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From: Lance Cpl. James W. Clark Unit: 1St Battalion, 6Th Marine Regiment Location: Marjah, Afghanistan

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From: Lance Cpl. James W. Clark Unit: 1St Battalion, 6Th Marine Regiment Location: Marjah, Afghanistan From: Lance Cpl. James W. Clark Unit: 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment Location: Marjah, Afghanistan Counting the close calls FORWARD OPERATING BASE MARJAH, Helmand Province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – I’m not an infantryman, far from it. I’m as much of a Pog (meaning person other than grunt) as one can be, but with the Marine Corps being what it is, even Pog’s are afforded the opportunity to see combat. While in Helmand Province, Afghanistan with 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, I’ve nearly been shot several times. I’ve wound up pinned down in a muddy canal by sniper fire and have watched stunned as a rocket-propelled grenade spiraled through the air, bounce of a doorframe and skid to a halt, ten feet away. After the first time you take contact, the elation and excitement starts to fade. The next time you don’t smile as wide or laugh as hard, and soon after that you’ve stopped grinning entirely. Without ever meaning to, I find myself making a mental checklist. Small-arms fire? Check Sniper fire? Check RPG’s? Check IED? Blank You stop looking at what has happened and begin to wonder about what will happen. Based on what you’ve gone through, what do you have left? How many more close calls do you have in you? Will there be enough? With this realization, you begin to look at things differently. You take stock of yourself, of what you have accomplished and what you still need to do. In an effort to better explain this, I spoke with other Marines in the battalion about their closest calls and the lasting impressions they left. An inch to the left – Cpl. Kyle Sutherland Recently, while conducting a routine census patrol in their area of operations near the district center in Marjah, Afghanistan, the Marines with 81 mm Mortar Platoon, Weapons Company, 1/6, took fire. Corporal Kyle Sutherland, on his second deployment, and present during the helo-insertion into the city with Bravo Co., 1/6, was hit by an AK-47 round during the firefight. The bullet impacted his side, slipping between the folds of his flak jacket and grazing the bullet-proof plates Marines wear inside of their body armor. The round came within an inch of his vital organs, but slipped out the other side of his body armor without ever breaking the skin. “At the time, I thought we were taking sniper fire, but as it turns out, an insurgent put his rifle through a hole in a wall and squeezed off three rounds,” said Sutherland. “I heard the first crack and got into cover, taking a knee. I waited a few seconds, to hear if someone was hit, then I heard the screaming. I had to decide if I was going to shoot back or get to the wounded Marine. The corpsman was too far away, so I made my way to [the injured Marine].” At this point, Sutherland says he felt something, like a heavy pressure on his side and looked down to see a hole in his grenade pouch. One of the Afghan soldiers ran up and made the “?” gesture with his hands, asking if he was hit. “I had him check me for wounds, putting his hands inside my flak and looking for blood,” said Sutherland. Once he was sure he wasn’t hit, he ran to provide security for the incoming medivac, falling at least four times along the way, recounted Sutherland. Looking back on the incident, Sutherland spoke on the change in perception both during the firefight and afterward. “Time slowed and the rounds all sounded far apart to me,” said Sutherland. “During my first firefight, everyone was just shooting and you could only think to shoot back. Now you can process a few more thoughts, like what should I be doing?” “It’s been a week in all, but every time we go out, I just wish we could not do this anymore,” said Sutherland. “I used to be the point man for our patrols, but the guys got together and decided to place me on rear guard because I have a wife and a kid on the way and need to get home to them.” Do they just not like me? – Cpl. Killian Zahringer Prior to the invasion of Marjah, Marines with the Personal Security Detachment, Headquarters and Services Co., 1/6 and Marines with Charlie Co., 1/6 went to set up the forward command center. While providing security, Cpl. Killian Zahringer found himself in his first firefight. “I leaned down for just a moment to talk to my vehicle commander, and a round went through the plates covering the turret, right as I ducked down,” said Zahringer, who is on his second deployment. “It makes a big difference, knowing that he’s aiming at you and that you’re not just at the wrong place at the wrong time, like with an IED.” Zahringer touched upon a thought that is often expressed among Marines. The majority of the time, Marines who are providing security or are on patrol are fired upon, and are forced to react to the situation, rarely being able to take the offensive. Constantly being the victims of attacks makes you wonder at times, whether or not they simply don’t like you, on an individual level. Do the men we’re fighting have something personal against me? What did I ever do? Additionally, it is sobering to realize that all it takes is a few rounds from an assault rifle. “On the news and television, you always see helicopters, tanks and bombs, but all it really takes is just some guy with an AK-47,” said Zahringer. From: Michael S. Hertzog II, 1st Lt, USAF Unit: CSTC-A CJ8 Title 10 OMA (Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan Resource Management Operations and Maintenance, Army) Location: Camp Eggers, Kabul, Afghanistan These are the first 5 e-mails I've sent home... Don’t Cough Up a Lung: Afghanistan 101.1 Dear Friends and Family, I arrived safely at the Kabul International Airport on Wednesday night and am halfway through day 4 of my year in Afghanistan. Traveling here was as easy as one can hope for when one goes the long way around the globe from Japan. Landing in Kabul was extremely uneventful, although the airport staff seemed a bit overwhelmed with our relatively large group (about 200 of us). Who is us? Soldiers, Airmen, spies, contractors, and a few diplomat types. We spent the night at the airport and then headed out to the various installations in the capital. The drive to the New Kabul Compound... When I walked in the Airport Wednesday night, I was told I was going to be working at NKC instead of Camp Eggers. I was a bit surprised and trying to figure out what I could possibly being doing at the U.S. Forces Afghanistan headquarters. After all, I am still very much a newbie in financial management and even more so in deployed operations. Nevertheless, we set out for NKC Thursday morning in an armored SUV. Looks just like a suburban, but everything is thicker--windows and doors. The driver gave us the "here's what to expect" talk. My favorite part was how said that he and I (since I was riding shotgun) would provide covering fire in the event we had to ditch the vehicle--I at this point had no bullets for my 9 mm, so if things did go south, I guess I was going to throw it and my empty magazines at any would be assassins :) The driver then said, "Feel free to take out your cameras and click away for the rest of the drive. I guarantee you'll see some things you've never seen before." He wasn't lying. Downtown Kabul is unbelievable. No one thing is so out of this world, it is just the combination of people and things in such a small space arranged so haphazardly and seemingly randomly that seems to catch you off your guard. Two scenes really caught my eye: skinned and strung up goats, cows, pigs, dogs, cats, and chickens all in a row and for sale to the right bidder and a bicycle (as in pedals) with a sidecar built for 1 transporting 4 Afghanis- -now that's what I call a road trip! We rolled up to the most congested traffic circle I will likely ever see and sat for about 45 minutes to go through and there on our right was the NKC. Huge walls and 3 tall buildings inside--that's it. I was already kissing outdoor strolls goodbye as we rolled through the gates. I dropped my body armor and bags outside the front door and went to find my office. Walked upstairs, found Major Clark, a friend of my boss at Kadena, and was quickly assured the folks at the airport were mistaken--I would be at Eggers after all. Camp Eggers... So I jumped in another armored transport and what do you know? I'm riding with the new inbound civil engineering group commander for Kadena. It is a flat and small world after all. After we left him at the embassy, we drove on Eggers. I started laughing almost immediately. It looks very much like an amusement park with tiny roads, tiny little toy land buildings, and a row of banners reminding me very much of Six Flags. And who is the first face I see when I step out? None other than Clayton Perce, the former 18th Communications Squadron boss when I first arrived at Kadena in 2007.
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