POLIcY memO china’s Growing Naval Power By Michael s. chase december 2010 This is the third installment in a three-part series investigating the state of China’s military. On September 7, 2010, the Japanese coast if the diplomatic dispute escalated into a conflict guard arrested the captain of a Chinese fishing between the Chinese and Japanese navies. boat for ramming two of its patrol vessels near disputed islands in the East China Sea. The This incident reflects Beijing’s overarching collision took place around the Senkaku Islands, maritime issues. China claims sovereignty which Japan administers but China claims (and over the whole South China Sea, something calls the Diaoyu Islands). The incident sparked Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines a major diplomatic confrontation between obviously protest. The Obama administration has Beijing and Tokyo: China demanded the captain’s articulated Washington’s support for peacefully release and canceled high-level meetings with resolving any maritime territorial disputes Japan. Beijing also suspended exports of crucial between China and its neighbors, and asserted minerals that Japan uses in high-tech products America’s interest in maintaining freedom of like hybrid cars. Finally, in late September, navigation in the area.1 Japan released the detained Chinese captain in an apparent attempt to resolve the standoff, but While Sino-American friction over maritime tensions lingered. security issues isn’t new, China’s regional assertiveness marks a strategic shift, one that U.S. officials urged China and Japan to resolve I outlined in a previous PPI Policy Memo on the dispute through negotiations. Because the Beijing’s “Emerging Anti Access Strategy”2. Senkaku Islands are covered by the U.S.-Japan In that paper, I argued China’s military defense treaty, and are administered by Japan, strategy was not to best America in a force- the U.S. could be drawn into a war with China on-force battle, but, rather, to develop asymmetric About the author Michael S. Chase is an Associate Research Professor at the U.S. Naval War College and a Fellow with the Truman National Security Project. The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s alone and they do not necessarily reflect the views of the Naval War College, Department of the Navy or Department of Defense. POLIcY memO Progressive Policy Institute war-fighting capacities that deter American Below, I explore these issues, first by giving a brief military intervention by driving up its cost. history of China’s evolving naval strategies since With that in mind, the implications of China’s the People’s Republic began in 1949. (It’s critical growing maritime assertiveness go far that U.S. policy makers understand the evolution of beyond tensions over the disputed Senkaku/ China’s thinking about the roles and missions of its Diaoyu Islands and Beijing’s frustration with navy.) Then, I provide a full accounting of recent Washington’s response to claims on the South Chinese naval hardware developments. Finally, I China Sea. draw policy recommendations designed to help American policy makers manage the challenges Since naval forces have access to the largest global that have arisen as a result of China’s improving commons—the high seas—it is only natural that capabilities, regional assertiveness and expanding as China emerges as a global power, it would global interests. emphasize a more vigorous naval strategy, with modern naval hardware and a force trained to In short, the U.S. will need to strengthen its ties operate it effectively. A more powerful Chinese to key countries in East Asia and develop strategic Navy will not only bolster China’s anti-access and and tactical military concepts and capabilities that area denial capabilities3, but also enable Beijing would allow it to counter China’s growing military to defend China’s expanding global economic power. Meanwhile, U.S. policy makers must seek interests. collaboration with the Chinese military in an effort to highlight the benefits of being a global it is only natural that as stakeholder to Beijing. china emerges as a China’s Evolving Naval Strategy global power, it would China’s naval strategy has gone through two major changes since the establishment of the emphasize a more People’s Republic in 1949. Until the 1980s, Beijing vigorous naval strategy, was interested in little more than protecting its with modern naval coastline from invasion; its naval strategy during those 30-plus years was appropriately known as hardware and a force “near-coast defense.” China possessed only small trained to operate it ships that had limited capabilities, dependent on land-based air defense and firepower support that effectively. was vulnerable to enemy aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. It’s clear that China’s Navy is growing in size and quality. Not only does China have the largest This strategy emphasized guarding waters about 12 navy in East Asia, it has an increasingly modern nautical miles from China’s coast, in part because and capable force of imported and indigenously its main focus during the 1950s was contending produced destroyers, frigates, missile patrol craft, with Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang forces, which and submarines. Beijing is even planning to deploy fled to Taiwan after losing the Chinese Civil War to its own aircraft carriers, a development sure to the Communists. alarm neighbors such as Japan, Vietnam, and India. In the late 1960s, as the Sino-Soviet relationship deteriorated, Beijing sensed its primary threat But what does it mean for American policy makers? was actually from Moscow. Consequently, China’s Should the United States increase its own maritime Navy, formally known as the People’s Liberation power in response to Beijing’s growing strength? Army Navy (PLAN), was mainly responsible for Are there diplomatic levers that Washington might supporting land operations in the event of a war pull to forestall potential Chinese aggression? between China and the USSR. 2 POLIcY memO Progressive Policy Institute Figure 1: china’s expanding spheres oF naval inFluence 1 Ryukyu Islands 3 2 Mariana Islands Guam Philippines key: Borneo 1 near coastal defense, 1949 - 1980s 2 near seas active defense, 1980s - 2000s 3 Far seas operations, Today Following Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 economic reform island chain,” from Japan to the Ryukyu Islands and opening policy, China’s coastal regions grew in to Taiwan to the Philippines to Borneo. Thus, the economic importance and prestige. This meant that PLAN was now responsible for the Yellow Sea, the PLAN’s strategy had to shift in a new direction. East China Sea and South China Sea, as well as areas adjacent to the outer rims of that chain of Admiral Liu Huaqing is frequently credited with islands. spearheading the PLAN’s modernization efforts. He served as the commander of China’s Navy from The new strategy curried new missions as well: 1982 to 1988 and advocated developing the Navy to Instead of simply supporting the army’s land keep pace with China’s rapid economic growth and operations, the Navy was to focus on reunification changes in modern naval warfare. Transitioning with Taiwan, maritime territorial disputes, to “near seas active defense” in the 1980s, China securing sea lines of communication (SLOCs) set its sights on a much larger area than before, and deterring or defending against enemy attack covering the waters within and around the “first from the sea. Following the 1995-96 Taiwan 3 POLIcY memO Progressive Policy Institute Strait crisis, the PLAN became mainly focused TaBle 1. The PLA navy’s Improving anTi-air on potential Taiwan scenarios, such as a blockade WarFare capaBiliTies or invasion of the island and countering U.S. SAM System and Platform intervention in a cross-Strait conflict. Range sovremennyy i/II DDG (imported SA-n-7 (russian), Yet the strategy did not cover independent from russia) about 12-20nm operations in more distant regions. As China LUYANG i DDG (domestically SA-n-7 (russian), has become a focal point of the global economy, produced) about 12-20nm its naval missions have followed suit. Today the LUYANG II DDG (domestically HHQ-9 (domestically PLAN appears to be moving toward a new strategy produced) produced), about of “far-seas operations,” with responsibilities 55nm extending out to the “second island chain” – LUZHOU DDG (domestically SA-n-20 (russian), running from northern Japan to the Northern produced) about 80nm Mariana Islands to Guam – and additional duties JIANGKAI II FFg (domestically HHQ-16 (domestically beyond when required. produced) produced), about 20- 40nm The increased responsibilities follow President Hu Source: Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Jintao’s 2004 enunciation of the Chinese military’s Navy: A Modern Navy With Chinese Characteristics, “New Historic Missions” and the subsequent August 2009, p. 18. development of the concept of “Diversified Military Tasks.” This approach requires the military not only to enhance its combat capabilities, but also to respond to nontraditional Modernization now means that Beijing could security challenges by participating in “nonwar call upon its Navy to defend China’s regional military operations.” maritime interests, protect SLOCs, evacuate Chinese citizens from trouble spots overseas, provide international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities and participate in The navy won’t have operations such as the anti-piracy deployment an operational modern currently underway off of Somalia. SSBn until the new Jl-2 That does not mean, however, that the PLAN will submarine-launched forgo missions closer to home. According to the ballistic missile is fully Office of Naval Intelligence, “Despite increased developed; the latest consideration of missions farther from China, the Navy’s primary focus will remain on preparing pentagon report indicates for operations within the ‘first and second island that it has failed the final chains’…with emphasis on a potential conflict round of flight tests.