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FS II 93-104

The Ruler of the Game: The Defining Power of the Standard Automobile

Mikael Hard and Andreas Knie

Berlin, Juli 1993 Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozialforschung, Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 BERLIN. Tel. +49-30-25491-0. Abstract

The basic structure of the present-day automobile was laid down in the early years of this century. An "automobile" was defined as a - driven, reliable race-, able to cover great distances in a short period of time. Despite the emergence of other technical solutions and the development of new user contexts, its fundamental features remain. The strength—or the defining power—of this solution goes a long way toward explaining why it is so difficult for so-called alternative automobiles to establish themselves today. We have accommodated ourselves so much to the character and performance of the standard automobile that it has become both cognitively unthinkable and pragmatically undoable for other types of automobiles to get a foothold. The only "alternative" to the gasoline-powered automobile is the diesel—and this solution has become successful only because its features are very similar to those of the gasoline car.

Zusammenfassung

Die heutige Automobiltechnik hat ihren Ursprung im ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert. Die konstruktiven Möglichkeiten, die fertigungstechnischen Voraussetzungen und vorherrschenden Nutzerbedürfnisse definierten um diese Zeit auch das technische Konzept "Automobil": eine auf vier Rädern montierte Zelle, angetrieben von einem bezinbetriebenen Hubkolben- Verbrennungsmotor, um mindestens vier Personen möglichst schnell und weit transportieren zu können. Obwohl sich die Umfeldbedingungen seit der Jahrhundertwende drastisch verändert haben, dominiert dieses Verständnis von "Automobil" auch heute noch. Die viel diskutierten "alternativen Antriebskonzepte" müßen sich heute nach dieser Maßgabe bewerten lassen. Es verwundert daher nicht, daß die einzige "Alternative", die bislang dauerhaft im Pkw- Antriebsbereich etabliert werden konnte, der Dieselmotor ist. Dessen Eigenschaften sind mit dem tradierten Verständnis von "Automobil" nämlich kompatibel, während andere Systeme diese beinahe 100 Jahre alten Vorgabe nicht erfüllen können. The crisis before us is largely cultural and perceptual; we may simply have to change our image of what a car looks like and does. (Nadis et al. 1993:91)

1. Introduction

Closure and stabilization are two concepts which have been much discussed in recent works in the sociology and history of technology. Constructivist scholars in particular have observed in sharp opposition to traditional historians that technological development cannot be understood as a one-way trip on a freeway to heaven (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987; Bijker and Law 1992). They have emphasized that this process—after an initially messy stage where virtually everything is negotiable and unstable—rather tends to get locked-in and follow quite narrow corridors. This paper is an attempt to contribute to this discussion about closure and stabilization processes. We ask what kind of actors and factors foster closure and opening of stable areas of engineering. Why are technological fixes created, and how may they be avoided? Is technological closure a global phenomenon which allows no deviations? We focus on the history of the so-called "automobile." Like the whole system of automobility, this artifact has proven highly resistant to fundamental change. Heretic technicians, concerned politicians, and active social movements have been largely unable to affect the field but marginally. Why is this the case? We will try to show that the basic characteristics of the automobile were laid down rather early in its history, and that these features still define what we usually mean by the term "automobile." The gasoline-powered automobile became the pattern for future designs mainly because of its success as a trustworthy race car. Our 2

paper can be read as an elaboration of two sentences which James J. Flink (1970:243) wrote more than twenty years ago: Gasoline automobiles were by far the most successful in competitions such as reliability runs. Thus the public image of what the car that could be expected to perform well should look like was predominantly shaped by gasoline automobile designs. The automobile as we know it was created in the early years of this century, when it received a defining power that more or less automatically led to the disqualification of vehicles with other features. The basic characteristics of today's automobiles still incorporate conditions which prevailed at that time and thus represent—to paraphrase Max Weber (1958:320)—a kind of "frozen or congealed spirit." It was defined as a race vehicle able to cover large distances in short periods of time, and this definition prevails in the 1990's— although the user contexts of today are substantially different. Langdon Winner (1986) has argued that the low overpasses on Long Island Freeway embody an ideology that might have been acceptable by some groups in the 1950's in that they effectively cut off the lower classes from the recreational areas of the island. Similarly, we would like to argue that the automobile still carries with it ideals and solutions which are no longer in accordance with values held by many people of today. However, this does not mean that the system of automobility is impossible to affect. A fresh start may be made, but only if the concepts of "automobile" and "automobility" are challenged at root. Needless to say, such an endeavor will be both difficult and painful. The concept of defining power is here meant to bring out the imperative strength that is or has been given to an artifact or technological system by one or more groups of actors. Their influence is or has been so large that their particular view of what functions a certain technology should perform and how it should be designed marginalizes all other views. We agree with Trevor Pinch's and Wiebe Bijker's (1987) assertion that, epistemologically speaking, a material object can be interpreted in a multitude of ways. We suppose that this "interpretative flexibility" is, socially and culturally speaking, relatively large when an area of technology is in flux. As soon as closure has established itself, however, the "winning" solution and the features it 3

incorporates come to define what attributes are going to be regarded as legitimate. It becomes a convention that this solution should be taken as the point of departure for subsequent developments. Maybe it be could said that the solution around which closure has been achieved receives an interpretative advantage. By definition, non-conventional solutions become suspect, strange, and maybe even stupid.

2. What is an "Automobile?"

Figure 1. A standard, gasoline-powered automobile; from The Oxford-Duden Pictorial English Dictionary (1981:330).

If you happen not to know what an "automobile" (Br. "motor car") looks like, please analyze Figure 1 closely. An automobile apparently consists of, among other things, four (14) mounted on a (2), a unitary body (1) with doors (4) and windows (21, 22,32), seats (31, 34,36), a (37), and a (24). If you dare open the (8), then you are most likely to find a -cooled, gasoline- driven, four-, Otto-cycle internal- with four or more cylinders. In case you are still not sure that you will be able to recognize an automobile after having read this paper and made your way out into the street, please compare the other varieties presented in Figure 2. 4

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Figure 2. A variety of automobiles; from The Oxford-Duden Pictorial English Dictionary (1981:335).

If you would like to know what an automobile does not look like, please pay attention to Figure 3. This is a "horseless ," which has no hood and no windows. Its engine is driven by gasoline and runs in accordance with the , but has only one and is placed in the middle of the vehicle. It clearly resembles the "horse-drawn " in Figure 4 more than the "automobiles" in Figure 2. 5

Figure 3. A Daimler from 1886; from Georgano (1985:10).

The number of horseless carriages slowly decreased at the turn of the twentieth century, and more and more automobiles were to be found in the streets of Europe and North America. A typical automobile from this time is shown in Figure 5. Virtually all of the characteristics which we mentioned above can be found here: four wheels, front-mounted, gasoline, , and so on. The term "Automobil" replaced the indigenous term "Selbstfahrer” in Germany, and the short word "bil" established itself in the Scandinavian languages in the first decade of this century. Its connotation has remained. 6

Figure 4. Various horse-drawn carriages; from The Oxford-Duden Pictorial English Dictionary (1981:321).

Figure 5. A Daimler Phoenix from 1899; from Georgano (1985:40). 7

In line with this argument, the Viking 21 depicted in Figure 6 is no "automobile" either. It lacks several of the characteristics which we normally attribute to automobiles; its maximum speed, for instance, is only just over 50 m.p.h. What we would like to suggest is that one reason for the difficulties that so-called alternative motor vehicles encounter is that they are not able to supply their users with familiar functions (maybe futuristic designs are thus counterproductive).

The automobile has been a stable artifact for almost ninety years. However, not only the artifact itself was closed a long time ago. The production structure, the technological support network (Staudenmaier 1985:Ch. 4), and the main elements of the surrounding infrastructure have also been upheld from the time shortly after World War One. Certain user behavior and user expectations have also followed in the wake of these closed structures. Both the artifact and its cultural ambience (ibid.) have been frozen. We believe that it is safe to say that at least the following characteristics of the "automobile" have survived from the time of the Ford Model T till this very day: the automobile is still a flexible land transportation vehicle which can be driven one mile to church on Sunday or 1,000 miles to some distant vacation spot in the Summer; 8

its performance still resembles that of a in that it can be accelerated quickly and can reach very high speed; it is still a mass-produced item which attracts consumers of all kinds; it still carries with it an image of sublimity and status which has been very hard even for its harshest critics to counteract; the technical structure of the artifact includes most of these items which have been listed above; it promises to meet human needs for freedom and mobility in accordance with a classic script (Akrich 1992). In short, the features of the automobile have shown an unbelievable ability to resist all attempts to introduce fundamental changes. Automobility still looms large, despite that several commentators regard it to represent yesterday's solution to yesterday's problems (Fester 1990). The automobile has become so entrenched in our culture that it is difficult to picture a society without it. It has successfully spread around the world (a reverse salient [Hughes 1987], though, is that the automobile still requires fairly good roads—a feature making most of its members largely useless in many parts of the world). Chryslers and Hyundais are to be found in traffic jams both in Detroit and Seoul. Their owners can buy the same gasoline, have most repairs made in the same shop, and use their vehicles for the same purposes. The common practice shared by the world's automotive engineers is substantial, and the qualitative difference between the support networks in various countries is not large. Distinctly particular local practices appear to be hard to discern—at least at a first glance. The automobile and automobility thus represent both a high degree of historical continuity and reflect a high degree of global uniformity. Our main tasks in Section 4 is to show how these similarities can be interpreted and ask who, if anyone, decides what solutions should be chosen. May it be that Hughesian technological styles do not exist in this field of engineering (Hughes 1983)? The questions we pose in the section below is how these processes of stabilization and entrenchment began and why the characteristics of the "automobile" and "automobility" still remain. The only inroad into the core of automobile engineering has been made by the diesel 9

engine, which has replaced the gasoline engine in certain cases. The question in Section 5 is why only this "alternative" (if we may use that term) has been able to establish itself. All attempts to erect other support networks or create alternative user contexts have failed. The question is why they have been so impotent.

3. The De-Construction of "Automobile" History

We would initially like to describe the processes that led to closure around the automobile gasoline engine in the first years of this century—and thus to the locking-out of all alternative solutions. Our account rests largely, albeit not fully, on existing literature and does not include a wealth of new empirical information (see, e.g., Bryant 1966, Eckermann 1981, Fersen 1986, Finch 1992, Flink 1988, Laux 1982, and Rae 1959). In our attempt to "de-construct" the history of early "automobility" we try to connect an assessment of technical factors and engineering ideals with a discussion about user contexts and support networks. Our story is not one of steady, evolutionary improvement, but of stabilization, conservatism, and inappropriate development. It had not been at all clear to the observers in the 1890's that the smelly, noisy, and roughly working internal-combustion engine would become the exclusively used engine in the horseless buggies. Equal interest was at this time paid to steam and electric vehicles, which worked smoothly and were relatively easy to drive. Unlike the gasoline automobile, they did not require a strong driver who was able to get the engine started by means of a hand and to overcome "the formidable problem of shifting gears" (Flink 1988:7). The steamer was probably just as dirty and noisy as the gasoline-driven vehicle, but it was based on a better established technology and had a larger technological support network. Finding fuel and competent repairmen was seldom a serious problem.1 The big drawback of steamers and electrics was their limited range. Steam vehicles needed to be continuously supplied with large amounts of water, and the batteries

1 Flink (1970:243) claim that gasoline could be find in virtually every country store in the at this time. This does not seem to be quite correct. Clessie (1967:75), one of the pioneers of diesel engineering, complains that he repeatedly had "to waste a half-day or more seeking out a supply of gasoline" still in the 1910's. 10

in electric vehicles needed to be recharged each 20 miles or so—a process which took a couple of hours. Just like today, the electric was primarily a city vehicle. There furthermore never developed a technological support network for the electric; most garages remained unfamiliar with it (Flink 1970:241f.). These limitations posed a clear problem to the horseless carriages' main user groups at this time: members of the upper classes who used their vehicles for entertainment rides or sports. Status and speed, reliability and range, were the ideals of these groups. Their members disavowed public means of transport and regarded the motorcar as a symbol for individual freedom (Birnbaum 1988). Races and reliability runs played an outstanding role in defining how a motor-driven vehicle was to perform and what it should look like. Although automobile competitions attract considerable interest also today, their importance was even larger at the turn of the century. There were basically two types of races: short races on track, where high speed was rewarded, and long-distance races between cities, where reliability and sturdiness (of both vehicle and driver) were equally important factors. The 1895 race Paris-Bordeaux-Paris was pioneering in the latter category. It was also common for manufacturers to advertise their new products by having someone drive them very long distances. Several companies in the U.S. Midwest drove their novelties all the way to New York City under great public attention. Whereas electric and steam vehicles did reasonably well in short races, they were mostly without chance when it came to long-distance runs. One person who understood the commercial importance of automobile races was Emil Jellinek, an Austrian-Hungarian businessman. His ideas of how to design an impressive gasoline race car were materialized by Wilhelm Maybach, chief engineer at the Daimler Motor Company. Their Mercedes caught the world by surprise. Its success in various contests in the period 1900-1903 led a French commentator to conclude that "the Mercedes era" had begun (Sass 1962:79ff.; cf. Fersen 1920). The automobile had a water-cooled, four- stroke Otto engine of 35 and could reach as much as 53 m.p.h. Particular efforts had been made to increase the compression in the cylinders and the number of of the . 11

Although the French Systeme Panhard—with front-placed engine and perpendicular to the wheel axes; compare Figure 7—came to define the modern automobile structure in the 1890's, the Mercedes "deserves credit for being the first modern motorcar in all essentials;" see Figure 8 (Flink 1988:33). The joint Jellinek-Maybach design must be considered pioneering when it comes to the heart of the automobile, the engine. Like motor vehicles of today, it also had a low point of gravity and a pressed-steel chassis. Its success as a sports car made other firms around the world try to copy its design features. After years of groping and experimenting, automobile engineers now had a Vorbild, a point-of-departure for subsequent work.2 They were happy to have found a pattern on which to build. The historic significance of the Mercedes is that it gave engineers and firms an archetype around which they could close their ranks.

2 Concerning the concepts of archetype or Vorbild, cf. Hard (1993:Ch. 3). 12

Figure 8. The Jellinek-Maybach Mercedes from 1901, an archetype or Vorbild in the history of automobility; from Bürgle and Frankenberg (1964:15).

It is highly important for most engineers to have a stable basis and clear goals for their design work (Vincenti 1990). It is just as difficult for a designer as for any human being to survive in a world where everything is in flux. Some degree of stability is necessary for us to be able to cope with the problems that we encounter. The 1890's had been a period of instability in motor-vehicle design, and the Mercedes gave the emerging automobile industry a standard to which it could orient itself. The existence of such a standard made life easier not only for designers, but also made it possible to make production more rational. Since the areas of steamer and electric-vehicle engineering did not undergo such a closure process, they were at a clear disadvantage (Abernathy 1978). Firms engaged in these areas could not benefit economically from the stability and clarity which come with closure. Idiosynchratic solutions and handicraft methods remained characteristic of the steam-vehicle manufacturers (Jamison 1970). This closure around the Mercedes meant that certain features became forever (?) attached to the term "automobile." The Mercedes was a sports car, and an automobile has ever since been connected to speed and endurance. "Automobility" became defined in terms that squared well with the interests of the race community (Heller 1912). We argue that the cultural code of "automobility" was laid down in the first years of this century and that it still remains (Ruppert 1993). 13

The gasoline-powered automobile was well adjusted to the demands of the leading consumer groups ninety years ago. It fitted into the contemporary user context. The social carriers of the automobile around the turn of the century included in all relevant countries wealthy sportsmen and businessmen (Laux 1982), and the performance and characteristics of automobiles like the Mercedes were in line with their needs.3 They saw to it that a technological support network of gasoline outlets and repair shops were erected. However, the problem is that the technological structure which they had constructed remained even after the relative importance of this group rapidly diminished after about 1905. New user groups established themselves unexpectedly quickly both in Europe and the United States in the following years. The automobile was now employed by various firms as a practical vehicle for the transportation of goods, by farmers for various purposes (Kline and Pinch 1993), and by the upper middle-class for visits and shopping. The sports vehicle was now primarily used for commercial and utilitarian purposes. It was no longer a toy for the upper classes. These changing user conditions were never reflected in the basic outline of the automobile.4 The earlier race-car structure remained. The gasoline-powered, standard automobile had surely been appropriate for races and reliability runs, but it was less suitable for several commercial applications—especially in towns and cities. Like the steamer, the gasoline automobile was difficult to get started—a liability which was particularly severe for local transportation purposes. Its odors rendered it severe criticism in many cities. One of the main advantages of the gasoline automobile, its ability to cover long distances without lengthy pauses, became less important. The great exception to this statement were, of course, the countryside users, who became particular influential in the United States. However, if farmers could benefit from the automobile's large range of operation, they were presumably not so much served by its speed characteristics. The poor condition of most countryside roads made high speeds an unnecessary function. It was hardly possible for any ordinary driver to

3 Concerning the social carrier concepts, see Edquist and Edquist (1979). 4 Several of the points raised in this paragraph are further discussed by Knie (1994). 14

travel at 53 m.p.h. on uneven gravel and dirt roads. The same goes, of course, for city users. None, except the race freaks, benefitted from owning an automobile with a sports-car engine. Both the characteristics and the inadequacies of the standard automobile remain. Regardless of whether it looks like a sports car, a family , or a pickup , the automobile is still basically a vehicle for high speeds and long distances. Today's user behavior is not reflected in the design. The majority of trips are nowadays shorter than 7 miles, and most automobiles drive at very low speed in urban areas (Nadis et al. 1993). Even though a lot has happened in automobile engineering during the last nine decades, there is a clear line of historical continuity from the old Mercedes of 1901 to the modern 850. After closure took place in the years around 1905, developments have followed along fairly well defined corridors.5 There are in today's automobiles usually four per cylinder instead of two, and the Volvo mentioned has five cylinders instead of four, but these have to be considered marginal, non-revolutionary changes. The development has moved along trajectories which has made the race characteristics of the automobile even more pronounced: toward more revolutions per minute, toward higher vehicle speed, toward larger operative range.6

4. Uniformity and Particularities in Automobile Engine Design

The German author, businessman, and politician Walther Rathenau noticed already during World War One that the international character of modern mass production leads to an increasing global uniformity. It is hardly possible any longer for an observer to tell whether he or she is Berlin, Paris, or New York. Houses, streets, and clothes look everywhere the same: Goods flooded the Earth. The old, beautiful differences that used to encounter anyone visiting distant cities and countries have been lost in our age. No longer is the

5 Concerning technological change in the post-closure phase, cf. Bijker (1993). 6 For a definition of trajectory in discussions about technological development, see Dosi (1982). 15

traveler able to experience and appreciate the fruits of new soils, art, and labor. (Rathenau 1918:20) Rathenau lamented this development and hoped that national traits would once more be imbued in various products. He wished in particular that German producers and consumers would be able to withstand the inflow of mass-produced goods from the United States and the influence of American designers. Rathenau's observation is no less valid today. Although he did not mention motor vehicles, it is hardly farfetched to assume that he— had he lived today—would have noticed the similarities between the automobiles in the streets of the world's capitals. The fact that the taxis of and the cabs of New York do not have the same color and shape does not take away this impression. Although there are more Toyotas in the narrow streets of Tokyo than on the jammed freeways of Texas, this does not mean that Toyotas built in Japan are substantially different from Toyotas built at so-called transplants in the United States. The main difference is probably that the latter are more likely to be equipped with a three-way catalyst. The differences between countries are more quantitative than qualitative. Why is this global uniformity so pronounced, and how far does it reach? We saw in the previous section how the basic features and main outline of the gasoline-propelled automobile engine were laid down in the first decade of this century. Product competition between firms came primarily to center around body design after this period (Edelmann 1989:20ff.). Knowledge of the fundamental characteristics spread through formal and informal communication networks. The features were codified in textbooks and accepted by virtually everyone active in the field; they came to represent the ruling standard of automobile engine technology. These standards defined what was to count as an automobile engine and what was not. They became the grammar of this field of engineering. Just as somebody needs to learn some grammar, if he or she is to be able to speak a foreign language, an engineering student or a technician needs to grasp the central ruling standards of gasoline-engine technology, if he or she is going to repair or develop such . Ruling standards are conventions which are not easily turned down or resisted. 16

Ruling standards are like grammar in that they have a large degree of inertia and generally tend to change quite slowly. It is difficult to affect them, but it is not impossible. In both cases such changes have to start so-to-speak from below. When the electric self- was developed by "Boss" Kettering of the Dayton Engineering Company in the beginning of the 1910's, it was first taken up by Cadillac (Leslie 1983). While most other manufacturers offered their customers a crank to get the engine running, the electric starter became an integral part of the local practice of this Detroit company. The self-starter was not yet a part of the grammar of automobile engineering, but this fact did not prevent Cadillac to include it into their local dialect. Ruling standards prescribe what solutions are preferred in an area of technology, but they do not force practitioners to stick to them.7 Of course, deviants might be understood by neither colleagues nor customers, but they cannot ordinarily be forced by legal means to stick to a certain ruling standard. This may only happen when legally sanctioned standards are imposed—for instance concerning exhaust emissions. If I live in Greece and want to communicate with the local population, it is certainly an advantage be able to speak Greek correctly. Nobody will force me to follow Greek grammar, however. Like grammar, ruling standards teach us what is acceptable behavior. The electric self-starter soon caught the attention of customers and other firms, and after a few years it had been adopted by virtually every automobile manufacturer. It was to be found in 97% of the exhibited vehicles at the London Motor Show already in 1919, and at the end of the 1920's it had made its way into all but the smallest European automobiles (Georgano 1985:49,186). It had by then become part of the common practice of automobile engineering. The Detroit expression had become a part of the language of automobile engine technology. Quite naturally, this change had to be reflected also in textbooks, and the electric starter was soon incorporated into the ruling standards of automobile engineering. Its diffusion might seem unexpectedly rapid. However, the reason for the relative quick, world­ wide adoption of the electric starter has to do with the fact that it was

7 Since this is not the place to get into a discussion about linguistic and praxis theories, we would only like to mention that our perspective has been influenced by Pierre Bourdieu (1977; 1990). 17

not a radical innovation; it did not challenge the basis of the internal combustion engine. The self-starter must be regarded as a "conservative" innovation that removed an awkward nuisance. After its introduction it was no longer necessary to crank the engine to get it started. In other words, we contend that change has to start on the level of one or more local practices. But, in order that this change be adopted by the whole branch of industry, the new expression has to move beyond the local dialect and spread to other parts of the community. Only after a majority of firms have included it into their own dialects does this novelty become a part of the whole language and find its way into the formalized body of grammatically prescribed ruling standards. These linguistic metaphors might help us better understand the uniform character of the automobile industry. Even though grammar does not prohibit members of a subculture from inventing their own dialect, these people will be partly cut off from other groups of the population if they do so. Even though ruling standards seldom prohibit a company from introducing a radical novelty, a highly innovative firm might become cognitively isolated and thus lose the possibility to draw on the collective experience of the whole industry. It is allowed to propose novelties, but it is not advisable to propose radical innovations. The history of technology in general and the history of the automobile industry in particular teach us that it is very difficult to have fundamental changes be accepted by the global community. Ruling standards are not easily moved. Post-closure stabilization is not only upheld by designers, developers, and manufacturers through their global communication networks. As users, we also tend to appreciate that the artifacts around us do not constantly change. It is hard to get by in a world where grammar and language are constantly negotiable. When automobility was in its infancy, it was carried by enthusiasts who liked to try out new ideas. This interest in novelties diminished as the automobile became a mass-produced good used for commercial purposes (Volti 1992). The average owner of a Ford Model T was hardly more interested in fixing his automobile than are most suburban family fathers of today. Both of them appreciate that their beloved behave reliable and are not crammed with untested, radical novelties. Stable artifacts also help 18

them move easily between models and brands. Those of us who are not professional or amateur motor-sport freaks readily succumb to the defining power of the existing automobile for the sake of convenience and comfort.

5. The [Im-?]Possibility of Radical Change

We have painted a gloomy picture, where the automobile has not only physical, but also social, cultural, and economic inertia. We have shown how the present-day automobile defines what should be counted as a . Automobility seems to have become an iron cage. May no actions cause these structures to change? As ought to be clear from the above analysis, we believe that changes are quite difficult to impose. We would not, however, like to suggest that it is impossible to open up technologies which have become closed and stable. The question is what factors are conducive to such change, or, put in another way, what actions are necessary for alternatives to make an inroad into established structures. Is it possible to challenge the defining power of the "automobile?" It might be beneficial to track down successful alternatives to the gasoline engine in order to address this question. As far as we are able to judge, the is the only "alternative" which has challenged the standard engine in any quantitatively important way. We would thus like to investigate what developments led to the introduction and the establishment of the diesel engine in the area of automobility. The diesel engine has complemented not only the automotive gasoline engine in the course of its history. The Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg (M.A.N.) had a strong background in areas like steam-engine and ice-machine technology, and did not have automotive applications in mind when it launched this engine at the end of the nineteenth century (Diesel 1955; Knie 1991; Thomas 1987). The first diesel engines to appear on the market were not an alternative to gasoline engines in horseless carriages, but used as a substitute for stationary steam engines. They also made their way into the area of marine transportation after a short while. These machines were large and bulky, and their speed was low and difficult to vary. 19

Considering the defining power that the old and well-established possessed, the diesel came to challenge marine and stationary steam engines surprisingly quickly. One reason for this is that there was a high degree of continuity between the steam and the diesel engines. Since the diesel provided its users with functions that were similar to those of the steam engine, it was able to catch on. Designers and manufacturers of diesel engines built upon experience from the development and production of steam engines, and the diesels came to incorporate features that were taken from the area of steam engine technology. The versatility of the machine-tool industry, discussed by Nathan Rosenberg (1976:Ch. 1), contributed to the relative ease with which this industry could turn to the production of diesel engines. Although a diesel engine is in principle rather different from a steam engine (the former being, for instance, an internal and the latter an external combustion engine), the coming of the diesel did not force users to drastically change their patterns of action, nor did it require that a totally new technical support network be built. Manufacturers, retailers, and repairmen with long experience from the areas of steam engines, gas engines, and ice-machines could fairly easily turn to this new field of technology—although some firms did so only after a period of procrastination. True, diesels run on oil instead of coal, coke, or gas, but since they can run on virtually all kinds of oil, the accessibility of fuel was not an insurmountable problem. The story about how the diesel engine slowly began to move into in the 1920's and 30's is similar. The archetype to which designers oriented themselves in this case was not the steam engine but the gasoline, four-stroke, Otto engine (Hard 1992b). Engineers in many countries tried to develop a diesel that was comparable with the standard automobile engine in all important functions: speed, power, size, and weight. They aimed at making the interface between new engines and old vehicle chassis compatible. Their goal was to accommodate the features of the diesel engine with those of the gasoline engine in order that both producers and consumers would accept the new engine. After having overcome strong initial resistance, this strategy worked reasonably well in the areas of truck and engines. The lower running costs of diesel engines made them increasingly popular in the 1940's and 50's, 20

especially in Europe with its relatively high fuel costs. Partly because of its higher capital costs, it was more difficult for it to force a wedge into the area of ordinary automobiles. Only in taxis did the diesel establish itself during these decades. The reasons for the entry of the diesel into the truck and bus field were quite similar to the reasons for the earlier acceptance of the diesel as a substitute for the steam engine. Haulers, bus owners, and taxi drivers, who were used to driving gasoline-powered vehicles, began to turn to diesels when the features of these engines had become comparatively close to those of gasoline engines. Due to the relatively low price of diesel oil, diesel engines had for some time been a potential threat to gasoline engines, but it did only catch on after the high-speed diesel engine had proven that it could provide its buyers with performance and functions with which they were familiar and acquainted. The diesel engine was not only accepted because it was cheap to run, but also because it did not force its users to radically change their set ways of behaving. No dramatically new user contexts or technological support networks were necessary for the diesel to establish itself. Existing oil companies could fairly easily complement their supplies of gasoline with supplies of diesel oil; established automobile and engine companies could complement their lines of gasoline-powered products with diesel-powered products without great ado; repairmen could learn how to change after brief instructions. The diesel engine was a "conservative" novelty. This conservatism was just as pronounced when the diesel engine made its next breakthrough on the automobile market in the 1970's. As is well known, the first half of this decade posed a severe challenge to the automobile industry. The Clean Air Act ("Musky Bill") of 1970 demanded strong reductions on exhaust emissions in the United States (Grad et al. 1975). Oil prices soared all over the world three years later, and, as a result, the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards of 1975 forced the automobile industry in the United States to reduce fuel consumption substantially. Fierce activity to reduce emissions and fuel consumption began not only in the United States, but also in Europe and Japan. The outcome was not a radical change to electric or steam vehicles, but the introduction of various conservative changes. More automobiles of smaller size were 21

presented, and the three-way catalyst was launched by as a typical end-of-the-pipe solution (Maruo 1992). Neither measure, of course, threatened the standard engine design. Simultaneously, the diesel engine began to receive more public attention—partly because of its better performance concerning CO and HC emissions. Companies like and Daimler-Benz increased their sales of diesel cars, and introduced a diesel version of their brand new Golf {Rabbit) model. Customers—also in the United States—were attracted by their lower fuel consumption and the relatively low price of diesel fuel. Why did these automobile companies accept the diesel? The main reason was that it had by now become possible to produce diesel and gasoline engines, as well as diesel vehicles and gasoline "automobiles," on the same manufacturing line. The attempts to make the diesel engine similar to the gasoline engine, which had started in the truck and bus area forty years earlier, were now successful also in the field of standard cars. The diesel was accepted by manufacturers and customers alike, because its performance and characteristics did not deviate substantially from those of the gasoline engine. Finally, we would like to make a few inferences from this history of the diesel success. We come to the—albeit not very optimistic—conclusion that alternatives to the present-day automobile may not be too radical if they are to succeed. They have to provide its users with recognizable functions; they have to fit into existing technological support networks; they have to be based on an established stock of engineering knowledge; they have to be rapidly assimilated by local practices in many parts of the world in order that a globally stable common practice develops. If we compare the present status of the with these points, then it is quite obvious why this technology has not managed to get accepted by presumptive manufacturers and customers. The electric vehicle is at present not carried by an extended technological support network; the knowledge of battery technology is not yet globally stable; no common practice has formed in this field of engineering. But, another important reason why the electric vehicle does not fit into the present cultural ambience. It is no "automobile" by definition. Since the electric vehicle does not enable us to drive 1,000 miles in two days to a distant vacation spot, it 22

does not square with the ideas of freedom and mobility that have accompanied the automobile from the beginning of this century (Perrin 1992). To conclude, truly radical alternative technologies can only get a foothold in a hostile world, if they may mature within strong, protective sanctuaries, and if radically new user contexts are simultaneously being formed. The advertisement for the new Hyundai in Sweden was partly right: a new time requires a new automobile. But, just as importantly, a new automobile requires a new time—new ideas and ideals, new user behaviors, a new cultural ambience, new technological support networks, and perhaps new companies. 23

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