This is a repository copy of Talking Politics, Performing Masculinities : Stories of Kong Men before and after the .

White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/134570/

Version: Accepted Version

Article: Ho, Petula Sik Ying, Jackson, Stephanie Forsythe orcid.org/0000-0001-6981-0712 and Lam, Jun Rene (2018) Talking Politics, Performing Masculinities : Stories of Men before and after the Umbrella Movement. Sex roles. pp. 533-548. ISSN 0360-0025 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-017-0887-z

Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item.

Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request.

[email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Sex R oles Talking Politics, Performing Masculinities: Stories of Hong Kong Men before and after the Umbrella Movement --Manuscript Draft--

Manuscript Number: SERS-D-16-00325R6 Full Title: Talking Politics, Performing Masculinities: Stories of Hong Kong Men before and after the Umbrella Movement Article Type: Original Research Keywords: masculinities; Umbrella Movement; Confucianism; gender; Social Movements Corresponding Author: Petula Sik-ying Ho University of Hong Kong Hong Kong, HONG KONG Corresponding Author Secondary Information: Corresponding Author's Institution: University of Hong Kong Corresponding Author's Secondary Institution: First Author: Petula Sik-ying Ho, PHD First Author Secondary Information: Order of Authors: Petula Sik-ying Ho, PHD Stevi Jackson, DLitt Jun Rene Lam, Mphil Order of Authors Secondary Information:

Funding Information: Research Grants Council, University Dr Petula Sik-ying Ho Grants Committee (HKU 744812H)

Abstract: The present paper addresses the under-explored issue of the role of politics in the construction of masculinity, focusing specifically on political Confucianism and men's doing of gender in the context of Hong Kong's recent turbulent history. Between 2014 and 2016 we conducted a series of paired interviews and focus groups with 10 Hong Kong men from differing social backgrounds. Through cooperative grounded inquiry, we demonstrate how political events and figures provided points of reference for these men in the construction and performance of masculinities. We emphasize the importance of Confucian hierarchical harmony to gender performance, elaborating three cultural logics—respectability, responsibility and romance—underpinning the doing of Hong Kong masculinities. We thereby shed light on the mutual constitution of personal and political selves and how men define and redefine masculine ideals in times of political turbulence.

Powered by Editorial Manager® and ProduXion Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation TITLE PAGE must contain all Authors information (e.g. Names, Email Addresses, Departments, Institutions, Schools and

1

Title page

Talking Politics, Performing Masculinities: Stories of Hong Kong Men Before and After

the Umbrella Movement

Journal Name: Sex Roles

1. HO, Sik Ying, Petula (Corresponding Author) Professor Room 507, Jockey Club Tower, Centennial Campus, Department of Social Work & Social Administration The University of Hong Kong Pokfulam, Hong Kong

Tel: (852) 3917 2091, 96627669 Email: [email protected] Website: http://sikyingho.socialwork.hku.hk

2. JACKSON, Stevi Professor Centre for Women's Studies University of York Heslington York, YO10 5DD, UK Phone: +44 (0)1904 323672 Messages: +44 (0)1904 323671 Email: [email protected]

3. LAM, Jun Rene Research assistant Room 566, Jockey Club Tower, Centennial Campus, Department of Social Work & Social Administration, The University of Hong Kong, Tel: (852) 64921904 Email: [email protected]

2

Acknowledgements

This paper was supported by University Grants Committee of the Research Grant Council under General Research Fund for the project entitled “Be a man!: Conceptualizing Hong Kong Chinese men’s strategies of sexual choices”. (HKU 744812H)

We are grateful for the participation of respondents. We also appreciate for the contribution of the assistance of Professor Veronica, Mr. Chi Kwok and our video team at the early stage of the project. Manuscript (No Author Information; Includes any Tables and Click here to view linked References Figures) 1 Running head: TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Talking Politics, Performing Masculinities: Stories of Hong Kong Men Before and After the 8 9 Umbrella Movement 10 11 12 Petula, Sik Ying Ho 13 14 The University of Hong Kong 15 16 17 Stevi Jackson 18 19 University of York 20 21 22 Jun Rene Lam 23 24 The University of Hong Kong 25 26 27 28 29 Author Note 30 31 Petula, Sik Ying Ho, Department of Social Work & Social Administration, The 32 33 34 University of Hong Kong; Stevi Jackson, Centre for Women’s Studies, University of York, UK; 35 36 Jun Rene Lam, Department of Social Work & Social Administration, The University of Hong 37 38 39 Kong. 40 41 The research reported in this paper was supported by the University Grants Committee of 42 43 44 the Research Grants Council under a General Research Fund entitled “Be a man!: 45 46 Conceptualizing Hong Kong Chinese men’s strategies of sexual choices” (HKU 744812H). 47 48 We are grateful for the participation of the respondents and the assistance of Professor 49 50 51 Veronica Pearson, Mr. Chi Kwok, and our video team at an early stage of the project. 52 53 Correspondence concerning this manuscript should be addressed to Sik Ying Ho, Room 54 55 56 507, Jockey Club Tower, Centennial Campus, Department of Social Work & Social 57 58 Administration, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong. Email: [email protected] 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 2 2 3 4 5 Abstract 6 7 The present paper addresses the under-explored issue of the role of politics in the construction of 8 9 10 masculinity, focusing specifically on political Confucianism and men’s doing of gender in the 11 12 context of Hong Kong’s recent turbulent history. Between 2014 and 2016 we conducted a series 13 14 of paired interviews and focus groups with 10 Hong Kong men from differing social 15 16 17 backgrounds. Through cooperative grounded inquiry, we demonstrate how political events and 18 19 figures provided points of reference for these men in the construction and performance of 20 21 22 masculinities. We emphasize the importance of Confucian hierarchical harmony to gender 23 24 performance, elaborating three cultural logics—respectability, responsibility, and romance— 25 26 underpinning the doing of Hong Kong masculinities. We thereby shed light on the mutual 27 28 29 constitution of personal and political selves and how men define and redefine masculine ideals in 30 31 times of political turbulence. 32 33 34 Keywords: Masculinities; Umbrella Movement; Confucianism; Gender; Social 35 36 Movements 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 3 2 3 4 5 Talking Politics, Performing Masculinities: Stories of Hong Kong Men Before and After the 6 7 Umbrella Movement 8 9 Umbrella M 10 The political turbulence surrounding the recent “ ovement” campaign for 11 12 democracy in Hong Kong had a major impact on everyday social life, offering a unique 13 14 opportunity for researchers to investigate the gendered intersections between personal and 15 16 17 political space. In the present paper we focus specifically on the construction and performance of 18 19 masculinity in the context of the protest and its aftermath. In so doing we address the 20 21 22 underexplored role of politics in the making of masculinities, in particular, the interrelationship 23 24 between political Confucianism and gender relations in a Chinese society. We analyze the ways 25 26 men do gender in their everyday lives and what this reveals about the reciprocal interaction 27 28 29 between the (re)negotiation of masculinities and contested politics, as well as how they locate 30 31 themselves in relation to the Chinese nation and to local patriarchal figures. In exploring the 32 33 34 multiple and shifting positions men take up in relation to political events, personalities, and the 35 36 state, we also evaluate the conceptual utility of the concept of hegemonic masculinity—the 37 38 39 dominant or “culturally exalted” ideal of manhood within a given culture (Connell 1995, p. 77). 40 41 As is widely acknowledged, however, hegemonic masculine ideals are rarely attained by most 42 43 44 men but rather serve as exemplars in relation to which men can define themselves (see Connell 45 46 and Messerschmidt 2005). 47 48 The relationship between Confucianism and male domination has been well documented 49 50 51 (Evans 1997; Louie 2002) and is central to any study of Chinese gender relations. The 52 53 relationship between Chinese politics and Confucianism has also received attention (Bell 2008). 54 55 56 But what happens when the political Confucianism that legitimates gendered, generational, and 57 58 wider social hierarchies is challenged? The Umbrella Movement constituted such a challenge 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 4 2 3 4 5 and thus enables us to explore how ordinary men respond to the consequent unsettling of 6 7 hegemonic masculine norms. In tackling the complex interrelationships between hegemonic 8 9 masculinity, political Confucianism, and everyday gender performances, it is necessary to take 10 11 12 account of the particular forms of hegemonic and subordinate masculinities characteristic of 13 14 Hong Kong. In so doing we draw attention to the “hierarchical harmony” that underpins both 15 16 17 familial relationships and the relationship between individuals and the state (Ho, Jackson and 18 19 Kong 2017, p.5). We argue that the Confucian focus on harmony and hierarchy—rather than 20 21 22 freedom, participation, and autonomy—interacts with gender ideals to shape men’s life choices 23 24 and political views. Adapting Fosse’s (2010) concept of cultural logics, we identify three cultural 25 26 negotiation of local, 27 logics that have emerged from our data and which underpin men’s 28 29 Confucian-inflected, masculine ideals: respectability, responsibility, and romance. Respectability 30 31 refers to the ways in which men seek to represent themselves as morally upright husbands, 32 33 34 fathers, and citizens. Responsibility concerns the expectation that men provide moral leadership 35 36 in their families. Romance denotes the small space men carve out for themselves through 37 38 39 extramarital adventures that could compromise respectability and responsibility if not kept 40 41 within acceptable bounds. 42 43 44 Masculine subjectivity is a result of constant negotiation of self and cultural ideals in 45 46 different domains of life, including men’s roles as citizens and national subjects. Feminist 47 48 scholars have, for some time, been aware of the ways in which the construction of nationhood is 49 50 51 gendered (Nagel 1998; Yuval-Davis 1997), and in recent years there has been a growing interest 52 53 in the relationship between masculinity and the resurgence of nationalism in various countries 54 55 56 (Banerjee 2012; Riabov and Riabova 2014). Little attention, however, has been paid to how the 57 58 politics of the nation relate to men’s everyday lives, which is our concern here. The relationship 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 5 2 3 4 5 between Hong Kong and , and thus the relationship between individuals and the nation, is 6 7 central to the recent protests in Hong Kong. 8 9 Our study involved a series of paired and focus group interviews with 10 Hong Kong men 10 11 12 from different backgrounds, who varied by age, social class, sexual identity and political 13 14 orientation, and conducted in the period from 2014 to 2016 when discussions of politics and 15 16 17 protest permeated Hong Kong people’s daily lives. In exploring how Hong Kong men do gender 18 19 in times of political turbulence, we focus specifically on how their participation or non- 20 21 22 participation in the campaign for democracy has influenced the construction and performance of 23 24 masculinity. In bringing issues of politics and citizenship into the conceptualization of 25 26 masculinity, we will analyze the interplay between politics and gender: how political 27 28 29 circumstances are implicated in gendered ideals and performances and, conversely, how gender 30 31 informs individuals’ understanding of and engagement with political events. 32 33 34 The Political Background 35 36 When Hong Kong was handed back to China in 1997, it was under an agreement between 37 38 39 China and the United Kingdom whereby Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region 40 41 (SAR) of China that would retain a degree of political and legal autonomy. The limited 42 43 44 democratization Hong Kong was permitted has since been “carefully managed from above” by 45 46 the central government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Ma 2011, p. 55). As a result, 47 48 China is believed by many Hong Kong people to have reneged on the “one country, two 49 50 51 systems” agreement that was integral to the terms of the handover (Davis 2015, p. 101). 52 53 The organization Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) was established in March 54 55 56 2013 to campaign for a genuinely democratic election of the city’s Chief Executive in 2017. 57 58 OCLP organized seminars, conducted a referendum, and planned to block roads in the Central 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 6 2 3 4 5 Business District (CBD) if the government did not provide an electoral system that satisfied 6 7 international standards of (Lee and Chan 2016). The OCLP movement 8 9 received much attention from the PRC and dominated local media coverage throughout 2013 and 10 11 12 2014. In August 2014, the PRC proposed a committee of only 1,200 people to elect the Chief 13 14 Executive. In response, OCLP leaders resorted to their plan to occupy the CBD, but it was 15 16 17 student protesters who were the first to take to the streets in late September. When riot police 18 19 fired rounds of tear gas on September 28, 2014, many more citizens joined them. The scripted 20 21 22 Occupy Central became a decentralized movement. Because umbrellas were used as protection 23 24 against pepper spray and tear gas, the protest became known as the Umbrella Movement. 25 26 Demonstrators occupied major roads in some of the city's busiest districts (Admiralty, Mongkok 27 28 29 and Causeway Bay), setting up tents and makeshift barricades. The protests lasted for almost 3 30 31 months until December 15 when the police cleared the last occupied site. 32 33 34 Although the Umbrella Movement gained considerable public support, this was far from 35 36 universal. Many objected to the disruption it caused and saw it as socially divisive. In talking to 37 38 39 men with a variety of views on the occupation and the wider democracy campaign, the links 40 41 between their politics and their understandings of masculinity and their roles as men came to the 42 43 44 fore. As we will go on to elaborate, it became clear that men’s gender performance was 45 46 contingent on political circumstances and the political discourses circulating in Hong Kong 47 48 society. 49 50 51 Masculinities as Contextualized Social Practices 52 53 Masculinity is not monolithic (Connell 2005); even in a single sociocultural context there 54 55 56 are multiple ways of being masculine and performing masculinity. The gap between hegemonic 57 58 masculine ideals and men’s actual practices and experiences, as well as the varied contextual and 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 7 2 3 4 5 structural conditions men face, means that contradictions and compromises are inevitable 6 7 (Boratav et al. 2014; Choi and Peng 2016) and is indicative of the potential for change and 8 9 fluidity in the meanings and practices of masculinity (Johansson and Ottemo 2015; Kimmel 10 11 12 2005; Messerschmidt 2012). Those who are unable to aspire to idealized or dominant standards 13 14 of masculinity can find alternative way of being men. Walker (2006, p. 5) observed what he calls 15 16 17 “protest masculinities” among working class American men, enacted through forms of sexual 18 19 banter and horseplay. Although these particular practices may not apply to Hong Kong Chinese 20 21 22 men, the idea of protest masculinity, through which men can create a sense of comfort and 23 24 solidarity in the face of more powerful men, is potentially applicable to the Hong Kong setting. 25 26 Studies of masculinity have demonstrated increasing awareness of , the 27 28 29 interconnection between gender and other social divisions such as class, race, and sexuality 30 31 (Pompper 2010), and the multiplicity of masculinities across different local contexts (Beasley 32 33 34 2008; Boratav et al. 2014; Lusher and Robbins 2009). In one of the few studies to have focused 35 36 on the interaction between politics and gender, Strier (2014, p. 4) focused on the fathers of 37 38 39 children who were “disappeared” by the Argentinian government between 1976 and 1983. He 40 41 found that this traumatic personal loss transformed the previously accepted definition of 42 43 44 masculinity as predominantly authoritarian, indicating that large-scale political events may have 45 46 substantial and long-lasting influences on gender hierarchy. 47 48 Such dramatic political moments provide new contexts for “doing gender,” which might 49 50 51 modify gendered subjectivities. “[T]o ‘do’ gender is not always to live up to normative 52 53 conceptions of and masculinity; it is to engage in behavior at the risk of gender 54 55 56 assessment” (West and Zimmerman 1987, p. 136). In times of political turbulence men may face 57 58 new gendered expectations. Participants in social movements may experience disruption of their 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 8 2 3 4 5 everyday habits and assumptions (King 2006; Yang 2000), which may influence their perception 6 7 of gender norms. Momentous events such as the Umbrella Movement not only affect 8 9 participants. Furthermore, whether nonparticipants are supportive or unsupportive may make a 10 11 12 difference (Hensby 2015), which may have consequences for their doing and understanding of 13 14 gender; their perceptions of gender ideologies may be either reconstructed or reinforced due to 15 16 17 varying political stances. Normative gender order can also be re-established even through doing 18 19 gender differently; new configurations of masculine practices may take the position of hegemony 20 21 22 (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005), especially in times of political instability. 23 24 In applying the concept of hegemonic masculinity to China, Louie (2002) conceptualizes 25 26 Chinese masculinity as a balance of wen (cultural attainment) and wu (martial valor). He 27 28 29 contends that this wen-wu mechanism still operates in a hierarchical gender order that enables 30 31 certain men to dominate others (Louie 2012). “Soft” or wen masculinity is highly valued and 32 33 34 resonates with the neoliberal logic of globalization and business culture (Jankowiak and Li 35 36 2014), which prioritizes an adventurous spirit, metropolitan lifestyles, and global connections. 37 38 39 Jankowiak and Li (2014, p. 11) observe that even “deceitfulness” is rewarded as a masculine trait 40 41 within the “new risk economy.” Economic or earning capacity is seen as central to the 42 43 44 construction of contemporary Chinese masculinity (Hird 2016). Chinese hegemonic masculinity 45 46 is emerging as entrepreneurial and bound up with the maintenance of men’s dominance of 47 48 women (Zheng 2012). Within this context, failure to fulfill the breadwinning role can lead to a 49 50 51 masculinity crisis (Leung and Chan 2012). As in many other regions (World Health Organization 52 53 2014), Hong Kong men have higher rates of suicide (Hong Kong Jockey Club Centre for Suicide 54 55 56 Research and Prevention 2014) and lower levels of satisfaction with career and life in general 57 58 (Leung and Ip 2007) than women do, possibly as a result of economic pressure. In pursuit of 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 9 2 3 4 5 more autonomy, self-esteem, and romantic attachment that are seemingly absent from their 6 7 marital relationships, Chinese men resort to extramarital relationships to fulfil their needs for 8 9 affiliation, recognition, and achievement (Ho, 2012). 10 11 12 In the macro political context, Confucian precepts have been incorporated into Chinese 13 14 nationalism and attitudes toward foreign powers (Bell 2008; Jiang 2013), leaving Western 15 16 17 democratic ideals little foothold in . Yet comparative political studies have failed 18 19 to engage with Chinese feminist theorizing in addressing political Confucianism, thereby 20 21 22 ignoring its gendered constitution and implications (Blanchard and Lin 2016). Confucian 23 24 ideology is gendered at its core in that male authority starts with the family and permeates every 25 26 level of the societal hierarchy until it reaches the center of political power, be that the emperor or 27 28 29 president (Sung and Pascall 2014). It is important to understand and take account of how the 30 31 Confucian focus on harmony and hierarchy interacts with gender ideals to shape life choices and 32 33 34 political views. 35 36 Social movements in China have been analyzed through the lens of microfoundations 37 38 39 such as relational repression (Deng and O’Brien 2013), bargained authoritarianism (Lee and 40 41 Zhang 2013), and informal concessions (Distelhorst 2015). The gendered aspects of Chinese 42 43 44 activism, however, remain relatively underexplored (see Zeng, 2016, for an exception). In what 45 46 follows, we contribute to addressing this gap in the literature through considering linkages 47 48 among political Confucianism, hegemonic masculinity, and the everyday doing of gender in 49 50 51 Hong Kong men’s accounts of the impact of the Umbrella Movement. We show how men’s 52 53 perceptions of social order and disorder are related to their orientations to their families and their 54 55 56 sense of their masculine obligations. 57 58 Method 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 10 2 3 4 5 Data Collection 6 7 We employed cooperative grounded inquiry (Kong 2016) in our study which merges the 8 9 principles of cooperative inquiry (Heron 1996) and grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967). 10 11 12 Grounded theory begins with a question or even just with the collection of qualitative data. As 13 14 researchers review the data collected, repeated ideas, concepts or elements become apparent and 15 16 17 are tagged with codes. As more data are collected, and as data are re-reviewed, codes can be 18 19 grouped into concepts, and then into categories. These categories may become the basis for new 20 21 22 theory. Cooperative grounded inquiry (CGI) is an offshoot of this methodology that aims for a 23 24 more democratic production of knowledge in aid of grounded theory technique of constant 25 26 comparative analysis (Kong, 2016). Participants are considered as co-researchers in a CGI 27 28 29 because they are constantly invited to create concepts (linguistic constructs) to make sense of the 30 31 lived experiences discussed in the interview(s). By constantly comparing and contrasting the 32 33 34 lived experiences of participants and making sense of the similarities and differences together, 35 36 languages used by the initiating researcher and the participants are open to scrutiny by each 37 38 39 other. 40 41 In keeping with our cooperative grounded theory methodology, our research evolved over 42 43 44 time and in response to issues raised by our participants. This evolution was influenced by 45 46 external events—the OCLP campaign for democracy and the Umbrella Movement occupation 47 48 and its aftermath—and the way our participants made sense of them. We have identified five 49 50 51 phases of data collection each one informing the next and raising new research questions. As a 52 53 result of this process and the political context, our research focus shifted over time. Because of 54 55 56 this shift, the data we present here comes only from Phases 2 to 5. 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 11 2 3 4 5 Phase 1. The first author, with the support of the General Research Fund, conducted a 6 7 study of Hong Kong men’s sexual choices based on a sample of 20 men from diverse 8 9 backgrounds who had cross-border relationships and who were recruited through snowball 10 11 12 sampling. This step informed Phase 2, at which point the research focus began to shift, so that 13 14 this first phase simply forms the backdrop to the present study. 15 16 17 Phase 2. This second phase was initially conceived as building on the findings from 18 19 Phase 1, exploring further men’s understandings of good and bad behavior in intimate 20 21 22 relationships. Three pairs of participants were interviewed, including two men from the Phase 1 23 24 study. Participants were purposively sampled to maximize diversity in age, class, occupation, 25 26 sexual orientation, and social/family background. They ranged in age from 28- to 70-years-old, 27 28 29 with education levels from primary through to postgraduate and a range of occupations, some of 30 31 which changed over the period of the project of the project. They had varied political stances 32 33 34 (see Table 1; pairings 1–3). 35 36 We adopted unstructured in-depth interviewing in which participants were invited to 37 38 39 narrate their life experiences and express their political opinions in an informal conversational 40 41 setting. Each interview was conducted with two paired participants and lasted for 2–4 hours. We 42 43 44 chose this unusual method of paired stranger interviews to establish a homosocial environment 45 46 for “men talk.” The presentation of masculinity in everyday life varies in different social 47 48 contexts, and men are observed to talk differently among themselves from the way they talk to 49 50 51 women (Johnston and Morrison 2007; Kimmel 2005). Because the interviewer was a female 52 53 scholar, pairing men was intended to provide an immediate point of male reference and a space 54 55 56 for male-on-male narratives (Wade 2000). All interviews were video-recorded with participants’ 57 58 consent and transcribed using pseudonyms chosen by participants. 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 12 2 3 4 5 The interviews took place from July to early September 2014, just before the Umbrella 6 7 Movement began, when the OCLP campaign was much in the news. A central question put to 8 9 them was what makes a puk gaai [bastard, cad]? The responses to this question proved pivotal to 10 11 12 our shift of focus because the men constructed their narratives around political events and figures 13 14 in Hong Kong. It became evident that the contentious were central to how 15 16 17 these men understood and accounted for their conduct and that this informed the further 18 19 development of our project. It was then that the occupation began, disrupting everyday life, and 20 21 22 our research was put on hold for the duration. 23 24 Phase 3. A few months after the occupation ended, we resumed work on the project and 25 26 interviewed these three pairs of men again. In the meantime, two of the men had joined the 27 28 29 protest, but were not centrally involved. This second round of interviews enabled us to explore 30 31 changes in the men’s construction of masculinities. We began each interview by showing the 32 33 34 men extracts from the video recording of their first interview and discussing this visual data. This 35 36 opening helped to further inform them about the project and deepen their understanding of what 37 38 39 they had consented to do. It also facilitated recall and enabled them to discuss interpretations of 40 41 their interaction with the researchers (Collier and Wyer 2016) in keeping with the precepts of 42 43 44 cooperative grounded inquiry. The interviews subsequently focused on their views and 45 46 experience of the movement, the impact it had on their personal lives, and their changing 47 48 perception of themselves. 49 50 51 Phases 4 and 5. In order deepen our understanding of the interrelationship between 52 53 gender and politics, we then organized a mixed focus-group discussion with six women and five 54 55 56 men in May 2016 (Phase 4). We sampled purposively to include individuals with a variety of 57 58 social characteristics (occupation, education, sexuality, etc.) and who had a variety of political 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 13 2 3 4 5 stances from those who had been very actively involved in the occupation to those who opposed 6 7 it. The discussion was organized around the ways the Umbrella Movement had influenced 8 9 Of the five men in the focus group, four were new recruits 10 people’s intimate relationships. 11 12 (Thomas, Hing, Shmily and Keung, see Table 1 for further details). Because we needed an 13 14 additional man to obtain a better gender balance in the group, we included one from Phase 2, 15 16 17 Hei. He was chosen because he had been open and provocative in his narratives, which we 18 19 judged would encourage others to talk, and which proved to be the case. In Phase 5, the four new 20 21 22 male participants in the focus-group were formed into two pairs Pairings 4 and 5 in Table 1) and 23 24 were interviewed twice, following the same procedures as in Phases 2 and 3. 25 26 Data Analysis 27 28 29 Analysis was ongoing throughout in keeping with the grounded theory method so that 30 31 data collection and analysis went on in parallel and the analysis was continually reappraised by 32 33 34 the team. From Phase 2 onwards, transcripts of the recordings were analyzed using line-by-line 35 36 coding and thematic coding, and, in keeping with the constant comparative method (Charmaz 37 38 39 2014), the emerging themes guided the interviewer’s questions in later phrases. We sought to 40 41 reflect on instances of agency, contradiction, and conflict in the narratives in order to investigate 42 43 44 change and fluidity in gender identities and ideologies (Johansson and Ottemo 2015). Due to the 45 46 political events occurring during our study, some of the narratives were not coherent and 47 48 changed through the span of the project. Their formation was an ongoing process that responded 49 50 51 to events as they unfolded. 52 53 Results 54 55 56 We begin this discussion of our data by showing how participants drew analogies 57 58 between the personal and the political in a time of political instability. We then elaborate on the 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 14 2 3 4 5 three main themes emerging from our coding—respectability, responsibility and romance— 6 7 which we identify as elements of the local “cultural logics” (Fosse 2010) of masculinity. These 8 9 themes and their subthemes, along with coding descriptions and prototypical personal and 10 11 12 political examples, are reported in Table 2. In addition, more information about the men quoted 13 14 in the following can be found in Table 1. 15 16 17 During the interviews, our discussion always flowed back-and-forth between personal 18 19 matters and the current political situation in Hong Kong. The links were often established 20 21 22 through drawing an analogy between gender and macro-politics. We found that all participants 23 24 made use of familial metaphors when they talked about Occupy Central and the Umbrella 25 26 Movement. When they talked about masculinities in their personal life, they often cited examples 27 28 29 of the wrongdoings of public figures to justify the discrepancy between their perceptions of ideal 30 31 masculinity and their own behavior. Alternating between personal and public sites of masculine 32 33 34 identities constituted a cultural logic for self-formation and self-justification. More importantly, 35 36 we argue that these cultural references drawn from Chinese patriarchy reflect the political 37 38 39 environment in Hong Kong where different representations of masculinity serve as metaphors for 40 41 different models of political authority (see Dudink et al. 2012). 42 43 44 Paul expressed a widely held view: “The relationship between Hong Kong and the 45 46 People’s Republic of China is like that of father and son. China is the father and Hong Kong is 47 48 the son.” This can be regarded as “common sense” for Hong Kong people where, after the 49 50 51 handover, the central government of the PRC is colloquially referred to as “grandpa” [Ah Yae]. 52 53 The HKSAR government is then imagined as the “father,” and Hong Kong citizens take the 54 55 56 position of “son.” It was apparent in some men’s discourses that Hong Kong politics was closely 57 58 intertwined with Chinese patriarchy where unequal power relationships were taken as part of the 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 15 2 3 4 5 natural order. This familial hierarchy was seen as too deep-rooted to shake or too costly to fight 6 7 against. For example, Tom believed that Hong Kong people should present themselves as 8 9 humble and harmless to grandpa, because that was where the real power lay and the child had 10 “ ” 11 12 no choice but do what he was told. Whether seniors were right or wrong was irrelevant. 13 14 According to Wah, to resist was to “stab oneself with two knives.” He equated the Umbrella 15 16 17 Movement with public suicide. Hei, who also described the Umbrella Movement as a suicidal 18 19 gesture, chose to adopt a strategy of faking obedience to the senior power; he said: “I am ‘yellow 20 21 22 ribbon’ [pro-democratic] in my heart, but to survive, I would say: ‘I love my country!’” 23 24 Although most participants accepted the authority structure, we also observed significant 25 26 moments of dissent when some participants, inspired by the Umbrella Movement, broke away 27 28 29 from social and political expectations and reinvented moral relationships in both their personal 30 31 and political lives (Thomas, Keung). Throughout our study, there was affirmation, reflection, 32 33 34 negotiation, and contestation in relation to conventional gender prescriptions, which were 35 36 illustrated through the themes we now discuss. 37 38 39 Respectability 40 41 When talking about the respectability of a masculine subject, either a man or a 42 43 44 masculinized state, the narratives of our participants were constructed around two interwoven 45 46 issues: first, the dominant and submissive characteristic of Chinese familial and political culture; 47 48 secondly the ability to earn or accumulate wealth so as to fulfil the central role of breadwinner. 49 50 51 With the putative grandfather-and-grandson relationship between Beijing and Hong Kong 52 53 citizens, some participants believed that the Umbrella Movement was not a desirable strategy 54 55 56 because it created rifts between “family members,” even when they agreed that the oppression by 57 58 the government had become increasingly blatant (Tom, Hei). This view was frequently 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 16 2 3 4 5 buttressed by paternalistic metaphors, constituted by the traditional Confucian values of filial 6 7 piety infused with neoliberal logic. Respectability was predominantly demonstrated through 8 9 monetary support of the family and financial dependability. This also reflected the economic 10 11 12 relationship between China and Hong Kong: 13 14 However you organize [the protest], it’ll be Hong Kong’s loss. Mainland’s 15 16 17 attitude towards Hong Kong has changed from very nice to assertive in recent 18 19 years. Like in a family, parents will treat the son better if the son makes a lot of 20 21 22 money, and change their attitude when he doesn’t. (Wah) 23 24 Here we see a post-socialist model of materialistic subjectivity (Rofel 2007) that 25 26 underpinned Paul sovereignty. The political relationship between 27 ’s and Wah’s notion of familial 28 29 China and Hong Kong was not only narrated as familial but also financial. Respectability is 30 31 gained through reciprocal financial support: the father provides for the son who is then expected 32 33 34 to make money to repay the paternal investment. From an economic perspective, the integration 35 36 with China and the opening up of business opportunities has restructured Hong Kong’s society 37 38 39 (Lui 2009). This has led to Hong Kong’s increased economic dependence on China (Kaeding 40 41 2014), which reinforces the relationship of father and son. In the Beijing inspired anti-Occupy 42 43 44 propaganda, the movement was depicted as the deliberate destruction of economic activities led 45 46 by foreign forces (Hua 2014). Within the familial analogy, Hong Kong was depicted as losing 47 48 out to its brothers, such as Shanghai and Shenzhen, in terms of economic contribution, 49 50 51 productivity, and strength by becoming the “disobedient son” who deserved to be punished. Half 52 53 of the men (Tom, Wah, Hei, Hing, and Shmily) disagreed with the tactics of Occupy Central 54 55 56 because of its potential to harm the economy without making positive political gains. Hei was the 57 58 only one who changed his view. Once it had happened he came to think that the Umbrella 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 17 2 3 4 5 Movement had been successful in terms of gaining international attention, although he had not 6 7 joined the protest. 8 9 The association between respectability and financial dependability aligned with most 10 11 12 participants’ perception of ideal masculinity as equating with material achievement. When 13 14 discussing what it was to be a good man, most of them said that it involved providing sufficient 15 16 17 material support to partner and family to gain respect. Paul and Hei saw their partners’ financial 18 19 dependency on them as confirmation of their role as men; for them, providing material support 20 21 22 justified their expectation that their partners would respect them and legitimated their dominance 23 24 in the relationship. Paul said: “My wife totally depends on me financially, so of course she has to 25 26 . This sexist intertwining of financial dependency and obedience was 27 listen to me as I’m the boss ” 28 29 extended from romantic relationships to the rest of the family. As Hei described it: “Because I 30 31 am the boss of the house … there is no one holding an opposite stance in my closest circle…. It 32 33 34 is not limited to this event [the Umbrella Movement]. It applies to everything.” He then justified 35 36 this undemocratic practice: “I do not provide democracy [to my partner] but I am very loyal. She 37 38 39 can accept me being undemocratic but loyal. Deal!” (Hei) 40 41 Whereas this pair of participants (Paul and Hei) both took pride in their financial 42 43 44 dependability, another pair of participants (Joe and Chiu) struggled with the pressure of 45 46 providing for their families, especially Joe who suffered during the economic downturn in 2008 47 48 and had a life-threatening bout of avian flu in 2014. Joe’s need for social recognition and self- 49 50 51 esteem was fulfilled by his partner’s financial dependence on him, without which she would be 52 53 unlovable in his eyes: “I used to date many women who earned more money than me and were 54 55 56 comparatively demanding. They were good women but I didn’t feel good…. I like my wife very 57 58 much because she does whatever I say.” Similarly, Chiu, a journalist, who earned less than his 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 18 2 3 4 5 wife, expressed intimate insecurity: “I advanced pretty quickly [in the journalistic industry], but I 6 7 cannot help that the industry is shrinking. It is like when the Titanic was sinking, you can climb 8 9 up to higher levels, but you are still doomed to sink. conducted the second paired 10 ” When we 11 12 interview after the Umbrella Movement, Chiu had left journalism and worked in a transport 13 14 company in mainland China. 15 16 17 Joe and Chiu shared strong feelings of resentment toward successful capitalists. In talking 18 19 about Li Ka Shing, a local legend of entrepreneurship, and his dominance over the Hong Kong 20 21 22 property market, Chiu said: “The worst thing is that these bad rich guys manipulate Hong Kong 23 24 people’s lives…. He has sold out the entire Hong Kong society.” For them, the real puk gaai 25 26 [bastard, cad] were those who exploited others and took away their life chances, reflected on a 27 28 29 larger scale in the masculinized global finance industry (Griffin 2012). Both of them supported 30 31 the Umbrella Movement, in a pragmatic way. Joe said: “Once people’s interests are threatened, 32 33 34 they will stand up.” Although these participants (Paul, Hei, Chiu, Joe) expressed similar desires 35 36 for social recognition through providing for their partners and families, they took different 37 38 39 stances on politics due to their own differentiated economic power. In general, Chiu and Joe felt 40 41 their respectability as men was endangered by economic inequality. 42 43 44 Respectability for most participants was also linked to the acceptance of authority. This 45 46 had been naturalized through inculcation into submission since childhood when most had to 47 48 submit completely to a superior male figure (e.g., a father or eldest brother) who represented 49 50 51 absolute authority. Challenge to this authority was not allowed, in one case even into adulthood: 52 53 My eldest brother is in charge of everything. We dare not say “no” to him. I have 54 55 56 tried to tell him my opinions and he has beaten me up to a point I was 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 19 2 3 4 5 hospitalized, several times. Therefore, I never dare to say “no.” I lived in terror. 6 7 (Keung) 8 9 In this kind of authoritarian familial relationship, children learn to satisfy the authority 10 11 12 figures’ demands and expectations through absolute obedience and self-oppression (Yeh 2009). 13 14 For over 2,000 years the ruling powers in China, whether dynastic or communist, have drawn 15 16 17 from Confucianism—overtly or covertly—to strengthen their political sovereignty. In particular, 18 19 the notion of filial piety has been utilized to enforce the ideology of “patriarchal parental 20 21 22 authority as a representation of the emperor’s absolute authority” (Yeh et al. 2013, p. 279). 23 24 Therefore, resistance tactics suggested by the Occupy Central Movement throughout the year of 25 26 2013 were seen as useless and stupid (Tom, Wah, Hei, Paul, Joe, Hing, Chiu), even though some 27 28 29 of them supported universal suffrage (Hei, Paul, Joe, Chiu). They believed that the protest would 30 31 only provoke the PRC into becoming violent and more autocratic. Hong Kong citizens would 32 33 34 suffer in the long term. Some participants (Paul, Chiu) believed that only when the movement’s 35 36 leaders adopted a radical and violent path, instead of calculating every strategic move, could the 37 38 39 people win the right to bargain for political reforms. 40 41 There were participants who adjusted their political stances through a process of personal 42 43 44 and political reflection during and after the Umbrella Movement. Self-identified as pro- 45 46 democratic at heart, Hei reflected on his roles as son and “the grandson of Beijing,” as well as his 47 48 privileged position in his own household: 49 50 51 I did not challenge my father’s decisions because I trusted him to a certain extent. 52 53 I thought it was okay to let him choose. Now I have grown up and I do not want 54 55 56 the government to choose for me, but the government dare not let us choose…. 57 58 When I think about my relationship with the people below me in my family, on 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 20 2 3 4 5 what grounds can I believe that the younger ones can choose a better path for 6 7 themselves, rather than the decisions made by me? (Hei) 8 9 Throughout the span of our project, Hei expressed complex emotions and took contradictory 10 11 12 stances toward Occupy Central/the Umbrella Movement. Before the occupation, he said 13 14 youngsters were being manipulated and used as a tool. After the movement, he said the student 15 16 17 protestors had persuaded him, although he did not participate in the protest. He was moved by 18 19 the spectacle but the matrix of patriarchal views to which he had subscribed led to confusion. He 20 21 22 was unsure how far he could go to challenge both the familial and political hierarchies and was 23 24 constrained to conform by his role as a civil servant. 25 26 Another participant, Thomas, camped on the street for 60 nights of the 79 days of the occupation. 27 28 29 For him the Umbrella Movement was a site of personal reflection on his own position in his 30 31 family. He wrote several letters to his daughters from the occupation after pondering about his 32 33 34 life. He was a businessman and had several factories in mainland China: 35 36 That was the first time I apologized [to my elder daughter from my first wife]. I 37 38 39 was an autocratic person because I am an elder son. I decided most of the things, 40 41 big and small. And I told her I was wrong. When my wife read the letters she 42 43 44 found it so strange…. The biggest effect of the whole movement on me was that I 45 46 have become softer. I thought I was a really tough person in the past. (Thomas) 47 48 Here we see a personal consequence of the political. For Thomas, the Umbrella Movement was a 49 50 51 site of political protest that also led to personal transformation. Although he kept saying that he 52 53 was a terrible husband and father throughout the interviews, he had become more communicative 54 55 56 and open-minded. He also said he stopped being homophobic after spending some time with gay 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 21 2 3 4 5 protesters. In the pursuit of a democratic relationship between the government and citizens, he 6 7 also sought to democratize his personal life. 8 9 Responsibility 10 11 12 In addition to the primary financial responsibility of supporting one’s family, the men 13 14 talked about a range of responsibilities which, as leaders of their family, they should perform 15 16 17 publicly as male citizens. For pro-establishment participants, there was a perceived moral 18 19 responsibility to teach young people correct thinking and rescue them from being swayed by evil 20 21 22 (pro-democratic) politicians. Moreover, two of our participants (Joe, Chiu) perceived the wider 23 24 political upheavals as compromising their ability to be good men in private life and thus held a 25 26 pessimistic view that causing less harm was an ideal quality as a responsible man in public 27 “ ” 28 29 life. 30 31 When talking about masculinity, most of the interviewees referred to their own fathers. 32 33 34 As was the case with puk gaai and public figures, they made sense of themselves as gendered 35 36 beings in relation to others. They typically did not want to replicate the way their fathers treated 37 38 39 women: “He hated trouble. When I was born, he ignored my mum. She cycled to the hospital on 40 41 her own” (Chiu). Some other participants were abandoned by their fathers (Joe, Shmily), an act 42 43 44 seen as the ultimate irresponsible male behavior. When these men became fathers themselves, 45 46 they attempted to embody the role of a wise teacher for their children and distance themselves 47 48 from the puk gaai in the political sphere who, they thought, led young people down the wrong 49 50 51 path. Some (Tom, Wah) insisted that it was “irresponsible and immoral” of political leaders to 52 53 involve young people in illegal actions, which “may well tarnish their future”: 54 55 56 [The Occupy Central leaders] mislead young people into causing unnecessary 57 58 harm and destruction in this city. All the people they negatively influenced, be 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 22 2 3 4 5 they police officers, storekeepers or drivers, are just common citizens when they 6 7 get off work. Protesters will only screw up these people’s lives. (Tom) 8 9 Similarly, Shmily saw young people as being influenced by irresponsible leaders: A lot 10 “ 11 12 of people are behind these students’ actions. They are grown men. They should know 13 14 how to be responsible…. Young people just make excuses to camp outside. I have heard 15 16 17 that there were a lot of condoms around.” 18 19 In taking up a position “outside the game” and above the crowd, these participants 20 21 22 attempted to emerge as rational subjects who were obliged to teach these young people as “good 23 24 fathers” and protect them from “bad fathers” or “dangerous men.” Taking up such a protective 25 26 to those they seek to protect. By comparing 27 role can enhance men’s dominance in relation 28 29 themselves with selfish politicians and social movement leaders, these men reinforced their 30 31 superior position in the family and society with this imaginary heroic stance. 32 33 34 Other participants (Joe, Chiu) reacted differently to the challenge of being a responsible 35 36 man at a chaotic time. The participants who supported the democratic camp witnessed the 37 38 39 spectacle of, and then the crackdown on, the Umbrella Movement. They were forced to accept 40 41 that it had not brought about universal suffrage. In the face of this reality, some of them retreated 42 43 44 to the position that a family focus and attempting to cause less harm was sufficient. Their high 45 46 ideals seemed unattainable and sometimes interfered with them performing well as ordinary 47 48 men. As Chiu put it: “When your claims are too big, they get the better of you and you start to 49 50 51 deceive yourself.” Joe, too, expressed concern about the consequences of political action: 52 53 Let’s leave our fate to God. I would just follow the rules and not get into trouble. I 54 55 56 do not want to end up in jail…. When you are married and have kids, you cannot 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 23 2 3 4 5 do much. I need to work hard and bring money home, so my wife will not suffer 6 7 and my kids will not stay poor. I have to face reality. (Joe) 8 9 , sang yu luen sai yau jung jaak yum [Being born in 10 Contrary to the movement’s motto “ ” 11 12 a dark time comes with certain responsibilities], these men wanted to retreat from the public 13 14 scene and fulfill their responsibilities in their personal lives as a way of preserving what security 15 16 17 they had. Responsibility as a breadwinner remained a pivotal masculine trait, and it was used as a 18 19 strategy to compensate for their powerlessness in the public arena. As Hei put it: “Under these 20 21 22 circumstances it is important not to let myself be apathetic. Actually this is already sufficient.” 23 24 This is a reversal of using the misdeeds of public figures to justify their personal 25 26 misconduct. Here they argue that being a responsible man in private life can be used to 27 28 29 legitimate their inaction in public life. Paying attention to the news and causing less harm were 30 31 their ways of engaging with politics and, in their view, making Hong Kong a better place. Over 32 33 34 their lifetime some older participants had experienced past turbulent political events. Inaction 35 36 and moaning about puk gaai seemed to be a safer and more pragmatic strategy for them. “I was 37 38 39 angry when the June 4 [Tiananmen Square] massacre happened,” Wah said. “But I changed very 40 41 soon because I saw through it. The game was over…. More than 20 years [have] passed. You all 42 43 44 still continue to protest and hinder my business [as a taxi driver].” Shmily also referred to the 45 46 past in explaining his view of the Umbrella Movement: “I have experienced a lot. At the time of 47 48 June 4 and the 1967 riot, I did not take to the streets either. In my opinion, those who do not 49 50 51 possess political wisdom should not participate in politics.” 52 53 These political traumas constituted a major part of their beliefs. Most of our participants 54 55 56 thought there was no such thing as “one country, two systems” (Wah, Tom, Joe, Chiu, Hei, 57 58 Hing). Identifying with the rising power of mainland China, according to some, was the only 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 24 2 3 4 5 way to live a better life (Wah, Tom, Hing). At least one has plans to migrate elsewhere (Hei). For 6 7 only a minority of our participants did resistance remain an important responsibility (Thomas, 8 9 Keung). Keung was resisting his autocratic family as well as the state and saw personal 10 11 12 responsibility as an important part of this resistance. In justifying his involvement in the protest 13 14 against his family’s wishes, he said: “I have my own opinions. I will take responsibility for what 15 16 17 I do.” Thomas was among the most active participants in the Umbrella Movement. When he 18 19 explained his choice to take to the street, he talked of his experiences as a father. Although he 20 21 22 shared in the general pessimism about Hong Kong’s future, he saw it as his responsibility, as a 23 24 man and protector of his family, to take action: 25 26 Every day over those years I wanted to make more and more money.... I have 27 28 29 never been to any protests in those years. I am not a registered voter. Therefore I 30 31 apologized to my daughter. I did not do any of these things and let Hong Kong 32 33 34 become what it is now. (Thomas) 35 36 Romance 37 38 39 There is a hegemonic culture of compulsory marriage in China where couples are 40 41 burdened with conventional familial responsibilities (Farrer 2013) and romance takes a backseat. 42 43 44 However, in extramarital relationships, men can find a space for romantic pursuits and personal 45 46 autonomy (Ho 2014; Shen 2005). None of our participants went so far as to question the social 47 48 institution of marriage and conventional family values. Instead, they were keen to discuss 49 50 51 strategies of concealing or confessing their extramarital relationships. We noted how they 52 53 portrayed political crisis and macrosocial problems as deserving more attention than minor 54 55 56 faults, such as their search for romance outside their marriages. The narratives on romance were 57 58 not directly related to the Umbrella Movement, but they were related to the wider context that 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 25 2 3 4 5 had given rise to the movement including corporate greed, useless politicians, and incompetent 6 7 social movement leaders who were seen as leading people down the wrong path. Public figures 8 9 who came in for criticism included Chief Executive Leung Chun Ying, seen contributing to the 10 11 12 political crisis, real estate tycoon Li Ka Shing, as well as Benny Tai, Kin Man Chan and other 13 14 social movement leaders. Reference to such examples was often central to attempts to 15 16 17 demonstrate the inconsequentiality of their own misconduct. The enthusiasm with which the men 18 19 spontaneously discussed public immorality, even when our questions did not directly address 20 21 22 politics, seemed to be a means of deflecting attention from their own sexual misdemeanors by 23 24 referring to these bigger crimes. 25 26 Most participants thought that the distinction between a good guy and a puk gaai should 27 28 29 not be solely based on what occurs in the private sphere, but should also include what one has 30 31 done in the public sphere—whether one has committed crimes comparable to those of major 32 33 34 political figures whose actions hurt other people (Tom, Joe, Chiu). By evaluating themselves 35 36 against poor standards in the political sphere, some sought to emerge as good guys even though 37 38 39 they could not fully meet the social expectations associated with being a respectable husband. 40 41 Bad politics was a convenient cultural resource on which men drew to do gender. 42 43 44 For most of these men, there were no universal principles by which someone was judged 45 46 to be an ideal man or, conversely, a puk gaai; men became puk gaai by being discovered doing 47 48 things that defied social expectations or undermined their own public claims to virtue. For 49 50 51 example, they thought that it was acceptable for men to watch pornography at home. However, 52 53 when Albert Ho, a respected legislator and solicitor in Hong Kong, was caught browsing photos 54 55 56 of sexy young women on his tablet device during a Legislative Council budget meeting, he was 57 58 considered a puk gaai because that was entirely inappropriate behavior. Therefore, masculine 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 26 2 3 4 5 ideals for them were not sets of objective criteria or ethical rules, but matters of presentation. In 6 7 terms of extramarital affairs, Hei and Paul emphasized that the golden rule was “to never admit 8 9 that you have had sex with 10 another even if your wife points a gun at you” (Paul). Hei 11 12 compared this rule to the current government: 13 14 Admitting to your wife that you have cheated on her is just like the government 15 16 17 admitting that the rain has damaged the High Speed Railway tunnel they are 18 19 building now. They are real puk gaai to dare to make such confession! (Hei) 20 21 22 Hei’s ideas of appropriate masculine marital conduct thus parallel how he perceives the 23 24 ideal ways for politicians to deal with political scandals. Whereas most participants saw 25 26 concealment as the best strategy, a few (Chiu, Thomas and Wah) believed it was more important 27 28 29 to confess their own shortcomings. Throughout our conversation, these three participants kept 30 31 claiming that they were bad guys, or just an “80-mark [80%] man” (Wah), although all of their 32 33 34 co-participants attempted to convince them they were not as bad as they thought. Chiu said, “Of 35 36 course I have to be honest with myself. Only fools would deceive themselves.” Wah also saw the 37 38 39 need to acknowledge one’s shortcomings: “Right is right. Wrong is wrong. You cannot use some 40 41 glamorous excuses to cover up…. My life-long pursuit is to be an 80/100 marks man, as a 42 43 44 husband and a son.” Chiu and Wah believed they were not perfect good men because they 45 46 inevitably made occasional mistakes. They considered it was important to be honest about their 47 48 imperfections to themselves and their intimate others. Wah believed all wives knew of their 49 50 51 husbands’ extramarital relationships: “Men think they can cover it up, but actually they cannot. 52 53 Women are smart.” Now he was satisfied with being an 80-mark man and maintained a 20% 54 55 56 allowance for occasional misbehavior such as extramarital affairs and gambling. 57 58 Discussion 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 27 2 3 4 5 Our 10 research participants had differing orientations to the social movement that were 6 7 related to different ways of affirming, negotiating, and contesting conventional gender 8 9 prescriptions. We have illustrated how these diverse political stances and experiences were 10 11 12 related to change and/or continuity in their identities, relationships, and how they see Hong Kong 13 14 society. Only two men, Thomas and Keung, participated intensely in the occupation and 15 16 17 certainly experienced significant changes in their self-perception. Two others, Joe and Chiu, 18 19 were more peripherally involved and exhibited some change in that they were more willing to 20 21 22 reflect on themselves and to question certain conventional beliefs about power and authority. Joe 23 24 was critical of police violence and wanted to see justice done. However, he felt that he was too 25 26 weak to do more because of his ill health and unemployed status. Chiu, although supportive of 27 28 29 the struggle for democracy, disagreed with some of the tactics employed by movement leaders. 30 31 The six non-participants in the movement were differentiated by whether they supported 32 33 34 its aims or not. Hei and Paul were supportive of the movement but had not been involved at all. 35 36 They had aspirations for higher ideals but they did not want to take actions that were not 37 38 39 effective in achieving goals. Hei, as a civil servant, could not be open about his political stance. 40 41 He said that he wanted to be a yellow-ribbon at heart but would profess his patriotism “should 42 43 44 the red-guards knock at my door.” His inaction resulted from his desire to preserve his hard-won 45 46 material success and, he implied, also his patriarchal privilege. The four who were unsupportive 47 48 of the movement were more insistent about the need to preserve social hierarchy and harmony 49 50 51 and were more inclined to accept China’s authority over Hong Kong (Hing, Wah, Tom and 52 53 Shmily). 54 55 56 In the end, most of the men maintained or reverted to the conventional logics of 57 58 masculinity in terms of respectability and responsibility: as providers for and authority figures in 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 28 2 3 4 5 their families and obedient citizens. Whereas some had become more reflexive about these 6 7 cultural logics, only Thomas and Keung explicitly redefined respectability and responsibility in 8 9 continuing to question patriarchal authority structures within family and society. They also 10 11 12 viewed the struggle for a more democratic future as part of their civic responsibility and their 13 14 duty to future generations. Most of the men also clung on to the right to extramarital romance as 15 16 17 their personal space, even if they admitted a degree of culpability. Thomas was the only one 18 19 prepared to see his past affairs as making him a bad husband and father; the others justified or 20 21 22 excused such behavior. 23 24 Theoretical Elaboration 25 26 Our findings suggest the need to theorize the interconnections between gender and 27 28 29 politics, both in general and in relation to Chinese societies. We begin to answer this need by 30 31 thinking through the application of the concept of hegemonic masculinity to Chinese 32 33 34 masculinities. It is now widely accepted that hegemonic masculine ideals in any given culture 35 36 and context are almost impossible for men to achieve (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; 37 38 39 Johnston and Morrison 2007; Kimmel 2005). Rather, as shown in previous studies, “[t]heir 40 41 negotiation of this tension define[s] them” (Hird 2016, p. 153). Our study illustrates the 42 43 44 conceptual utility of thinking of hegemonic masculine ideals as socially prescribed exemplars 45 46 against which men define themselves. Their masculinity might be subordinate in relation to 47 48 hegemonic ideals, but it is not marginal or deviant. It is a masculinity negotiated in relation to the 49 50 51 gap between the ideal and the possible; it is the way most men do masculinity in their everyday 52 53 lives. To understand this view, it is first necessary to consider the modern Chinese context. 54 55 56 The Chinese form of hegemonic masculinity is bound up with China’s economic 57 58 ascendancy and is an entrepreneurial masculinity, a product of the post-socialist marketization of 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 29 2 3 4 5 the economy. The ideal is a man who is economically individualistic, wealth-seeking, and 6 7 consuming, but also patriotic, loyal to the party-state, and obedient to higher authorities 8 9 (Kleinman et al. 2011; Zheng 2015). He thus establishes his respectability. He should also 10 11 12 demonstrate dominance over women while being a responsible husband and father and filial son. 13 14 These family ties do not preclude extramarital relationships. In reform era China, the hegemonic 15 16 17 masculinity embodied by wealthy men is constructed within a business environment involving 18 19 “nightly carousing with business partners, mistresses, and paid hostesses” though which such 20 21 22 men are “creating and enacting a particular version of masculinity that is associated with being a 23 24 man of status and wealth in post-Mao China” (Osburg 2016, p. 163; see also Osburg 2013; 25 26 Uretsky 2016; Zhen 27 g 2012). A husband’s responsibility to his family, and thus his public 28 29 respectability, should nonetheless be maintained within this ideal of masculinity, including 30 31 support of wife, children, and elders. This balance involves maintaining a strict segregation 32 33 34 between the social worlds of family and business. 35 36 Our data suggest that the Hong Kong version of hegemonic masculinity, although 37 38 39 sharing some features with that in mainland China, differs in other respects. There is a similar 40 41 emphasis on wealth, economic individualism, and attachment to a patriarchal, hierarchical family 42 43 44 order (see Ho et al., 2017), but loyalty to the party-state is not so ingrained given that Hong 45 46 Kong has a long established tradition of free speech. For the men in our sample, deference to 47 48 Beijing was a pragmatic move because they were well aware of the power of the PRC 49 50 51 government, which clear in Wah’s statement about knowing that the game was up after the June 52 53 4 massacre. Patriotism could be evinced in a more muted form than on the mainland by 54 55 56 acceptance of being Chinese or it could be a surface performance that belied their actual views 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 30 2 3 4 5 (Hei). For those who had been activists in the Umbrella Movement, however, patriotic 6 7 attachment was to Hong Kong, not China (Thomas, Keung). 8 9 How do men define themselves in relation to this hegemonic masculinity? Self- 10 11 12 definition, we argue, should be understood in terms of a conceptualization of the self as social 13 14 and relational, constructed in relation to others and the wider socio-political context and as 15 16 17 shifting over time and with context (Jackson 2010). This relationality is also associated with the 18 19 reflexive properties of the self—the ability to reflect back on oneself (Mead 1934). Thus men 20 21 22 draw on wider cultural meanings in making sense of themselves and their lives, and in justifying 23 24 their conduct, they deploy local, socially acceptable accounts. In positioning themselves in 25 26 relation to masculine ideals in the stories they recounted, the Hong Kong men orient themselves 27 28 29 to each other, to family, and to the wider social contexts of Hong Kong and China. 30 31 The use of paired and focus group interviews enabled us to gain some insight into the 32 33 34 way men related to each other and drew on shared understandings of the world in building a 35 36 form of masculine camaraderie. The everyday masculinity deployed in this context can be seen, 37 38 39 in part, as a form of disciplined protest masculinity (Walker 2006), whereby men create 40 41 solidarity among themselves against hegemonic masculinity, as opposed to the anomic, 42 43 44 destructive forms of protest masculinity often associated with working class young men (Broude 45 46 1990; McDowell 2002). The Hong Kong men’s enactment of disciplined protest was 47 48 accomplished through political contention rather the sexual banter described by Walker. 49 50 51 These men created a limited form of protest masculinity by demeaning the masculinities 52 53 of important patriarchal figures. Our participants recognized their powerlessness in relation to 54 55 56 the authoritarian Chinese state. In this situation they express a muted form of resistance and 57 58 engage in a safe form of protest by voicing criticism of patriarchal figures against whom they can 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 31 2 3 4 5 evaluate themselves more positively. As Mouffe (2005, p. 2) noted, “othering” is an integral part 6 7 of identity construction, which these men evinced by utilizing puk gaai as moving targets to 8 9 construct their selfhood. Criticizing the behavior of men who might otherwise be seen as 10 11 12 embodying hegemonic ideals of power and wealth allowed our participants to feel better about 13 14 themselves. Through this discursive positioning of themselves in relation to flawed powerful 15 16 17 men, they satisfied their affective, sexual, and material needs, and above all, the need for social 18 19 recognition (Ho 2014; Rofel 2007). They thus reinforced in their interactions with each other a 20 21 22 shared sense of being “almost good guys.” 23 24 Personal failings, then, were represented as forgivable and negligible as compared to the 25 26 public wrongdoings of politicians, capitalists, and social movement leaders. It is through this 27 28 29 process of inclusion, exclusion, and displacement that our participants constituted themselves as 30 31 moral subjects (see Kleinman et al. 2011), as basically respectable and responsible. It is notable, 32 33 34 however, that the context in which powerful men were most often positioned as the “real” puk 35 36 gaai was in men’s justification of their extra marital romances. Thus, while they expressed 37 38 39 resistance to hegemonic masculine ideals of power and wealth, they were simultaneously 40 41 endorsing another aspect of hegemonic masculinity——and backing each other up 42 43 44 in so doing. Both strategies were conducive to the mutual reinforcement of each other’s 45 46 masculine selfhood. Of note here is that within Chinese masculine ideals, extramarital romance 47 48 is acceptable only insofar as it does not compromise familial respectability and responsibility and 49 50 51 does not disrupt the hierarchical harmony of the family. To be found out by one’s wife, who 52 53 might then challenge a man’s authority, respectability, and responsibility, is to be a puk gaai, and 54 55 56 then excuses become necessary, including the displacement of criticism onto the “bigger crimes” 57 58 of powerful men. 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 32 2 3 4 5 The other strategy that men used to excuse marital infidelity, when found out, was to ask 6 7 for a “discount” from their wives—here orienting themselves both to other men and to the 8 9 family. It was in this context that Wah talked of receiving 80%, rather than 100%, to compensate 10 11 12 for occasional “mistakes” as a husband, a view that Tom, his partner in the paired interview, 13 14 happily endorsed. Most of the men saw extramarital romances as a fact of life. Only Thomas 15 16 17 expressed regret for past affairs: He confessed his “wrongdoings” in his relationship with his 18 19 second wife, seeking to save his marriage and renegotiate his masculine identity. 20 21 22 For these men, their most important responsibility to their families was material support 23 24 and as long as they felt secure in their provider role, this also bolstered their sense of manhood. 25 26 Here, as elsewhere in their orientation to their families, they adhered to Confucian family values, 27 28 29 and thus the normative standards of Chinese hegemonic masculinity. They were, with the 30 31 exception of Thomas and Keung, insistent on maintaining the patriarchal familial hierarchy in 32 33 34 which each one was “the boss” in his own household. Maintaining hierarchical harmony was 35 36 essential to maintaining the sense of responsibility and respectability so central to being a Hong 37 38 39 Kong Chinese man. 40 41 Family hierarchy and harmony, through which senior men expect obedience from 42 43 44 women and junior men, is central to Confucian principles and also to the revival of 45 46 Confucianism in its political variant as a form of governance. The family has traditionally been 47 48 seen as a microcosm of the state, with its head as a petty emperor, binding it in the overall power 49 50 51 structure of society at large. In both Hong Kong and mainland China, “the family” is promoted 52 53 as a source of social stability through which individualism is limited to economic striving, 54 55 56 constraining its potential to challenge the authority of the state. Among the men in our sample, it 57 58 was only the two who had been very active in the Umbrella Movement who challenged this 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 33 2 3 4 5 view, questioning both familial and wider political power hierarchies. The views of the others 6 7 were imbued with traditional Chinese patriarchal values leading to the normative compliance 8 9 . 10 expected from “good citizens ” They might be critical of authority but they submitted to it 11 12 nonetheless. Thus, views on the family mirrored to a large degree their political stances. 13 14 However, even those who were pro-democracy but not active in the Umbrella Movement mostly 15 16 17 endorsed familial hierarchies. 18 19 An understanding of Confucian patriarchal familialism was also evident in the way that 20 21 22 the men we interviewed talked about the relationship among themselves, Hong Kong, and China, 23 24 with China cast as father to Hong Kong and the Beijing government as paternal grandfather [Ah 25 26 Yae] to themselves. These men did not, however, express the kind of absolute patriotic loyalty to 27 28 29 the Chinese state observed in mainland China. Their primary allegiance was to Hong Kong, and 30 31 this loyalty framed their identities as Hong Kong men. They valued Hong Kong’s relative 32 33 34 autonomy and wanted to preserve their way of life, but they also saw themselves as having little 35 36 choice but to identify with or succumb to authoritarian communist rule. Many of them saw the 37 38 39 democracy movement as divisive, as harmful to Hong Kong’s future and their own prosperity, 40 41 and as creating further threats to Hong Kong by angering grandfather. Those who were strongly 42 43 44 opposed to the campaign for democracy saw identifying with a strong China as the only way to 45 46 lead a better life. Most of them had become more pessimistic about Hong Kong after witnessing 47 48 the negative consequences of campaigning for more democracy. 49 50 51 In orienting and defining themselves in relation to other men, family, Hong Kong, and 52 53 China, there were inevitable inconsistencies and slippages through which they moved in and out 54 55 56 of adherence to hegemonic masculine ideals, endorsing them in relation to their own families 57 58 (with the exception of Keung and Thomas) while being critical of, but ambivalent about, 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 34 2 3 4 5 powerful men—men to be admired and emulated in some respects but who were also found to be 6 7 flawed. They thus (re)produced their identity as men by flexible use of their different roles 8 9 through a process of inclusion, exclusion, and displacement, recreating the local cultural logics 10 11 12 of masculinity. 13 14 Practice Implications 15 16 17 That most of the men we interviewed were either opposed to the Umbrella Movement or 18 19 did not want to be involved may be reassuring for those seeking to maintain the status quo and 20 21 22 limit protest in Hong Kong. Conversely, men’s reluctance to join the campaign for greater 23 24 democracy is indicative of the obstacles faced by those seeking to widen participation in activism 25 26 for change. From the point of view of activists, however, identifying the barriers to political 27 28 29 participation may be helpful to future mobilizations. Some of the reasons for men’s reluctance to 30 31 be involved, such as lack of interest in politics or focusing only on their own and their families’ 32 33 34 immediate interests, are not limited to Hong Kong. Others, however, are specific to the local 35 36 context and situation: the power that China has over Hong Kong, the Beijing government’s 37 38 39 opposition to what are seen as western democratic ideals, and its record of political repression. 40 41 Most of the men we interviewed were, at least to some degree, critical of the local Hong Kong 42 43 44 and mainland Chinese regimes, but either felt that resistance was futile, even counter-productive, 45 46 or that they had too much to lose by protesting. Those seeking to promote the struggle for greater 47 48 democracy therefore need to find ways of addressing both the acceptance of the status quo and 49 50 51 fears of the consequences of resistance. More generally, understanding what fosters or inhibits 52 53 men’s political participation may offer insights into how men can be encouraged to be more 54 55 56 productively engaged in civil society. 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 35 2 3 4 5 The experiences of the two men who were very actively involved suggest that there are 6 7 positive gains to be made—as individuals—from political activism, particularly in terms of re- 8 9 visioning, and potentially challenging and changing, hierarchical family relationships. These 10 11 12 narratives of personal transformation highlight the connections between political Confucianism 13 14 and the everyday Confucian-influenced principles that support patriarchal family structures and 15 16 17 practices. Where both of the activist men sought change in their family lives, the rest were keen 18 19 to maintain their positions within their families. The striking parallels between men’s views of 20 21 22 both the public politics of the Chinese and Hong Kong regimes and the private politics of home 23 24 and family should provide food for thought for feminists in Chinese societies. So too should the 25 26 e privileges and the burdens, 27 potential tensions between men’s desire to maintain their masculin 28 29 in terms of respectability and responsibility, that this places upon them. What we have learnt 30 31 from the men we interviewed casts new light on the pressures Hong Kong men currently face as 32 33 34 a result of gendered expectations. These are issues of importance both for feminist analyses of 35 36 and for activists seeking to challenge and contest male domination. They may 37 38 39 also be relevant to counselors and other practitioners seeking to develop pro-feminist forms of 40 41 support for troubled men. 42 43 44 Limitations and Future Directions 45 46 Although we have sought to cast light on the ways in which Hong Kong men do 47 48 masculinity in troubled political times, we must recognize the limitations of our research and 49 50 51 therefore that our findings can only be provisional. This project was not organized in a 52 53 predetermined way because nobody had predicted that Hong Kong was about to experience a 54 55 56 sustained mass social protest movement. Our method of collecting data emerged from the flow 57 58 of events over which, by definition, we had no control and may not provide an ideal balance of 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 36 2 3 4 5 data from before and after the occupation. Moreover, no interviews were conducted during the 6 7 Umbrella Movement, which limits our understanding of the immediate impact of social unrest on 8 9 Moreover, the data 10 stability and/or change in each participant’s construction of masculinity. 11 12 derive from a small sample and cannot lead us to firm generalizable conclusions, but they do 13 14 suggest some new directions. 15 16 17 Our methodology, in giving participants the opportunity to discuss issues with each 18 19 other enabling them to view and reflect on videos of previous interviews, proved informative in 20 21 22 capturing responses to changing circumstances. This methodology might have wider applications 23 24 to research on personal consequences of social and political change, particularly if it could, in 25 26 less unpredictable circumstances, be operationalized more systematically. In terms of substantive 27 28 29 issues, by articulating the relationship between the macro-political setting and the micro-politics 30 31 of everyday life, our study suggests that politics can be a new arena for studying gender 32 33 34 relations. The issues we have raised may help to frame future research questions about the 35 36 interconnections between gender and politics. The under-theorized interplay between politics and 37 38 39 gender clearly deserves further explorations. Bringing issues of politics and citizenship into the 40 41 conceptualization of masculinity opens up questions of how political circumstances are 42 43 44 implicated in gendered ideals and performances and, conversely, how gender informs 45 46 individuals’ understanding of and engagement with political events. Further investigation into 47 48 the interconnections between politics and the everyday doing of gender would clearly require 49 50 51 research on both women and men. Although our study was carried out in a specific and unique 52 53 location with its own political and cultural particularities, our analysis might be useful in 54 55 56 inspiring research elsewhere, especially in the many other parts of the world experiencing 57 58 political turbulence in its many forms. 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 37 2 3 4 5 Conclusion 6 7 We set out to explore the consequences of political upheaval for men’s performance of 8 9 masculinity. It was inspired by the tension between Hong Kong and China regarding political 10 11 12 reforms and universal suffrage, in particular the Umbrella Movement and its aftermath, which 13 14 created a context for raising new questions about masculinity. We have discussed the ways in 15 16 17 which recent events in Hong Kong have re-positioned men politically, economically, and 18 19 culturally. Our research also has enabled us to identify change and continuity in participants’ 20 21 22 attitudes and their constructions of masculinity and to begin to draw some tentative conclusions 23 24 on the relationship among masculinities, family life, and political disturbance. 25 26 Given the importance of Confucianism in both public and private life in Chinese 27 28 29 societies, it has been central to our analysis. In studying the specific situation of Hong Kong, we 30 31 have engaged with the ongoing theorization of the reshaping of Confucianism in contemporary 32 33 34 China (Bell 2008; Jiang 2013) by relating this to the ways in which Confucian principles play out 35 36 in both politics and family relationships and the interrelationship between them. In this context 37 38 39 we have highlighted how, in doing gender, men make pragmatic adjustments in order to maintain 40 41 a sense of their self-worth as members of families and their status as “good citizens” in the eyes 42 43 44 of others. 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 38 2 3 4 5 References 6 7 Banerjee, S. (2012). Make me a man: Masculinity, Hinduism and nationalism in India. New 8 9 York: State University of New York Press. 10 11 12 Beasley, C. (2008). Rethinking hegemonic masculinity in a globalizing world. Men and 13 14 Masculinities, 11(1), 86-103. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X08315102. 15 16 17 Bell, D. (2008). China’s new Confucianism: Politics and everyday life in a changing society. 18 19 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 20 21 22 Blanchard, E., & Lin, S. (2016). Gender and non-western ‘global’ IR: Where are the women in 23 24 Chinese international relations theory? International Studies Review, 18, 48-61. 25 26 https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viv019 27 28 29 Boratav, H., Fişek, G., & Ziya, H. (2014). Unpacking masculinities in the context of social 30 31 change: Internal complexities of the identities of married men in Turkey. Men and 32 33 34 Masculinities, 17(3), 299-324. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X14539511 35 36 Broude, G. J. (1990). Protest masculinity: A further look at the causes and the concept. Ethos, 37 38 39 18(1), 103–122. https://doi.org/10.1525/eth.1990.18.1.02a00040 40 41 Charmaz, K. (2014). Grounded theory in global perspective: Reviews by international 42 43 44 researchers. Qualitative Inquiry, 20(9), 1074-1084. 45 46 https://doi.org/1010.1177/1077800414545235 47 48 Choi, S. Y. P., & Peng, Y. (2016). Masculine compromise: Migration, family, and gender in 49 50 51 China. Oakland, CA: University of California Press. 52 53 Collier, A., & Wyer, M. (2016). Researching reflexively with patients and families: Two studies 54 55 56 using video-reflexive ethnography to collaborate with patients and families in patient 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 39 2 3 4 5 safety research. Qualitative Health Research, 26(7), 979-993. 6 7 https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732315618937 8 9 Connell, R.W. (1995). Masculinities. Cambridge: Polity. 10 11 12 Connell, R. (2005). Masculinities (2nd ed.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 13 14 Connell, R., & Messerschmidt, J. (2005). Hegemonic masculinity: Rethinking the concept. 15 16 17 Gender and Society, 19(6), 829-859. https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243205278639\ 18 19 Davis, M. C. (2015). Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement: Beijing’s broken promises. Journal of 20 21 22 Democracy, 26(2), 101-110. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0027 23 24 Deng, Y., & O’Brien, K. J. (2013). Relational repression in China: Using social ties to demobilize 25 26 protesters. The China Quarterly, 215, 533-552. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741013000714 27 28 29 Distelhorst, G. (2017). The power of empty promises: Quasi-democratic institutions and activism 30 31 in China. Comparative Political Studies, 50 (4), 464-498. 32 33 34 https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015617960 35 36 Dudink, S., Hagemann, K., & Clark, A. (Eds.). (2012). Representing masculinity: Male 37 38 39 citizenship in modern western culture. London: Palgrave. 40 41 Evans, H. (1997). Women and sexuality in China. Cambridge: Polity. 42 43 44 Farrer, J. (2013). Good stories: Chinese women’s international love stories as cosmopolitan 45 46 . Sexualities, 16(1-2), 12-29. https://doi.org/10.1177/1363460712465568 47 48 Fosse, N. E. (2010). The repertoire of infidelity among low-income men: Doubt, duty and 49 50 51 destiny. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 629(1), 52 53 125-143. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716209357401 54 55 56 Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative 57 58 research. London: Weidenfield & Nicolson. 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 40 2 3 4 5 Griffin, P. (2012). Gendering global finance: Crisis, masculinity, and responsibility. Men and 6 7 Masculinities, 16(1), 9-34. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X12468097 8 9 Hensby, A. (2017). Networks of non-participation: Comparing supportive , unsupportive and 10 ‘ ’ ‘ ’ 11 12 ‘undecided’ non-participants in the UK student protests against fees and cuts. 13 14 Sociology,51 (5), 957-974. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038515608113 15 16 17 Heron, J. (1996). Co-operative inquiry: Research into the human condition. London: Sage. 18 19 Hird, D. (2016). Making class and gender: White-collar men in postsocialist China. In K. Louie 20 21 22 (Ed.), Changing Chinese masculinities: From imperial pillars of state to global real men 23 24 (pp. 137-156). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 25 26 -national cross border romances. Asia 27 Ho, P. S. Y. (2012). Hong Kong men’s stories of intra 28 29 Pacific Journal of Social Work and Development, 22(3), 176-186. 30 31 https://doi.org.eproxy2.lib.hku.hk/10.1080/02185385.2012.691717 32 33 34 Ho, P. S. Y. (2014). An embarrassment of riches: Good men behaving badly in Hong Kong. In 35 36 D.S. Davis and S.L. Friedman (Eds), Wives, husbands and lovers: Marriage and 37 38 39 sexuality in Hong Hong, Taiwan and urban China (pp. 165-188). Stanford CA: Stanford 40 41 University Press/ Hong Hong: Hong Kong University Press. 42 43 44 Ho, P. S. Y., Jackson, S. and Kong, S. S-T. (2017). Speaking against silence: Finding a voice in 45 46 Hong Kong Chinese families through the umbrella movement. Sociology, Advance online 47 48 publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038517726644 49 50 51 Hong Kong Jockey Club Center for Suicide Research and Prevention. (2014). Retrieved from 52 53 http//crsp.hku.hk/statistics accessed 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 41 2 3 4 5 Hua, C. Y. (2014). Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying’s regular press conference on 6 7 September 30, 2014. Retrieved from 8 9 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1197147.shtml 10 11 12 Jackson, S. (2010). Self, time and narrative: Re-thinking the contribution of G.H. Mead’ Life 13 14 Writing, 7(2), 123-136. https://doi-org.libproxy.york.ac.uk/10.1080/14484520903445255 15 16 17 Jankowiak, W., & Li, X. (2014). The decline of the chauvinistic model of Chinese masculinity: 18 19 A research report. Chinese Sociological Review, 46(4), 3-18. 20 21 22 https://doi.org/10.2753/CSA2162-0555460401 23 24 Jiang, Q. (2013). A Confucian constitutional order: How China’s ancient past can shape its 25 26 political future. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 27 28 29 Johansson, T., & Ottemo, A. (2015). Ruptures in hegemonic masculinity: The dialectic between 30 31 ideology and utopia. Journal of , 24(2), 192-206. 32 33 34 https://doi.org/1010.1080/09589236.2013.812514 35 36 Johnson, C. A. B., & Morrison, T. G. (2007). The presentation of masculinity in everyday life: 37 38 39 Contextual variations in the masculine behaviour of young Irish men. Sex Roles, 57, 661- 40 41 674. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-007-9299-9 42 43 44 Kaeding, M. (2014). Challenging Hongkongisation: The role of Taiwan’s social movements and 45 46 perceptions of post-handover Hong Kong. Taiwan in Comparative Perspective, 5, 120- 47 48 133. 49 50 51 Kimmel, M. (2005). The gender of desire: Essays on male sexuality. New York: State University 52 53 of New York Press. 54 55 56 King, D. S. (2006). Activists and emotional reflexivity: Toward Touraine’s subject as social 57 58 movement. Sociology, 40(5), 873-891. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038506067511 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 42 2 3 4 5 Kleinman, A., Yan, Y., Jun, J., Lee, S., Zhang, E., Pan, T., ... Guo, J. (Eds.). (2011). Deep China: 6 7 The moral life of the person: What anthropology and psychiatry tell us about China 8 9 today. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 10 11 12 Kong, S. T. (2016). Social work practice research innovation, implementation and implications: 13 14 A case of ‘cooperative grounded inquiry’ with formerly abused . 15 16 17 Qualitative Social Work, 15(4), 533-551. https://doi.org/1010.1177/1473325015595856 18 19 Lee, C. K., & Zhang, Y. (2013). The power of instability: Unraveling the microfoundations of 20 21 22 bargained authoritarianism in China. American Journal of Sociology, 118(6), 1475-1508. 23 24 https://doi.org/10.1086/670802 25 26 Lee, F. L., & Chan, J. M. (2016). Digital media activities and mode of participation in a protest 27 28 29 campaign: The case of the Umbrella Movement. Information, Communication & Society, 30 31 19(1), 4-22. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2015.1093530 32 33 34 Leung, L. C., & Chan, K. W. (2012). Understanding the masculinity crisis: Implications for 35 36 men’s services in Hong Kong. British Journal of Social Work, 44(2), 214-233. 37 38 39 https://doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bcs122 40 41 Leung, K., & Ip, O. (2007). Employee confidence, job satisfaction and age discrimination 42 43 44 survey. Hong Kong: Department of Management, City University of Hong Kong. 45 46 Louie, K. (2002). Theorising Chinese masculinity: Society and gender in China. Cambridge: 47 48 Cambridge University Press. 49 50 51 Louie, K. (2012). Popular culture and masculinity ideals in East Asia, with special reference to 52 53 China. The Journal of Asian Studies, 71(4), 929-943. 54 55 56 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911812001234 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 43 2 3 4 5 Lui, T. L. (2009). Hong Kong’s changing opportunities structures: Political concerns and 6 7 sociological observations. Social Transformations in Chinese Societies, 5, 141-164. 8 9 https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004181922.i-270.42 10 11 12 Lusher, D., & Robbins, G. (2009). Hegemonic and other masculinities in local social contexts. 13 14 Men and Masculinities, 11, 387-423. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X06298776 15 16 17 Ma, N. (2011). Hong Kong democrats divide. Journal of Democracy, 22(1), 54-67. 18 19 https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2011.0000 20 21 22 McDowell, L. (2002). Masculine discourses and dissonances: Strutting “lads,” protest 23 24 masculinity, and domestic respectability. Environment and Planning D: Space and 25 26 Society, 20(1), 97-119. https://doi.org/10.1068/d43j 27 28 29 Mead, G. H. (1934) Mind, self, and society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 30 31 Messerschmidt, J.W. (2012). Engendering gendered knowledge: Assessing the academic 32 33 34 appropriation of hegemonic masculinity. Men and Masculinities, 15(1), 56-76. 35 36 https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X11428384 37 38 39 Mouffe, C. (2005). The return of the political. London: Verso. 40 41 Nagel, J. (1998). Masculinity and nationalism: Gender and sexuality in the making of nations. 42 43 44 Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21(2), 242-26. https://doi.org/10.1080/014198798330007 45 46 Osburg, J. (2013). Anxious wealth: Money and morality among China’s new rich. Stanford, CA: 47 48 Stanford University Press. 49 50 51 Osburg, J. (2016). Corruption, masculinity and jianghu ideology in the PRC. In L. Kam (Ed.), 52 53 Changing Chinese masculinities: From imperial pillars of state to global real men (pp. 54 55 56 157-172). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 44 2 3 4 5 Pompper, D. (2010). Masculinities, the metrosexual, and media images: Across dimensions of 6 7 age and ethnicity. Sex Roles, 63, 682-696. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-010-9870-7 8 9 Riabov, O., & Riabova, T. (2014). The remasculinization of Russia? Gender, nationalism and the 10 11 12 legitimation of power under Vladimir Putin. Problems of Post Communism, 61(2), 23-35. 13 14 Rofel, L. (2007). Desiring China: Experiments in neoliberalism, sexuality, and public culture. 15 16 17 Durham, NC: Duke University Press. https://doi.org/1010.1215/9780822389903 18 19 Shen, H. H. (2005). “The First Taiwanese wives” and “the Chinese mistresses:” The 20 21 22 international division of labour in familial and intimate relations across the Taiwan Strait. 23 24 Global Networks, 5, 419-437. 25 26 Strier, R. (2014). Fatherhood in the context of political violence. Men and Masculinities, 9, 5-22. 27 28 29 Sung, S., & Pascall, G. (2014). Gender and welfare states in East Asia: Confucianism and 30 31 ? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 32 33 34 https://doi.org/1010.1057/9781137314796 35 36 Uretsky, E. (2016). Occupational hazards: Sex, business, and HIV in post-Mao China. Stanford, 37 38 39 CA: Stanford University Press. 40 41 Wade, J. C. (2000). Male reference group identity dependence: Support for construct validity. 42 43 44 Sex Roles, 43, 323-340. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026695209399 45 46 Walker, G. W. (2006). Disciplining protest masculinity. Men and Masculinities, 9, 5- 47 48 22. https://doi.org/1010.1177/1097184X05284217 49 50 51 West, C., & Zimmerman, D. H. (1987). Doing gender. Gender and Society, 1(2), 125-151. 52 53 https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243287001002002 54 55 56 World Health Organization. (2014). Preventing suicide: A global perspective. Retrieved from 57 58 http://www.who.int/mental_health/suicide-prevention/world_report_2014/en/ 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 1 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 45 2 3 4 5 Yang, G. (2000). The liminal effects of social movements: Red guards and the transformation of 6 7 identity. Sociological Forum, 15(3), 379-406. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007563225473 8 9 Yeh, K. H. (2009). The dual filial piety model in Chinese culture: Retrospect and prospects. 10 11 12 Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies, 32, 101-148. 13 14 https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580913484345 15 16 17 Yeh, K. H., Yi, C., Tsao, W., & Wan, P. (2013). Filial piety in contemporary Chinese societies: 18 19 A comparative study of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China. International Sociology, 28(3), 20 21 22 277-296. https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580913484345 23 24 Yuval-Davis, N. (1997). Gender and nation. London: Sage. 25 26 Zeng, J. (2016). and genesis of the citizen intelligentsia in China. Hong Kong: City 27 28 29 University of Hong Kong Press. 30 31 Zheng, T. (2012). Female subjugation and political resistance: From literati to entrepreneurial 32 33 34 masculinity in the globalizing era of postsocialist China. Gender, Place & Culture, 19(5), 35 36 652-669. https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2011.649354 37 38 39 Zheng, T. (2015). Masculinity in crisis: Effeminate men, loss of manhood, and the nation-state in 40 41 postsocialist China. Etnogràfica, 19(2), 347-365. 42 43 44 http://etnografica.revues.org/4026#entries 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 13 14 15 16 17 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 46 18 19 20 Table 1 21 22 Summary of Respondents’ Demographic Details 23 24 25 Name Relationship 26 (Pairing) Age Education Occupation Status Political Orientation Remarks 27 Tom (1) 44 Master’s Psychologist Married Pro-establishment Newlywed 28 Wah (1) 58 Primary school Taxi driver Married Pro-establishment 29 Hei (2) 36 Master Fire station officer Cohabiting Pan-democratic 30 ’s 31 Paul (2) 60 University Village head/ Married Pan-democratic 32 businessman 33 Joe (3) 38 Middle school Businessman Married Pan-democratic Trans man 34 Chiu (3) 28 University Journalist/ Married Pan-democratic Changed job after the 35 36 Administrative Staff movement 37 Thomas (4) 56 University Banker/ Businessman Divorced Pan-democratic Divorced due to a 38 mainland mistress 39 Hing (4) 62 Middle school Bus driver Married Pro-establishment 40 Shmily (5) 70 Middle school Retired Single Neutral Gay advocate 41 a 42 Keung (5) 57 Sixth form Unemployed Single Pan-democratic Recovered mental patient a 43 Sixth form: pre-university level, ages 16–18 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 13 14 15 16 17 TALKING POLITICS, PERFORMING MASCULINITIES 47 18 19 20 Table 2 21 22 Themes, Descriptions, and Examples 23 24 25 Theme 26 Subtheme Description Personal example Political example 27 Respectability How men relate to each 28 other to gain respect 29 30 Financial Fulfilling the role of a The insistence on paying means “you are When we go out for dinner, it’s 31 family breadwinner a man.” There is no doubt and not even important to see who’s paying… 32 worthy of discussion. (Wah) likewise, it’s important to see clearly 33 who sets the rules in politics. (Paul) 34 Cultural The extent that traditional The whole culture is going astray. People think Hong Kong is an 35 36 Chinese cultural values Youngsters do not respect teachers, independent place. They don’t need to 37 impact on their headmasters, their fathers and grandpa. listen to grandpa. But you cannot escape 38 relationships (Wah) from grandpa’s finger! (Wah) 39 Romance Perceptions & practices of 40 intimacy 41 42 Marital Marital satisfactions I need to hold her hands when I sleep. I extend my love for you to people in 43 This is what I call happiness. (Chiu) this world, so I can help other people to 44 love whom they love. (Paul) 45 Extramarital Erotic experience relating When I go to mainland China, all my No matter how powerful—Mao Zedong, 46 47 to other women friends would hang out in nightclubs, Hitler or Clinton—in the end men will 48 how could I not go? (Wah) be trapped by their desire for women. 49 (Wah) 50 Responsibility Perceived obligations to 51 family and society 52 53 Assertive The obligation to teach the Parents used to tell their daughters not to Too many people believe in democracy. 54 younger generation and let anyone take advantage of them. It No one has taught them what is bad 55 protect the family doesn’t work anymore. (Paul) about democracy…. (Tom) 56 Ambivalent The sense of powerlessness It is difficult to claim yourself as a “good I have come a long way to be able to 57 58 in face of authority and guy.” It is easier to claim yourself as a enjoy life like this. … How can I give 59 ethical dilemma puk gaai [bastard, cad]. (Chiu) up my hard won happiness? (Hei) 60 61 62 63 64 65 Compliance with Ethical Standards

Compliance with Ethical Standard

The research was funded by University Grants Committee of the Research Grant Council under General Research Fund. There are no conflicts between the research funding and the findings in this paper. All interviewees were carefully informed and gave informed consent to the researchers before the commencement of the project. Ethical approval was obtained through the host university of the first author. (Reference EA: 130212)

Response to Reviewer Comments (Author Information Must Not Be Included)

Response to reviewer

Thank you for your comments! We have revised the paper and addressed all your concerns.