The Really Forgotten Korean War

> Review The Really Forgotten Korean War Hawley, Samuel. 200. The Imjin War. Japan‘s Sixteenth-Century Invasion of Korea and Attempt to Conquer China. Seoul: The Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch; Berkeley: The Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 4 pages, ISBN 89 94424 2 Sem Vermeersch Although the book offers no new rev- key military decisions. This is clear in rigorous criticism, for they may have elations, it accurately reflects current General Sin Rip’s defence of Ch’ungju. served to paint their authors in a flatter- f the Korean War of 1950-53 is still knowledge. In this sense it resembles Hawley shows that his strategy of ‘fighting light, as may have been the case for Ioften labelled the ‘forgotten war’, Stephen Turnbull’s Samurai Invasions, ing with a river to one’s back’ was not Yu Snng-nyong’s war reflections. Also, then what about the Imjin War of 1592- the only other English language book- mere folly but rather based on Chi- a few of the author’s generalisations are 98? While there are now literally hun- length treatment,1 which is superior nese military precedent2. By cutting open to question, for example, that the dreds of works available in Western in terms of its lavish illustrations but off all escape routes for his untrained Koreans did not need Chinese interven- languages on the Korean War, Samuel inferior in its detail. Their ordering of and inexperienced men, he hoped they tion, or that Koreans were good fighters Hawley’s volume is only the second events is similar, but their assessment would fight for their lives (pages 154-8). when defending high ramparts and bad devoted solely to the Hideyoshi inva- of key issues differs somewhat. One of While this reliance on Chinese military ones when standing the ground of their sions, and the first to give them their the most enduring controversies regard- manuals proved disastrous on land, it adversaries. full due. Although the war is undoubt- ing the invasions is whether or not Yi worked very well at sea, where the Japa- edly a key event in world history, even Sun-sin’s ‘turtle ships’ were ironclad. nese had no answer for Yi Sun-sin’s It is disappointing that the author decid- a basic description of its development Hawley argues that they were almost superior battle strategies. ed to apply romanisation standards very was until recently unavailable. Previ- certainly not (pages 195-8), while Turn- loosely. All diacritics have been omit- ously, the only facet of the invasions that bull leaves some room for doubt (pages Accommodating the lay ted, not only the macrons on Japanese Japanese ‘meglomaniac warlord’ Toyotomi managed to draw the West’s attention 243-4). reader to a fault vowels and the breves on Korean vow- Hideyoshi. were the exploits of Admiral Yi Sun-sin The author uses secondary sources els, but also the apostrophes indicating and his alleged invention of ironclad Hawley’s major strength is his insight responsibly, but the shortcomings of aspiration. Thus the city of Ch’nngju Moreover, different romanisation sys- ‘turtle ships’. on Korean military tactics. While the relying mainly on English-language is rendered as ‘Chongju’ throughout, tems are often mixed, especially the Chosnn army suffered from the neglect sources are obvious, as many date back but with many similar place names McCune-Reischauer system and the This is a pity, because the Imjin War and discrimination of Confucian offi- to the very beginning of Western schol- (besides Ch’nngju there is also Chnnju Revised Romanisation System of Kore- was a major event in the final stages of cials, it drew heavily from Chinese arship on Korea and Japan. Many prima- and Chnngju), readers unfamiliar with an; thus we find ‘Kwak Jae-u’ instead the traditional East Asian world order military classics, which clearly inspired ry sources, meanwhile, demand more Korean geography will be confused. of Kwak Chae-u (Mc-R) or Gwak Jae-u and in the transition to the modern (Revised). period. The pragmatic, militaristic Japanese, spurred on by the megalo- Another annoying feature is the fre- maniac warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi, quent repetition of whole sentences, clashed with the idealistic Confucian even paragraphs. Undoubtedly, this is bureaucracies of Ming China and to refresh the reader’s memory the Chosnn Korea. An international war invasions developed on many fronts, of a kind never seen before, it was and as the narrative moves back and perhaps the first example of modern forth some repetition is inevitable but warfare, with the speed, organisation the author could at least have made an and sheer size of the invading Japanese effort to vary his phrasing. Meanwhile, force unrivalled until the modern peri- while maps are provided to help readers od: the more than 150,000 men con- trace the main stages of the war, they quered the 450 kilometres from Pusan are rather sketchy, and many battle sites to Seoul in just 20 days. are not listed. No maps show battle for- mations at major engagements. The war is also important in world history as a case study of the effects of Perhaps these were editorial decisions Western missionary, trade and mili- in the interest of making the work more tary expansion; the muskets that were accessible to the general reader, but I perfected and used to such devastating think they are counterproductive, as effect by the Japanese had been intro- they tend to confuse rather than sim- duced by the Portuguese in the 1540s, plify. On the whole, however, the author while many of the Japanese command- has succeeded in providing us with a ers and their troops were Christian con- much needed reference work which verts. A Spanish missionary accompa- gives us all the basic facts about a dev- nying Japanese troops sent back to the astating conflict that is crucial in under- West its first eyewitness accounts of standing the recent history of northeast Korea, and missionaries or traders also Asia. What remains to be done, howev- introduced plants from the New World, er, is to move beyond the details of the such as red pepper and tobacco. Hidey- battlefield into the realm of political, oshi’s death in 1598 signalled the final economic, cultural and social history to retreat of Japanese forces, but his inva- reveal the larger contours and effects of sions left enduring material and psy- the Imjin War. < chological scars on all three countries involved. notes 1. Turnbull, Stephen. 2002. Samurai Inva- ‘Fighting with a river sion. Japan’s Korean War 1592-1598. Lon- to one’s back’ don: Cassell. Samuel Hawley provides a compre- 2. The expression “Bei shui yi zhan”, literally hensive, in-depth overview of the war, “fighting with the river at your back”, was its causes and effects, and the reasons often used to mean “either win or die”. for failure and success in battle. Based This expression came from the battle of on all available English-language sec- Jingjingkou, in which the military com- ondary sources, primary sources and mander Han Xin deliberately stationed his a few modern Korean studies, the troops facing the enemy, with their backs author writes in a lively prose style that to the river, leaving no escape route. The includes both dramatic re-enactment of knowledge that there was no way out but key scenes and more reflective exposito- victory or death inspired the soldiers to ry passages. The result is an engrossing fight harder. narrative that reads almost like a novel. Despite the action-packed plot, Hawley Sem Vermeersch avoids reducing actors to stereotypes of Academia Koreana, Keimyung University heroism or cowardice, good or evil, and [email protected] does so without ignoring the tragedy of the war. A turtle ship replica at the military museum in Seoul. 3 4 IIAS Newsletter | #44 | Summer 2007.

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