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To What Extent Can Philosophy Contribute to the Public Understanding of Science?

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‘Sloppy Thinking’: To What Extent Can Philosophy Contribute to the Public Understanding of Science? Ben Trubody A thesis submitted to the University of Gloucestershire in accordance with the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Media, Arts and Technology Cheltenham September 2013 Abstract This thesis will address two questions: Does philosophy contribute to the ‘public understanding of science’ (PUoS), and if so, how? The popular public image of science is one of methodology. Science is a means for making true statements about the world, where we compare hypothesis with observation against the evidence. This then allows for a body of knowledge that guides further advancements and progress. Philosophy, however, seems to be antithetical to this. A popular notion is that philosophy is either what science was, or it deals with objects and ideas so intangible, that they have no real effect in the world. Either it is an outmoded way of doing science, or it is the preserve of armchair academics. In both cases the average person would be forgiven for thinking it had no relevance to them, and especially their ability to understand science. This thesis will look to challenge this relationship. Using hermeneutics, discourse-textual analysis and deconstruction, I present two interpretations of science and philosophy. These two interpretations I will call the ‘methodological’ and ‘historical’ approach. The ‘methodological’ approach is to understand science as a collection of principles or rules that, if followed, will produce true statements about the world. An example of such a principle that intersected both philosophy and science is ‘falsification’ as understood through the ‘problem of demarcation’ (PoD). The irrelevance of philosophy to science is fortified by the constant failure to produce fixed rules for what makes one thing scientific and another not. The ‘historical’ approach is to understand the actions of scientists as historical events. So rather than ask ‘what is science?’ we might ask, ‘what does it mean to act scientifically?’ I will argue philosophy can be of use in overcoming the antagonism between understanding a methodological question historically and a historical question methodologically. Firstly, I give an uncontroversial reading of the PoD, as argued by Karl Popper, who represents the ‘methodological’ view and oppose this to the ‘historical’ approach of Paul Feyerabend. Due to the dominance of the interpretation of science as a methodology, I argue that historical critiques, like Feyerabend’s, become nonsensical when understood as methodological substitutes. This is what I call the ‘received view’ of what both Popper and Feyerabend had to say on science. Here, Popper fails to solve the PoD and Feyerabend appears to deny the method, objectivity or rationality of science. Next, using ideas inspired by Heidegger, I reverse those roles by presenting a ‘methodological’ and ‘historical’ reading of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn. I develop two types of language, which I call ‘about’ and ‘of’ language that map on to the methodological and historical distinctions. Using this method I construct two contradictory readings of the text, but unlike the Popper- Feyerabend antagonism, we see how the historical approach is the more fertile interpretation. One version, which I call the ‘strong’ reading, has Kuhn as a relativist, irrationalist or anti-science, which is important if this is the ‘received view’ of Kuhn. This reading carries political weight with ‘interest groups’ who may wish to undermine the epistemic authority of science. That same reading can be used to discredit Kuhn/ philosophy of science, and by extension philosophy as a worthwhile instrument for understanding science. The other version, which I call the ‘weak’ reading, has Kuhn as a supporter and defender of science, but it also resolves old philosophical disputes by framing the problem in a different way. This will not only problematize any notion of a dominant interpretation, but it gives good grounds why one cannot be relativist or irrationalist about ‘truth’. Thus it defends the epistemic authority of science, and also gives philosophy a valuable role in public thinking about science. Declaration I declare that the work in this thesis was carried out in accordance with the regulations of the University of Gloucestershire and is original except where indicated by specific reference in the text. No part of the thesis has been submitted as part of any other academic award. The thesis has not been presented to any other educational institution in the United Kingdom or overseas. Any views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and in no way represent those of the University. Signed…………………………………. Date……………………………….. Acknowledgements Firstly, I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisors, Dr William Large, for his continuous support, discussion, and feedback, which has gone way beyond institutional requirements and my expectations. I would also like to extend my appreciation to Dr David Webster for his patience in waiting for the final drafts and input into the finished article. I dedicate this work to those that have helped guide and encourage me back into education and achieve something that has always been an ambition of mine. In particular I wish to thank my parents, for their example, belief in my ability and encouragement to try for something better. Finally, I would like to thank my girlfriend Phailin for being understanding and generous with her cooking and patience. Table of Contents Table of Contents …………………vi Chapter One ……………….…1 Introduction: Science, Philosophy and Society ……………….…1 1.1 Introduction ……………….…1 1.2 The Thesis ……………….…6 1.3 Is to be Scientific to be Anti -Philosophy of Science? ………………...12 1.4 Philosophy in the Public Understanding of Science ………………...16 1.5 The Harvard/Conant Group ………………...18 1.6 Scientific Literacy ………………...20 1.7 Rationale and Methodology of Thesis ………………...22 Chapter Two ………………...26 The Public Understanding of Science ………………...26 2.1 A Brief History of the Public Understanding of Science (PUoS) ………………...26 2.2 The Deficit Model ………………...30 2.3 The Contextualist Model ………………...33 2.4 Problems with the Problem of Demarcation ………………...37 Chapter Three ………………...44 Karl Popper and Falsification ………………...44 3.1 Karl Popper ………………...44 3.2 Popper and the Logical Positivists ………………...47 3.3 Logical and Methodological Falsification ………………...50 3.4 Degrees of Falsifiability ………………...52 3.5 Falsification of What? ………………...55 3.6 Popper, Idol ………………...60 Chapter Four ……………...…68 Paul Feyerabend: Against Method ……………...…68 4.1 Paul Feyerabend ………………...68 4.2 Against Method ………………...71 vi 4.3 Against a Universal Neutral Observation Language ……………...…78 4.4 Against Feyerabend ………………...81 4.5 Conclusion ……………..….88 Chapter Five ………………...96 The Role of Philosophy ………………...96 5.1 The Effects of Philosophical ‘Literacy’ or Different ……………...…96 Worldviews? 5.2 The Smolin-Susskind Debate ……………….101 5.3 Richard Feynman on Science ……………….103 5.4 The Situation so Far ……………….106 5.5 Thomas Kuhn ……………….109 5.6 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions ……………….112 5.7 Martin Heidegger: An Introduction ……………….116 5.8 Summary ……………….120 Chapter Six ……………….123 Heidegger’s Influence …………….…123 6.1 My Route to Heidegger ……………….123 6.2 From Kuhn to Heidegger ……………….127 6.3 The Critical Reception of Heidegger …………….…131 6.4 The Post-Positivistic Philosophy of Science …………….…133 6.5 Ontological Difference: Methodological and Historical …………….…135 Interpretations 6.6 Fundamental and Regional Ontology …………….…136 6.7 Categorical and Lived Space …………….…138 6.8 ‘About’ and ‘Of’ languages …………….…142 Chapter Seven ……………….151 The Strong Reading ……………….151 7.1 Kuhn and Structure - The Strong Reading ……………….151 7.2 Framing the Strong Reading ……………….152 vii 7.3 The General Structure of Structure ……………….159 7.4 Paradigms ……………….160 7.5 Normal and Revolutionary Science ……………….172 7.6 Incommensurability ……………….181 7.7 Introducing the Weak Reading ……………….192 Chapter Eight ……………….195 The Weak Reading ……………….195 8.1 Kuhn and Structure – Recap of the Strong Reading ……………….195 8.2 The Weak Reading ……………….196 8.3 Framing the Weak Reading ……………….201 8.4 A General Structure of Structure ……………….205 8.5 Paradigm ……………….208 8.6 Normal and Revolutionary Science ……………….226 8.7 Incommensurability ……………….242 Chapter Nine ……………….253 Conclusion ……………….253 9.1 Concluding Remarks ……………….253 Bibliography ……………….261 viii Chapter One Introduction: Science, Philosophy and Society 1.1 – Introduction This thesis places itself at a point of convergence between several issues, emanating from sociology, education, politics, history and philosophy of science. My main concern is with the dialogue between science as a practice and what is necessary for a person to know in order to have a fair understanding of that practice. What concerns me with this dialogue is the apparent irrelevance philosophy has in contributing to this debate in the public sphere. Public understanding of science and much of science education tend to promote science as a ‘method’, where we can say uncontroversial things like ‘knowledge and understanding in science are rooted in evidence’.1 There is absolutely no denying that science is successful at what it does and it does so because of its methods. On the other hand ‘philosophy’ appears to make little contribution, since it tirelessly fails to make progress in its subject areas, and worse it has led
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