningmachine gun), the martyrMrawweh Saadeh, Lieu- tenantYahya Zawawi, the martyrSaid Abu Tayr,and thedriver of the armoredcar, Ali Abu Ghannam. When we reached Biddu, I stopped fora while to consider the possibilityof takingthe road to the nearbyJewish colony of Ma'ale Hahamisha. My initial thoughthad been to dash throughthe colony using the "disguise"of our Jewish armoredcar and thenonto the mainJaffa-Jerusalem road to approach Qastel from the northwest.My colleagues thoughtthis plan very hazardous and prevailed

12. An able youngIraqi officer. 13. Hasan Salameh,the second seniorcommander of Jihad Muqaddas after 'Abd al-Qadir,was killedin actionon 2 June1948. His sectorcovered the towns of Lyddaand Ramlain the coastalplain as well as thevillages between them and jaffa. He was thefather of Ali Hasan ("AbuHasan") Salameh, the PLO intelligenceofficer assassinated by theIsraelis in Beirutin January1979. 14. Palestinianresidential quarters in EastJerusalem lying between the walls of theOld City and ShaykhJarrah in thenorth.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 80 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES upon me to abandon it.Instead, we continuedon our way to BaytSurik, which is about 1.5 kilometersdue northof Qastel. The routeto Qastel, however,was un- passable by vehicle so we set offon foot,joined by villagersfrom Bayt Surik. No sooner had we startedout thansomeone came shoutingthat the village of Nabi Samweel was underattack by a Jewishforce that had justattacked the village of BaytIksa east of BaytSurik. Nabi Samweel,some 3 kilometersnortheast of Bayt Surik,was on the most strategicheight north of Jerusalem.Its importancewas greatereven than that of Qastel because it dominated the entiresurrounding countrysideand its occupation would greatlystrengthen Jewish control of Qastel itself.Without delay, we climbed back into the armoredcar and the lorryand drove offto Nabi Samnweel.When we got there,we foundno Jewishforces and no fightingbut met some of the BaytIksa villagerswho had justrepulsed a devastating attackon theirvillage in which most of itshouses had been blown up by the Jews.Returning to Bayt Surik,we proceeded on foottoward Qastel. Qastel and Environs,8 April1948 To Ramallah North Biddu Nabi Samweel N 0 ToJerusalem

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KarerT - MukhtalQdr'shous dyn 3 - Cemetamony

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I'he villagersof BaytSurik had warnedus thatwe would come underheavy fire fromthe Jewish forces controlling the approaches to Qastel fromthe north.But I ignoredtheir warnings, and we advanced on footwith all our machineguns blaz- ing.The plan succeeded. The intensityof our fireand our approach fromthe north took the Jews by surprise,given thathundreds of fighterswere simultaneously attackingQastel fromthe south. Our approach fromthe northhad cut offJewish reinforcements from both the east and the west. Presentlythe Jewishforce on Qastel summit,under the twin attacksfrom north and south,began withdrawingwestward through the forestbut stillwithin range of our fire.Many of themwere killed,and as we enteredQastel fromthe northwestthrough the same forest,we saw more enemy dead, in one place as many as eleven veryclose together.We reached the summitwhere we met our comrades attackingfrom the south. There I met my friendMuhammad 'Adil Najjarand his men fromWadi Joz. We were exhilarated.Qastel was in our hands. Our losses were few. Enemybodies were scatteredeverywhere. Our joy was short-lived.Someone came with the news that 'Abd al-Qadir's body had been found.It lay on the southeasternside of the village in frontof a house about 100 metersfrom the mukhtar'shouse. I was stunned.I sat on the ground in greatdistress and was overcome by a sense of dread about what the futurenow held. I orderedmy men not to go to see the body of theirleader out of concern fortheir morale. I stayed therefor a long time with MuhammadNajjar nextto me and my men surroundingme. Our loss in 'Abd al-Qadirwas irrepara- ble. He was the standardaround which the fightersrallied. Presentlyword arrivedthat the fighterswere withdrawingfrom Qastel on a wide scale to accompany 'Abd al-Qadir's body, which was being transportedto Jerusalem.The sight of this mass exodus of fighterswas trulyterrifying and threatenedto demoralizemy men, but theyremained with me nonetheless.After a while AnwarNusseibeh appeared. He greetedus and presentedhis condolences. At the same time he expressed his strongdisapproval of the mass withdrawalof the fightersand theirabandonment of Qastel afterall the sacrificesthat had been made to recoverit, including the loss of our leader. He asked me what I intended to do. I said: "I'm stayinghere." He said: "You're not well, your wounds haven't healed. You stillhave bandages aroundyour chest and stomach.You should order yourmen to stayput but go back to Jerusalemyourself." I said I couldn'tdo that, butwould staywith Muhammad Najjar and our men. He asked what he could do forus. I said: "Threethings: Food, ammunition,and a reliefforce to take over from us tomorrowmorning." Qastel was now desertedexcept for about fortymen-my own and those of MuhammadNajjar. A messengerarrived from 'Abd al-Halimal-Gilani, leader of the Hebronrebels in 1937-38. The messengersaid: "Abu Zaydan ['Abd al-Halim]has sentme to say thathe and his men fromHebron are close to yourpositions. Let us knowif you are in trouble."I asked himwhere his forceswere, and he replied:"In Suba." I thankedhim but was secretlyannoyed at my old comrade in arms:here we were,all alone now, and he had his men in Suba fivekilometers away.

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Clearly,we had only ourselvesto depend on, so we went into action.I gave a series of orders.First, that two fortifiedpositions, each witha Browningand two Brens,be prepared-one to face the main road and repel any attackfrom the east, fromthe directionof Jerusalem, and the otherto face the main road and repel any attackfrom the west, fromthe directionof Jaffa.Second, I ordered thatall the houses of the village as well as the nearbycaves be searched beforenightfall to make sure thatnone of the enemywas hidingthere. Third, I asked thatthe road to Suba be blocked with boulders to preventthe Jews fromadvancing along it in armoredcars; fourth, that a trenchbe dug aroundthe commandpost in themiddle of the cemeteryat the top of the village next to the mukhtar'shouse and the mosque. MuhammadNajjar and I thenwent roundthe village to see thatour orderswere being carriedout. We came upon a largeJewish armored car in excellentcondi- tionthat the Jews had been forcedto abandon when itsank in the mnud.Some ALA soldierswho had not leftwere strenuouslytrying to freeit to take to Jerusalem. Some of them knew me well and pleaded with me to allow them to continue, havingreceived strictorders from their commander to take the armoredcar with them.I relented.After an hour or so, theysucceeded in pullingit out and set offin the directionof Suba, where I laterlearned that 'Abd al-Halimrequisitioned it from them. We foundtens of tons of barbed wire and a large room chock frillof an explo- sive powder, yellow in color. The bodies of the enemy were scatteredhere and there,but we did not have the timeto count,much less burythem. Every now and thena Jewisharmored car would approach and soldierswould let themselvesout of a trapdoor in its belly to pick up the corpses withintheir reach. Throughoutthis time, a three-inchmortar was continuouslyshelling us from Motsa colony, while two planes circled above us and dropped locally made bombs. We did not suffercasualties from the shellingor the planes because we were dispersedthroughout the village.But the appearance of the planes did have a demoralizingeffect. It symbolizedthe enemy's superiorpower, for here they were, using planes while the countrywas stillunder Britishrule withsome fifty days to go untilthe end of the Mandate.Their use of air power in these circumstances made clear to us Britain'sopen partisanshipin favorof theJews, though we did not know at the timethat the Britishhad actuallysold theJews twenty-two planes, includingthe two thatwere attackingus at thatmoment.15 Nightfell, and itwas verydark. The stillnesswas brokenevery now and thenby mortarshelling and bombs fromthe planes, as well as by our intermittentreturn of machine gun fireagainst Motsa and the Dilb colony (QiryatAnavim) to demon- strateour presence in Qastel.At about nine o'clock thatnight, two donkeysloaded with food and ammunitionreached us from'Ayn Karem, sent by Anwar.This raised our morale.A littlelater, we were joined by an Egyptianofficer and three fighterswith a Bren machine gun. They were all desertersfrom ALA unitsin the

15. The Britisharmy sold these planes (light Austers) to the Jews in earlyJanuary 1948.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR 83 north16and had come to supportthe fightersin Qastel. Had I not known one of thempersonally, we would have been suspicious.Their entry into Qastel thatdark nightwas an extremelydangerous venture: but forthe courage and self-controlof our men,they would have been killed.But theirarrival was welcome, particularly as the Egyptianhad a wonderftilsense of humor,which helped reduce our anxi- ety. About midnight,while MuhammadNajjar and I were at the command post in the trench,the quiet of the nightwas interruptedby heavy machinegun firefrom our own easternand westernpositions. I sent a runnerto both positions,and he returnedquickly to reportthat three Jewish armored cars were approachingfrom Motsa (i.e., fromthe east) and anotherthree from Qiryat Anavim (i.e., fromthe west). I immediatelyran to the firstposition in the east and saw the threearmored cars approachingus withtheir headlights on. They did not seem concernedby our firingand did not returnit. I orderedmy men to stop firingand to send an ambush partywith grenades to halt theiradvance. When we stopped our firing,the armored cars turnedoff their headlights, and we could see nothingafter that. I then ran to the Westernbunker, and sure enough,three armored cars were advancing, also withtheir headlights on. When we stopped firing,they, too, turnedthem off. I calculatedthat the armoredcars were reconnoiteringto ascertainour strength butwould probablynot attackfrom that direction; rather, I thought,they might be intendingto approach via the Suba road. Whateverthe case, I thought,the enemy would attackat the firstlight of dawn eitherto reoccupyQastel or at least to evacuate theirdead. I immediatelysent a patrolalong the Suba road to findout ifthe armoredcars were tryingto approach thatway. The patrolreturned without seeing any armoredcars, so I assumed thatthey were not comingthat way. Neverthe- less, I sent a runnerto Suba withthe followingmessage foral-Gilani: "Bahjat and his men are surroundedin Qastel and call on you to help." The runnerdid not return,and neither'Abd al-Halimnor any of his men showed up. Suddenly,all hell brokeloose at a strategicheight three kilometers to theeast of us on the otherside of a deep ravine.I knew the place well. It was the village of Dayr Yasin. The village came under continuous attackin threewaves untilthe morning.To the west, the planes were bombing withoutrespite the villages of Saris and BaytMuhaiser.17 At daybreak,we looked towardJerusalem. We could see the road descending at Liftatoward us in the directionof Kolonia. On the road tens of vehicles were heading our way withtheir lights on. We began to count: one, two, three,up to 130. One hundredthirty vehicles-three timesthe totalnumber of our men! We were alone. No reinforcements,no replacements.Everyone was in Jerusalempre- paringto take partin 'Abd al-Qadir'sftineral. Was thisa Jewishconvoy going from Jerusalemto Tel Aviv,or was it a forcecoming to recaptureQastel?

16. These were desertersfrom Qawukji's ALA units in thecentral sector. 17. Thesevillages lay on themain Jerusalem-Jaffa road east of Bab al-Wadsome 7 kilometers westof Qastel.The attackon themwas partof OperationNachshon.

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Soon enough,the vehicles reached the villageand stopped,extending virtually along the entiresemicircular road skirtingQastel. We firedall our machineguns at themin one go, and hellfirebroke out againstus. Shellswere rainingon us fromat leastten three-inch mortars. We had to get out of theirrange, so we had to takethe difficultdecision to withdraw.We had no alternative,so we pulled back fromthe Qastel summitto a lower hillabout 400 metersto the southwest.Here, we took up positionsin trenchesalready dug while the shellingof Qastel summitcontinued. Presentlythe shellingstopped. A largeJewish force advanced on footthrough the westernforest toward the mukhtar'shouse and the mosque-the latterde- stroyedin the course of the intenseshelling. This was a golden opportunityfor us, as the enemywas now exposed to our fire.We saw a numberof themfall, but for a while theydid not returnour firesince theirmain objectiveat thisstage was to occupy the summitof the village and to clean it up. Aftera while, anotherlarge

. ' A .t v. =!~!. 1 M

'Abd al-Qadir's funeral at the Mosque of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, 9 April 1948. (Before T7eir Diaspora, Institutefor Palestine Studies) group ofJews advanced fromthe east of the village towardthe southwest,trying to cut offour line of retreatto 'Ayn Karem. Again we had to take the difficult decision to withdrawsouthward toward 'Ayn Karem, but by now the planes reap- peared and startedbombing us as we retreated.We triedto hide under treesand bushes on our way and eventuallybroke free and got to 'Ayn Karem. As we reached it,we heard the enemyblowing up the houses of Qastel. It was thusthat Qastel again fellinto the hands of theJews, while hundredsof armed men from

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR 85 everyquarter took partin the funeralto honor theircommander, 'Abd al-Qadiral- Husayni. Did 'Abd al-Qadirdie a suicidaldeath? No, he did not.What he triedto do was to recaptureQastel as quicklyas possible, and at whatevercost, because of the greatimportance he attachedto itfrom the militaryand moralepoints of view and because he feltthat the MilitaryCommittee in Damascus had in a sense dared him to recaptureit. All those who knew 'Abd al-Qadir are well familiarwith his braveryin battle and his personal indifferenceto danger. Everyone knows that guerrillacom- mandersin wars of nationalliberation, unlike commanders in regulararmies, personally lead theirmen into battle.I have oftenseen him standingupright under heavy fire,deliberately defying danger to instillcourage in his men. And did theBritish kill him, as some have suggested?The onlyBritish who took partin the battlewere threearmy deserters who were underAbu Dayyeh's command.18He confirmedto me thatthey could not possiblyhave seen 'Abd al-Qadir enter the village or known about it because they were with him personally throughoutthe battle, constantlyfighting alongside him. When Ibrahim was wounded, one of the threewas also wounded, temporarilylosing his sightafter being hitby shrapnel. The Jews claim thatthey found and recognizedthe body of 'Abd al-Qadirafter his martyrdom.This is a lie. When our men foundhis body, his personalweapon, an EnglishSten submachinegun with a silencer,was in his hand. His notebook and papers were in his breastpocket. Nothinghad been touched. We arrivedin Jerusalemon the afternoonof Friday,the 9th of April,after the funeralservice was over. I did not have the honor of biddinghim a finalfarewell. The depressingeffect of the recentevents-Qastel, DayrYasin, Kolonia,19and the martyrdomof 'Abd al-Qadir-was palpable. Morale in Jerusalemhad sunk veiy low. Our own sadness was compounded when we learned thatrunners had ar- rivedduring the funeralto announce: "Bahjatis surroundedat Qastel,"but to no avail. Thousands had attendedthe ftineral.It was an impressiveevent, but the partici- pation of hundredsof armed men was, quite rightly,the object of harshcriticism and disapprobation.Prayers were performedover his body at the Haram al-Sharif followingthe Fridayprayers, and he was buried near al-Aqsa Mosque. May God have mercyon his soul.

18. Some halfdozen Britishsoldiers deserted their units to joinJihad Muqaddas to avengethe deathof comradeskilled by Irgunand Stern.After 'Abd al-Qadir'sdeath, a rumorspread that thedesertions were partof a Britishplot. 19. On 12 April,in a surprisepredawn attack carried out by Palmachunits from Qiryat Anavim,Kolonia was captured,its inhabitants expelled, and all itshouses blownup. For an eyewitnessaccount, see HariyLevin, Jerusalem Embattled (London: Victor Gollancz, 1950), pp. 64-67.

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THE FALL OF HAIFA

Plan Dalet went into implementationin the countrysideon 5-6 April with OperationNachshon. Thefirst city to be attackedunder theplan was Tiberias.It fell on 18 April.Next on theHaganah listwas Haifa. The noninterferenceof the BritishArmy (which was supposed to maintain law and order until the end of the Mandate on 15 May) in thefighting in Tiberias and its evacuation of the Arab population was a great and welcome eye-openerto the Haganah Com- mand. Alreadya plan for a massive attackagainst theArab quartersof Haifa, Oper- ation Misparayim("Scissors'), had been prepared. But theposition of Haifa dif- feredfrom that of Tiberias,though both citieswere included in theJewish state by the UN partitiondecision. Haifa was theprincipal port of Palestine and the citywhere the Britishforces withdrawingfrom the restof the countrywere to convergeand assemblefor embarkationto Britain. Indeed the Britishgovern- mnenthad repeatedlystated thatfor logisticalreasons its militaryevacuation of thecountry could not be completedby 15 May and thatsome of itsforces would remain in Haifa and itsvicinity until 1 August.Moreover, in explaining itswith- drawal plans to the Arab governments,Britain had also stated that the withdrawal movementwould be from "southto north"via Haifa. The Haganah's di- lemma in Haifa was that,unlike the case of Tiberias,an operationon thescale of Misparayim would bring it into direct confrontationwith the British army, whichpatrolled the borders and no-man's-landbetween the Arab and Jewish quarters of the city. Haganah's concern on thisscore was resolvedon 18 April,when Major Gen- eral Hugh C Stockwell,British Commander, North Sector, Haifa, summoned to his headquartersHarry Beilin, theJewish Agency liaison officerwith the British army in the city.This was the same day that Tiberias had fallen and its Arab population was evacuated by theBritish army. Unquestionably,this momentous eventwas uppermostin Stockwell'smind, as it musthave been in Haganah's. To thesurprise of Beilin and theHaganah Command (to whomBeilin reportedthe meetingwith Stockwell), the general informedBeilin that he intended immediately to begin withdrawinghis forcesfrom the bordersand no-man's-landbetween theArab and Jewishqtarters in Haifa and thatthe withdrawal would be comnpletedby Tuesday,20 April.Stockwell is reportedto have walked over to a large wall map ofHaifa and asked Beilin ifthe Haganah could capturethe Arab quarters. Haifa had a population of 140,000, a littleover halfof whichwas Jewish.The Arabportions of thecity stretched along theseafrontfrom northwest to southeast for about 3,500 meters,overlooked and dominated by the modern Jewish quarters on the higherslopes of Mount Carmel (Hadar Hacarmel). The Arab quarterswere 1,000 metersat theirwidest, the average widthbetween the Jewish quarters and the sea rangingfrom 350 to 400 meters.At a point close to the commercial area near the harbor (where a Palmach company was secretly based, its membersmasquerading as port laborers), the major northwestand

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR 87 southeastportions of theArab citywere linkedby a wasp's waist barely200 me- terswide. Contactby landfor theArab communitywith the rest of Palestine was via RushmiyvaBridge in the southeast(see map).

Haifa,21 April1948 \\ ~~~~~~~Mediweranean Sea

3 n HlHarbor Arab-heldportsrth

] 11^ Bay~~~~~~~~~~~~~ofHaifa

I 1 I I I I

1 - Old CommercialCenter 2 - RushmLyyaBridge i Hafa,o ciie v

man Jewishatta ndson Arab town a Ai Iz a a o Arab-heldportions 7 wn 0 200 400 600 800 1000 9W

7Therewas no ALAgarrison in Haifa, onlycitizen volunteers,though the commander (the only trainedofficer in Haifa), Amin Izz al-Din,a Lebanese, was an ALA appointee of theMilitary Committee in Damascus. He had taken up hispost only three weeks before,on 27 March. The garrison was about 450 strong, armed withBritish and Frenchrifles, mostly of WorldWar I vintage,and chroni- cally short of ammunition. The entire garrison possessed only fifteen sub- machine guns, an essential weapon in urban warfare. In contrast,Haifa was the home and recruitingbase of the 2,000-strong Carmelior Second Brigade, one of theseven brigadesof KHISH, thefield armyof the Haganah. The Carmeli Brigade had armored cars, two-inchand three-inch mortars,machine guns, Sten and Thompsonsubmachine guns, rifles,and grenades-all in plentifulquantities and withvirtually unlimited supplies of mortar shellsand ammunition.The brigade also used two weapons in Haifa nicknamed Davidkas and Barak Bullets. The first were heavy mortars with sixty-pound

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 88 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES shells,the latterconverted oil barrelsand spherical sea nines filled with explosives and rolleddown on theArab quartersfromthe higherJewishareas. Both theDavidkas and Barak Bulletswere inaccurate,but because theycreated indis- criminatedestruction and exploded withtremendous noise, theirpsychological effectagainst civilians was devastating. Withforeknowledge of Britishintentions and withdrawalplans and a green lightfrom Stockwell,the Carmeli Brigade went into action. The scope of Mis- parayim, originallyconceived as a massive hit-and-runoffensive against major Arab targetsin the city,was now revisedto produce a repetitionof the Tiberias outcome.permanent occupation of the Arab quarters and the evacuation of theirinhabitants. By thistime, Passover (whichfell thatyear on 24 April) was approaching, so Misparayim was renamed Bi'ur Hametz ("Cleaning the Leaven ') to celebrateit and to reflectthe operation'snew scope.1 On Wednesday,21 April, General Stockwellsummoned sequentially to his headquarters representativesof theHaganah Command and theArab commu- nityformally to notifythem of his intentionto withdrawfrom the borderareas. Stockwell'snotification took theform of a writtenstatement evenhandedly ad- dressedto bothparties, which he read out and distributedto each at theirrespec- tive meetings.The textof the statementwas.

To those in charge ofArab and Jewishaffairs in Haifa: During thepastfew weeksmany clashes have occurredbetween Arabs andJews. Theseclashes should cease and peace and order be restoredin Haifa. I have no intentionof lettingthe [British]army or police inter- fere in any way in Arab-Jewishclashes. I intendto protect those streets and areas requiredforthe evacuation ofBritish forces withinthe coming three weeks via theport of Haifa.

Therefollowed a long listof roads, arteries,and cityquarters to whichhe would withdrawhis forces, which by eliminationclearly indicated theexact areas from whichhe was withdrawing. But while the Haganah representatives,with whom Stockwellmet at 10 A.M., knew that the withdrawalhad already been completedby sunset theprevious day, Tuesday20 April,this was thefirstindication the Arab side had of what was afoot.Captain Izz al-Din, accompanied by GeorgeMu'ammar, theArab Liaison officerwith the Britisharmy, immediately grasped the implicationsof thestate- mentwhen Stockwellread it out. Upon emergingfromthe 11 A.M;meeting, Izz al-

1. Accordingto EncyclopaediaJudaica, "No hamez (leaven) is to be foundin thehouse or owned duringPassover (Ex. 12:15,19). On thenight before the festival, the house is thor- oughlysearched for hamez (Pes. 1:1).All leavenfound in thehouse is gatheredtogether in one place and burnedon thefollowing day beforenoon."

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Din wentstraight to Damascus to alertthe Military Committee of what had transpired,handing over command of theArab garrison to his deputy,Yunis Naffa, a Palestinian sanitary engineer withno militaryexperience whatsoever. At 10.30 A., , even as Stockwellwas reading his statementto the Haganah representatives,the CarmeliBrigade had issued itsorders to begin Bi'ur Hametz by movinginto positions vacated by theBritish and attackArab positions at the RushmiyyaBridge area. The trap on the Arab quarters was thus to be closed, preventingboth exit and the arrival ofArab reinforcements. The cumulative effectof the weapons used by Haganah continuouslyfrom 10.30 AML on Wednesday,21 April,throughout the day and nightand well into the evening of 22 April was compounded by thepsychological bombardment of continuousbroadcasts in Arabicfrom theHaganah Qol Ha AMegen(Voice of the Defender) and loudspeakerson trucksurging the immediateevacuation of women and children.In fact, according to the PalestinePost, theprecursor of the Jerisalem Post,the broadcastshad startedas early as Monday, 19 April,i.e., the day afterthe Beilin-Stockwell meeting. A great deal is made by Israeli historians,including liberal revisionists,about the attitudeduring the crisisof theJewish mayor of Haifa, Shabatai Levy.At the second of the two Town Hall meetingsheld on 22 April,Levy did make a poign- ant appeal asking his Arab colleagues to reconsidertheir request-made under the weightof theHaganah attack and mountingcivilian casualties-to evacuate theArab population withadequate protection.But Levydid not reflectHaganah policy, and the principal representativeof the Jewish side was not Levy but "Motki"Maklef, operations officerof the Carmeli Brigade. When General Stock- well,after Levy had spoken,turned to Maklefforhis views on theArab evacuation,his answer was: "Thisis theirbusiness, and theyhave to decide." But whateverwords were spoken at thismeeting, it was Haganah actions that counted. The ordersto theattacking units on 21 Aprilwere "tokill any Arab you encounter... set on fire allflammable objects... and force open doors with explosives." The CarmeliBrigade's fullforce was unleashed on a civilianpopulation of some 75,000 crowded into an area no more than 1.5 square kilometers. When the Haganah Command learned that the Arab authoritieswere calling upon the civilians to gatherfor shelterin the old marketplace, three-inchmortars,according to theofficial history of theCarmeli brigade,were orderedto shell the marketplace. "Whenthe shellingbegan and shellsfell inside the marketa greatpanic ensued. The crowd brokeinto theport and pushing aside thepolice who guarded thegate it stormedthe boats and began toflee the city." A contem- porary Arab reportdescribed the scene at theport as follows: "Men stepped on theirfriendsand women on theirown children.The boats in theport were soon filled with living cargo. The overcrowdingin them was horrible.Many turned over and sank withall theirpassengers." Commentingto the colonial secretaryin London on Haganah conduct,Gen- eral Cunningham,a WorldWar II veteranand high commissionerin Palestine, wroteon 30 April 1948. "RecentJewish military successes (if indeed operations

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based on themortaring of terrifiedwomen and childrencan be classed as such) have aroused extravagantreactions in theJewish press." Stockwell'sconduct in Haifa tookthe British government in London (as it took all Arab capitals) bysurprise. Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin was furious withthe army authoritiesand accused themof lettinghim down. Thepersonal intervention of Prime MinisterClement Atlee was required to restorerelations between Bevin and Field Marshall Montgomery,the chief of the Imperial General Staff and Stockwell'sboss. The six memoranda thatfollow,originally written in Englishand reproduced here for thefirst time, record the death throes of Haifa in the period from Wednesday,21 April to Sunday, 25 April. The signatorieswere membersof the Arab National Committee(ANC) of the city,an emergencybody formed, as in otherArab citiesafter the UN partitionresolution, to oversee the evolvingsitua- tion. Theywere businessmenand lawyers,innocent of militaryaffairs.

ARAB NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF HAIFA, LETTER TO GENERAL STOCKWELL, MILITARY COMMANDER, NORTH SECTOR, HAIFA, CONCERNING His STATEMENT OF WITHDRAWAL, 22 APRIL 1948.

From the timeHaganah launched itsground assault and throughoutthe day of Wednesday,21 April,repeated attemptsby membersof theANC to secure an urgentappointment with General Stockwellwere rebuffed.Finally, at 9.30 Pm., Stockwellagreed to meetan ANC delegation,but only the next morning,Thurs- day the22nd, at 10 A.m By thattime, tens had been killedand many wounded, while thousands of women and childrenhad fled theirhomes in panic. Thefollowing letter, responding to the redeploymentstatement (quoted in the introductorynote above), which Stockwellread out and thengave to theArab representativesat 11 A.M theprevious day, was drawn up by the signatoriesat an emergencymeeting held at 6 A.m Thursday,22 April in preparationfor the meetingwith Stockwell to be held several hours later.It was handed to Stockwell at that meeting.

ARABNATIONAL COMMITTEE HAIFA 22nd April,1948.

To: The MilitaryCommander NorthSector Haifa

Dear Sir,

1. The ArabNational Committee of Haifahave had the opportunityof considering the contentsof yournote of the 21stinstant, delivered to the OfficerCommanding theArab National Guard at Haifaregarding the maintenanceof peace and orderin the town pending the finalevacuation of His Majesty'sForces fromPalestine.

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2. The Committeenote with deep concern thatit is your intentionto ensure the preservationof tranquilityin those partsof the town definedin the aforesaidnote2 leaving the remainingparts open to disorderand chaos. They feel bound, in the circumstances,to place on recorda strongprotest against this action which is, in theiropinion, a flagrantviolation of the declared policy of His Majesty'sGovern- mentto be responsiblefor the maintenanceof peace and orderup to and including the 15thday of May,1948, the date on whichthe Mandate will come to an end. They are convinced thatyour attitudeis harmfulto Arab interestssince it places theircompatriots at a greatdisadvantage and exposes themto grave danger aris- ing fromthe unceasing shootingby Jewishsnipers from posts dominatingArab quarters.The painfulevents of last nightwhen theJews indiscriminatelyfired at and bombarded the Arab hospital and Arab residentialquarters in the old city, Wadi Nisnas and the easternparts of the townresulting in considerablecasualties, dead and wounded, are irrefutableproof of the wrongfulnessof your policy which constitutesa breach of the legal and moral responsibilitiesof the Govern- mentto preservepeace and order,and to protectthe lives and propertiesof the inhabitants.We say withouthesitation that upon you lies the sole responsibilityfor the cold-blooded and butitalmurder of innocentpersons by theJews, the perpe- trationof which was encouraged, and indeed induced, by the arrangementde- scribedin your aforesaidnote.

3. It is hardlynecessary for the Committeeto emphasize thatthey have always been sincereand earnestin theirpolicy to assistthe authoritiesin the preservation of peace and orderin the town.Ample proofof the honestyof theirintention and of the sincerityof theiraim is to be found in the numerousappeals which they made to the Arab inhabitantsof the city,and in the publicationswhich theydis- tributedfrom time to timeamong the Arab community.British Administrative Of- ficers,Police and MilitaryOfficers, will, doubtless,confirm to your good selfthis assertion;and the Committeeentertains no doubt thattheir attitude in thisrespect leaves nothingto be desired.In almostall the clashes of which complaintis made in your note theJews were aggressors,and the Arabs replied in self-defense.

4. The Committeeventure to suggestthat if it be the sinceredesire of the authorities to ensure peace and order in the town pending the finaldeparture of His Majesty'sForces fromPalestine, all places where clashes between Arab and Jews are likelyto occur should be sufficientlyguarded by militarypatrols, day and night.In particularit is essentialthat the areas of Allenby,Hijaz, Nazarethand Iraq streetsshould be included in the scheme outlinedin yournote. The excl-usionof these roads fromthe contemplatedarrangement will, the Committeeapprehends, affordample opportunitiesfor the Jews to launch bloody attacksupon innocent Arabsresiding and carryingbusiness in those quarters.Indeed, the events of the last 12 hours have fullyjustified their apprehension. It is to be observed thatthe scheme fullyprotects the thoroughfares,predominately Arab, used by theJews in

2. Thisrefers to thecity quarters to whichStockwell was redeployinghis troops.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 92 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES the ordinarycourse of theirtrade, and deprives fromsuch protectionthe roads frequentedby the Arab inhabitantsin the course of theirtrade and dailywork. 5. We wish to assure you, notwithstandingthe regrettableoccurrences of last night,of our unflinchingreadiness to adhere to the policywhich we have hitherto adopted and followed,to co-operate with the authoritiesfor maintaining peace and orderin thewhole town of Haifa.But we feelunable to do so ifthe important Arab quartersmentioned in the preceding paragraph hereof,remain excluded fromthe protectionenvisaged in the scheme described in your note of the 21st instant. 6. We trustthat you will be able to reconsiderthe matterin the lightof the repre- sentationsherein contained and take such immediateaction as may be necessary to ensurethe maintenanceof completeorder and peace throughoutthe town,and to preventany furtheraggression by theJews upon theArab community. We have reportedthe eventsnow occurringin Haifa to the Arab States,3stressing the mala fides of the BritishAuthorities here, particularlyin view of the refusalof those authoritiesto renderany assistancefor the rescue of women and childrenin spite of the repeated earlyrequests made by Mr. George Mu'ammar,the Arab Liaison Officer,and Mr.Farid Saad, a memberof thisCommittee, to the militaryand civil authoritiesof the town.4 Yours faithfully, VictorA. Khayat Farid Saad George Mu'ammar Elias Koussa Anis Nasr THE ARABNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF HAIFA P.S. We feel distressedand profoundlyaggrieved by the lack of sympathyon the partof the BritishAuthorities to renderaid to the wounded althoughthey have been requested to do so. Many persons sufferingfrom serious wounds lyingin streetsand buildingsare leftunattended; and attemptsby the Arab medical serv- ices to renderthe necessaryhelp were frustratedby Jewishsnipers. There are in- stanceswhere driversof ambulances and nurseshave been shot at and wounded whilstperforming this human act.

ARAB NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF HAIFA, AIDE-MEMOIRE OF THE MEETING BETWEEN GEN- ERAL STOCKWELL AND THE ARAB REPRESENTATIVES, 22 APRIL 1948. The aide-memoiresummarizing the gist of the talks between the signatories and General Stockwellat theirmeeting at 10 A.M on 22 Aprilwas writtenby the

3. Thiswas done via theconsuls of Egypt,Transjordan, Lebanon, and Syriain Haifa. 4. At5 A.M. earlierthat morning, 22 April,George Muammar, the liaison officer with the British armyin Haifa,had pleaded withthe army to send ambulancesto rescuethose wounded in the Haganahbombardment that had precededthe attack on theWadi Rushmiyyabridge area. Whenthe appeal was refused,he appealed forBritish troops to escortArab ambulances. This, too,was rejected.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR 93 delegation while the meetingwas stillin progress.It was given to Stockwellto read and sign in recognitionof its accuracy, which he did. FROM: The Arab Executivesof HAIFA We, the undersigned,have todaymet GeneralStockwell in the presence of the DistrictCommissioner of HAIFA,the BritishConsul and BrigadierJohnson on the subjectof the massacreby Jews of Arabsin the town of HAIFA now takingplace. He informedus thathe was unable and thereforenot preparedto fightthe Jews and put an end theretoand thathe was not willingto allow Arab ArmedMen to enterthe town to help the Arab inhabitants.He was primarilyinterested in safe- guardingthe routesand areas occupied by theArmy. He furthersuggested that he could intervenewith the Jewish Authorities for a Truce. He will only interveneif we agree to negotiatea Truce. (signed....) VictorA. Khayat Farid Saad Elias Koussa George Mu'ammar Anis Nasr 22 Apr.48 Seen H. Stockwell

THE HAGANAH COMMAND, TERMS FOR A TRUCE BETWEEN JEWS AND ARABS IN HAIFA, 22 APRIL 1948. AfterGeneral Stockwellsigned theaide-memoire recording his refusalto intervene in thefighting unless theANC delegation agreed to negotiatea trucewith the Haganah, the delegation,desperate to stop the bloodshed and destruction, asked him to obtain Haganah's truceterms. Accordingto Farid Saad, a senior memberof the delegation,the general re- tired with his aides on thepretext that he wanted to contact theJews. He re- turnedwithin fifteen minutes to readfrom a typedsheet the textof thefollowing document. The delegationraised many objectionsand insistedthat the agreement should contain an articleindicating that the truce did not implyrecognition of thejuris- diction of the Haganah or any change in the political status of the country, whichtechnically was stillunder BritishMandatory sovereignty. Stockwell made a note of thisdemand, promising to conferwith the Jews. The moststriking fea- tureof thedocument, in addition to itsbeing one of unconditionalsurrender in everysense of theword, was therole assigned in it to theBritish army in disarming theArab population on behalfof the Haganah. It was agreed thata meetingwould takeplace at the Town Hall at 4 Rm. the same day (Thursday,22 April) between the ANC delegation and Jewishrepre-

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 94 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES sentatives.The meetingwould be attended by Stockwelland would discuss the truceterms. Haifa,22.4.48

TERMS OF THE HAGANAH COMMAND FOR A TRUCE IN AND APPLICABLE TO HAIFA BETWEEN JEWS AND ARABS.

1. COMPLETE DISARMING OF ALL ARAB ARMS,INCLUDING WEAPONS OF ALL KINDS, ALL EXPLOSIVES, MILITARY VEHICLES AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT WITHOUT EXCEPTION. 2. ALLARMS WITHIN THE ABOVE DESCRIPTION,WITH THE EXCEPTION OF LICENSED ARMS,A LIST OF WHICH WILL BE SHOWN TO THE HAGANAHBY THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER,HAIFA, MUST BE DELIVERED BY 12.00HOURS, 23RD APRIL, 1948, AT THE FOLLOWING PLACES OF ASSEMBLY.THIS TIME LIMITMAY BE-EXTENDEDTO 17.00 HOURS, 23RD APRIL,1948, AT THE DISCRE- TION OF THE G.O.C., NORTHERNSECTOR. (i) NEARTHE RUSHMIYABRIDGE OPPOSITE THE OFFICES OF THE EASTERN MOSLEM COUNCIL; (ii) CORNER OF STANTON STREETAND BOURJ; (iii) ENTRANCETO OLD BUSINESS CENTRE; (iv) EGGED STATION,CARMEL AVENUE. THESE WILL BE HELD IN TRUST TO THE HAGANAH AND HANDED TO THEM AT THE DISCRETION OF THE G.O.C., NORTHERN SECTOR NOT LATER THAN MIDNIGHT 15/16MAY, 1948. 3. REMOVALFORTHWITH OF ARABROADBLOCKS AND FREEDOM OF TRAF- FIC UNDISTURBED WILL COMMENCE FORTHWITH UNDER SUPERVISION OF THE MILITARYAUTHORITIES. 4. ALLFOREIGN ARABMALES WILL CONCENTRATE AT PLACESOF ASSEMBLY TO BE FIXED BY HAGANAHAND WILL LEAVEPALESTINE WITHIN TWENTY- FOUR HOURS UNDER MILITARYCONTROL. 5. EUROPEANNAZIS WILL BE DELIVERED TO MILITARY.5 6. A TWENTY-FOURHOUR CURFEW WILL BE IMPOSED BY THE MILITARY AUTHORITIESON ARABQUARTERS AND HOUSES TO ASSURECOMPLETE DIS- ARMING. 7. NON-DELIVERYOF ARMSWITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED WILLBE TREATED AS AN OFFENCE AND WI LL BE PUNISHABLE.

5. Therewere none, but this was a good propagandagimmick.

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8. AFTER THE HOUSE CURFEW EACH PERSON IN HAIFA WILL BE FREE TO CARRY ON HIS NORMAL BIJSINESS AND WAY OF LIVE.

9. ALL PERSONS WILL CARRY ON THEIR WORK AS EQUAL AND FREE CITI- ZENS OF HAIFA.

10. ANY JOINT MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE TOWN HALL.

11. THIS TRUCE COMES INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY.

THE ARAB NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF HAIFA, LETTER TO GENERAL STOCKWELL SUMMA- RIZING His POSITION AT THE 22 APRIL TowN HALL MEETINGS, HAIFA, 23 APRIL 1948.

In preparationfor the Town Hall meetingset for 4 PAl of 22 April,the ANC delegation, upon leaving General Stockwell'sheadquarters at 12:15 Pmli that same day, called for a general meetingof Haifa Arab notables to discuss the situation. The meetingwas held at the house of VictorKhayat, transportbeing provided by Britishtanks because of the continuingbattle. The delegation reportedon theirtalks with Stockwell.The assembled asked YunisNaffa, the deputy garrison commander,how long resistancecould last.He declined to discuss securitymatters publicly. An agonizing discussionfollowed on thepros and cons ofaccepting the truce terms read earlier byStockwell. There was consensus that the uppermostconsideration should be to stop the ongoing killingof innocent citizens. The delegation was authorized to sign any agreement it consideredwarranted by the circumstances. The Town Hall meetingwas held as scheduledat 4 Pm. It was attendedon the Jewishside by the mayor,Shabatai Levy;a representativeqf theJewish Agency; and "Motki"Maklef; operations officerof the Carmeli Brigade and Haganah's representative.Stockwell read the termsof theproposed truce,which were virtually identical withthose he had read in the morningat his headquarters. The ANC stronglyprotested the termsas unfair and destructiveof Arab political rights.A heated discussionfollowed. The Arabs asked that a condition be added to the effectthat the agreementdid not implyrecognition of thejurisdic- tion of the Haganah or any change in thepolitical status of the country.Upon theJewish rejection of thisrequest, the delegation asked for a twventy-four-hour adjournmentto consultthe Arab governmentson such a momentousissue. Both Stockwelland theJews refusedAt thispoint, Stockwell said emphaticallythat the delegationmust sign theagreement as it stood thatsame evening ifthey wanted to avoid 300-400 additional casualties.After repeated and insistentrequestsfor an adjournmentto consulttheir Haifa colleagues,Stockwell granted an adjourn- mentuntil 7 Pm thatsame evening. Upon leaving the Town Hall, thedelegation returned to VictorKhayat's house to briefthe general meetingof notables on what had transpired.There was an- otheragonizing discussion in thelight of Stockwell'sdire warning utteredin the presenceof the Haganah representative.The assembledrenewed their authorization to thedelegation to do what it thoughtnecessary given the extremegravity of thesituation and to sign the agreementif therewas no otheralternative.

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Meanwhile, operation Bi'ur Hametz continued in full swing. As Moshe Car- mel,commander of the CarmeliBrigade, reports,the British had asked himfor a cease-fireto create a "conduciveatmosphere" for the 4 Pm Town Hall meeting but "we did not thinkit suitable to do so, and the battlescontinued." On the way to the 7 i_,v meetingat the Town Hall, the membersof thedelegation conferredamong themselvesand, despitethe "authorization"from the general meetingat Khayat's house, decided that theycould not themselvesassume the tremendousnational responsibilityof endorsingan agreementthat did not contain an article about Haganah jurisdiction and the political status of the country. Upon enteringthe Town Hall meeting,they declared theirinability to endorse theproposed truceagreement and requestedthe evacuation ofHaifa's Arab citizens (which in any case had been ongoing under duress thewhole day) because of Stockwell'srefusal to protect their lives and properties. It was after hearing this that the mayor, Shabatai Levy, made his moving speech asking the delegation to reconsiderits decision and the exchange took place betweenStockwell and Maklefmentioned in thegeneral introductorynote above. At the end of thissecond Town Hall meeting,it was decided to hold a meetingat 11 AM thefollowing day, Friday,23 April,to discuss evacuation ar- rangements. Thefollowing document was composed by the delegatesprior to the 11 AM meetingthe following day toput on recordStockwell's position at the Town Hall meetingsof 22 April.The letterwas handed to Stockwellat the23 Aprilmeeting. As he refusedto receive it,it was given instead to the districtcommissioner.

THE ARABNATIONAL COMMITTEE HAIFA 23rdApril, 1948.

To: The MilitaryCommander NorthSector, Haifa.

Dear Sir,

1. We submitthis note by way of confirmationof the statementwhich you made to us at themeeting in the town hall of Haifa,on Thursdaythe 22nd instant,to wit, (a) thatunless theArabs accept the termsof the Haganah Commandfor a truce in Haifa, the murderousattack by the Jews upon the Arab quarterswill be re- newed resultingin some 300-400 casualties,in dead and wounded; and (b) thatyou are neitherable nor prepared to take any effectivemeasure to preventthe contemplatedassault.

2. We wish to reiterateour statementat thatmeeting that while the removalof the Arabinhabitants from the town is voluntaryand is being carriedout at our request,

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR 97 yet the request was to the greatestextent prompted by your refusalto take any action to protectthe lives and propertiesof those residents.

Yours faithfully, VictorA. Khayat Farid Saad Elias Koussa Anis Nasr George Mu'ammar

Copy to: The DistrictCommissioner, Haifa.

ARAB NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF HAIFA, LETTER TO HAIFA MAYOR SHABATAI LEVY, 23 APRIL 1948. The meetingto discuss evacuation arrangementswas held as scheduledat 11 A. on 23 April.Present at the meeting,in addition to theArab delegation,were senior Britishmilitary and civilian officials,including Stockwell, the district commissioner,and officersrepresenting the army, navy, and police. Alsopresent was C. H Marriott,Stockwell's British erminence grise (who had just been appointed consul and whose area of expertisehad been Latin America),and Shabatai Levy and otherJewish representatives. Before discussingevacuation plans, the delegation registeredits strongpro- testsat thecontinuing acts ofgratuitous violence against thedeparting Arabs by the CarmeliBrigade and theStern and Irgun (which theHaganah had allowed toparticipate in Bi'ur Hametz). theshooting of unarmed civilians,firing on ambulances and paramedics, stealing of cars, breakinginto homes and the whole- sale lootingof theircontents, the arrest of a large numberof civilians whosefate remained unknown, and theprevention of people from enteringtheir homes. Stockwellpromised to take correctiveaction, but nothingwas done about any of the violations. Thefollowing letter was handed to Shabatai Levyat thismeeting in his capac- ityas mayor.It indicatesthe delegation's attempt to limitthe scope of theevacua- tion.Despite Levy'sgood intentions,nothing came of the memorandum.

THE ARABNATIONAL COMMITTEE HAIFA 23rdApril, 1948.

Dear Mr.Shabatai Levy, In connectionwith the proposed removalof the Arab inhabitantsfrom Haifa, we shall be glad ifyou will let us have a writtenassurance by yourgood selfand by theJewish authority concerned that: (a) everyArab remainingin the town will enjoy fullfreedom of business and residence,and will not be molestednor fetteredby any measureswhatever subject to the requirementsof peace and order of the town which will be endorsed equally to all Arab and Jewishcitizens;

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(b) the propertiesof the Arab inhabitantsleaving the town will be adequately protected;and (c) all religious establishmentswill be safeguarded,and no encroachments thereonwill be allowed. Yours faithfully, VictorA. Khayat Farid Saad Elias Koussa George Mu'ammar Anis Nasr Copy to: The DistrictCommissioner, Haifa. The MilitaryCommander, North Sector, Haifa.

ARA NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF HAIFA, LETTER TO GENERAL STOCKWELL, 25 APRIL 1948. This document records Haganah's continuingfailure to honor its commit- mentseven under the truceagreement. It also indicates theANC's last desperate and somewhatpathetic attempts to minimize thescope of the evacuation and if possible even to reverseit. There was littleresponse from Stockwell. HAIFA ARABEMERGENCY COMMITTEE HAIFA 25thApril, 1948. To: The MilitaryCommander NorthSector, Haifa. Dear Sir, 1. We wish to inviteyour attention to threematters of vital importance to theArab communityof Haifa, and trustthat you will see your way to take the necessary measures to ensure the earlyremedy of theircomplaint. 2. It would appear fromthe note dated the 21stinstant, which you deliveredto the OfficerCommanding the Arab Civil Guards,that the reason forthe exclusion of the quarterspredominantly Arab fromthe area forwhich you assume responsibilityof preservingpeace and orderwas the frequencyof clashes between Arab and Jews.These clashes have finallyceased on the 22nd instant.We submitthat it is only fairand just thatyou should now assume controlof the whole town and be responsiblefor the assistanceof peace and ordertherein in conformitywith the declared policy of His Majesty'sGovernment. The adoption of thismeasure will secure the removalof membersof theJewish forces from Arab quarters,and will, doubtless,help to restorea feelingof confidenceand of safetyto theArab inhabitants minimizingthe numberof Arab evacuees. 3. The second complaintis the organisedand systematiclooting of Arab properties. Houses and business premises have been virtuallyemptied fromall mov- ables, and manyArab families have been deprivedof all theirbelongings save the

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR 99 clotheswhich theynow wear. The Arab hospitalin the old town have [sic] been broken into and all surgicaland medical equipmentsstolen. 4. Thirdly,the Jews preventall Arab persons fromcirculating in Arab quarterson variouspretences. This actiontends to intensifythe feelingof mistrustin the inno- cence and honestyof theJewish measures, and to nullifythe effortsof thisCom- mitteeto pacifytheir compatriots. 5. We have repeatedlyrequested the Jewish authorities to put an end to thisstate of affairs,but all our endeavourshave, unfortunately,proved to be futile.We cannot but hold the BritishAuthorities, civil and military,responsible for this lamenta- ble condition,and we feel thatit is withinyour power to put mattersin order. Yours faithfully, VictorA. Khayat Farid Saad E. N. Koussa George Mu'ammar Anis Nasr Copy to: The DistrictCommissioner, Haifa. His Worshipthe Mayorof Haifa.

THE FALL OF JAFFA

REPORT TO FAwzI QAWUKJI, COMMANDER OF THE ARAB LIBERATION ARMY (ALA) CEN- TRAL FRONT, FROM CAPTAIN MICHEL ISSA, HEAD OF THE AJNADIN BATTALION, 6 MAY 1948. If Haifa was the second cityafter Tiberias on Haganah's list,Jaffa was the third.In fact, the operationplanned againstJaffa hadfrom the beginningbeen dubbed 'Bi'ur Hametz. " However, the "leaven"to be cleansed in theJaffa "Bi'ur Hametz" was not as yet thepopulation ofJaffa itself;but of the Arab villages surroundingit: Saqiyah, al-Khairiyya,Yazur, Salameh, Abu Kabir, and Tal al- Rish. Haganah's relativecoyness with regard toJaffa was promptedlargely by the deploymentof theBritish army in the vicinityofJaffa-Tel Aviv and the unlikeli- hood of therebeing ajaffa "Stockwell,"particularly asJaffa was part of thePales- tinianstate according to the UNpartitionresolution. Hence, Jaffa'sfate was to be death by strangulationrather than frontal assault. Accordingto the officialhis- toryof theHaganah, Jaffa"would be forced to surrenderonce theBritish left on 15 May." And indeed, the Britisharmy in theJaffa-Tel Aviv sector was on the alertafter the fturor that Stockwell's conduct had aroused in theBritish cabinet. But Haganah's plans against Jaffadid not reckon withthe plans of its rival, theIrgun, whose headquartersand thebulk of whoseforces were in neighboring TelAviv, where its leader Menachem Begin resided. Relationsbetween Haganah and theIrgun werefundamentally a functionof thecompetition for political influencein theJewish state-to-be between the "Left"

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 100 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES and the "Right," which theyrepresented respectively. The mostdramatic and po- liticallyrewarding arena for thisconmpetition during thisfirst phase of the 1948 war was "military"action against the Palestinians, as it had been against the Britishin the immediatelypreceding phase. Already a gruesome victimof this competitionhad been Dayr Yasin on 9 April. Begin was aware of Haganah's plans with regard toJaffa. He had his own Hametz plans. He decided to go for an all-outfrontal assault in the expectation that the British,judging from theirconduct in Haifa, would not dare take him on. He, too,planned it to coincide with Passover on 24 April but could only launch it on the 25th. Having seized a vast quantity of mortarshells from a Britisharmy train, he began a relentlessand indiscriminatebombardment of the residentialand commercialquarters of thecity, which he maintained round the clockfor the next threedays and nights.Simultaneously, he launched an east-to- westland attackwith 600 men against thenarrow neck of a Jaffaneighborhood Manshiyya,which jutted northwardalong the sea and was surrounded by Tel Aviv on the northand east. Resistancein Manshiyya was stubbornandfierce. Unable to advance into it throughoutthe day and nightof 25 April,the thrustof the assault was changed southwardin the directionofJaffa proper, but here,too, an all-dayassault during 26 April was halted.By the evening of the 26th,Begin was ready to call off the land operations against Jaffawhile continuinghis relentlessbombardment of the city'sresidential and commercialquarters. But his lieutenantsprevailed on him to renew the assault against Manshiyya. Resistance here continued throughoutthe day of27 April,but some progress was made by nightfall.Contin- uing the attack throughthe night,the Irgun was finally able to make a break- throughto thesea by 7 A.M of the28th, severing Manshiyya from the restof the city.Thereupon the Irgun startedmopping up the quarter and lootingit. In the words of theAnglo-Jewish journalist Jon Kimche,"Everything that was moveable was carried offfromJaffa-furniture, carpets, pictures, crockery andpottery, jew- elryand cutlery.The occupied part ofJaffa [i.e., Manshiyya] was stripped... what could not be taken away was smashed. Windows,pianos, fittingsand lamps went in an orgyof destruction." At thispoint, theBritish intervened after a warning to theHaganah authorities in Tel Aviv. On 29 April,they shelled the Irgun headquarters in a Tel Aviv suburb and machinegunnedfrom theair theIrgun unitsin Manshiyya,forcing themto retire.Ironically, a British-Haganahagreement allowed joint patrols of theirforces to take Manshiyya overfrom the Irgun. That same day, 29 April, Bi'ur Hametz, delayed because of the Irgun land operations,was launched by theHaganah, tighteningthe noose roundJaffa proper. The villagesfell like nine- pins under the assault of unitsfrom threeHaganah brigades,the Kiryati,the Alexandroni,and the Givati. An Irgun-Haganah agreementconcluded on the 28thput theformer under Haganah commandfor thisoperation. But all was not smoothsailing for Bi'ur Hametz. TheJaffa garrison, comprising 350 fightersof theALA and a local Palestinian force of some 250 civilian volunteers,made its last stand when it counterattackedon the29th to reoccupy

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR 101 the eastern suburb ofJaffa, Tal al-Rish,two kilometersaway. In this battle,according to the officialhistory of the Haganah, the Givati brigade lost 33 dead and 100 wounded. But it was too late. The civilianpopulation, masspanicked by the continuingmortar bombardment, was leaving in droves,demoralizing the fightersat Tal al-Rishand elsewhere.The Britishinterfered with Bi'ur Hametz only to the extentofforcing the Haganah to allow a land escape route on the main Jaffa-Jerusalemroadfor thefleeingcivilians who had not already escaped by sea.

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Issa 'sforcesthat were responsibleforthwarting the northern thrust of the Yevussi operation. Michel Issa 's report,addressed to Fawzi Qawukji, thepopular Lebanese officer in charge ofthe ALA 's CentralFront, records the last days ofjaffaas an Arab city, from the timeof his arrival to his departurewith the remnantsof his battaliona week later.It was translatedby Walid Khalidi. [Letterhead: Headquarters,Arab LiberationArmy, Northern Front, the Com- mander]

To: His Excellencythe Commanderof the CentralFront' Subject: The JaffaGarrison Date: 6 May 1948 From: CaptainMichel Issa

1. At 12 hoursnoon, 28 April1948, 1 receivedyour order to proceed to Jaffawith my battalion2plus a platoon fromHittin Battalion3 to reinforcethe Jaffa garrison. 2. Atthe timeof the receiptof thisorder, Ajnadin was deployed in thevillages of Biddu and Nabi Samweel.

3. Afterconsiderable efforts to secure the necessarytransport and petrol,I was able to reachJaffa with my battalion at 6.00 hourson 29 April.With support from a unitcommanded by MajorMahdi, I got throughdangerous points along the way.4 4. Upon arrivalin Jaffa,I foundthe cityin a stateof greatpanic as a resultof the greatpressure on it by theJews on the northernfront.

5. The commanderof theJaffa garrison, Major Adil Najmuddin,5ordered me to send immediatelytwo platoons to the northernfront, which I did.

6. I receiveda copy ofyour orders to MajorNajmuddin to hand over the garrison of the cityto me.

1. Followingthe formation by theArab League of theArab Liberation Army (ALA), Palestine was dividedinto three sections: the Northern Front, comprising the Galilee; the Southern Front, comprisingthe Negev; and theCentral Front, comprising the rest of thecountry. While the SouthernFront was theoreticallyunder the Egyptians, the Northern and CentralFronts were in principleunder the command of theArab League Military Committee in Damascusheaded by GeneralIsmail Safwat. In fact,however, the situation was farmore complex, and thePalestin- ian guerrillaforces of theJihad Muqaddas under the Arab Higher Committee (led by Hajj Amin al-Husayni)controlled much of therural areas. The commanderof theCentral Front to whom thisreport is addressedwas Fawzi Qawukji. 2. AjnadinBattalion (like otherALA battalions named after early battles of Islam)was 250 strong.It was made up of Palestiniansrecruited from the TJJF (the Transjordanian Frontier Force),a forcetrained and officeredby theBritish to patrolthe frontier between Palestine and Transjordanand whichthe British disbanded in January1948 following their decision to leave Palestine. 3. AnotherALA unit comprising three companies and a totalof 500 men,mainly Palestinian. 4. Mahdiwas an IraqiALA officer. His help would have been requiredgiven the tightening Haganahcircle around Jaffa. 5. An IraqiALA officer.

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7. MajorNajmuddin declined to hand over the garrisonof the city,upon which I sent you the followingtelegram dated 30thApril 1948:

TO FAWZI.6 CC: MILITARY COMMITTEE.7 ADIL REFUSES TO HAND OVER THE GARRISON AND IS LEAVING THE CITY WITHOUT DOING SO STOP GARRISON HAS COLLAPSED, ITS ARMS ARE DISPERSED STOP CITY AND GARRISON IN STATE OF COMPLETE CONFUSION STOP ATTITUDE OF ADIL NEGA- TIVE AND POSSIBLY PLEASED WITH STATE OF AFFAIRS STOP HIS TROOPS HAVE LOOTED SEVERAL SHOPS STOP NO ONE CAN CONTROL SITUATION WITHOUT SUPPORT OF REGULAR FORCES STOP 80 PERCENT OF POPULATION HAS LEFT CITY AND THE FLOOD OF DEPARTURE IS CONTINUING IN TRAGIC FASHION STOP NATIONAL COMMITTEE UNABLE TO CON- TINUE FUNCTIONS BECAUSE OF LACK OF RESOURCES [SIGNED] MICHEL

8. Morning,1st May 1948:Just learned thatMajor Adil,his Iraqi troops,and the Yugoslavs8 are waiting in their vehicles at the entrance of the city,determined to leave. I prevented them from doing so unless there is a proper handover of the garrison.

9. Noon, 1st May 1948: Major Adil, with all the Iraqis and Yugoslavs, were able to leave by sea without my knowledge, and I sent you the following telegram dated 1 May 1948:

TO FAWZI: ADIL LEFT CITY BY SEA WITH ALL IRAQIS AND YUGOSLAVS STOP AFTER MORE DEPARTURES TODAY, CITY ALMOST DESERTED BY INHABITANTS STOP THE ABILITY OF THE CITY TO PROVIDE FOR WHAT IS LEFT OF THE GARRISON WILL END TOMORROW STOP THE BRITISH COMMANDER HAS ORDERED A CEASE-FIRE UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF THE CUR- RENT MONTH9 STOP IF THE JEWS DO NOT OBEY THE ORDER I HAVE NO FORCES ADEQUATE TO HOLD THEM BACK STOP THE INFECTION HAS SPREAD TO AJNADIN STOP I AWAIT YOUR URGENT INSTRUCTIONS [SIGNED] MICHEL

6. Qawukji,commander of theCentral Front. 7. The ArabLeague Military Committee headquartered near Damascus. 8. The ALAJaffa garrison under Najmuddin, comprising 350 fighters,was made up of about 325 Iraqis,the rest being "Yugoslavs"-more accurately, Bosnian Muslims who had foughtin Yugoslaviaduring World War II. 9. Sincethe Mandate was to expireand theBritish forces to leave thecountry on 15 May,the Britishcommander was tryingto arrangefor a cease-fireonly until that date.

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10. The remainderof the garrisonhave fledwith their weapons, except fora mi- noritywho handed theirweapons and ammunitionover to me.10This was after theysaw Major Adil and his comrades depart. 11. On 2nd May I sent you the followingtelegram:

TO FAWZI.CC: MILITARYCOMMITTEE. MOST OF GARRISONIS NOW GONE AND A GOOD PARTOF AJNADINSTOP THE JEWS DOMINATE THE EXIT ROAD FROMJAFFA TO RAMLASTOP CI- VILIANLIFE HAS COME TO AN END STOP CIVILIANSAND DE- SERTING MEMBERS OF GARRISON ARE LOOTING HOUSES AND STORES STOP I DO NOT HAVE AN ADEQUATE FORCE TO PREVENT THIS STOP ONLY 20 PERCENT OF DOCTORS AND HOSPITAL STAFFS ARE STILL AT THEIR POSTS STOP CONDI- TION OF PATIENTSAND WOUNDED IN HOSPITALSVERY SAD STOP WE ARE FINDING GREATDIFFICULTY IN BURYING THE DEAD STOP I URGENTLYDEMAND EXPLICITAND CLEARIN- STRUCTIONS [SIGNED] MICHEL

12. Eveningof 2nd May: I called fora meetingof the remainingmembers of the MunicipalCouncil and the National Committeeto discuss our predicamentand suggestedto themthat we declareJaffa an Open City'1on my own personal responsibilityfor whatever consequences mayresult from this decision. Their agree- mentwas unanimous.The followingday in the morningof 3rd May the members of the MunicipalCouncil and the NationalCommittee asked me to send the following telegram:

TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE: NO GARRISON IS LEFT IN JAFFASTOP MOST OF ITS INHABITANTSARE GONE STOP THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTADVISES THAT WE DECLARE JAFFA AN OPEN CITY AND AWAITS YOUR RESPONSE BY TO- MORROW MORNING STOP PLEASE RESPOND [SIGNED] GAR- RISON COMMANDER, MEMBERS OF MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, MEMBERSOF NATIONALCOMMITTEE

13. Morningof 4thMay: I got in touch withthe BritishDistrict Commissioner12 in the company of members of the Municipal Council and National Committee.I asked himto contactthe Jews and propose the declarationof Jaffa as an open city

10. In additionto theALA force under Najmuddin, the Jaffa garrison included local civilianvol- unteers,loosely allied to theJihad Muqaddas, numbering about 250 and underthe command of Saleh Nazer. 11. A citythat is undefendedand thereforenot to be attacked,like Paris during World War II. 12. The representativeof theCivil Administration, still theoretically in controlof Palestineuntil theMandate was to end on 15 May.

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR 105 on conditionthat Arabs and Jewsremain within the municipalboundaries of Jaffa and Tel Avivrespectively, with each side undertakingnot to attackthe otheruntil 15thMay even if Arabs elsewhere in the countryattack Jews in other parts of Palestine. 14. Morningof 5thMay: Informed that the Jews have accepted these conditionsin principleand referredthem to the JewishAgency to draftthe finaltext of the agreement. 15. 15.00 hours 5thMay: LeftJaffa with 50 troopers,all thatwas leftof Ajnadin,13 and proceeded to Ramallah.The Britisharmy helped in my departure. 16. Succeeded in takingout withme largestpossible quantityof armsand ammu- nitionduring the two days of 4th and 5th of May 1948. 17. Conclusion:The followingin my opinion are the reasons forthe collapse of theJaffa Garrison.

(a) Continuousshelling with mortars of the cityby Jews forfour days beginning25th April, which caused inhabitantsof city,unac- customedto such bombardment,to panic and flee. (b) The mass panicked departureof the inhabitantsdemoralized the garrison. (c) Failureof Jaffa Garrison commander to reassurethe population and rallythe garrisontroops, which indicatedto everybody the garrison'sinability to protectthe cityagainst attacks from the Jews. (d) The spread of defeatistruLmors by anarchisticelements, which exploited the confusion.

13. Aboutan equal numberof Ajnadinhad leftthe city the day beforeon ordersfrom Issa, takingwith them arms and ammunition.

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