Selected Documents on the 1948 Palestine War Author(s): Walid Khalidi Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Spring, 1998), pp. 60-105 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537835 Accessed: 24-07-2015 20:24 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of California Press and Institute for Palestine Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Palestine Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR SELECTED AND ANNOTATED BY WALID KHALIDI The 1948 PalestineWar, whose fiftiethanniversary occurs thisyear, fell into two major phases: the first,the civilwar phase, began soon afterthe UnitedNational General Assembly(UNGA) partitionresolution of 29 November 1947 and lasted until15 May 1948,the formalend of the BritishMandate. The second, the regular war phase, lasted from15 May (when the Stateof Israel was also declared) until the various Arab-Israeliarmistice agreements were concluded in 1948-49. Most Westernliterature on the PalestineWar deals with the second phase, while the predominantsingle image of the war in the Westernmind is thatof a tiny,poorly armed and pacific Israel attackedin its cradle and withoutprovocation by the overwhelmingforce of the regulararmies of the neighboringArab states. In fact,of the two phases, thefirst was the more climactericand decisive.It was duringthis phase thatthe vastly larger forces at the disposal of theJewish Agency, infinitelybetter armed, organized, and led than anythingthe Palestinianspos- sessed, launched theirlong-prepared and contemplatedmajor offensiveunder Plan Dalet. The timingof the offensive(the firstweek of April1948) took advan- tage of the alreadyadvanced stage of disintegrationof Britishrule, although Brit- ain was to remainthe sovereignpower in the land until15 May. The objectiveof Plan Dalet was the establishmentby forceof armsof theJewish state in theJewish and Palestinianlands assigned to it by the UNGA partitionrecommendation and the conquest of as much additionalterritory (particularly Jerusalem) as possible. Strikinglyunavailable to the Westernreader has been contemporaneousmate- rial reflectingPalestinian or Arab conditions and perspectivesduring this first phase of the 1948 Palestinewar. The followingnine documentspertain to the last days of the Mandate fromthe end of Marchonward. They have been chosen for theirintrinsic worth and because theyreflect widely differing perspectives. Except for the second document,which has already appeared in printin Arabic,the othershave not to the best of myknowledge appeared beforein extenso in either Englishor Arabic. Read in sequence with my introductoiynotes and footnotes,they affordin- sightsinto several key aspects of the firstphase of the 1948 war: the asymmnetryin thebalance of power between thetwo sides, contemporaneousArab perspectives of thisbalance of power, the ignominiousbehavior of the Britishauthorities, the disarrayin Palestinianand Arab militaryorganization (but also the dedicationand courage of the Palestinianguerrillas), the militarystrategy and tactics of the Haganah and the "dissident"Irgun, the cause of the Palestinianexodus, the death Walid Khalidi, a founderof The Institutefor Palestine Studies and itsgeneral secretary, is a formerprofessor at OxfordUniversity, the American University of Beirut,and HarvardUniver- sity. Journal of Palestine Studies XXVII, no. 3 (Spring 1998), pp. 60-105. This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON THE 1948 PALESTINE WAR 61 throesof the Palestiniancommunities of Jaffaand Haifa,the trueattitude of the Jewishauthorities to the exodus fromthe lattercity, the methods by which the Jewishauthorities implemented the UNGA partitionresolution, and the circum- stances thatinevitably led to the interventionof the regularArab armiesafter 15 May 1948. The documentsselected are as follows: The Military Situation in Palestine on the Eve of Plan Dalet "A BriefReport on the Situationin Palestineand ComparisonBetween the Forces and Potentialof Both Sides," by General Ismail Safwat, General OfficerCommanding, Arab League MilitaryCommittee, Da- mascus, to JamilMardam Bey, PrimeMinister of Syriaand Chairman of the PalestineCommittee of the Arab League, 23 March 1948 ....... 62 The Fall of Qastel and the Death of 'Abd al-Qadir An EyewitnessAccount by Bahjat Abu GharbiyyaExtracted from The Memoirs of a Freedom Fighter,1916-49, Institutefor Palestine Stud- ies, Beirut,1993 (in Arabic) ................ ............................ 72 The Fall of Haifa Arab NationalCommittee of Haifa,Letter to General Stockwell,Military Commander,North Sector, Haifa, Concerning His Statementof With- drawal,22 April1948 ................................................... 90 Arab NationalCommittee of Haifa,Aide-Memoire of the MeetingBe- tween General Stockwelland the Arab Representatives,22 April 1948 .......................................................... 92 The Haganah Command,Terms for a Truce BetweenJews and Arabs in Haifa,22 April1948 .................................................... 93 The Arab NationalCommittee of Haifa,Letter to General Stockwell SummarizingHis Positionat the 22 AprilTown Hall Meetings, 23 April1948 .......................................................... 95 Arab NationalCommittee of Haifa,Letter to Haifa MayorShabatai Levy, 23 April1948 ................... ........................................ 97 Arab NationalCommittee of Haifa,Letter to General Stockwell, 25 April1948 .......................................................... 98 The Fall of Jaffa Reportto Fawzi Qawukji, Commanderof the Arab LiberationArmy (ALA) CentralFront, from Captain Michel Issa, Head of the Ajnadin Battalion,6 May 1948................................................... 99 This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 24 Jul 2015 20:24:50 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 62 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES THE MILITARY SITUATION IN PALESTINE ON THE EVE OF PLAN DALET "A BRIEF REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE AND COMPARISON BETWEEN THE FORCES AND POTENTIAL OF BOTH SIDES," BY GENERAL ISMAIL SAFWAT, GENERAL OF- FICER COMMANDING, ARAB LEAGUE MILITARY COMMITTEE, DAMAScuS, TO JAMIL MARDAm BEY, PRIME MINISTER OF SYRIA AND CHAIRMAN OF THE PALESTINE COMMITTEE OF THE ARAB LEAGUE, 23 MARCH 1948. As thepolitical situation in Palestine deterioratedfollowing the UN Special Committeeon Palestine'srecommendation ofpartition on 3 September1947, the Political Committeeof the Arab League Council based in Cairo appointed a Tech- nical Committeeof militaryexperts to reporton the militarysituation in the country.In the wake of the UNpartitionvote on 29 November1947, the Techni- cal Committeewas transformedinto the 'MilitaryCommittee" in overall charge of militarymatters in Palestine. Headquartered near Damascus, the committee had as its mandate to "ascertainthe defense needs of Palestine"and coordinate Arab effortswithin thatframework. General Ismail Safwat,the former Iraqi chief of staffwho had dominated the Technical Committee,was made its chairman. Fightingbetween Jewish and Palestinianforces broke out in the wake of the partition vote. The Palestinians were loosely organized in an irregularforce called Jihad Muqaddas (Holy War) under Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni,a charis- matic and highlypopular guerrillaleader and nephew ofHajjAmin al-Husayni, the exiled leader of theArab Higher Committee-thehighest Palestinian political body. The MilitaryCommittee, while reflectingthe Arab League's antipathyfor Hajj Amin and by extensionfor theforces allied to him,at the same time was sincerelyand deeplyskeptical on principle of the efficacyof guerrilla action. Its position,repeatedly expressed in reports,memoranda, and oralpresentationsto the Arab League's highestbodies, was that only the regularArab armies could counter theZionist onslaught. In his effortsto mobilize theArab states,General Safwat wrotea seriesof esca- lating reportsnoting thegrowing Zionist militarystrength and Arab weakness and stressingwith increasing urgencythe need for a massive and coordinated Arab effort.His firstreport, dated 9 October1947, recommended,among other things.the immediaterecruitment, training, and arming ofArab volunteers;the deploymentnear Palestine's bordersof regularArab troops,the establishmentof an overallgeneral Arab command;and theallocation of moneyand thedispatch ofarms in set quotas. TheLeague countriesbalked at Safwat'srecommendations. Money was sent to theMilitary Committee, but an overallgeneral command was notset up and riflesand arms weresuppliedfar below thequotas set outforeach country. But volunteersdid begin to arrive in Damascus, numberingabout 1,000 by the end of December 1947. AnotherIraqi, General Taha Hashimi, a former primneminister then in exile in