Subprime Mortgage Lending in New York City: Prevalence and Performance
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Subprime Lending, Mortgage Foreclosures and Race: How Far Have We Come and How Far Have We to Go?
Subprime Lending, Mortgage Foreclosures and Race: How far have we come and how far have we to go? Ira Goldstein, Ph.D. Director, Policy & Information Services The Reinvestment Fund With: Dan Urevick-Ackelsberg The Reinvestment Fund Subprime Lending, Mortgage Foreclosures and Race Background For most of the 20 th century, lending discrimination occurred primarily through the denial of credit to minority group members and to the neighborhoods in which they lived. Redlining is a place-based practice in which lenders denied mortgage credit to neighborhoods with substantial numbers of minorities – typically, African Americans and Latinos. Together with the differential treatment of minority and White applicants, a people-based practice, mortgage credit discrimination accelerated segregation and neighborhood decline. For many years, the private market and federal government (e.g., through the explicit practices of the Federal Housing Administration) operated under laws and policies that permitted (and many argue, promoted) redlining and racial segregation.1 After the passage of a number of historically significant federal laws in the 1960s and 1970s, especially the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 (ECOA), federal law and policy outlawed lending discrimination, and started to require data collection among federally-regulated lending institutions. However, early enforcement of federal fair lending laws was anemic as evidenced by the limited number of legal actions filed, most of which were by private actors.2 Data collection on lending institutions did not begin in earnest amongst regulators until petitions were made to the financial regulatory agencies by the National Urban League in 1971. -
Eliminating Racial Discrimination in the Subprime Mortgage Market: Proposals for Fair Lending Reform
Brooklyn Law School BrooklynWorks Faculty Scholarship 2009 Eliminating Racial Discrimination in the Subprime Mortgage Market: Proposals for Fair Lending Reform Winnie F. Taylor Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Housing Law Commons ELIMINATING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET: PROPOSALS FOR FAIR LENDING REFORM By Winnie F. Taylor* INTRODUCTION Lending discrimination has been a national problem for decades. Before Congress enacted the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) in 1974 to combat it, lenders routinely denied credit to potential borrowers because of their race, gender, age, marital status and other personal characteristics unrelated to creditworthiness standards.' For instance, some creditors based their lending decisions on stereotypical assumptions about whether women in certain age groups would have children or return to work after childbirth.2 Others excluded minority communities from their lending areas by literally drawing red lines on maps around neighborhoods where mostly African Americans and Hispanics resided.3 The ECOA is a fair lending law that proscribes lending practices that impede credit opportunities for women, racial minorities and others who have * Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful to Bethany Walsh, Dylan Gordon, and Adrienne Valdez for their helpful research assistance. I also thank the Brooklyn Law School faculty research fund for its support. See Winnie F. Taylor, Meeting the Equal Credit Opportunity Act's Specificity Requirement: Judgmental and Statistical Scoring Systems, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 73, 74-81 (1980). 2 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FIN., CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES, 151, 152-53 (1972). -
Housing Finance at a Glance: a Monthly Chartbook, November 2020
HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER HOUSING FINANCE AT A GLANCE A MONTHLY CHARTBOOK November 2020 1 ABOUT THE CHARTBOOK HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER STAFF The Housing Finance Policy Center’s (HFPC) mission is to produce analyses and ideas that promote sound public Laurie Goodman policy, efficient markets, and access to economic Center Vice President opportunity in the area of housing finance. At A Glance, a monthly chartbook and data source for policymakers, Alanna McCargo Center Vice President academics, journalists, and others interested in the government’s role in mortgage markets, is at the heart of Janneke Ratcliffe this mission. Associate Vice President and Managing Director Jim Parrott We welcome feedback from our readers on how we can Nonresident Fellow make At A Glance a more useful publication. Please email any comments or questions to [email protected]. Jun Zhu Nonresident Fellow To receive regular updates from the Housing Finance Sheryl Pardo Policy Center, please visit here to sign up for our bi-weekly Associate Director of Communications newsletter. Karan Kaul Senior Research Associate Michael Neal Senior Research Associate Jung Choi Research Associate Linna Zhu Research Associate John Walsh Research Assistant Caitlin Young Research Assistant Daniel Pang Research Assistant Alison Rincon Director, Center Operations Gideon Berger Senior Policy Program Manager Rylea Luckfield Special Assistant and Project Administrator CONTENTS Overview Market Size Overview Value of the US Residential Housing Market 6 Size of the US Residential -
Race, Power, and the Subprime/Foreclosure Crisis: a Mesoanalysis
Working Paper No. 669 Race, Power, and the Subprime/Foreclosure Crisis: A Mesoanalysis by Gary A. Dymski University of California, Riverside Jesus Hernandez University of California, Davis Lisa Mohanty* TUI University May 2011 * Correspondence: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]. The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper Collection presents research in progress by Levy Institute scholars and conference participants. The purpose of the series is to disseminate ideas to and elicit comments from academics and professionals. Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, independently funded research organization devoted to public service. Through scholarship and economic research it generates viable, effective public policy responses to important economic problems that profoundly affect the quality of life in the United States and abroad. Levy Economics Institute P.O. Box 5000 Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000 http://www.levyinstitute.org Copyright © Levy Economics Institute 2011 All rights reserved ABSTRACT Economists’ principal explanations of the subprime crisis differ from those developed by noneconomists in that the latter see it as rooted in the US legacy of racial/ethnic inequality, and especially in racial residential segregation, whereas the former ignore race. This paper traces this disjuncture to two sources. What is missing in the social science view is any attention to the market mechanisms involved in subprime lending; and economists, on their side, have drawn too tight a boundary for “the economic,” focusing on market mechanisms per se, to the exclusion of the households and community whose resources and outcomes these mechanisms affect. Economists’ extensive empirical studies of racial redlining and discrimination in credit markets have, ironically, had the effect of making race analytically invisible. -
Understanding Your FICO Score
UnderUnderstandingstanding YYourour FICFICOO® SScorecore Contents Your FICO® Score— A Vital Part of Your Credit Health . 1 How FICO® Scores Help You . 2 Your Credit Report— The Basis of Your FICO® Score . 3 How FICO® Scores Work . 5 What a FICO® Score Considers . 7 1. Payment History . 8 2. Amounts Owed . 9 3. Length of Credit History . 10 4. New Credit . 11 5. Types of Credit in Use . 12 How the FICO® Score Counts Inquiries . 13 Interpreting Your FICO® Score . 14 Checking Your FICO® Score . 15 Checking Your Credit Report . 16 Please note that FICO and myFICO are not credit repair organizations or similarly regulated organizations governed by the federal Credit Repair Organizations Act or similar state laws. FICO and myFICO do not provide so-called “credit repair” services or advice or give advice or assistance regarding “cleaning up” or “improving” your credit record, credit history, or credit rating. FICO and myFICO are trademarks or registered trademarks of Fair Isaac Corporation, in the United States and/or in other countries. Other product and company names herein may be trademarks of their respective owners. © 2000–2011 Fair Isaac Corporation. All rights reserved. This information may be freely copied and distributed without modification for non-commercial purposes. 1557EB 11/11 PDF Your FICO® Score— WHO IS FICO? Founded in 1956, FICO uses A Vital Part of Your advanced math and analytics to Credit Health help businesses make smarter decisions. Besides inventing When you’re applying for credit—whether it’s the FICO® Score, FICO has also a credit card, a car loan, a personal loan or a created other leading tools, mortgage—lenders want to know your credit risk including products that help level. -
The Future of Subprime Mortgage Markets
16 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 31 III. The Future of Subprime Mortgage Markets A. Introduction Largely believed to be a significant cause of the recent U.S. financial crisis, subprime mortgages remain a contentious subject of litigation and regulatory action nationwide. Subprime mortgage lending increased from six percent of all mortgage originations in 1996 to twenty percent in 2006.1 From 2004 until 2007, subprime delinquency rates were significantly higher than prime delinquency rates.2 Since then, prime loan delinquencies have surpassed subprime loan delinquencies.3 These numbers suggest that although subprime loans initiated the mortgage crisis, the effects have spread throughout the rest of the housing market. The response to the role of subprime mortgages in the crisis has been two-fold: litigation against originators and securitizers of subprime loans and regulatory responses attempting to stem the crisis’ effects and prevent it from happening again. B. Litigation: The Threat of Enforcement Over one trillion dollars of risky mortgage bonds remain outstanding, meaning the market is still saturated with “disgruntled 1 See KATALINA M. BIANCO, THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN (CCH) 6, available at http://business.cch.com/bankingfinance/focus/news/Subprime_WP_rev.pdf (reviewing the rise of subprime lending in the United States in the context of the overall housing market). 2 See Gene Amromin & Anna L. Paulson, Default Rates on Prime and Subprime Mortgages: Differences and Similarities, PROFITWISE NEWS AND VIEWS 2 (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_ assets/publications/profitwise_news_and_views/2010/PNV_Aug2010_ReEd _FINAL_web.pdf (depicting default rates of prime and subprime loans each year from 2004-2007 in terms of months since the mortgage began). -
Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending
CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE REGULATORS NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMER CREDIT ADMINISTRATORS STATEMENT ON SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LENDING I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND On June 29, 2007, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) (collectively, the Agencies) publicly released the Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending (Subprime Statement). The Agencies developed the Subprime Statement to address emerging risks associated with certain subprime mortgage products and lending practices. In particular, the Agencies are concerned about the growing use of adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) products1 that provide low initial payments based on a fixed introductory rate that expires after a short period, and then adjusts to a variable rate plus a margin for the remaining term of the loan. These products could result in payment shock to the borrower. The Agencies are concerned that these products, typically offered to subprime borrowers, present heightened risks to lenders and borrowers. Often, these products have additional characteristics that increase risk. These include qualifying borrowers based on limited or no documentation of income or imposing substantial prepayment penalties or prepayment penalty periods that extend beyond the initial fixed interest rate period. In addition, borrowers may not be adequately informed of product features and risks, including their responsibility to pay taxes and insurance, which might be separate from their mortgage payments. These products originally were extended to customers primarily as a temporary credit accommodation in anticipation of early sale of the property or in expectation of future earnings growth. -
MULTIMEDIA CAROUSELS - an Educational Journey Describing the Relationship Between Humankind and the Different Elements of Nature and Main Natural Discoveries
FICO Eataly World DIGITAL CITIES CHALLENGE 29-30th January 2019 Algeciras, Spain FICO: the World’s largest food park We are a real place We represent Italy We speak to the World • The World’s largest food park: 1.000 square meters devoted to italian food culture • fields and stables: 2 hectares with 2.000 cultivars • 100 cities together at FICO with their recipes and • 2.500 media releases on Italian and and over 200 animals traditions foreign press • 40 producing factories • FICO and UNESCO are ambassador of the Italian • 2,8 milion visitors: 70% coming from • restaurants: 45 among street food kiosks and beauty outside Bologna area, of which 20% gourmet cuisine • over 100 events per month celebrating the coming from abroad • 5 guided tours e 20 courses per day, almost 2.000 different crafts and expertises of food producing guided visits in a year and Italian food culture • 700 events FICO: the World’s largest food park Opened in November 15th, 2017 FICO has been chosen by almost 3 million visitors, three quarters coming from outside Bologna of which 20% from abroad, especially from China, France, United Kingdom, Germany, USA, Switzerland, BOLOGNA and Spain. 40,000 of school children and teenagers have visited the park during organized school trips and educational activities. 300,000 people spent at least one hour of their time to discover and deepen the culture of food. FICO is a free entry park, so that everybody is invited to come and enjoy the experience. FICO: where people learn by doing and having fun Education with FICO is fun. -
Know Your Credit Score
mortgage ratecredit score payment historydebtinstallment loanAPR credit scoremortgage rate installment loanAPRpayment historydebt mortgage ratecredit score 720 665 600 680 740 620 720 665 Your Credit70 Scores 0 » Credit scores are vital to your financial health » For example A credit score is a number that helps lenders and Consider a couple who are others predict how likely you are to make your looking to buy their first house. Let’s say they want a 30-year mortgage credit payments on time. Each score is based on loan and their FICO® credit scores are 720. the information in your credit report. They could qualify for a mortgage with a low 6.2 percent interest rate.* But if their scores are 580, they probably would pay » Why do your scores matter? 9.4 percent* or more—that’s at least 3 full percentage points more in interest. On Credit scores affect whether you can get credit and what you pay for credit cards, auto loans, a $100,000 mortgage loan, that 3 point mortgages and other kinds of credit. For most kinds of credit scores, higher scores mean you difference would cost them $2,650 dollars are more likely to be approved and pay a lower interest rate on new credit. a year, adding up to $79,500 dollars more over the loan’s 30-year lifetime. Want to rent an apartment? Without good scores, your apartment application may be turned Your credit scores do matter. down by the landlord. Your scores also may determine how big a deposit you will have to pay for telephone, electricity or natural gas service. -
The Subprime Crisis and the Link Between Consumer Financial Protection and Systemic Risk
FIU Law Review Volume 5 Number 1 Article 8 Fall 2009 The Subprime Crisis and the Link between Consumer Financial Protection and Systemic Risk Erik F. Gerding University of New Mexico School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview Part of the Other Law Commons Online ISSN: 2643-7759 Recommended Citation Erik F. Gerding, The Subprime Crisis and the Link between Consumer Financial Protection and Systemic Risk, 5 FIU L. Rev. 93 (2009). DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.25148/lawrev.5.1.8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Subprime Crisis and the Link between Consumer Financial Protection and Systemic Risk Erik F. Gerding This Article argues that the current global financial crisis, which was first called the “subprime crisis,” demonstrates the need to revisit the divi- sion between financial regulations designed to protect consumers from ex- cessively risky loans and safety-and-soundness regulations intended to pro- tect financial markets from the collapse of financial institutions. Consumer financial protection can, and must, serve a role not only in protecting indi- viduals from excessive risk, but also in protecting markets from systemic risk. Economic studies indicate it is not merely high rates of defaults on consumer loans, but also unpredictable and highly correlated defaults that create risks for both lenders and investors in asset-backed securities. Consumer financial regulations can mitigate these risks in three, non- exclusive ways: (1) by reducing the level of defaults on consumer loans, (2) by making defaults more predictable, and (3) by reducing the correlation of defaults. -
The Role of Housing and Mortgage Markets in the Financial Crisis
The Role of Housing and Mortgage Markets in the Financial Crisis Manuel Adelino, Duke University, and NBER Antoinette Schoar, MIT, and NBER Felipe Severino, Dartmouth College June 2018 Abstract Ten years after the financial crisis there is widespread agreement that the boom in mortgage lending and its subsequent reversal were at the core of the Great Recession. We survey the existing evidence which suggests that inflated house price expectations across the economy played a central role in driving both demand and supply of mortgage credit before the crisis. The great misnomer of the 2008 crisis is that it was not a "subprime" crisis but rather a middle-class crisis. Inflated house price expectations led households across all income groups, especially the middle class, to increase their demand for housing and mortgage leverage. Similarly, banks lent against increasing collateral values and underestimated the risk of defaults. We highlight how these emerging facts have essential implications for policy. We thank Matt Richarson (referee) for insightful comments. All errors are our own. Ten years after the financial crisis of 2008 some of the drivers and implications of the crisis are starting to come into better focus. The majority of observers agrees that mortgage lending and housing markets were at the core of the recession. US housing markets experienced an unparalleled boom in house prices and a steep expansion in mortgage credit to individual households before 2007. Once house prices started to collapse, the drop in collateral values not only lead to increased defaults but also affected the stability of the financial markets. The ensuing dislocations in the financial sector led to a drying up of credit flows and other financial functions in the economy and ultimately a significant slowdown of economic activity, which cumulated in the great recession. -
Do Banks Pass Through Credit Expansions? the Marginal Profitability of Consumer Lending During the Great Recession
Do Banks Pass Through Credit Expansions? The Marginal Profitability of Consumer Lending During the Great Recession∗ Sumit Agarwal† Souphala Chomsisengphet‡ Neale Mahoney§ Johannes Stroebel¶ September 9, 2015 Abstract We examine the ability of policymakers to stimulate household borrowing and spending during the Great Recession by reducing banks’ cost of funds. Using panel data on 8.5 million U.S. credit card accounts and 743 credit limit regression discontinuities, we estimate the marginal propensity to borrow (MPB) for households with different FICO credit scores. We find substantial hetero- geneity, with a $1 increase in credit limits raising total unsecured borrowing after 12 months by 59 cents for consumers with the lowest FICO scores (≤ 660) while having no effect on consumers with the highest FICO scores (> 740). We use the same credit limit regression discontinuities to estimate banks’ marginal propensity to lend (MPL) out of a decrease in their cost of funds. For the lowest FICO score households, higher credit limits quickly reduce marginal profits, limiting the pass-through of credit expansions to those households. We estimate that a 1 percentage point reduction in the cost of funds raises optimal credit limits by $127 for consumers with FICO scores below 660 versus $2,203 for consumers with FICO scores above 740. We conclude that banks’ MPL is lowest exactly for those households with the highest MPB, limiting the effectiveness of policies that aim to stimulate the economy by reducing banks’ cost of funds. ∗For helpful comments, we are grateful to Viral Acharya, Scott Baker, Eric Budish, Alex Frankel, Erik Hurst, Anil Kashyap, Theresa Kuchler, Randall Kroszner, Marco di Maggio, Matteo Maggiori, Rick Mishkin, Jonathan Parker, Thomas Phillipon, Amit Seru, Amir Sufi, and Alessandra Voena, as well as seminar and conference participants at Berkeley Haas, NYU Stern, Columbia University, HEC Paris, BIS, Ifo Institute, Goethe University Frankfurt, SED 2015, NBER Summer Insti- tute, and LMU Munich.