. ,

Taiwan's Nationalistic Politics and Its Difficult 'Status Quo'

MAU-KuEI MICHAEL CHANG

AbstTact " Taiwan's growing calls for independence have provoked China and heightened the risk of military conflictin the region. This paper addresses two issues: first. it seeks to provide a short historical overview of the development of Taiwan­ ese nationalistic self-assertion; second, it questions the commonly held notion of keeping the 'status quo', which is in effect always changing and dynamic. The paper uses a historical-institutional framework for its interpretation. It explores the origin and rise of Taiwanese nationalism in its relationship to Taiwan's past. and the changing gea-political contexts in which it is situated. It then analyses the importance of electoral institutions and the struggles to broaden political participation and legitimation. Several disparate sources of Taiwanese identity are also discussed, namely: (i) Taiwan as a frontier terri­ tory of the Manchu Empire, which was later colonized and modernized by the Japanese; (ii) unification with the Republic of China under authoritarian rule since 1945; and (iii) the transformation of the ROC regime, its indigenization and grounding in Taiwan in the context of its long separation from China and its international isolation. This indigenization process has been gradually ac­ complished through electoral struggles and by revising the electoral system and the constitution. I

Introduction

The recent growth of Taiwanese nationalist sentiment has caused wide­ spread alarm and raised the spectre of military conflict in the region. It is not that Taiwan's nationalism is expected to lead to strategic or

territorial expansio n, but that in the eyes of the Beijing government, it is seen as a 'provocative' step in the direction of 'permanently sepa­ rating' from China. During the last decade, Beijing's efforts to subdue Taiwan1s move towards independence, which have included the use of military exercises and threatening remarks. have been unsuccessful in dampening its growth. Sometimes stern reactions from the PRe vis-

______91 _ _ Mau-Kuei Michael Chang______Taiwan's Nationalistic Politics and Its Difficult 'Status Quo' a-vis Taiwan's domestic politics just helped to add fuel to the fire. The 'independence' and 'unification' actually mean to them for their identity­ dark cloud of war has been looming since 1996 over the Taiwan Strait making process. It also overlooks how different historical trajectories (Friedman 1999). and political institutions have exerted various influences on Taiwan's Beijing has offered Taiwan the terms known as 'Peaceful Unifica­ nationalism and capacity for self-assertion. and how this has ironicallv' tion. One Country Two Systems'.' Very briefly. this means that Taiwan divided and united Taiwan at one and the same time. could enjoy a very high degree of autonomy. including maintaining its [t is fair to argue that Taiwan has developed its own zig-zag na­ military force. but must remain a special territorial government under tion-building course under the geo-political constraints set by global the PRe. Hong Kong was at one time the often-cited model to persuade and regional powers beyond its borders. Though the nation has many Taiwan to accept this concept. though less so now. partly caused by adversaries. including the recent t�1reat of incursion by China. Taiwan rising discontents among Hong Kong citizens for their government. is defacto an independent country. Indeed. in 2003 it ranked as the 17th The PRC firmly believe that if Taiwan were to accept this offer. both largest trade country of the world. boasting a fully-fledged democracy sides of the Taiwan Strait would benefit from a peaceful and prosper­ and government. Though it does not have enough power to shake up ous future. a true 'win-win' situation. One needs to enquire why the i the big geo-political picture. significant events do take place within political trend in Taiwan has been edging in the opposite direction by Taiwan's domestic political agenda. such as combining a disputed ref­ choosing to promote independent sovereign statehood. 'separating' I erendum with a heated preSidential election at the same time. proposing from China. Why is it that more and more Taiwanese people and their I. to revise its constitution and its national title. lobbying to enter UN as political leaders have. in their political manoeuvrings. continuously a nation-state at the Assembly. and revising the curricular of historv declined China's unification proposal. and defied China's warning of and geography in national education contents. All these developments war? Political analysts also wonder why Taiwan does not grasp the op­ have the potential to exert a Significant pressure on concerned parties portunity while it still has the chance. since time is on the side of China. and people. both inside and outside of Taiwan. and to impact on its whose economy is booming and which is swiftly rising to become the neighbouring countries through 'provoking' Chinese military actions major regional player. and hence forcing the US and japan to take a stand on the issue. One simple answer to these questions is that Taiwanese nationalism The purpose of this paper. therefore. is to provide a 'balanced' inter­ is 'protected' by the US in the name of maintaining peace in the region pretative framework to examine Taiwanese politics and its significance. and defending democracy. [n the eyes of its opponents. Taiwan has The paper attempts to look at issues that concern many Taiwanese, and been regarded as the 'protectorate' of the US since the 1950s. when the explain why have they been occupying a salient position in Taiwan's Korean War broke out. At that time. Taiwan was occasionally referred political arena.' [contend that Taiwan's nationalistic drive has its origin to as an 'unsinkable' carrier of the West Pacific to contain the spread in the complex and powerful functions and influences of colonialism, of communism. And now it is vital to the strategic interests of the Ja­ nationalism and the state apparatus. The pursuance of national mod­ pan-US alliance in the region to balance and check the surging Chinese ernization and development has been confined to geo-politics. And influence. Despite its affirmation of the 'One-China' policy. and its as­ nationalism, be it Taiwanese or Chinese, has been a crucial element sertion that it does not support Taiwanese independence. the US has a in the institutional formulation of the ROC's constitution and in the vested interest in a 'separate' Taiwan, especially when engaging with evolution of its electoral politics. It cannot be discredited as political China. Opponents of Taiwanese nationalism question its authenticity, manoeuvring and strategic mobilization by some cunning political and believe that without US backing. Taiwan would have lost its status elites and opportunist political parties. Nationalism. once it has arisen. quo and caved in very quickly. develops and transforms itself through major events and critical his­ From the viewpoint of renlpolitik. this explanation may not be far from torical conjunctures. Its capacity to grow is also constrained by the reality. But this is also an oversimplistic view because it takes little ac­ range of probable actions set by the constraints in institutional politiCS. count of what the citizens of Taiwan actually practise in their routine According to its relative strength at a particular juncture. it may either political life: namely what the concepts of 'democracy' and 'nation'. follow or contravene the rules of the game imposed at that time by

92 ______Th� CO�"h.lgen JQul'"nal of Asian Studies21 • 2005 ______93 ______' Mau·Kuei Michael Chans ______Taiwan s Nation,'listic Politics and Its Difficult 'Status Quo'

powerful interests. Thus its developmental course is often non-linear to stabilize the current regime and to inject a degree of self-restraint and not predetermined; rather it is path-dependent, meaning that the in domestic politics, as against any hasty move. The corresponding latter developments are led and influenced by earlier developments or percentages for the pro-independence camp, consisting of those who events with a degree of uncertainty. want independence as soon as possible, and those who perhaps would The framework of this paper will be mainly historical-institutional. I prefer independence at some future date, have increased steadily in wish to demonstrate the impact of the past on the present, and that the recent years, from under 20 percent to almost 26 percent. But the sup­ present can only play itself out within the boundaries set by the past. port for immediate independenceis still relative low, hovering around In other words, when political change takes place, it tends to occur in­ 5-6 percent. On the other hand, the support for unification with China crementally. unless the power structure or major institutions have been shows a more fluctuating and declining percentage. A recent 2004 poll seriously disrupted. Moreover, incremental changes, some big and some suggests that about 11.4 percent favotir unification some time in the small, are also completed through the pre-existing institutional set-lips. future, with only 1.6 percent opting for immediate unification. Besides regulating the possibilities and providing rationalizations for political actions, inSfitutional set-ups are also situated at the centre-stage FIGURE 1: Opinion Poll (1998-2004) on whether Taiwan Should Seek of contentious politics, becoming the target for political struggles. Thus Independence or Unification with China (%) they constrain and energize political changes almost simultaneously.

The first part of this paper explores the historical background ofTai­ �5 < . • Status quo now/ • wanese national self-assertion. For most people, trying to make sense 40 • dt..'CidcI,lter

• of the present and look toward the future, the past can provide ration­ 35 ____ For st.ltus quo il'w.:tcfinitdy alizations and meanings either through direct lived experience (of the 30 , older generation) or through narrating and using the past to educate 2S St,ltus quo nnw/ the younger generation. What we see in today's Taiwanese nationalism independenceli1kr 20 has a long historical trajectory, originated in its colonial legacy of the -,-Status quo rK.IW/ 15 early 20th century. This legacy persists in the current political scenario, unifk.ltion I,lter 10 -'-Independence ASAP and is repeatedly narrated by today's political actors. The paper then , • focuses on three major sources of political energy to explain Taiwan's 5 �',C .. -e-Others drive for nationalism and inde1-1endence: (i) the early phase ofTaiwilnese 0 national self-assertion under the Japanese, (ii) the historic building of J.,n A\lg MolY luI Jul Au).!; Sept Unific.Hil'll, ASAP nationalist authoritarianism in Taiwan by the ROC government, and 1998 lq9q :Wi,lLl :2001 2U02 ZUU) 2004 (iii) the movement from the grassroots to transform the regime into a representative polity through the struggles to enlarge the existing $tll/rCL': M'linland Aff.,irsCOUIlCil, Ex�.'cutiv!:!Yu.lll,alld Taiw

Another way to explain the complexitv is to look at the formation The Complexities of the Current National Status of the 'status quo' in Taiwan. For many Chinese, the term 'China' is so Figure 1 gives an indication of the range of Taiwanese attitudes CI99H- natural that it appears to be unequivocal and seemingly eternal. Butin 20(4) towards Taiwan independence versus unification with China. Over reality and in history. 'China' has mallY different faces and meanings the years, compared to other choices, over 50 percent of the Taiwanese to different peoples. And the territory and people of 'China' through­ public favours preservation of the 'stntus quo'. The majority view helps out history have also varied according to the period ill question. To

94 ______Th� Copenh,');!:!n J'.lurn.,1 (If A�ian StlliJit.'s �1 • 2005 ______95 Mau-Kuei Michael Cl1ang______Taiwan's Nationalistic Politics and Its Difficult 'Status Quo'

explain just how complicated the issue of national identity is in Taiwan A simple way to describe the status quo of Taiwan is this: First the Republic today; we can begin with its official title and constitution. The official of China was on Mainland China, then the Republic of China came to Taiwan, then the Republic of China was on Taiwan, and now the Republic of China title of Taiwan today is still the Republic of China (the ROC), which is Taiwan.... Taiwan has never been part of Mainland China. Mainland was established in 1911 in Nanjing (in Mainland China), following the China is Mainland China. Taiwan is Taiwan. Taiwan is part of the Republic overthrow of the Manchu monarchy. And the constitution of ROC was of China, but not a part of Mainland China. Taiwan has always existed. U's passed only towards the end of 1948 in Nanjing a few months before just that the Republic of China before 1949 was on Mainland China, and the fall of the Nationalist government. This event occurred during the then it came to be Taiwan. It existed on Taiwan, and now it is Taiwan.''' period of heightened civil war between the government and the 'rebel' (Tillie, 16 February 2004) communist army. Later, that constitution was taken to Taiwan when Chen's statement may accurately sUJl1marize his pro-independence the central government went into exile. Never fully implemented (for party's official line: namely, to entrench the country's independent sov­ obvious practical reasons), the constitution became a token for the 'legiti­ ereignty while avoiding military confrontation with China by upholding mate and truthful China', which is also the pro-US and US-backed 'Free the ROC's formal titles and constitution. China'. The constil4ltion was upheld as an intrinsic part of democrac,', Even if Chen is correct in stating the 'reality', that Taiwan has never against the 'communist dictatorship reginle'. And it was also used as a been part of the PRe, there is no justification in denying that viewed 'cosmetic disguise' for the authoritarian rule that persisted in Taiwan from the Mainland Chinese perspective, Taiwan is an inseparable part of for nearly 40 years. In more recent times, the ROC constitution has be­ China. The Chinese people in general believe that the PRC has inherited come the focus of politicaicontention.ln the debate over which political and represents the entire China, as a timele�s notion with boundaries model to adopt to set Taiwan on its future path, different political forces always clearly drawn, while both pride and shame passed on to them engaged in a power struggle to control the revision of the constitution, along with its past. There is no question in their minds that Taiwan be­ which needed to be attuned to the new political situation:' longs to this seemingly eternal China; and that it was only taken away [ronically, although the constitution can be viewed as an obsolete .. nd by imperialists in the past. Taiwan thus represents unfinished business ineffective instrument to confront the new political realities of present­ left over from the civil war; it is about strengthening a unified. country, day Taiwan, it remains the main legitimizing organ. This in respect to: and about redeeming the humiliation caused by foreign incursions on institutional governance, the separation of powers, the structure of gov­ Chinese soil. In this regard, unification with Taiwan is equal to recover­ ernment, national representation, the national title and the requirement ing the lost honour of the Chinese people. It is sacred, and is bound lip of loyalty from its citizens. Any violation of, or attempt to redraw the with Chinese dignity in world affairs. ROC constitution (especially those parts that are implemented, added So the 'status quo' iterated by Chen Shui-bian may be one-sided, and and revised in Taiwan) can stir up political crises and cause serious not nearly'"as simple as it may at first appear. In defiance. since August protests over its legitimacy. 2002, Chen has re-appropriated Lee Teng-hui's 'two-country' argument, However, 'constitutionally' speaking, the ROC still holds territorial which originated in the late 1990s, by stressing the 'separation reality' claim over the entire area of China, including Outer Mongolia (the Re­ of the two places.' [n 2004, during Taiwan's heated presidential election public of Mongolia since 1946). This particular 'China', prescribed by the campaign, Taiwan's pro-independence camp (led by the incumbent ROC constitution, therefore, is definitely not tile 'China' that is prescribed President Chen Shui-bian) for hoping to get more support for their by the Chinese Communist Party and the constitution of the People's campaign had manoeuvred to mobilize the independent sentiments to Republic of China (the PRC).; This complexity is also fu lly illustrated such an extent that Chen angered both Beijing and Taiwan's strongest in a recent interview given by Taiwan's pro-independence President ally-the US. President George W. Bush, who was prompted to send the Chen Shui-bian, in the midst of his tense rresidential campaign for his strongest signal yet to discredit Chen's campaign strategy for holding second term. Describing the complicated historical process of confront­ an unnecessary referendum, sllspecting that it was a plot to 'change ing political realities, Chen said: the status-quo'.N

96 ______The Copenhagen Journ.ll t�t Asi.,n Studi�s 21 • 20llS ______97 Mau-Kuei Michael Chang,______Taiwcm's Nationalistic P(liitics ,lnd Its Difficult 'Status Quo'

just how did this head-on collision between the two places ever hap­ to Mainland China (and later became disillusioned) wrote a famous pen? What are the historical and institutional reasons that led to the", novel in Japanese in 1956 (recently translated in English; see Wu 2005) current complexities? entitled Orphan of Asia. In this work he lamented the fate of Taiwan: its marginalization in the world, its lack of recognition, its search for

W The Beginning of Taiwanese Self-Assertion: belonging in a world torn by wars, resentments and discriminations. Such was the moving and compelling novel derived from the 'sand­ Sandwiched between Traditional Roots wiched condition' felt by most enlightened and educated Taiwanese and the Modern Japanese Empire' youth under Japanese colonialism. Taiwan became the place of exile for some Ming loyalists after the But this early phase of Taiwanese nationalism did not evolve into its Manchu conquered most parts of the Mainland around the 1660s. In present form automatically. The resistance camp during the era of Japa­ 1683, Manchu, already the ruler of China, annexed a portion of Taiwan nese colonialism was divided between the left-wing movement (which Island after it had defeated the last Ming resistance group holding in made its appeal in name of revolution and liberation from imperialism) Taiwan. For most ojthe time, Taiwan was not a vital part of the empire's and the more moderate reform movement (which called for the estab­ interests until the late 19th century. Then Taiwan's strategic importance lishment of a representative council though indirect election), although increased because of the advancement of the western powers (e.g. the both camps were carefully monitored and suppressed by the Japanese British and the French) and the ascendancy of Japan in the region. In authorities. The japanese were relatively more successful in eliciting 1885, the Manchu emperor granted Taiwan full provincial status tu patriotism for the emperor among the younger generation through strengthen its maritime defences against other countries. Nine years modernizationmeasures. These included a broad and carefully crafted later (1894) the Manchu dynasty went to war with japan because of spectrum of plans ranging from modernizing the education system, the political crisis that arose in Korea. Defeated by Japan, Taiwan was to improving public health, extending life expectancy, and promoting severed from the Manchu empire and given to japan as part of the truce industrialization and urbanization, which led to the rise of a new ur­ contained in the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895. ban-based middle class. In the late 19305, when the Second World War Present-day Taiwanese national identity can be traced back at was at its height, efforts to promote Japanization also peaked. Some least to the resistance against Japanese colonialism in the early 1920s, Taiwanese youth had chosen to side with the government because of when nationalistic and liberalizing ideas inspired colonized peoples practical needs and the influences from the carefully crafted 'japaniza­ throughout the world. In the early part of the 20th century, Taiwanese tion' process.In the face of heavy competition, they eagerly tried to fulfil elites and educated youth were influenced by a progressive Japanese /apan's stringent criteria to enter the armed forces and may well have felt education system, and by a number of historic developments, such as pride in defending the Empire." In an exemplary work on this periud, the republican revolution in Mainland China and the Irish home-rule Wu Rwei-ren (2003) argues that Taiwan could have been turned into movement and its 'rebelling' against the Great Britain during in early another newly annexed territory (not a 'colony') like Okinawa, through 20th century, the Wilsonian call for self-determination in the 1920s after japan's strenuous efforts to integrate and absorb it, were it not for japan's the First World War, and later by the communist and leftist calls for class ultimate defeat and surrender in 1945 (See also Ching 2001). wa"fare and national liberation from imperialism. The most important [t would be fair to say that the majority of Taiwanese people had not progressive ideologies of the early 20th century all contributed to dif­ won their freedom from Japanese colonization by the end of the Second ferent discourses and strategies of the Taiwanese resistance movement Worfd War. Liberating Taiwan came with its return to the 'homeland' in one way or another (Chang 2003: 3042; Wu 2004). represented by the KMT and the nationalistic Republic of China in 1945. " A famolls Taiwanese activist, jiang Weishui at one time said that the Though some were confused and uncertain about their future status and Taiwanese owed their ethno-cuitural roots to their Chinese ancestors, identity, the Taiwanese people in general had high hopes for post-war but they were also citizens belonged to Japan, although treated with peace and reconstruction. freedom and self-autonorny. discrimination. Another Taiwanese writer, Wu Zhuoliu, who travelled

98 ______n,e C(lpenhJgt!n fourn

In 1947, less than two years after Taiwan's return to China, clashes practice of institution-building. the formation of cultural codifications broke out. The Taiwanese rose up in riots and formed guerrilla units (such as different languages), and the symbolic power for defining to rebel against the Chinese government in Taiwan (appointed by patriotism, developed differently in two separate, albeit historically re­ the homeland) for its mistreatment, corruption, discrimination and lated geographical locations. In 1945, when lapan surrendered, Chinese mismanagement of the general socio-economic conditions. The nation­ nationalists went into Taiwan with the power and legitimacy to rule. alistic government in Nanjing. led by Chiang Kai-shek, sent in troops When the two were reassembled, victorious Chinese nationalism was who brutally suppressed the uprising after the 'February 28 Incident', clearly positioned above the 'sandwiched' and differently imbricated which is commemorated today as part of the long-suffering history of Taiwanese identity, thereby depriving Taiwanese, especially the more the Taiwanese, caused by 'outsiders' and 'colonizers'.!.) educated of the population, of any opportunity for self-redemption. These early experiences-including resisting but also collaborating Resentful sentiments arose quickly as the Taiwanese found Taiwan's with Japanese, the ensuing 'liberation' and confusion, the unification new overall social, economic and political order swiftly deteriorating. in with the 'homeland', the illusion and the atrocities -left deep scars contrast to their high expectations. Taiwanese political leaders were also on the early gener.,tions of the Taiwanese people. Some activists and angered by Chinese officials who either consciously or unconsciously indigenous leaders, who were lucky enough to survive, felt so alien­ discredited them as ill-equipped for home rule because they lacked the ated that they relapsed into a long silence. Others went into exile and proper senseof patriotism or affinity towards China in their sentiments. formed overseas organizations to campaign for Taiwanese independence In retrospect, clashes like the rebellion in February 28, 1947 could hardly by advocating the overthrow of the nationalistic Chinese government have been avoided. imposed upon Taiwan. However, since the 1950s the Taiwan independence movement has Thus, in a historical context, a combination of many factors rendered been largely a movement in exile. It could hardly survive in Taiwan under the situation conducive to the beginning of the modern Taiwanese na­ the authoritarian regime. The movement was unorganized and had lit­ tional self-assertion that reiterates the fundamental 1920s nationalistic tle resources or practical means to overthrow the ROC government that idea: that Taiwan should belong to the Taiwanese people. Today some retreated to Taiwan in 1949. The growing support for the development Taiwanese still feel resentful at being mistaken as 'Chinese', or even at of present�day Taiwanese nationalism came into existence at a later time, the mention of any 'unification with homeland', especially coming from roughly during the late 19705 after the so-called 'Formosa Magazine Inci­ the mouths of Mainlander Chinese or the Beijing government" dent' (which will be discussed later). Its evolution has its roots in specific Many identify the 'February 28 Incident' in 1947 as the watershed for historical conditions, in the struggles bern.'een political activists and the the Taiwanese independence movement. But one should not think of authorities within the confines of institutional politics, and it centres on this incident as 'the cause' of the modern Taiwan independence move­ partisan struggles and on revisions to the electoral institutiuns. ment; indeed, the body of scholarship that has examined the causes In the following three sections, r shall discuss first, the establishment of this incident have failed to prove this connection. The incident was of an imposing SOCia-political structure on Taiwan; second, the reasons rather the culmination of a clash between two different historical tra­ for the lack of recognition of the ROC as the true and authentic China in jectories, which had projected Taiwan and Mainland China on different international regime. and third, the institutiunal setting of the intricacy roads to modernization, nation-bllilding, and self-identity since 1895. of electoral politics and the push for democracy 'from the local to the In that year, Taiwan and China had been forced to split and to embark national'. on different and unknown routes. Taiwan and China even waged war against each other because of Japan's intensified military actions in The Establishment of Authoritarian China since 1926. Being separated from each other, the combined forces Chinese Rule on Taiwan, 1949-70 of wars, revolution, colonialism, nation-building, and the pursuit of modernizationin general, had propelled both the people and the society When Chen Shui-bian said that 'the ROC came to Taiwan', he was refer­ in different directions and imbued them with different outlooks. The ring to the vast and violent structural changes occurring in China during

100 ______The Cflpenhagen lourn.,1 of Asic'" Studies 21 • 2tl05 ______101 ______Mau-Kuei Michael Chang ______T.1iwan's Nationalistic Politics and Its Difficult 'Status Quo'

1948-50, which Taiwan was impotent to resist but only could accept A small number of the Taiwanese elites were recruited by the KMT, the consequences. Losing to Chinese communists in the Mainland, the but as they were considered to have only 'local' importance, they were ROC's central government, including the KMT party, the military, the relatively marginal to the centre of power. National Assembly, legislators and loyal intellectuals, wbich became During this period, the two Chinese governments on either side of the so-called 'fatong' (a reference to the authentic legitimacy and the the Taiwan Strait had proclaimed their respective determination to ac­ holy codes of the Chinese grand tradition) withdrew to Taiwan. Exiles complish the unification mission by eradicating the other. They engaged regrouped on the island under the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek. The in hostile actions despite the nationalistic dream they shared. They used newcomers numbered between one and one and a half million, while not only propaganda warfare tactics, but also military manoeuvrings Taiwan's original population was about six million. Today they are to intimidate the other side. However, because the ROC was under the identified as the first generation of the 'Mainlander' group in Taiwan. military umbrella of the US, and the -PRC was preoccupied with do­ Mainlander elites in Taiwan enjoyed relative advantages, privileged mestic troubles in building 'socialist new China', the regional remained access and monopoly to government power and the national cultural relatively uneventful up until the late 1970s." apparatus, such a",the media and education. The basic power structure of politics was framed in two tiers. One was Continuous Setbacks on the International Front the national or central government, the ROC sitting on the top rungs and the 'Softening' of Authoritarianism, 1971-86 of the political hier,\rchy, with the KMTcontrolling the army and secu­ rity, and directing economic development. The other was the local and From the 1970s onward, the KMT -ROC government began to remove regional Taiwan tier prescribed to support the nationalistic mission of some of the constraints that had deterred Taiwan's grassroots opposi­ the central government. The former (i.e. the ROC tier), representing the tion, though apprehensively. 'Authoritarian softening' meant that the whole of China and dominated by the Mainlanders, was not account­ government would allow local Taiwanese interests to participate in able to the local people. Since Taiwan was seen as just a part of China, national politics providing this was conducted under careful scrutiny. In the political and cultural priorities, national symbols and significant this tactic there was, to be sure, a gradual shift in the mode of domina­ historical meanings were assigned to the whole of China, and Taiwan tion, from brutal suppression to more sophisticated legal punishment was assigned a base position for national restoration, to pay back the and harassment, using blatant propaganda to smear the enemy (Rigger homeland, and to retake Mainland China. Taiwan was thus regarded 1999, 2001; Wu 1995: 78-80; Dickson 1996: 53-8). as a local or a portion that could not represent the whole. And it is thu� This change in ruling tactics was prompted by the continuous set­ on the 'lower' position vis-a-vis the symbolic making of China. backs, which the government suffered in international affairs. The With US backing, coupled witb the Cold War ideology, the ROC's KMT-ROC government was gradually losing its long-term legitimacy rule in Taiwan frol111950 to 1978 was viewed as 'hard' authoritarian­ claim to represent the whole of China in international business, and the ism (Winkler 1984). The constitution was frozen in tbe name of national rationale for upholding the hierarchical relation between the central and emergency and martial law was decreed for internal security. People the national government of the ROC and local government of Taiwan. were only allowed limited room for political participation at tbe local By far the most debilitating setback was the ROC's loss of its seat in the government level. The Party controlled education and tbe media in UN (1971). This was confirmation of the international shift tl1<1t now order to portray itself as genuine guardian of tbe country. Loyalty to recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China. the Party and patriotic love for the country were strongly promoted in This frustration was complicated by the fact that the US was redi­ an almost indistinguishable way. The government promulgated the recting its foreign policy and normalizing its relations with the PRC to absolute importance of unity. Representative government. separation contain the threat from the Soviet Union. President Nixon visited Beijing of powers. and freedom of expression were interpreted as not befitting in 1972. Coming in the wake of this dramatic ",,/Ie fnce in US foreign Chinese culture and society. Dissidents such as the leftists and inde­ policy was the sudden upsurge in Chinese nationalistic and patriotic pendent activists were tracked down, punished or expelled overseas. sentiment in both Taiwan and Mainland China. rt was stirred up by

102 ______TI1e CQpenhi'lg en Journ.ll of Asicln Studie-s!l • :!O1l3 ______103 ______Mau�Kuei Michael Chang, ______Taiwan's Nationalistic [,olitics Jnd Its Difficult 'Stattls Quo' a territorial dispute with Japan over a small and uninhabited island independence groups, attracting younger Taiwanese (overseas students called Diaoyulai (or Senkagu) which was situated between Taiwan and and bUSinessmen) who became sympathizers for Taiwan's independ­ Okinawa. These two events galvanized the call for increased national ence. The incident also 'awakened' some of the post-war generation of assertiveness, dissatisfaction with the government, and for greater Taiwanese youth. Sympathizers interpreted this incident as a brutal as­ political reforms. Combined with the rise to power in 1970 of Chiang sault on Taiwanese identity by an outside regime. But this did give the Ching-kuo (who was about to succeed his father) as leader of the next younger generation of Taiwanese activists first-hand experience of the generation, the government hesitantly responded, with liberal measures suppression previously meted out to the older generation of Taiwanese in handling new political denlands, and by allowing intellectuals and activists." Because of the Formosa MagaZine Incident, the domestic activists more freedom of expression. dissidents and the overseas activists could now finally support each This was not the end of ROC's legitimacy problem. After years of be­ other in questioning the legitimacy of the ROC. Thus, together they hind-the-scene negotiation, the PRC and the US finally agreed in 1978 obtained in 1991 the freedom to openly express support for Taiwan to establish formal diplomatic relations. The US annou nced this to the independence.PI rest of the world a'ld agreed to comply with the PRC's insistence on its The weakness of the authoritarian measures forced the government 'one-China' claim. TI,e simplistic version of this claim is that there is one to comply with increased demands for political liberties, social justice China, represented by the PRC, of which Taiwan is an inseparable part, and accountable politics. In the period 1980-86, Taiwan's opposition and therefore a domestic concern of Beijing. After this came the severance continued to grow with a blend of three sets of interrelated discourses. of the mutual defence treaty between the US and the ROC, and the US The dominant one was of course, democratization, for example, protect­ agreement to phase out its weapon sales to Taiwan. This constituted it ing human rights, legalizing party politics and broadening the scope serious crisis for the ROC government,since the US was a powerful ally for political participation. The second discourse was for social refa rm, and the only country left in the world still backing up its claims." which comprised a mix of progressive grassroots social movements from These changes impacted on Taiwan's domestic politics. Now the women to aborigines, and some pro-labour and farmers' leftist ideas. previous excuses for preventing the Taiwanese people from having a And the third discourse was self-determination: the right for Taiwanese 'normal' political system and 'accountable' central government for Tai� people to decide their own future. This last one was not yet a blunt wan (and only for Taiwan, not including Mainland China) drew heavy statement for Taiwan independence, since this was still strictly forbid­ criticism. The demand for political reform arose in association with the den. Advocates for self-determination resorted to the phrase 'Taiwanese continuing social pluralism since the mid-1970s, which followed on need to be their own master' in a suggestive and milder way, to test the the heels of rapid economic development. The relationship between regime's tolerance levels. economic development and democratization in the third world (or in the socialist countries) cannot be dealt with here. Suffice it to suggest 'Long Live the Election!'- The Characteristics that at early stages of economic growth, early beneficiaries were more of Taiwan's Democratization Process likely to support the government for moderate political reforms in order Taiwan's democratization process since the 1970s is generally seen as to further or protect their hard-earned interests. And later, if economic relatively peaceful and incremental (Tien 1989; Chu 1992; Copper 1998; success continues to be sustainable, then people are more likely to de­ Rigger 1999; Alagappa 2001). But this also reveals the painfully slow mand large-scale systematic and institution reforms, either because of process through which the KMT yielded to the democratic movement. rising social inequality or relative deprivation. The institutional reason for this slow process was the continued exist­ The last incident of brutal suppression against political dissidents­ ence of elaborate election schemes established since early 1951. In the the 'Formosa MagaZine Incident' - took place in December 1979. Mass beginning it was designed to suppress communist insurgents and to arrests and courts martial were handed out to Taiwanese dissidents enhance the dominant position of the KMT government. But soon it accused of treason and subversion, linked to Chinese communists. I; evolved into setting the 'game rules' that would prescribe the probable The 1979 crackdown, ironically, helped to boost overseas Taiwanese political actions to take place. It served two important functions: one,

104 ______The CopenlM�en Journ.,1 of Asi,ln Studies 21 • 1005 ______105 _ Mau-Kuei Mich�el Chang ______T.,iw,:m's Nationalistic Politics

to provide a relatively practical (though still very risky) instrument TABLE 1: The Evolution of Electoral Institutions in Taiwan, 1950-2000" of last resort and the only possible venue to challenge the authority, Posts Open to Signilicolnce for the SignifICance for Opposition compared to going underground or into exile to advocate toppling the Yeus Politicolil Competi- Ruling Party. the (loiter the DPP i n 1986) until tion KMT(until 20(0) 2000 government. Two, it worked to help the KMT to stabilize the regime 1) ViII'\b"C "","I dis- t) Showcases demo- 1) Isolated and mild protest, by letting the pressures and discontents to go off periodically under tnct head, district cracy for'free Chin,,' unorganized dissidents close watch during election times. A comparison between Taiwan, the representative 2) Co-opting and con- 2) Slim chance for winning 2) CountyPhilippines and South Korea would reveal the extent to which Taiwan's 19S0-n strate and councils land reform sUCCt.'SS compete against the KM political changes have been surrounded by revisions to the regulations (Only local (excluding the two J) r"cifying the land- ell..'Clion!l) nla;orcities. Taipei lords governing electoral institutions and the winning of significant posts in and Kaohsiung 4) Expanding toc"t major elections. It is fair to say that Taiwan had election(s) long before it since 19(6) support fof the Party 3) T"iwan provin- had democracy; and elections even as it helped the push for democracy d,ll council from the bottom-upduring the authoritarian era, excluding other more Supplementary 1) Improving KMT's 1) Expansion in 'election radical means to tqpple the regime. citc'Ctions for n.ltio- legitimilcy ctl1 im by holidays', Forming organized nal represent.,ti- " ltowing TiliwM� opp

______106 ______The Copenhag t!11 Journ,ll of Asi,m Studies '21 • 2(X15 107 Mau-Kuei Michael ______Chans ____ Taiwan's Nationalistic Politics Clnd Its Difficult 'Status Quo'

in 1983, the KMT was still in complete domination and no election resu It status, despite its economic success. Added to that was of course the could topple the power structure." The KMT used elections to recruit PRC's increasing pressure for peaceful unification along its new national younger-generation Taiwanese into the ruling party, and therefore to course in the pursuit of modernization and self-transformation.2S The legitimize the regime's authoritarian sway. But this new supplementary KMTacutely felt the pressure of propaganda emanating from the Chinese electoral system was viewed differently way by the opposition. Now Communist Party. Also the US government had often criticized Taiwan they not only had room to manoeuvre but also influence at the national for its mistreatment and suspected murder of politicaldissidents. But, in level to strive for. They took the opportunity to speak out to test the the final analysis, it must be Chiang's unsurpassed power that made him limit of the allthorities' tolerance and their determination for reform secure enough to almost single-handedly change the course of KMT. (and for suppression as well). The death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988 marked the beginning of the In the 1970s and the 19805, the results of supplementary elections, end of the Falang of the ROC in Taiwan, and triggered more demands though skewed, were used as political barometers, to measure how for electoral political reform in the name of democratization and indi­ 'unpopular' (not 'popular') the KMT was among Taiwanese people. genization. Chiang left his preSidency, including the ROC's legacy, to Lee Thus, during this R"riod, the KMT government felt compelled to mo­ Teng-hui who succeeded him from the position of vice-president. Lee bilize its security and propaganda machine to intimidate and smear its came from the Taiwanese background of a Japanese family. He became adversaries (Tien 1989). Ouring the late1970s, the opposition alliance in the first native Taiwanese to assll me such a top position. According to Taiwan was networking as a semi-political party, emerging in the name Lee himself, the succession was not carefully designed or promoted by of Dangwai (meaning outside the KMT party). They seized the brief and Chiang, but took place as a passing event along the institutional chain periodic interstices of political openness during the election season. This of succession.2'" was the background for well-known expressions like 'election holidays' Lee, though a native Taiwanese, was an 'outsider' of the old KMT and 'long live the election' slogans of the late1970s and early 1980s. The ruling circle dominated by Mainlanders. [n Lee's early years of govern­ 'holiday' metaphor was to suggest the temporary slacking in repression ment, he co-operated with the old circle by following Chiang's previous by the government during election time. Thus the dissidents used these strategy in dealing with the opposition (Chang 1994). He manoeuvred interludes to express their ideas and political positions with less fea r to fence off the OPP, trying to keep the KMT and the Fa/Ollg to preserve and restraint. The second expression suggested the importance of the its dominance, and he yielded to pressure only when strictly necessary. election, and the striving for election fairness, as a time for the dissidents But he and the KMT party were now facing not only a rising, stronger to challenge the authority and to push for reform." and more defiant OPP, but also other social movements demanding By 1986, the opposition had gained about 30perce nt or more of the votes progressive ideological reforms for 'self-determination', democracy, in most of the quasi nationwide elections, despite the KMT's manipulation environment protection and welfare reforms. The self-determination and smears against the Dnngwni members. As support for the opposition principle was inserted into the orr's various party planks, upholding grew, in a daring move, it formed the Oemocratic Progressive Party (OPP) the statement that Taiwan's future was to be decided by the people of in Septemberof that year. Much to the surprise of the electorate, dictator Taiwan. For instance, in 1987. it said that people of Taiwan should have Chiang Ching-kuo decided to lift martial law to allow the OPP to exist the right to pursue national independence. [n I988. it stated that Taiwan (asserting that they should adhere to the policy of 'one China', without was a sovereign independent nation, which did not belong to 'the PRC supporting independence for Taiwan). Thus, the 'liberalization' process led by Beijing'." ln 1990, it stated that Taiwan's sovereignty would not speeded up in his last two years of his office. 11,e political momentum in extend to Mainland China or to Outer Mongolia. At the same time, the Taiwan shifted towards democratization and the OPP." political power of the KNIT's old circle was pushed back because of ris­ [t is still a mystery why Chiang chose to liberalize; he left no personal ing domestic pressures, especially by the 'March Movement' (or March records to explain his decision. But it is possible to view the context in Student Movement) of 1990, and also indirectly by the suppression of which Chiang was governing as offering few alternatives. One of the the democratic movement in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. main reasons lay in Taiwan's continuous downslide in international

108 ______The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 21 • 2((15 ______109 _ ____ Mau-Kuei Michael Chang ______Taiwan's Nationillistic Politics and Its Difficult 'Status Quo'

Taiwan's opposition movement rose to another level in March 1990. A ests amassed throughout the years. The Taiwanese voters for some time burgeoning social protest from college students, various organizations were concerned with the images of the OPP and their lack of credibility and OPP supporters galvanized the movement. They objected to the to manage the country's national security and economy. The inability attempted manipulation of the presidential election by the permanent of the OPP to obtain a sweeping victory throughout the 1990s must be members of the National Assembly (consisted of mostly Mainlanders accredited to the leadership of KMT, or the 'silent revolution' led by elected in 1949, who never retired). These members were part of the Taiwan's former president and KMT chairman, Lee Teng-hui. Fatong, who supposedly possessed the institutional power to elect Now we tum to a final important point that emerges from Table1: the the president on behalf of the entire people of China. The old gu,rds 'silent revolution' linked to the direct election of the preSident of the ROC had networked to favour a particular pair of candidates instead of its since 1996_ ROC's first Taiwanese president Lee served as the KMT's chairman, Lee, the incumbent and the popular Taiwanese president. party chairman from 1988 until 2000 before his forced expulsion from Waves of students and the general public protested in uproar. But the the Party by mostly Mainlander loyalists in mass protests." Lee in many drama ended peacefully as the old National Assembly caved in at the ways described the process for the transformation of the ROC Taiwan, last minute unde,\mounting pressure. And Lee Teng-hui was elected under his leadership as a 'silent revolution'. This could be interpreted to as the more popular new president as the victor emerged out of the mean all-out and co-ordinated efforts to make the KMT, the ROC and chaotic situation. its constitution, adapt to the new political, economic and global situa­ By comparison, ten months earlier the Tiflllanmefl democratic move­ tion. It also included aggressive diplomacy, lobbying foreign dignitaries ment, also led by the youth, emerged in Beijing. If it appeared familiar for their support. programmes to re-socialize the general publiC in the and seemed to parallel the movement in Taiwan, the overall result was name of 'love of community and soil', and to build the 'common fate of strikingly opposite. The mass killing of demonstrators had repercussions the community' among all the people of Taiwan. on Taiwan. Though the lesson may have many meanings to different The political and cultural transformation of the 'silent revolution' was people, the consensus of opinion was that the Communist Party could the 'indigenization' process, which had no precise meaning. Lee used it be 'deadly' serious if it was threatened. After years of propaganda from interchangeably with 'democratization'. Broadly speaking. 'indigeniza­ the KMT, most people in Taiwan had finally experienced an eyewitness tion' could be understood as affirming Taiwanese interests, historical account of the brutal suppression committed by the Chinese Communist sentiments, and self-identity in contrast to those that had previously Party. [n conlparison, Taiwan has earned its denlocracy through civil been imposed by Chinese nationalistic traditions. Specifically, it was disobedience, and Taiwan and Mainland China are worlds apart. Now about shifting political power and cultural domination from the Main­ the call for national unification with China looked even more uncon­ landers' hands and Chinese interests to that of the native Taiwanese. £t vincing because of the comparison. also entailed assigning the cultural and historical ex periences of Taiwan These movements and changes in both Taipei and Beijing politics set to a prominent position in framing the people's passionate love for the the background for the following major revisions in the ROC constitu­ land and the country of Taiwan. It was also therefore known as the 'de­ tion, including the removal of the old guard in the central representative Sinicization' process, which meant replacing 'China' with 'Taiwan' in bodies after some 42 years in power. After the old Mainlander repre­ substance and in name. And this was done also in the context of expand­ sentatives loyal to the KMT were retired, more vacant posts to be filled ing and intensifying electoral politics, democratization and ousting the by elections created sudden opportunities for upward political mobility defensive old KMT constituency from the political centre. (Chang 1994). The most important change on the institutional leveL besides the elec­ This trend was a welcome one for the newly rising Taiwanese within tion of national representatives and legislators in the early 1990s, was the KMT. And the newer and younger KMT members felt free from the the direct election of the president in 1996. Like the other institutional burden of defending the Party's unjustifiable old legacy. In fact, despite changes that had taken place throughout the democratization period. the retiring of the old guard, the KMT was always able to win in the this change succeeded amidst much protest and political conflict. On the national elections because of its tremendous resources and vested inter- one hand, the pro-OPP and pro-Taiwan indepenLience camp thought that

110 ______The COpenhi:lgen Journ,,' of Asian Studies 21 · 2005 ______111 _ Mau·Kuei Michael Chang ______Taiwan's Nationalistic Politics and Its Difficult 'Status Quo'

this change would give them the long-awaited opportunity to rule the directly face the CCP-PRC's intimidation against pro-Taiwan inde­ country through winning the presidency. On the other hand, the KMT pendence parties. And to do this and to forge itself a secured political conservatives criticized the proposed change as violating the symboliC future, the prO-independence parties would need to win continuously representation of the whole of China, and of yielding to the Taiwan in­ and decisively in nationwide elections against its arch nemesis - the dependence cause. Lee Teng-hui accomplished this major reform with traditional constituency of the old KMT-China still existing in Taiwan. shrewd strategic moves, allying his support from outside of the KMT, (So far they have not been able to accomplish this at all). especially with the OPr's constituency, to overcome opposition, which mainly existed within his own party. Repercussions of Taiwan's 'Indigenization': Lee's success also boosted his already high popularity among Tai­ Domestic and Cross-Strait Poljtics wanese voters. He became the first directly elected president of the ROC in 1996 with a decisive majority." Because of Lee and his silent By the 199Os, the political changes discussed in this paper, induding revolution, the KMT, which originated from the Mainland, now be­ democratization and indigenization, had resulted in two serious reper­ came indigenouslyyransformed, and was therefore able to rule Taiwan cussions. The first, on the domestic front, was that the issue of Taiwan's continuously between 1994and 2000." It has been argued that without national identity began to rise to the top of major policy debates, over­ this indigenization process, which began in the early 199Os, the KMT shadowing routine politics and other social activities. Not surprisingly, would have lost its legitimacy and domination much sooner. Moreover, the 'silent revolution' and Taiwanese affirmation drew counter-attacks Taiwan would have been plunged into a more chaotic situation with from Mainlander constituencies in Taiwan from both the liberal and the fu rther political turmoil. conservative camps. The battlefield of Taiwan's domestic politics thus Allowing citizens to choose their own president in 1996 through direct became much more ruthless and vicious. voting can be seen as a decisive turning point in the ROC government's For instance, the power struggle within the KMT, the expulsion and drive to become fully 'Taiwanized', for the ROC to become fully merged marginalization of Mainlander elites from influential positions. and the into Taiwan, although this was not achieved without creating internal de-Sinicization process resulted on two occasions in the break-up of the divisions. Now all parties and candidates, despite their nationalistic KMT. On the first occasion this led to the emergence of the New Party tendencies, would have to join the institutionalized political system if in 1993, which allowed the opp candidate Chen Shui-bian to win the they wanted to be taken seriously. And a president of the ROC directly post of mayor of Taipei City. The second occasion in 2000 was marked elected by Taiwan citizens definitely legitimized the ROC's existence in by an acrimonious split between its die-hard supporters, which allowed Taiwan. From now on there could be no alternative other than to take the opr candidate, Chen Shui-bian, once again to win the presidential part in institutional politics, unless more radical means were resorted elections in March of that year. The orr not only encouraged but also to, such as toppling the ROC government. benefited from the KMT-promoted indigenization campaign. They allied Sofar we have outlined the uneven course of present-day Taiwanese with Lee Teng-hui in his intra-party squabbles, tactically criticizing the nationalism. It started out primarily as a domestic conflict, resisting the 'old' China power base on important issues. domination of the Taiwanese by the KMT -ROC polity; later forcing the By March 2004. after three national presidential elections in eight ROC government to become accountable to Taiwanese. But soon after years, party politiCS became much more complicated (albeit also sim­ political liberation and democratization began, Taiwanese nationalism plified since all political parties now are divided and measured on a became a viable option for partisan struggles for national representa­ simple political gauge marked by their standings on Taiwan's future tion and power structures. Of course. these changes did not occur over­ and identity issues. Two new political parties surfaced because of the night; they were achieved gradually through major electoral struggles, dissolution of the power base of the KMT in 2000-01, related to the presi­ the expansion of elections, geo-political changes, and regional events dential election of 2000. Losing the presidency to orp's Chen Shui-bian related to changes occurring in Mainland China. One led to another, forced the KMT to hand over the government to the orp. This marked incrementally. Taiwanese nationalist supporters would now have to the first ever regime transition in Taiwan, drawing loud applause for the

112 ______The Copenh"'b�n Journal of Asi.ln Studies 21 • 2005 ------113 ______Milu-Kuei Michael Chang ______Ti'liwan's Nationalistic r'oliticsand Its Difficult 'Stiltus Quo' success of the democratization process. But Lee was criticized heavily nicknamed his new standing on cross-Strait relation as the 'two-coun­ and held responsible for 'destroying the KMT and selling out thecountry try statement'. which denied 'one-China' ever existed and claimed the (to the DPP)," after this second major loss. Protesters rallied and force ROC's long existing sovereignty since 1911. He also refused to accept him to quit from the Party and he stepped down as party chairman with 'one-China' as the presupposition or the predetermined result for the bitterness. Later his supporters and sympathizers regrouped to form two sides to negotiate with each other. a new party. the Taiwan Solidarity Union (ISU). which has been the Fearing that the US may be reneging on its commitment to 'one-China'. most outspoken party for Taiwanese independence and for de-Siniciza­ and angered by Taiwan's move and Lee's remarkson sovereignty. China tion. [n 2004 the TSU held 13 seats. or 6 percent of the total seats in the decided to chastize Taiwan by sending stern warnings.The crisis was Legislature Yuan. marked with four large-scale military exercises in sou thern China in . The second spin-off was the People's First Party (PFP). also formed less than a year. combined with the launching of ballistic missiles into in 2001. The PFP was represented by some hardliners of the KMT who areas close to Taiwan's waters. China made grave threats to invade strongly opposed Taiwanese independence. They first felt betrayal by if Taiwan should delay unification or pursue independence. China's Lee Teng-hui's nomh,ation of Lien Chan. rather than their own favoured warning came at a time when Taiwan's first presidential campaign was candidate. James Soong. who had represented the KMT in the presi­ just about to take place. dential elections of 2000. They believed that Soong. who had enjoyed The crisis ended with the US sending in two carrier battle groups near high popularity in pre-election polls. should have been nominated and Taiwan waters. and publicly reaffirming its support for the 'one-China' that his victory would have been assured. Because of this intra-party policy but also itscommitment to its domestic Act. theTniwnll Reln tions conflict and Soong'sdetermination to run as an independent candidate Act. On the other hand. the intimidation had to end since it proved to be outside of the KMT. which effectively split the vote. both Soong and a misreading of Taiwanese public opinion and its political culture. Lee Lien lost to the DPP's Chen Shui-bian. Afterwards. they blamed Lee Teng-hui was able to win with a strong l1"1ajority over other candidates for forcing them to walk out from the KMT in the 2000 elections. which (including those who looked more acceptable to Beijing). The victory had disgraced the ROC and had opened the way for the DPP to take represented a robust endorsement for Lee's policy. and some believe power. Consequ ently. in 2001 the PFP was established with Soong as that China may even have indirectly helped Lee by attacking him for their chairman. They managed to win 46 seats. or 20 percent the total being a 'villain'. seats in the Legislature in 2004. Following Lee's victory as the people's first elected national leader, Entering the 2004 presidential elections. Taiwan's political map was Beijing intensified its campaign known as well gOflg Wfl lw (verbal attacks clearly marked with two colours: the pan-Blue and the pan-Creen. The plus intimidating actions). It launched a global campaign known asfml former. KMT loyalists and the hardliners of the People First Party. become du ell tOf1g (oppose independence and support unification) against the the Blue camp. They spoke strongly and paSSionately against surging Taiwanese government. Lee. the DPP and other political factions that Taiwan independence, and proposed a more practical approach towards favoured separatism. To back up its warning. Beijing has since stepped the PRe. aimed at improving cross-Strait relations. As for the Green up the modernization of its military machinery. obtaining a new mili­ camp. represented by the DPP and TSU. both are firm supporters of the tary arsenal from the former Soviet Union ill all attempt to deter US pro-Taiwanese independence movement, opting for strong defence dI''1d intervention if an invasion of Taiwan became necessa ry. Taiwanese nationalism to resist the PRes unification tactics. China's tough stance appears to have given them few positivepoliti cal The second major repercussion centres on the worsening and hostile gains as far as national unification is concerned.[t could not even stop relationship with the PRe. This formed the backdrop to the Taiwan the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party and its leaderChen Strait crisis from August 1995 to March 1996 (Zhao 1999a. 1999b; Chen Shui-bian from winning the presidential elections twice in 2000 and 2004. 1999). The trigger was Lee Teng-hui's unprecedented visit (dubbed But Beijing has something to look forward to: the sharp divisions of in­ as 'ice-breaking') to the US in June 1995. This was followed by Lee's terests and worldviews existing among Tahvanese citizens. On the one abrupt change in tone when speaking of the future of China. The media hand. Beijing hasbeen successful in isolating Taiwanon the international

______114 ______The Copenhilgen JOllrn.1I of Asiilll Stlldi�s 21 • 2005 115 ______Mau-Kuei Michael Chang,______Taiwan's Nation.,listic P()litics and Its Difficult 'Status Quo' stage by playing up its hostility against the Taiwanese government. Conclusion: Defining and Resolving [nternational isolation can hurt Taiwan's business interests and Taiwan the Difficult 'Status Quo' is clearly anxious not to become marginalized from the international community in this age of globalization. How are the Taiwanese to solve In this paper I have presented an outline of Taiwan's resistance to 'China'. this isolation and political hostility? So far the Taiwanese government The word has at least two faces: one relates to the lingering legacy of has elected to maintain its opposition and to break through the imposed the ROC, the 'old China', and the other relates to the PRC China, the constraints, trying (without much success) to direct its business interests 'new China'. From a historical-institutional fra mework, [have discussed to South East Asian regions instead of Mainland China. But the citizens reasons that have led to the ROC-Taiwan being what it is today. [have are divided; some are willing to adopt a more pragmatic and concilia­ also focused on the interactions between the international environ­ tory position to negotiate with Beijing, and to renounce what they see ment, Taiwan's national status, and domestic politics. The crucial point is Taiwan's long-established self-assertion through its early history, as a hopeless drive for Taiwanese independence. This pragmatic stance is basedon Taiwan's growing economic depend­ its democratization movement and Lee Teng-hui's 'silent revolution', ence on China. Beijing has attracted Taiwanese capital (into the PRC) which is now largely inherited and capitalized upon by the Green camp. These factors read together have transformed the ROC which settled in and is alluring as a market. In 2003,about one-quarter of Taiwan's trade surplus came from trade with China (including Hong Kong), and about Taiwan since 1949. And during this transformation process, two major one-half of Taiwan's foreign investment went to China. Thus, China historical developments are crucial. One is the ROC's dwindling inter­ has gradually (and ironically) become Taiwan's most valuable trading national status since the 1970s; and the second is China's emerl'l'""ence as 'partner' since the mid-1990s, when it was also under the constant threat a major player in world affairs and in the global marketplace since the of a Chinese incursion. To complicate matters further, it is estimated that late 1980s. There is little here that Taiwan could have changed, since there are a million Taiwanese (out of a population of 23 million) living, both contingencies were created beyond Taiwan's (or ROC's) border by. studying, doing business or travelling to China every day, while some bigger and stronger global movers. And this analysis has also found th'lt Taiwanese nationalism has not have chosen to live there permanently. Cross-Strait marriages are also always been a viable choice or the prime driver in the political agenda. on the rise and are becoming quite a sensitive political issue. These two opposing forces, political hostility and economic interde­ [t surfaced slowly in late 19705, developed quickly in late 1980s, and became a fully-fledged force only in the late 1990s. Its growth is embed­ pendence, are creating divergent interests and dividing public opinion ded in Taiwan's electoral and partisan struggles, and hence its progress in Taiwan. At one extreme, there are those who wish to defy China, has been incremental through political re-shufAings, espeCially in im­ resist the pressure emanating from Beijing, and go all the way to strive portant elections. forTaiwan's national status and independence. The other practical view There is little doubt that Taiwan helS nearly completed its sovereignty supports a more moderate position towards China. And Taiwan's politi­ construction process from its own internal political viewpoint. It has cal parties and their representatives are about equally divided. built a clear political hierarchical system with an elected, accountable Since political hostility and economic need, or national security and and democratic leadership. What is surprising is the ROC's constitution, economic interdependence, contradict each other, China can no� play Taiwan's domestic political ball game more easily by both manipulating which is still in effect and is regarded as the foundation of power, even though it is constantly criticized for being 'foreign' and 'out of date'. people's vested interests (or future interest) in China by playing with The many elections and reforms of electoral institutions that have taken Taiwan's internal politics and political rivalries, and by exerting pres­ place under the umbrella of the constitution have "llowed tl1e people sure on the Taiwanese government on questions of national identity participating in these processes to build an 'imagined community' of a and unificatioll. . dc fa ciO Taiwan. Today, international relations analysts and politicians believe that retaining the 'status quo' may be the best bet for keeping peace in the

116 ______The Copenhagt!n JOllrnal of Asian Studi�s 21 • 2005 ______117 ______Mau·Kuei Michael Cha"g ______Taiw

region for some time. Public opinion in Taiwan also supports this idea. The ROC or Taiwan government under Chen Shui-bian, has its own But what 'status quo' has ever been static? It is dynamic in global affairs, idea of 'status quo'. The status quo is ROC and that is Taiwan. To be regional relations, gea-politics and, of course, domestic politics. What sure, the ROC title and legacy it carries is not someUling the Taiwan is the 'status quo' after all? president wants to embrace. but it is far more acceptable compared to Recent official statements from the US have rendered the meaning other alternatives. And, to the DPP and his administration, Taiwan has of the term, status quo, intriguing if not problematic. In December 2003, no need to declare independence since it already enjoys independent President Bush stated that he opposed Chen Shui-bian's campaign stra­ sovereign status. Chen Shui-bian has promised more than once that tegy by holding a referendum calling on China to remove its missiles Taiwan would keep the ROC as its national title unless Beijing decides aimed atTaiwan, since he saw Chen intending to 'change the status quo on invasion. But the status quo also means that Taiwan is not recog­ unilaterally'. Later, in May 2004, when testifying in the US Congress, nized as a sovereign nation by mostoLthe countries of the international the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, James community. It is excluded from many of the world organizations, and Kelly, stated that the Bush administration would 'oppose any unilateral sidelined in matters that may affect its trading prospects in the global move from Taipei ol)Beijing aiming at changing the status quo', adding marketplace. It also needs to invest a high proportion of its CDP for that the status quo should be 'as we define it' (Devan 20(4). national self-defence, suffers from inefficiencies in government· for lack As Kelly understood and admitted, the 'status quo' is not an object of a suitable constitution, and, without decisive national direction, is reality out there, but is defined and framed from the viewpoint of dif­ politically rent asunder by internal divisions. Though most Taiwanese ferent interests. And this has worked well as far as the US interests are support a 'status quo', some feel this is also not normal; that the rem­ concerned. The US has said it would support 'one China' since 1972 edy should be either building a completely sovereign and independent but has not aided and abetted unification. It has been more positive in Taiwan, or accepting the 'One Country Two Systems' deal offered by dealing with China except insisting on its arms sales and commitment Beijing. It is certainly unrealistic to expect Taiwanese citizens to feel to defend Taiwan, which really irritates Beijing. The US also warned ind ifferent to the issue of determining their country's future and forging Taiwan not to provoke Beijing on the issue of sovereignty, or not to a clear national direction, or to be insensitive to necessary reform of its count on US support as unconditional (Pan 2003). political institutions through democratic processes. In short, to expect The PRC has its own idea of status quo, though this is much more them not to do anything to change the status quo-not to negotiate transparent than that of the US though. From its unique historical per­ the possibilities, and not to struggle against the limits imposed by the spective, Taiwan has 'always' belonged to China. At present, the PRC PRe - may be asking too much. represents the whole of China governed by the Chinese Communist Since both the PRC China and many in Taiwan believe that this so­ Party, and Taiwan is a renegade province of PRe. The status quo is, called 'status quo' is rea lly not desirable, and since the US's notion of therefore. not regarded as normal. [t would become a great humilia­ the 'status quo' accords with its own interests, attempts to modify and tion for Beijing if it could not resolve this problem. The PRC leaders redefine the term are bound to occur. For Taiwan's domestic politics, have had little option other than proclaiming that Taiwan should and forcefu l attempts in this direction are most likely to be drawn up in the must be reunited, regardless of cost. If peaceful means are not enough next election battle. to carry out unification, then forceful means must be used. Thus, any political moves from Taiwan, the US, any other countries or interna­ Epilogue tional organizations, multinational companies, even individuals (such as academicians or scholars) are carefully watched and monitored. So [n March 2005, during submission and revision of this paper, the Na­ the CCP-PRCs basic assumption of 'status quo' is biased in favour of tional People's Congress of the PRC passed the Allli-Secessioll L",l'. which its interests in the unification with Taiwan. or the stopping of Taiwan especially targeted Taiwanese independence. The law reiterates the independence. Any move against this interest is seen as an intention to PRe's position against Taiwan's independence. and the 'non-peaceful change the 'status quo', and therefore to be rebutted. means' (now legalized and prescribed in codes) it will use against Taiwan

______118 ______Th� Copt!nh.lg;en Journal of Asian Studi�s 21 • 2003 119 ______Mau-Ku M c han ______ei i hael C g _ T,'iw..ln's Nationalistic Politics and Its Difficult 'StanIs Quo'

if other peaceful measures fail. Taiwan government's official reaction each revision hasenrnilt.-d a maior political battle associated with a continuou� power was moderate, heeding to the advice of the US government, for fear of struggle. Likewise, though the PRC does not r't..'Cognize the ROC and its constihltion, it was heightening the tension, while hundreds of thousands of citizens, some also ambivalent about the extent to which Taiwan could revise the ROC constitution. responding to the call by the opp and the TSU, marched into Taipei City For instance. when Taiw.m's pro-independence president Chen Shui-bi'ln suggested to protest against PRC's threat by expressing their belief in democracy. that the ROCconstinltion needed re-drnfting in order to abandon its territorial claims and support for Taiwan patriotism. over the entire mainland of China, Beijing reacted with outrage and warned against such moves would �a step moving from dl..'fac1u to de jllrt independence. Given this new development, the main thesis of this paper still 6 The emphasis is the author's. holds true. Taiwanese nationalism is here to stay, to transform, within 1 lee's notion of 'two countries' in the late 19905sti ll held out the idea for a unified the range of the possibilities inscribed in Taiwan's domestic politics, China in the future. He set the recognition of the ROC as an equal political entity by the PRC as the premise for negotic1ting the future. In the second half of 2002. Chen which are also structured by geo-political powers outside of its borders. stepped up its criticism against China. Chen was quoted as saying that 'Our country Peace may be preserved against all odds, but the status quo is always cannot be bullied, dwarfed or m.:trginalized. and we are not a part or a province of dynamic. ,mother country'. and that 'there is one country on each side' (Taipei Times. 4 August 2002). His rhetoric is much stronger and held little room for negoti" ting a future \ one-China. Mau-KLIci Michael alOng is Rescarclr Fellaw and ,,/ tire Inslilule of Professor R I am referring to the event when President Bush 'chasti:ted' Chen for wanting tC' SOCiology, Academia Sinica, Nangmrg, Taipei. 'change the status quo unilaterally'. This took place during a joint press conference with PRC's Premier Wen Jiab..,o on 9 December2003. '1 I hiwe written on this topic in a different article (see Ch

I I began this pClper during my visit to the Internati<.mClI Institut� for Asi,ln Studit.'S one ill both discourse and strtltegies. But the past can always help to expl"in

suicide. The novel has recentlv• been translated into EIlC"lish (see Wu 200'i)- • which have res ulted in major revisions to the original paper. II (:> J p.1 m�n This id�a of 'I,(,,.ill� '(II1�yi. .tIi,'>!rw lirmg:1rP {Peaceful Unification. One Countr\' Two 11,e a nese �overnmentreported th.1t about 17.000 young who held competed to meet the rigorous screening to join the r

120 ______The Copenh.lgen JOlln",1 of Asi.ln Studies 21 • �(l05 121 au·Kuei �ichaeI Chang ______------______'raiwan's N

lit out r to form a human chain to express their 'love for Taiwan', and the need for 'se lf· ...ee admitted in 1994 that he thought of himself as Japanese until he was 20 years salvaging' to commemorate their previous sufferings. The high turnout was also old. This confession quite angered his Mainlander opponents (rom both sides of triggered by a very intensive presidential campaign betweenthe pro-independence Taiwan Strait. ,., , -- candidates of the DPP and the anti.independence candidates of the other camp. L.A:..� won with 54 percent of the YOre. Pcng Ming-min of the OPP. the dosest con- 15 The last major b.1ttle fought between the PRe and the ROC was in 1958,when Que­ tender. received 21.1 pet'Cent of the vllte. About 25 percent of the votes supported moy (Kin·men) was besieged wi th heavy shelling. other independent candidates. IIi To compensate its breach of the security of Taiwan, and the potential loss in the Xl Some critics will say that this period was also the high tide for 'black.gold' politics. region, the US passed the TaitMn Relnlialls Act in 1979 very swiftly. The Act is de· meaningrent·seekingbeluwiour by JX'liticians through illegal means such as inside fined as a domestic law. prescribing the US responsibility toward Taiwan's defence information and privileged (jnanciClI practices. LOSing the moral high ground in capability and i� need for prosperity and development. Today, this Act is regarded ruling Taiwan, the KMT becamereliant on corrupt politicians and cronies to win as one of the cornerstones of US diplomacy in dealing with both the PRC and Tai· seats in the Legislature to maintClin itspolitical majority. wan. despite its publicacknowledgement of the 'One·China policy' (see Metzger )1 After his forced resignation (rom the KMTparty. l.ee Teng.h ui switched from ex·KMT and Myers 1996). PNew York: in the ROC constitution). For example, even in 1989. the newly elected Le gislature PalgrClve Macmillan: 23·58. members occupied less than one-third of the seats. Chen. Qim2lo 1999. 'The Taiwan Straits Crisi�: c.,uses. Scenarios, and Solutions.' In U 'Long Live the Election' was a title of a book written by a well-known opposition Zhao. Suisheng (ed.). ,krr..r!'$ fi,e Trliwlm Stmit: Mlli"",,,d C!,;'III. Tt l;WrTfl, mId till' 1995� leader Hsu Hsin-Liang in 1979. He was campaigning for the importance and mo­ 1996 Crisis. New York: Routledge. ril lity of having fair ;md large-scale elections. More importnntly. he described the r t I c� Ching, Leo T. 2001. BcCtr",illX /lIpmIC&': Colol/illl T li /'f Il (Illd lite Pt11iti l!ffdL'llfit!1 Fill'll/II· strategy to challenge the authoritarian government by using 'edging toward close tit"'. Berkeley: University of C.,liforniil Press. to violence' t l...ee was not Chi

122 ______Mau-Kuei Michael Chang ______

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