MONTESQUIEU AND GUIZOT

From the Regime to Society

by

STEVEN PATRICK CONNOLLEY

A thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology

in conformity with the requirements for

the degree of Master of Arts

Queen's University

Kingston, Ontario, Canada

August, 1998

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This thesis has compared the idea of political determinism - i.e., the notion that the regime has causal primacy over its society - with the idea of sociai determinism - Le., the notion that political institutions are effects of social conditions. Consequently, this argument juxtaposed Montesquieu's political determinism with Guizot's social determinism. The first chapter described how Montesquieu considered a vast array of extra-political factors but nevertheless rnaintained the traditionai view of the regime as holding causal primacy over its society. The second chapter illustrated the movement away frorn the emphasis on the regime in both Britain and France. This chapter, moreover, argued that Guizot's works brought together these reflections and were the first to apply systematically the idea of social determinism. The fmd chapter analyzed how both Montesquieu's political determinism and Guizot's social determinism were important elements of political debate during the Bourbon Restoration. This examination demonstrated how both political detedsmand social determinism significantly inforrned views on the appropriate role of government. Whereas the Right tended to dernand that the govemment confer order on society, the Left asserted that the governent could only remain stable by accepting the new set of sociai conditions. More generally, the debates of the Bourbon Restoration suggest the need for careful consideration of how ideas on the relation between the regime and sociery might direct current courses of debate in both academic and political settings. 1 would like to thank Dr. Gunn for generously offering his assistance. This rare opportunity has allowed me to study political theory according to the highest scholarly standards. 1 am especially grateful for his insightful and critical comrnents, which have prevented me fiom committing countless errors, and, more importantly, have directed me toward a greater appreciation for the fmer points of logic, grarnmar, and style.

1 would also like to thank Dr. Beamish for his many helpful suggestions and for supporting the aims of this work.

This work, of course, is dedicated to my parents whose support for my academic endeavours is unparalleled. iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... i .. Acknowledgements ...... il

1 Introduction ...... 1

Montesquieu & Political Determinism ...... 7 1 .Montesquieu's variation on classical politicai philosophy ...... 9 II .The Spirit of the Laws and the typology of regimes ...... 12 A w The. nature. .of regirnes ...... 12 B .Political pnnciples ...... 17 C .Political principles and the breadth of the regimels inHuence.21 III .The General Spirit of a Nation ...... 22 A .Definition ...... 24 B .The causal primacy of the regime within the General Spirit .. 26 C .Charges of climatic determinism...... 27

IV O Two examples pf Montesquieu's political determinism ...... 29

A O Example 1: Slavery and Climate...... 29 B .Example 2: The faulty structure of the Roman regime ...... 32 V .Conclusion ...... 34

Developments of Social Determinkm from Montesquieu to Guizot ...... 35 1 .The development of social determinism in Britain ...... 36

A O The Scottish Enlightenrnent and the waning of the regime ... 36 1 .David Hume ...... 36 2 .The social determinism of Adam Ferguson . John Millar. and Adam Smith ...... 39 B .The social determinism of David Williams ...... 42

II O The development of social determinism in France ...... 51 A .Louis de Bonald's contribution to sociological thought ...... 51

B O François Mignet1sminor contribution...... 54 C .The social determinisrn of Guizot ...... 57 1 .Essais sur l'histoire de ka France ...... 58 2 .Example: the origin of the nobility ...... 59 III .Guizot's decisive contribution to social determinism ...... 62 A .Guizot vs. the Scots ...... 62 B .Guizot vs. Bonald ...... 64 .Example: .. Charlemagne ...... 65 C .Guizot vs. Williams...... 68

The impact of both Political Determinism and Social Determinism during the Bourbon Restoration...... 70 I .The challenges of the Bourbon Restoration...... 70 .Incidents coneibuting to the political divide ...... 73

II O Fundamental orientations of both the Left and the Right ...... 75

A O Guizot: the Charter as recognizing the new society ...... 76

B œ The Royalists: the Charter as conferring social order ...... 81 III .The presence of both political deterrninisrn and social determinism in political debate ...... 83 A .Promotion and recruitment in the armed forces ...... 84

B œ Altering the electoral system ...... 89 C .The symbolic recognition of pnmogeniture ...... 96 IV .Conclusion ...... 104

5 Conclusion ...... 105 . . Bibliography ...... 108

Vita ...... 1 12 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Broadly speaking, this work approaches the vast problem of the definition of the unit of analysis known as society. Although the everyday practice of the social sciences takes this terrn for granted, its conceptualization rernains nebulous and consequently problematic. What is and what is not a society ofien becomes unclear. This was not a great concem for classical political philosophy and its main int, the regime. The relatively concrete character of the regime, with its reference to the city state's predominant political institutions, ailowed the classicd political philosopher to categorize a collectivity, for exarnple, as a democracy, a monarchy, a mix of the two, and so on.

Moreover, these schemes of classification ailowed for the recognition of the set of practices and beliefs that result from the particular political organization.

This thesis limits its investigation to the moment when considerations of society eclipse the political regime as a unit of analysis. Accordingly, Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Lam [1748] and the early works of François Guizot during the 1820's make for an interesting cornparison. On the one hand, Montesquieu is ofien considered to be one of the earliest pioneers of the notion of society and the sociologicaI tradition. Although he worked primarily within the framework of the regime, he sought to illustrate how the various foms of government Uitluence a people's way of life outside the politicai sphere and even how the way of life cmcharacterize the regime itself. On the other hand, building on subsequent developments in sociologicd understanding, which were ofien inspired by Montesquieu's efforts, Guizot may be considered as the fikt figure to emphasize systematicdy the importance of social conditions over political institutions. Montesquieu's notion of socie~- which arose fiom, yet remained subordinate to, the regime - is thus juxtaposed with Guizot's view, which reduces politicd institutions to being e ffects of existing social conditions.

More specifically, this cornparison focuses on the following question: given either

Montesquieu's or Guizot's account of the relation between society and political institutions, what would be the basic pnnciples of sound goveming and wise legislation?

What kinds of laws and policies would be harrnful or perhaps even fatal to a regirne?

How might a government become more effective and what measures could it take to ensure stability? This issue is approached not only through Montesquieu's and Guizot's works but also by highlighting some specific instances in which their respective theories have been appropriated in political debate.

The final chaprer approaches this question by examining certain debates of the

Bourbon Restoration (1 8 14-1 830). There are two related reasons why the examination of the Bourbon Restoration is useful. First, both Montesquieu's and Guizot's theories were highly iduential amongst many prominent political figures of this period. On the one hand, Montesquieu's Spirit of the Lmvs was still an enomously Uinuential work that had popularized the idea of regime holding causal primacy over society. As a result, variations of political deterxninism had shaped, both implicitly and explicitly, the basis of several significant political positions during this period. On the other hand, Guizot had emerged as an important figure in both acadernic and political circles early in this period.

Guizot quickly established himself both as a reputable historia. and as an effective writer for prominent politicians. He therefore was able to wield considerable influence over some of the most significant issues of the time. His histoncd works and speeches, then, transmitted the notion that political institutions were dependent on social conditions beyond an academic audience and were a source of theoretical justification for some of the most important debates of the Bourbon Restoration.

The second reason why the Bourbon Restoration warrants attention is that the prevdent desire of the period to maintain political stability gave rise to the importance of theories on the relation between the regime and society. The newly restored monarchy had to establish and maintain itself in the midst of a society that was fundamentally altered both by the French Revolution and Napoleon's mie. This new France was often hostile to anything that seemed to hark back to the ancien régime. The question that preoccupied the supporters of the new regime, then, was how to ensure its longevity in these new circumstances. The Royalists - that is, the ardent supporters of the monarchy or the Right - sanctioned those approaches having much affinity with Montesquieu's political thought. This position claimed that stability could be attained only if the govemment first recognizes that France is rightfùlly a monarchy. The governrnent must consistently legislate according to this guiding standard in order to alter and regulate key elernents of the new and sometimes recalcitrant society in a coherent manner. The

Royalists' position, therefore, presumed the causal primacy of the regime by asserting that an effective govemment would be capable of irnposing order on the society at large.

Those Liberals of the Center, including Guizot, however, tended to reject this formula and viewed the new society as having the potential to invigorate the newly restored monarchy and to encourage the progress of France. This position was consistent with Guizot's assertion that society itself is the tme source of political stability because it is the foundation for al1 political institutions. The restored monarchy, then, would do well to seek its source of strength and to legislate in a harmonious manner within the new society. An attempt by the goverment to legislate with the intent of controlling society according to pre-determined ideas of a "monarchical society" would only exacerbate the antagonistic elements of this new society. nius, the project to establish a lasting and stable regime brought these abstract notions of the relation between the regime and society into the very center of political life in France.

This work proceeds in the following manner. The Fichapter describes

Montesquieu's political determinism - the assertion that the regime imposes on the totality of society a certain principle that sets the tenor for patterns of thinking, feeling, and living. Certain developments of Montesquieu's thought, however, gradually led to the rejection of the regirne's causal prirnacy. While Montesquieu's investigations revolved around a political typology, he had also encouraged the study of extra-political factors.

This eventually led to the development of theories that conflicted with notions of political determinisrn.

The second chapter, then, presents a brief narration of the development fiom political determinisrn to social detemllnism - the daim that underlying social conditions determine the regime. This chapter begins with a discussion of the Scottish

Enlightenrnent's similar development away fiom political determinism to social determinism. The later thinkers of this movement, such as Adam Smith, eventudly abandoned David Hume's emphasis on the regime and instead focused on a society's mode of subsistence. Next, there is an examination of David Williams's critique of

Montesquieu's political theories in his Lectures on Political Principles [L789], which was perhaps the clearest exposition of social determinism prior to Guizot. One of the chief results of his attack on Montesquieu's notion of political principles was the diminution of the regime' s influence and its ultimate dependence on extra-political factors. A description of the reversal of Montesquieu's political determinism in France follows, with an examination ofcontnbutions of Louis de Bonald, François Mignet and Guizot.

Bonald, a prominent counter-revolutionary thinker, was a significant figure in the development of social determinism because he had stressed the importance of extra- political conditions. Bonald, however, did not display a systematic social determinism but instead maintained a traditional notion of political determinism. Not until the Bourbon

Restoration did Guizot, and Mignet to a lesser extent, produce works reflecting this idea.

Mignet's early work, De Iri féodulite' [18Z 11, and Guizot's numerous historical endeavours of this period explicitly began with the idea that a collectivity's political institutions could only be properly understood as effects of social conditions - patterns of landholdings, class systems, prevelant ideas, etc.

The concluding chapter of this work contrasts Montesquieu's and Guizot's opposing accounts of the relation between the regime and society. After sumrnarizing the general orientations of both Guizot and the Royalists during the Bourbon Restoration, three major debates of the period will be examined. The bill on the recruiting and promoting practises of the army (18 18), the electorai bill (1 820), and the bill on primogeniture (1826) reveal how notions of political determinkm and social deterrninism

CHAPTER 2 MONTESQUIEU & POLITICAL DETERMINISM

In Raymond Aron's view, Montesquieu marked the beginning of the sociological tradition and the study of social organization and culture. Besides offenng explanations on the effects of climate and other geographic factors, Montesquieu discussed how a collectivity's habits, affectations, and customs might both influence and be influenced by their political institutions. Montesquieu's unprecedented broad scope, according to Isaiah

Berlin, was fundamental to the idea of "a rational science of govemment" that could

"test" the actions both of ruling bodies and of those who are governed at any place and time. Therefore, "a social technology can be elaborated, means can be fitted to ends in accordance with principles derived fiom experience and observation" (Berlin, 1956: 371).

Yet. besides the absence of the term sociefy, Montesquieu's investigations do not in several respects resemble modem sociology. Most significantly, he retained the classical emphasis on the regime, which regarded the form ofgovernment as the definhg kature of any collectivity. Consequently, unlike much of modem sociology, there was no causal primacy given to social or economic factors. On the one hand then, Montesquieu's works, "...reinterpreted ciassical political thought in terms of a total conception of society and he sought to explain al1 aspects of colIectivities in a sociological mode" (Aron, 1963:

56). In other words, Montesquieu, by situating his political analyses into a far broader context than was true of classical works, was a key figure in the transition fiom classical political philosophy to modem sociology. On the other hand, Montesquieu regarded the political regime as the chief determinant for a society and expressed this primarily by means of a typology of regimes. This chapter wili emphasize this feature of Montesquieu's thought.

Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Law [1748], his magnum opus, illustrated the political determinisrn inherent in his work. This was Montesquieu's greatest attempt to explain comprehensively collectivities' fundamental qualities by means of an unprecedented synthesis of classical political philosophy and the emerging foci of modem sociology. The idea that societies develop according to Fundamental laws was central to this project. Once these fundamental patterns were known, Montesquieu expected that rnoulding a collectivity's legal system accordingly could offer great benefits. Knowledge of a collectivity's geognphic conditions, such as climate and soil, sources of wedth, traditions, religion, customs and su on would aid in the establishment oFa regime that could act most rationally and effectively. Most interesting, however, in

The Spirit of the Laws was the elevated status of the regime, an emphasis which might pdethe modem reader. Montesquieu structured his discussion around a typology of regimes that served as a means of distinguishing between different kinds of society. This was necessary because Montesquieu regarded the type of regime as a society's crucial explanatory variable and it dictated its general patterns of beliefs, habits, and customs.

This chapter begins with a brief cornparison of Aristotle and Montesquieu in order to demonstrate the latter's view of the regime within a broader scope of considerations.

Second, Montesquieu's fundamental affinity in The Spirit of the Lmvs with classical politicai philosophy is examined. More precisely, there are two major concepts in this work that demonstrate Montesquieu's political determinism: political principles and the general spirit of a nation. In order to address the former, there is a summary of Montesquieu's typology of politicai regimes. This discussion continues with an examination of the notion of political principles, the general sentiment that the regime infuses into al1 levels of society. Next, there is a discussion of the general spirit of a nation, which significantly informed the features of this work most resembling modem sociology. The genera[ spirit of a nation, despite the broad scope of this concept. nevertheless revealed the political determinism that was more apparent in Montesquieu's typology of regimes and notion ofpoliticalprinciples. A discussion surnrnarizing his commentaries on climate and its relation to slavery ensues these observations on

Montesquieu's fundamental concepts. This example clearly demonstrated the political determinism that Framed even his broadest analyses. Finally, there is a bnef look at

Montesquieu's earlier work, Consideraiions on the Causes of the Greatness of the

Romans and their Decline [1734], which demonstrated an explanation based fundarnentdly on considerations of the regime.

1 - Montesquieu's Variation on Classical Political Philosophy

Before discussing Montesquieu's typology of political regimes, a few general observations on the similarities and differences between hirn and Aristotle are useful.

Aristotle serves as a representative of classical political philosophy and the contrast dernonstrates the novelty of Montesquieu's approach. On the one hand, Montesquieu was similar to AnstotIe because he utilized a typology of regirnes as a starting point for the understanding of various coiiectivities. In Politics III-7, Aristotle determined the main categories of regimes by emphasizing primarily the [ocation of power in the city-state, that is, the number of people who hold political authority. He also arranged subdivisions 10 depending on whether the regime wuorientated toward the cornmon good, that is to Say, the ends of the city-state, or toward the sole advantage of the niling body. The Former subset consisted of the following regimes: a monarchy, the rule of a single person; an aristocrucy, the deby a few; and apolity, the nile by the many. The other subset contained the degenerate counterparts: a tyranny was the regirne in which the location of its power exists in one individual and was focused on the fulfilment of the desires of this person; an oligurchy was the rule of the few who view the city-state as an instrument for the advancement of their own goals and pleanires; and a democracy was the ignorant and selfish nile of the many where concems for the common good are overlooked or seen only as burdens (1984: 111-7). To Anstotle, a collectivity's regime type was the ultimate source of its character and practices. It was thus necessary to grasp this key characteristic in order to begin a rational approach to politics.

Montesquieu's typology of regimes in The Spirit of the Laws echoed Aristotle's

Politics in that the classification of the basic species of regimes fundamentally stnictured the ensuing discussions. This feature was consistent with the classical idea that the regime was the defining feature of a society. Because the regime was central for the accurate classification and description of collectivïties, it was necessary therefore to establish a typology of regimes to organize the fundamental patterns that are shared by the severai societies, in spite of their apparent differences.

On the other hand, Anstotle and Montesquieu differed from each other in terms of theu scope. Unlike Montesquieu, Aristotle had no real concem for extra-political elements that are found in modern notions of society (Lowenthal, 1987: 134). This absence of the idea of socieîy cm be traced to the notion that hurnans are by nature creatures with the potential for a moral or spintual existence. Accordingly. Aristotle argued that it was the duty of humans to live well, and not simply live, according to the ideals that cmbe discerned by reason. Moreover, the city state provided the politicd life necessary for tnie wellbeing and so the city state's comprehensive aim was to secure an environment conducive to the good life for its citizens. Consequently, Aristotle viewed as acceptable al1 activities and controls employed by the city state to promote the good life and considerations on how to advance this aim had the highest priority (Willoughby,

1903: 60-6 1 ). Aristotle, then, would have regarded discussions on extra-political factors, not having the city state as the primary reference point, as futile because they would have excluded this dl-important condition for the good life. In fact, the city state, by providing the education to its citizens, was responsible for conceptions of a moral and rationai life in the first place. The presence of the city state, then, was evident even in the most basic aspects of an individual's life. The Greek thinkers, therefore, viewed non-political or private associations as topics not worthy of discussion. It is not surprising, then, as W.W.

Willoughby observed, that the Greek political philosophers did not even have the words or even the need to distinguish between the concept of stute and the concept of sockty

(1903 : 60-61). In fact, socieîy is denved fiom the Latin societas - a word with no equivalent in Greek. Yet, this term also had a definite political connotation to the

Romans: societas referred to the alliances made for specinc purposes, whether it be for the sake of criminal activity or for the sake of governing (Arendt, 1959: 24).

While Aristotle viewed collectivities in relation to the ultimate ends of the city 12 state, Montesquieu stressed the importance of the extra-political sphere. Montesquieu proceeded by demonstrating the impact of the relations existing between the regime and its society. Even though he viewed the regime as wielding causal pnmacy over its society, he oFten emphasized the continuous interaction behlreen these two realms. In fact, he ofien illustrated how the regime itself could at time:; be affected by other societal elements. Thus, Montesquieu's emphasis on the political regime was a pecuiiarly modem one. Unlike classical political philosophy, he did not regard the ends of the regime as the ultimate criterion and he viewed extra-political considerations as indispensable.

Moreover, Montesquieu's emphasis on the relations between a regime and its society suggests that Aristotle's political philosophy cannot be considered as a compelling example of political determinism, which implies a causal relation fiom the regime to society. Aristotle regarded both the regime and society as one, in other words, as a relation of identity. A relation of identity, consequently, leaves no room for causation in Aristotle's analyses. Accordingly, unless an extra-political element could be justified in light of the aims of the regime, Aristotle would have regarded it as irrelevant or unimportant for investigation. Montesquieu's political theories, however, accepted a fundamental distinction between the regime and its society. Montesquieu's project thus could explain the causal primacy of the regime. Montesquieu's novel contribution, then, was that he continued to emphasize the regime, not as a crucial elernent for the good Me, but rather as the fundamental determinant of its society.

II - The Spirit of the Laws and the Typology of Regimes A - The Nature of Regimes Montesquieu formulated in The Spirit ofthe Lmvs a typology of regimes based

fundamentally on the naiure or srructure of each government, that is, the number of those that rule and the manner of ruling. A monarch, for example, would have differed

Fundamentally fiom the despot because the rule of law limited the former, even though one person would have ruled in both regimes. Based on these dual considerations,

Montesquieu thus claimed that the repiiblic, the monarchy, and despotism were the three main types of regirnes:

... republican government is that Ni which the people us a body. or oniy a part of the people have sovereign po wer; monarchicai government is that in which one ulone governs, but by fired and established laws; whereas, in despotic government, one alone, without law and without nile. draws everything dong by his will and by his caprices ( 1989: II- 1; Montesquieu's emphasis).

In addition, Montesquieu sub-divided the republican category according to the proportion of the population wielding political power. Where the "people as a body" hold power, they are designated as a democracy; in the cases where "only a part of the people" govern, they are classified as an arisfocracy.

Montesquieu, furthemore, claimed that the very nature of a regime produced a set of "fundamental laws" (1989: 11-1). These fundamental laws were grounded in the essential characteristics of a particular kind of regime - that is, they were necessary for the maintenance of the regime's structure. In a democracy, where the people as a whole are the ruling body, the first fundamental law would be the law establishg the rïght to vote. As Montesquieu asserted, the regdation of voting is a central concem for democracies:

hdeed, it is as important in this case to regulate how, by whom, for whom, 14

and on what issues votes should be cast ... (1989: 11-2).

In particular, such laws must determine how many citizens are required to attend the assemblies so that dlcould agree that not merely a part but the people as a whole have voiced their opinion. Of course, the total body of citizens cannot manage dlof the republic's affairs. There is, then, always a need for the selection of ministers. If the citizens are to trust the chosen ministers, al1 must be involved in the selection process.

Yet, those elected must not represent the total body of citizens because the laws ought to prevent the lower classes fiom pursuing public office. In fact, Montesquieu asserted that the division of citizens into classes is crucial to the survival of a democracy:

In the popular state, the people are divided into certain classes. Great legislators have distinguished themselves by the way they have made this division, and upon it the duration and prosperity of democracies have always depended (1989: II-2(2)).

In refemng to the reforms of the Athenian Solon, which established divisions of eligibility within the population, Montesquieu argued that this fundamental law was necessary to a democratic republic. A democracy cannot allow for the simplistic application of majority rule. Rather, its survival depends on the totality of citizens being enlightened by its more outstanding members by way of class divisions and accountability.

In an aristocracy, such as Venice in Montesquieu's tirne, one fûndamentd law requires that voting must be done by choice and not by lot Whereas voting by lot in a democracy serves to lessen envy, this passion is not a pressing concem for an aristocracy.

In fact, envy is necessary to the nobiiity as a class, the crucial element in the nature or structure of dl aristocraties. Now, if there is a large body of aristocrats, then there is a need for a senate. Yet, the laws must prevent senators from having the right to fil1 vacancies since this leaves open opportunities for abuses. Moreover, Montesquieu asserted that the vitality of acistocracies rests on how well the nobility cm merge with the interests of the people as a whole. If those who are excluded from politicai power are both few and poor, then there would be little incentive for the ding body to tyrannize this inconsequential segment of society. Further, if the nobles are able to view the commoners as holding the same interests as themselves, then the aristocratie republic would be in a more perfect state. "The more an kstocracy approaches democracy," Montesquieu

surnrnarized, " the more perfect it will be, and to the degree it approaches monarchy the less perfect it will become" (1989: 11-3).

In a monarchical regime, Y.. the prince is the source of al1 political and civil power" ( 1989: 11-4). It is imperative, however, that there are intermediate and subordinate powen - such as a class of nobles, a church, and a parliament - that are derived fiom this source. Without such bodies, there would be no fixed manner in which the prince's power is exercised. Consequently, the monarch would actudly become a despot because the only guide in ding would be the capncious demands of the individual in power.

According to Montesquieu, the nobility is the moa naturai of these lesser powers. As

Montesquieu emphasized,

In a way, the nobility is the essence of monarchy, whose fundamental rnhis: no monarch, no nobility: no nobility, no monarchy.' (1989: 11- 4)-

The nobility serves to uphold the ranking system in the monarchy (Shackleton, 1961 :

279), which in turn reinforces the social imrnobility that a monarchy requires. The presence of the church also mediates the monarch's power because it is a constant reminder that no unjust act escapes the eye of God. Yet, the establishment and maintenance of intermediate powers are in~~cientbecause a "depository of laws" is required. This rather hazy term referred to the political bodies - often a parliament with a written constitution - which are responsible for the announcement, use. interpretation, and preservation of laws (1989: 11-4, XXVIII-45; cf. editors' comrnents, p19n). By sdeguarding past laws and interpreting new laws accordingly, the bbdepository"calls for the monarch to apply political power in a consistent mariner. In short, al1 of these bodies are required for the stability necessary to a monarchy. The demise of these intermediary powers would leave the people either with a despot or a republic.

In a despotic regime, there are neither firm laws nor a depository of laws. If anything can be recognized as a depository of laws, it would be the religion of the people.

If not, then the people would hold customs and manners, rather than any sort of law. in high esteem (1989: 11-4). One cannot doubt that Montesquieu viewed despotism as a hom&ing condition. His writings on this type of regime, then, do not really discuss the nature of despotism but rather how despotism is a corruption of nature. The despotic regime requires that the state have as its object the pleasure of the despot. The . management of public &airs need not be a concem for the despot because he could appoint a viner for this purpose. That the despot will not care for such matters is quite probable for "... a man whose five senses constantly tell him that he is everything and that others are nothing is nanvally lazy, ignorant, and voluptuous" (1989: LI-5). In fact,

Montesquieu went as far as to Say that the appointment of a vizier is the only fundamental law of despotism.

B - Political Principles

The republican, monarchicai, and despotic regimes, in addition to having their respective natures and fundamental laws, have corresponding political princip[es.

Poliricd principles are those ways of thinking, habits, and sentiments that prevail in a society, have their source in the regime, and are necessary for sustaining the regime. The difference between the nature and the principle of the regime can be thought of as the difference between the state of being of the regime and its actions. As Montesquieu wro te:

There is this difference between the nature of the government and its principle: its nature is that which makes it what it is, and its pnnciple, that which makes it act. The one is its particular structure, and the other is the human passions that set it in motion (1 989: III- 1).

The passion that supports the republic is virtiie; for the monarchy it is honotir; and for the despotic state, it is fear. This idea is central for the causal primacy of the regirne because this is how the regime sets the general tenor of its society. Eventually, through the regime's judicious and consistent adherence to the correct political principles, the whole society would corne into line with the sentiments appropnate to the regirne and thus becoming a republican society, a monarchical society, or a despotic society.

Virtue, seen as patriotism or public aitruism, is the crucial sentiment of a democratic regime (1989: III-3). In this discussion, Montesquieu firmly rejected the ideas on the welfare of democracies fiom contemporaiy thinkers of politicai economy.

The political men of Greece who Lived under popular govemment recognized no other force to sustain it than vimie. Those of today speak to us only of manufacniring, commerce, hance, wealth, and even lu- (1989: III-3). This republican type demands a certain virtue that engenders upnght behaviour in al1 areas of the citizens' lives; that is, they must corne to believe that they are subject to the laws of their own making, both in persond life and beyond. Not only must they feel that they are bound to the laws, they also need to believe that tnie medom can only exist within the boundaries of these laws. Al1 limits set in public life must have the weight as limits set in private. This is why, for exmple, the Julian law concerning addtery considered this act as a serious crime (1989: VIL 13). A democracy, then, must attempt to enforce moral conduct in every aspect of the citizens' lives. Now, if a king were the sole figure executing laws in a monarchy, then this would be the only person whose virtue is crucial. If the monarch chooses not to obey the laws, then correcting this single person could avert the slide to tyranny. But if the virtue of the democratic regime deteriorates, it would be far more dificult to change this course. The unwillingness of the people to execute their own laws leads to the "corruption of the republic" and selfish ambition would replace public altruism. The realm of law, consequently, would be seen as an arena of restriction rather than a haven of fkeedom. Under these conditions, Montesquieu asserted, a democratic regime couid not last for long. A democratic regime, then, must continually impose an overarching standard of WNe in order to orient the whole society to this ideai.

Virtue is also required in an aristocratie republic but to a lesser degree because only a small proportion of society requires this passion. Instead, the problem is how virtue can regulate and contain the ambitions of the nobles. The noble must leam,to recognize the danger in laws that sacrifice the interests of other nobles for the sake of his 19 own. To support such legislation would undermine his own class and thereby, in reality, would attack hirnself. It is thus necessary that the "nature of the constitution" demands and promotes virtuous conduct amongst the nobility. Furthemore, the presence of via is not only crucial amongst the nobles but it is also fundamental to their relations with the subordinate classes. Montesquieu argued that if an aristocracy were to believe that it could repress the commoner with ease, eventually the more powemil uistocrats could feel unconstnined in acting in a like manner with the lesser rnembers of their class.

Ultimately, tyranny could prevail and al1 would be repressed. According to Montesquieu, there are two different ways in which an aristocracy could utilize the polificalprinciple to cope with this danger. The first of these relies on a moderate course and a lesser virtue that aims to promote the feelings of solidarity and mutual interest arnongst the nobility for the sake of prese~ingthe regime. The second route - which is more dificult to enact since it calls for greater changes within the regime - is the pursuit of a higher virtue that encourages the nobles to view the cornmoners as havhg the same interests as themselves.

A successfûl result of this virtue, Montesquieu asserted, would be no less than a great republic. The aristocratie regime, therefore, is in a superior condition whenever it is inclined toward democracy rather than toward the self-senring nobility that flourishes in monarchies. There was little doubt for Montesquieu as to the mperiority of the democratic republic.

Honour rather than virtue is the principle that animates a monarchical socîety

(1989: [II-5). Obedience from the king's subjects is more important than there being vimie arnongst them. In other words, there is no need for the subjects to have the 20 intention of being good; Wnie in the emphatic sense is not necessary. Honour, then, functionally replaces vutue and upholds the ngid distinctions throughout the whole society that are needed to uphold this regime. Here, the desire for honour, which fiels ambition, compels the individual to support unwittingly this regime while wholeheartedly pursuing a higher status in the monarch's court. Thus, uniike the democratic regime, which emphasizes the intrinsic value of virtue in al1 areas of society, the competition for extemal rewards and distinctions sustains a monarchy.

Fear, rnaintained by bmtality, is the principle of the despotic regime because it tends to discourage the populace's inclination for rebeilion (1989: 111-8). Despotism demands equality : al1 are equally slaves. The despot, therefore, must root out homur fiom this regime for it promotes distinctions and ranks throughout the society. The pursuit of honour also encourages a daring attitude toward death: the despot's greatest weapon thus loses force for he survives on the power to take away anyone's life. However, because honour must be supported by fin laws and distinctions, the state of lawlessness inherent to despotism tends to obviate this problem. Furthemore, Montesquieu observed that this regime seemed to be the most common. One reason is that despotism thnves on and really only needs the powefil and readily available passion of fear. But the despot can never stop perpetuating terror; he mua always give the impression, perhaps by occasional gruesome exhibition, that he has the will and the ability to destroy anyone under his de, especially those who appear to be able to threaten his domination. Perhaps the only available countenneasure to tyranny is the religion of the people since the despot cannot place himself above supematuraljudgements (1 989: HI- 10). C - Political Principles and the Breadtb of the Regime's Influence

Montesquieu's statements on the effects of the despotic political principle of fear deserve attention because they demonstrate most forcefully the power of the regime to influence even the most intimate levels of society. In the state of despotisrn, men are reduced to rnere beasts and behave in a manner below their nature (1989: III- 1O).

Montesquieu described this wretched deviation from nature:

No tempering, modification, accommodation, terms, alternatives, negotiations, remonstrances, nothing as good or better can be proposed. Man is a creature that obeys a creature that wants. He can no more express his fears about a future event than he can biame his lack of success on the' caprice of fortune. There, men's portion, like beast', is instinct, obedience and chastisement. It is useless to counter with natural feelings, respect for a father, tendemess for one's children and women, laws of honor, or the state of one's health; one hm received the order and that is enough (1 989: III- I O).

This statement reveals how an unjust regime can significantly alter al1 aspects of society through its politicalprinciple. The heaith of individuals, the intimacy within families, and decency amongst strangers are not immune to the presence of a despotic regime. The onset of despotism eventually eradicates al1 aspects of a society that might have been worthy and harshness prevails.

But in the way that the despotic regirne advenely affects the whole society. a 8 more just and moderate regime could beneficially structure a society by means of a more civilized general sentiment. As implied above, Montesquieu regarded the democratic regirne as the best of al1 because its society best promotes the wellbeing of its citizens.

Not only do order and tnie fieedom exist in public affairs, these qualities even exist in the most farniliar aspects of the citizens' lives. Under the sway of the democratic principle of 22 virtue, citizens would view with disdain those who are contemptuous of the law as well as those who iack control in their own [ives. The contrast between the enormous effects throughout the whole of society brought on by a democratic regime and a despotic one demonstrates the notion that the form of govemment is most salient in setting the tone of a collectivity.

The rnost basic point to be drawn from this discussion is that Montesquieu's typology of regimes and his notion ofpolitical principles overtly indicate the adherence to political determinism. The regime is the most dominant presence in a society and it infuses into the whole society a general sentiment that informs every aspect of life. The regime is the most powerful instrument of a collectivity, and if used judiciously with reference to the appropriate politicaI principle, a stable and just society could be consmicted. The laws promoting the survival of the regime, then, are most essentid.

Montesquieu passed judgements on laws and mores according to whether they conformed to the correct political principle; the incoherent or inconsistent implernentation of laws necessarily leads to the regimefsdemise and disorder in society. In short, Montesquieu's portrayal of the government as having the potential both to maintain itself and to control key aspects of society indicated the idea that the reghe holds causal primacy over society.

III - The Generat Spirit of a Nation

The notion of political principles was the bridge through which Montesquieu was able to extend his political science beyond a typology of regimes. The idea of the regime as an on-going, continual cause lent itseifwell to considerations about social relations in general. By investigating the essential sentiment that the regime requires of its inhabitants, Montesquieu looked into al1 the ways in which political principles effect their lives. He investigated the manner in which the regime affect and is affected by, for example, class structures, technologies, customs, pattems of land ownership, and so on.

In other words, Montesquieu's concept ofpolitical principles opened whole areas of inquiry that were not found in earlier political treatises. It could be argued, then, that his efforts led to an early politicai sociology because he examined how several social elements relate to the regime.

It is, then, not surprising that Montesquieu extended this direction of inquiry and situated the regime within generai patterns of development of ail societies, thereby placing his political analyses into a far more expansive contes. In other words,

Montesquieu not oniy stressed the importance of extra-political factors for the understanding of the regime, he also considered its historical development. Examination of a collectivity's earliest conditions - for example, its climatic conditions, its long- standing customs, and so forth - became crucial factors for the emergence of a particular regime. It could be argued, then, that Montesquieu developed an early generai sociology through that political sociology which arose fiom the idea of political principfes.

However vast Montesquieu's range of considerations might have been, this section demonstrates that he continwd to uphold political detenninism, which was more overt in his typology of regimes. Despite the complexities of these general analyses, ranging from physicai factors, e.g., climate, to social ones, eg,religion, Montesquieu maintained that the activities of the regime are the most decisive factors for a society. A - Definition

The general spirit of u nation was the centrai concept wdby Montesquieu for his analyses of the development of societies as a wholc. Montesquieu explained this concept as follows:

Many things govem men: climate, religion, laws, the maxims of govement, examples of past things, and manners; a generai spirit is formed as a result. To the extent that, in each nation, one of these causes acts more forcefully, the others yield to it. Nature and clhate alrnost alone dominate savages; manners govern the Chinese; laws tyrannize Japan; in former times mores set the tone in Lacedaemonia; in Rome it was set by the maxims of government and the ancient mores (1989: m).

Montesquieu's use of the terni "govem", however, did not rnean that these factors are unidirectional causes. Instead the general spirit is the integration of several partial or probable causes, both "physical", i.e., geographical, and "moral", i.e.. either social or political, to which a collectivity is exposed over time. A collectivity's exposure to a certain combination of influences at varying strengths accounts for the presence of certain characteristics - the way of life, the prevalent behaviours, the thoughts and feelings or what we may cal1 bbculture"(Aron, 1965 : 40-4 1). Moreover, Montesquieu did no t consider the general spirit as a fuial account or a set of ultirnate causes. Rather, the general spirit was a description of the continual. dynamic interaction between several partial causes of various strengths.

Montesquieu stated that, as a society develops through thne, geographic factors become less important considerations while the non-physicd factors play a greater role.

During the earliest stages, however, climate is indeed the main determinant since social and political factors have not yet developed. Robert Shackleton's Magery of the general 25 spirit likened to an artichoke, where the leaves represent significant developments of the nation, is usehl for clarifying this point (196 1: 3 18). If the leaves of the artichoke are removed one at a time, beginning with the outermost leaf, one could trace back the general development of society. The removal of the first set of leaves would represent the development of a society's artefacts. These artefacts are the results of human activity consisting of the laws, manners, mores, and maxims, which are fwidarnentally ingrained into the society. Stripping away the next set of leaves would reveal the religious foundations of the nation. While Montesquieu also viewed religion as an artefact, he considered it as the primordial and most potent source of human constmcts. After these leaves are stnpped away, one would be at the point wliere al1 human constmcts are gone.

If this is so, then it follows that there could be no exmples of how things were done in the pst at this stage; that is, there would be no traditions. The innermost leaves that would be left represent only the physical factors directly shaping the society. Amongst these, climate, in Montesquieu's view, would be the moa domhant of the factors during this fledgling stage. When Montesquieu wrote, "the empire of clirnate is the first of al1 empires" (1989: XIX-14), climate could be considered as fint in the chronological sense as well as being an important consideration for prudent legisiation. The reverse of this process - that is, the concentric growth of leaves - would represent the general stages of development. The f~stset of leaves to grow represents the development of religion and this turn eventuaily gives rise to a whole system of habits, customs, etc. Next, the nation would fashion laws, make precedents, Le., examples of past things, and thus set in motion the evolution of mores, manners, and maxims of the govemment. At this point of development, many non-physicd factors would influence the collectivity and these even have corne to overshadow the physical influences to the point that the latter are barely discernible.

B - The Causal Primacy of the Regime within the General Spirit

Now, one can situate in generai tenns the causal status of the regime by examining Montesquieu's recommendations to the legislator in light of the general spirit.

Because the general spirit is the interplay of several partial causes, there is the possibility of manoeuvring within or at least moderating some of the harrnhl influences that may exist within it. This is pnmarily done through legislation because the regirne has the power to orchestrate the dynamics of the whole society.

As mentioned, Montesquieu asserted that regimes require a fidamental passion or principle in order to maintain themselves. The principle in question, however, must be understood in light of the specific, perhaps unique, characteristics of the society. Put differently, political principles must be seen within the context of the general spirit of a particular collectivity (Aron, 1965: 41). As Montesquieu wrote in book XIX of The Spi& of the Laws:

The Iegislator is to follow the spirit of the nation when doing so is not contrary to the principles of the government ... (1989: X[X-5).

This statement clearly indicates that the legislator's fmt task is to understand the prirzciple of the govemment within the context of the generai spirit. This requires the legislator to have a thorough knowledge of a society's particular composition. The constitutions that may have been acceptable elsewhere, then, would most likely not be applicable to the legislator's own society. Moreover, the rnere maintenance of the 27 moderate regimes is enormously difficult requiring highly perceptive leadership to prevent the encroachrnent within the general spirit of potentiaily destructive causes. In short, the mling body mut respect the limitations set by a society's general spirit.

The most important aspect of the above statement, however, is its implicit political determinism. One could argue that Montesquieu maintaint:d the regime's causal prirnacy even within the general spirit. If Montesquieu recomended that the legislator must follow the lead of the general spirit but only ". .. when dohg su is not contrary to the principles of he government ...(my emphasis)", then this suggests that the promotion of the regime's principle is within the realm of possibility. Further, not only did

Montesquieu believe that the regime could direct its social conditions, his writings indicate that this was fundamental to prudent goveming. Thus, this statement pointed to an unmistakable political determinism. Put differently, Montesquieu's statement is consistent with the notion that the regime has the potentid to control the fundamental aspects of society. Montesquieu, then, viewed knowledge of the general spirit of a nation as a crucial element of sound governing because the ruling body must understand the particular geographical and social challenges to be faced. Montesquieu, however, aiso viewed the regime as having the capacity to manipulate the key aspects of the society by promoting the correct political principle. Montesquieu, therefore, presumed a degree of political determinisrn when he had offered explmations of how the astute legislator might skilfùily proceed within the general spirit.

C - Charges of Ciimatic Determinism

The general spirit of a nation, then, despite its broad scope, allowed for the causal primacy of the regime. It is not, as some of his contemporaries charged, a doctrine of climatic determinism. Even far into the following century, Comte seconded this popular interpretation ( 1883: 139- 143). When Montesquieu later reflected on ihis immediate impression of The Spirit ofthe Laws, he explained in Pensées that he had deliberately stressed climate so that it would not be overlooked as a secondary consideration for legislation.

le sais bien que, si des causes morales n'interrompaient point les physiques, celles-ci sortiraient et agiraient dans toute leurs étendus (199 1: #8 1 1, p.352).

Even before The Spirif of the Laws, he had stressed the importance of moral causes. One of Montesquieu's earlier works, Essai sur les causes quipeuvent affecter les esprits et les caructéres [1736], demonstrated this point. The second part of this work, which deals with importance of moral causes, emphasizes that these factors, and in particular education, can moderate physical causes.

Les causes morales forment plus le caractère general d'une nation et decident plus de la qualité de son esprit que les causes physiques (1958: 60).

Montsquieu, then, in The Spiri! of the Laws did not intend to underemphasize moral causes but rather to consider them in light of physical ones. Moreover, he viewed the effects of legislation as being the moa decisive in influencing al1 other moral factors. In short, while Montesquieu considered the general spirit as the continual integration of a wide range of causes, hmclimatic to non-physical or "moral" causes (1989: XIX4), the regime clearly retained causal primacy over social factors and consequently even physical factors were seen as fding under its sway. The following discussion on Montesquieu's treatment on the relation between climate and slavery demonstrates this point.

IV - Two Examples of Montesquieu's Political Determinism

A - Example 1: Slavery and Climate

Montesquieu's discussion of slavery demonstrated the causal primacy of the regime while at the same time considering a broad range of extra-political factors.

Montesquieu viewed climate as being perhaps the most important factor in the perpetuation of slavery. That the legislator ought not to take lightly the effects of climate was expressed at the opening of the book on the effects of climate:

If it is tme that the character of the spirit and the passions of the heart are extremely different in the various climates, laws should be relative to the differences in these passions and to the differences in these characters (1989: XIV-1).

In particular, his theory on climate (one of the two major geographical factors dong with the nature of the soil), discussed for the most part in book XIV-2 in The Spirit of the

Lows, rested on a basic distinction between the effects of cold and hot temperatures.

Accordingly, countries could be categorized either as a cold country or a hot one.

Observing a sheep's tongue with the aid of a microscope in both cold and hot conditions,

Montesquieu round that the fibres contracted in the cold and expanded in warmth.

Because of these basic physiological observations, Montesquieu concluded that the people of colder countries have extremities with contracted fibres. Consequently, the elasticity or "spring" of the vessels is magnified; more blood is returned or "pushed harder" to the heart form the extremities; and so these peoples have greater strength. This entails certain benefits:

... more confidence in oneseif, that is, more courage; better knowledge of one's superiotity, that is, less desire for vengeance; a higher opinion of one's security, that is, more frankness and fewer suspicious maneuvers and tricks (1989: XIV-2).

On the other hand, people of hot countries have the fibres of their extremities relaxed.

There is, then, less "spring" and consequently less strength in these people. But the heat's emollient effects on the skin tissue facilitate the transmission of more sensations to the nerve endings. The people of hot countries, then, have greater "imagination, taste, sensation, and vivacity" due to the "infkite number of small sensations" (1989: XIV-2).

Montesquieu, for example, illustrated this by comparing the tirnid response of the English to the very same opera that was enthusiastically received in Italy:

... the same music produces such different effects in the people of the two nations that it seems inconceivable, the one so dm,the other so transported (1 989: XIV-2).

Briefly, then, Montesquieu regarded climate as an important factor in the physical environment responsible for certain physiological responses, which in tum influence the developmental course of a nation's character.

Taking climatic conditions to be an essential aspect of a society's general spirit, and consequently important for prudent legislation, the kinds of laws that are required for hot countries are not the same for cold countries. In fact, Montesquieu stressed that the stakes are higher in a hot country because the legislation must be particularly good in order to manage the Mpressionability indigenous to the people of this climate.

As a good educator is more necessary to children than to those of mature spirit, so the peoples of (hot) climates have a greater need of a wise legislator than the peoples of our own (1989: XIV-3).

Whereas cold countries cm absorb the mistakes of mediocre ders, legislative errors are magnified in the hot countries.

Furthemore, Montesquieu argued that hot climates induce a general laziness amongst the population, a vice that often leads them into the servitude of a despot. As

Montesquieu explained,

There are countnes where the heat enervates the body and weakens the courage so much that men corne to perform an arduous duty only fiom the Fear of chastisement; slavery there runs less counter to reason, and as the master is as cowardly before his prince as his slave is before him, civil slavery there is accompanied by political slavery (1 989: XV-7).

There is linle doubt that Montesquieu saw this as a homfying condition. As the beginning of the book on slavery stated:

(Slavery) is not good by its nature; it is useful neither to the master nor the slave: not to the slave, because he cm do nothing fiom vimie; not to the master, because he contracts dl sorts of bad habits ftom his slaves, because he imperceptibly grows accustomed to failing in al1 the moral virtues, because he grows proud, curt, hanh, angry, voluptuous, and cruel (1989: XV-1).

The only way to avert this desperate condition, according to Montesquieu, would be for the legislator to counter the dangers resulting from physical causes by manipulating certain "moral'?ones.

In particular, Montesquieu suggested that "the more the physicai causes incline men to rest, the more the moral causes should divert hem fiom it" (1989: XIV-5). The legislator must banish generai laziness amongst the inhabitants of a hot country by way of a mandatory level of industriousness.

But whatever the nature of slavery, civil laws must seek to remove, on the one hand, its abuses, and on the other, its dangers (1989: XV-1 I ).

This statement asserts that moral causes have the potential to regulate physical causes. It is more accurate, however, to Say that the implementation of prudent legislation could prevent or end the practice of slavery. Montesquieu's treatment of slavery, therefore, demonstrated the regime as having causal primacy over al1 other social factors. By arranging the moral causes in a manner that moderates the il1 effects produced by certain physical conditions, the regime has the potential to produce a civilized society.

Montesquieu's assertion that ruling bodies in hot countries often hi1 in this regard is secondary; the political determinism at the core of this advice rernains intact.

B - Example 2: The Faulty Structure of the Roman Regime

In an earlier work, Considerarions on the Cairses of the Greatness of the Romans ctnd their Decline [1734], Montesquieu's political determinism was prevalent throughout.

Here. he argued that the fall of the Roman Empire was an inevitability due to factors within the dornain of the regime. Briefly, Montesquieu's argument rested on the idea that the Roman Empire originally had a regime with a set ofmaxims that facilitated its conques of other peoples. However, as the legions expanded their campaigns to distant lands, the soldiers eventually "lost their citizen spirit" (1968: 91). That is, their comection to the polirical prhciple, which had made their victories possible, became tenuous. Yet, restraining expansion in order to keep this tendency in check was impossible. The Romans' regime was a conquering one whose structure demanded laws amenable to continual expansion. This was the root of the problems to corne.

Montesquieu described the conditions as follows:

It is true that the laws of Rome became powerless to govem the republic. But it is a matter of common observation that good laws, which have made a smd republic grow large, become a burden to it when it is enlarged. For they were such that their nahual effect was to create a great people, not to govern it (1968: 94).

This direction in legislation, according to Montesquieu, was fatal:

There is a considerable difference between good laws and expedient laws - between those that enable a people to make itself master of others, and those that maintain its power once it is acquired (1968: 94).

Thus, the structure of this inherently expansive regime - with its inability to maintain a stable condition - contained within itself the means of the Romans' inescapable destruction.

Eventually, the vast temtory that was acquired and the change in the soidiers' spirit demanded a change in the structure of government (1 968: ch. xvii; esp. pp. 156-165).

Consequently, there was a corresponding change in maxims. This was decisive because these new maxims replaced the ones that had made Rome great in the first place (1 968: 169). In other words, the change in the structure of the regime had powerful and irrevenible effects. As

Montesquieu summarized:

Here, in a word, is the history of the Romans. By means of their maxims they conquered al1 peoples, but when they had succeeded in doing so, their republic could not endure. It was necessary to change the government, and contrary maxims ernployed by the new government made their greatness collapse (1968: 169).

Whereas before the Romans held military supremacy, they were forced eventually to compromise this position: they permitted the military prowess of other peoples to tlourish wh it waned fiom within (1968 : 168-169). Ultirnately the faulty structure of the regime had initiated a whole set of causes to work against the empire and it was, therefore, only a matter "of how, and by whom, it was to be overthrown" (1968: 102).

It is quite clear, then, that Montesquieu assigned to the regime causal primacy over ail other considerations while simultaneously considering a wide range of other factors, both social 34 and physical. The original regime had promulgated a set of laws that could not sustain a stable regirne. Al1 other factors were secondary to the political ones in the downfall of the Roman

Empire.

V - Conclusion

This chapter highiighted the political determinism underscorhg Montesquieu's thought. This idea was evident in Montesquieu's assertion that the regime imposes on a society a certain political principle that sets the tenor of key social characterktics.

Montesquieu also retained the causal primacy of the regime in his discussion of the general spirit of a nafion. Finally, Montesquieu's discussions on slavery and the decline of the Roman Empire demonsûated how the regime and legislative activities werc ovemding considerations in his explanations. CHAPTER 3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL DETERMINISM FROM MONTSQUIEU TO GUIZOT

The previous chapter described the political determinism that was fundamental to

Montesquieu's views on society in general. Montesquieu, however, also illustrated the importance of various extra-political causes and how these could affect the regime. This depiction of the causal primacy of the regime, then, was not a unidirectional relation with a ruling body irnposing order on a passive society. Rather, the regime was placed in the context of complex social factors; but ultimately Montesquieu viewed the regime as a collectivity's main determinant. This view of the regime's causal primacy was intluential for many years after Montesquieu's death. Yet, Montesquieu's depictions of the importance of extra-politicai factors had begun the process that eventually led some scholars to branch away fiom political determinism and regard the regime as an effect of socid conditions.

This chapter will provide a cursory look at this strain of Montesquieu's progeny, which contributed to Guizot's systematic reversal of political determinism. The first section will describe the development of social determinism in Britain. This begins with a description of the Scottish Enlightenment's parailel movement away fiom the causal primacy of the regime. This movement began with David Hume's reflections on the relation between economic and political conditions, which had a definite emphasis on the regime; thinkea later in the Scottish Enlightenment reversed this emphasis and turned to the level of subsistence as the fundamental variable. Next, there is a discussion of the culmination of social determinism in Britain by the Welsh political thinker David 36

Williams, who was well acquainted with the works of the Scottish Enlightenment.

Williams's Lectures on Political Principles [1789] was perhaps the clearest exposition before Guizot of the declining statu of the regirne. The next section surveys the rise of social determinism in France. This begins with Louis de Bonald, a counter-revolutionary political thinker who warrants examination because certain historians of social science have regarded him as one of the Brst sociologists. This discussion, however, argues that

Bonald's approach differed fundamentally from social science. In particular, although his works were a development of Montesquieu's considerations of social factors, he nevertheless retained the causal primacy of the regime. The next discussion covers

François Mignet's minor contribution toward the reversal of political determinism in his essay De ln fiorlalité des institutions de St. Lorris et d'influence de la legislation rlr ce prince [182 11, which coincided with Guizot's early works on this subject. Guizot's Essuis sur l 'histoire de la France followed in 1822 with his fust explicit and systematic application of social determinism. With this work, Guizot completed the reversal of political determinism and in tum passed down this view of the regime to a number of scholars of the next generation. This chapter concludes with a summary of Guizot's contribution through a general cornparison of his works with the Scottish Enlightenment,

Bonald, and Williams.

1 - The Development of Social Determinism in Britain A - The Scottish Enlightenment and the Waning of the Regime

1 - David Hume

Hume's Essays Morui, Political, and Literary [1 74 1- 17421 O ffered early examples of the Scottish Enlightenment's concem with the importance of the relationship between extra-political factors and the regime. "On Commerce" [ 1741 ] noted the relationship between economic development and the activities of the regime:

Thus the greatness of the sovereign, and the happiness of the state, are in a great measure united with regard to trade and manufactures (1903: 268).

Hume argued that the increase in the production of goods lessens the sovereign's problem of motivating his subjects to engage in difficult labour. Greater economic advances could eventually abolish those hanh measures used al1 too ofien in the past because of the lack of labour power. As Hume wrote,

The greater the stock of labour of al1 kinds, the greater the quantity may be taken kom the heap without making any sensible alteration to it (1903: 268).

"Of Refinements in the Arts" [1741] provided a similar statement on the effects of economic innovation:

... a progress in the arts is radier favourable to liberty, and has a natural tendency to preserve, if not produce a fiee government (1903: 283).

Hume was refuting the common notion that improvements in technology led to idleness among the populace, which in tum made them vulnerable to subjection under a despotic regime. Such improvements, Hume insisted, încrease the chances of establishing and maintaining fiee and moderate regimes.

How inconsistent, then, is it to blame so violently a refuiement in the arts, and to represent it as the bane of liberty and public spint (1903: 284)?

Hume's statements. then, illustrated the notion that a country's economic relations greatly influence the conditions with which the regime must operate.

Hume's focus, however, was on the regime. As in Montesquieu's thought, much attention was paid to the relations between the regime and its society but Hume retained the emphasis on the regime (Forbes, 1975: 226,3 19). "Of National Characters" [17Jl] demonstrated this orientation. Hume argued that amongst several "physical" and "moral" causes, the forms of government are the most powefil determinants of nations' characteristics. For example, Hume observed,

The same national chmcter cornrnonly follows the authority of govemment to a precise boundary; and upon crossing a river or passing a mountain, one finds a new set of manners, with a new govemment (1903: 209-2 10).

Moreover, Hume traced back different patterns of behaviour arnongst societies to variations in forms of government.

Where the government of a nation is altogether republican, it is apt to beget a peculiar set of manners. Where it is altogether monarchical, it is apt to have the sarne effect; the imitation of supenon spreading the national manners faster among the people (1903: 2 12).

Perhaps Hume's Treatise of Human Nature [ 173 9- 17401 contained his most forcefui statement on the causal primacy of the regime. As Hume declared,

Men cannot Iive without society, and cannot be associated without government. Government makes a distinction of propew, and establishes the different ranks of men. This produces industry, traffic, manufactures, law-suits, war, leagues, alliances, voyages, travels, cities, fleets, ports, and al1 those other actions and objects, which cause such a diversity, and at the same time maintain such an uniformity in human life (1939: Bk.iI-III-1, p. 402).

The role of society is quite iimited; it merely provides the set of manners, behaviours, and so on that supports the regime. As Duncan Forbes pointed out, Hume did not view society as a "positive social force," and at most, "the people in the last resort cm unmake a govement: they cannot make one" (1975: 320). It was not until later in the Scottish

Enlightenment that the regime would be seen as subordhate to economic relations and society seen as a "positive socizl force". . . 2 - The Social Determinism of Adam Ferguson, John Millar, and Adam Smith

Later prominent figures of the Sconish Enlightenrnent eventually reversed Hume's emphasis on the regime. These thinkers asserted that govemrnents could be located within a general scheme where the level of subsistence was of greatest importance. In particular, they argued that higher levels of economic development improve the ovenll conditions of the collectivity. One of the most important effects would be the rise of more civilized governrnents. Adam Ferguson's An Essay on the History of Civilimtion [1767] was an early instance of the growing emphasis on the stages of civilzation. As Ferguson wrote,

The enjoyment of peace, however, and the prospect of being able to exchange one commodity for another, tums, by degrees, the hunter and the warrior into a tradesman and a merchant ( 1767: III, p.277).

John Millar a few years later developed this idea Merin Observatiom concerning the

Distinction in Ranh in Society [1771]. As Millar argued,

Thus, in proportion as a country is better cultivated, it cornes to be inhabited by a greater number of distinct societies, whether derived from the same or fiom a different original, agreeing in their manners, and resembling each other in their govemment and institutions (1 77 1 : 152).

In addition to claiming that one could classi@ societies according to the level of development,

Millar also asserted that one could understand govemments in the same manner.

The advancement of a people in civilization, and in the arts of life, is attended with various alterations in the state of individuals, and in the whole constitution of their govemment (1 771 : 177).

Thus, some decades after Hume's remarks assiuTling the primacy of the regime, Ferguson and Millar viewed the level of progress of a society as a more crucial variable for setting its general patterns of behaviour than the form of its government.

Adam Smith's An Inqzriry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [1776] was perhaps the most well-known work of the Scots that gave causal primacy to the level of economic development over political institutions. In the third book, "On the different Progress of

Opulence in different Nations", Smith discussed the effects of economic development on governrnent. In particular, Smith viewed the order of development of economic conditions as the primary consideration for the classification of societies.

According to the natural course of things, therefore, the greater part of the capital of every growing society is, first, directed to agiculture, aflerwards to manufactures, and last of al1 to foreign commerce. This order of things is so very natural, that in every society that had any temtory, it has always, I believe, been in some degree observed. Some of their lands must have been cultivated before any considerable toms could have been established, and some sort of coarse industry of the manufacturing kind must have been carried on in those towns, before they could well think of employing themselves in foreign commerce (198 1: III- 1. p.380).

Some of the fruits of this development are the rise of more civilized governments and the humane manner in which the inhabitants ofa country relate to one another. The earlier tendency for countries to deal with both interna1 and external matten through savage means becomes scarce as the level of subsistence rises. Furthemore, Smith asserted that the increase of wealth in both commercial and manufacture towns,

... gradually introduced order and good govemment, and with them the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived in a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of seMle dependency upon their superion. This, though it has been Ieast observed, is by far the most important of ail their effects (198 1: III-4, pp. 41 1412).

This statement, of course, demonstrated the assertion that the establishment of a constitution is a secondary consideration compared to the status of economic relations in safeguarding a country's peace. Thus, Smith's Wealth of Mons emphasized a society's non-political factors over political institutions.

Generally speaking, then, the works of Ferguson, Millar, and Smith indicated the dwindling status of the regime as the key factor in shaping society. By focusing on those general patterns of development exhibited by al1 collectivities, they abandoned the orientation toward the regime found in Hume's works and early sociologicai analyses emerged. The distance between Hume and these other Scots could be illustrated by exarnining their different interpretations of the same event. In Hume's Histury of Enghnd

[1767],he discussed how Europe had reached "the dawn of civility and sciences" after many centuries of barbarism. The cause of this, Hume asserted, was a revolutionary improvement in legal systems thtoughout Europe, which the accidental discovery of a copy of the Justinian Pandects around 1130 had initiated. Hume emphasized the power of this legal system to transform utterly al1 aspects of society. As Hume claimed,

It is easy to see what advantages Europe mut have reaped by its inheriting at once fiom the ancients, so complete an art, which was also so necessary for giving security to dl other arts, and which, by refuiing, and still more, by bestowing solidity on the judgement, served as a mode1 for faaher improvements (1983: 52 1).

Millar' s An Historical View of the English Constitution [1787l, however, disrnissed this account and portrayed the huidamental powerlessness of laws in the face of contmy social conditions*As Millar stated,

In the year 1 137, the Pisans, at the taking of the town of Amalfi, found a copy of lustinian's Pandects; and to this accident, the rapid cultivation of the civil law, fiom that period, has been commonly ascribed. But we may be aLlowed to entertain some doubt, whether an event of that magnitude could have proceeded from a circumstance apparently so fiivolous (1803: 11-7).

Millar's treatment of this subject, then, rejected Hume's emphasis on the forms of government and legislation. Millar thus replaced Hume's essentially passive notion of society with one that subjugated the regime's pnmacy.

Guizot adopted this development in Scottish thought into his philosophical histories. Guizot, however, would be more occupied specifically with political questions.

Unlike the later figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, who provided broad descriptions of social development, Guizot would articulate in a far more specific and systematic manner the notion that the regime is but an effect of social conditions.

B - The Social Determinism of David Williams

David Williams, an ofien overlooked Welsh political thinker, was farniliar both with the works of the Scottish Enlightenment and The Spirit of the Laws. In fact, he offered perhaps one of the earlier applications of social determinism in the realm of political thought. Guizot, one might argue, takes priority in this matter over Williams merely because of the greater impact by the former.

Williams's Lectures on Political Principles [1789] was his main cornmentary on

Montesquieu, where he critically analyzed The Spirit of the Laws, book by book. As the title indicated, Williams directed his criticism toward Montesquieu's notion of principles, the idea that a regime requires from its inhabitants a certain fundamental sentiment in order to maintain itself. Taking a materialist position, Williams asserted that metaphysical speculation had led Montesquieu astray. The Spirit of the Laws had an inaccurate portrayal of political realities, which in turn sanctioned the continuation of sinister 43 political practices, specifically because Montesquieu had attached the notion of political principles to particular types of regimes. The result of this criticism in Williams's

Lectures on Political Principles was the diminution of the regime as a unit of analysis.

The bais of Williams' critique was his rejection of Montesquieu's fundamental distinction between a regime's nature or structure and its principle. As mentioned,

Montesquieu asserted that the nature of a regime refers to the basic elements shared by al1 regimes of the same form. This would include, for instance, considerations about the proportion of the populace taking part in the process of goveming as well as those findamental laws vital to the regime. A regime's principle, however, does not necessady have an empincal referent since it is the basic sentiment that must be promoted and maintained by the govenunent for its stability. In a democracy, for example, Montesquieu argued that the principle of virtue is absolutely necessary; this sense of patriotism or public altmism must be encouraged and enforced in every level of society so that the laws wiil be respected by their very makers. Furthemore, Montesquieu's notion of principles was also significant to his analyses because he viewed it as the principal medium through which the regime fundamentally characterizes the society. A particular type of regime, then, would eventually encourage a general set of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours throughout the whole society. In other words, Montesquieu explained the regime's causal primacy through his notion of political principles.

Williams questioned the validity of Montesquieu's political principles. According to Williams, not only was it unnecessary to make the distinction between structure and principle, but this was possible oniy by adhering to an erroneous rnetaphysical conception of principles. Williams explained this error as follows:

No man cm be more sensible than 1 am, of the importance of distinctions; but 1 am also aware of the rnischief of multiplying causes. As materialists see no reason to introduce an extraneous substance into the human fiame, to produce its thoughts and operations: so in artificial bodies, the distinction of nature and principle (unless it be that of cause and effect) tends to confound them and embmass those who observe them (1 789: 35-26).

The chief result was that Montesquieu's political principles became detached entities with the ability to transform society. Williams, then, identified Montesquieu's distinction as having an finity with the mistaken dualisrn of mind and body: the mind is a soul or spirit, a mysterious second substance that empowers the body.

Williams asserted that the notion of a soul is an unwarranted addition because the activities of the mind can be explained by refemng solely to the functions of the body.

One of the il1 effects resulting from this error, Williams stated, was the proliferation of superstitious beliefs. The belief, for exarnple, that recalcitrant spirits control misbehaving children endosed corporai punishment in order to extirpate them from the body.

Indolent, or vicious parents, excuse themselves, by alledging (sic) the peculiar spirit of a child; and pretending to accommodate al1 things to that minculous and occult quality. Al1 vices are thus cherished, by an absurd and wicked education (1 789: 29).

At the root of these misconceptions is the idea that the body is essentially inanimate material under the control of a mysterious entity. Put differently, purveyors of this metaphysical scheme gratuitously regard the spirit or soul as the causal agent of a given body.

Williams contended that these errors due to metaphysical speculation permeate

Montesquieu3 political analyses in a similar manner. Because of the uncertain status of political principles, Montesquieu was able to assign causal prirnacy to forrnal govemment. The detachment of political principles from the structure of governments tended to mask the limited influence of the regime on society. In other words,

Montesquieu's fundamental distinction between structures and principles, in effect, augmented - in a rnanner similar to a sou1 controlling a body - the influence of principles and their supposed source, the regime. One consequence of this view, according to

Williams, was that al1 bodies - that is, political bodies as well as men - are passive, inanimate materials to be used as instruments by the political principle. A society in proper fom, then, according to Montesquieu's view, would passively conform to the appropriate political principle. Questionable metaphysical underpinnings, therefore. rather than observations of the actual operations of regimes, allowed Montesquieu to consider the regime as the main determinant of a society.

According to Williams, Montesquieu's clah that the maintenance of political principles is necessary for the survival of a regime, and consequently necessary for the wellbeing of the society, was perhaps the most dangerous effect. Prirnady, the regime must preserve the social conditions that support the p~cipleby holding both the society and the formal government in stasis. Williams thus viewed Montesquieu's theories as being inherently hostile to change, whether or not certain changes rnight lead to vast improvements of a society's health. Put otherwise, Montesquieu would rather have preserved the political principle, a mysterious entity, at the expense of regarding society as materiais to be used in support of the principle. It was not surprising, then, that advocates of Montesquieu's political theories viewed with suspicion and hostility change and growth in societies - necessary elements of al1 societies, according to Williams.

In contrast, Williams argued that nature and principle are intimately connected.

Al1 bodies produce a range of sentiments as a result of the workuigs of the structure itself.

The highest of these sentiments is thefirsr principles.

The kst principles, in al1 bodies, natural, moral, and political, is self-preservation and self-enjoyment: the operations of these principles necessarily produce. not passions only, but reason; which in various degrees of imperfection, is the general and actuating spirit of al1 bodies (1 789: 28-29).

It is not necessary to rely on another substance to explain what sets the body in motion.

Thus, if one considers the human body, the rnind could be explained without reference to a soul, spirit, and so on. Further, Williams had a dynarnic conception of principles. Al1 bodies in good order would operate according to the first principles: the seeking of happiness and the striving for self-preservation. Such well-ordered behavior would result in the increasing movement toward rational capabilities and the fading of lower sentiments or passions.

Accordingly, Williams asserted that one could attain accurate politicai analyses by investigating the order amongst the members of a society. This would indicate how certain sentiments are produced and offer a more accurate account of the society's political condition. The crucial result of Williams' approach was the de-emphasis of the regime as a causal agent. Williams' competing account of virtue demonstrated this emphasis on society.

A society, in which the people are admitted and insaucted to bestow happiness on themselves, will necessarily be actuated by the highest and most ardent affection for the state; which the author casWtue. To constitute such a society, is to produce a perfect body; which like other bodies will generate its own principle. The measure of this virtue, or public affection, in dl deviations nom the just constitution of political states, lessens in exact proportion to those deviations; or to the dimunition of mens' interest in the transactions of the society (1 789: 26).

Montesquieu argued that a democratic regime, with judicious measures, could impose and encourage republican virtue at every level of society. Williams, however, rejected this depiction of the govemment as the necessary source of republican virtue. Instead, he viewed virtue as the outcome of a society living in a healthy arrangement. If the members of a society were arranged so that they could live according to thefirst principles, the love of nation or patriotism would be produced without imposition by the govemment.

Moreover, Williams asserted that assessing the arrangement of the whole society could attain a more accurate account of its potential for progress.

Govemment founded on the will and judgment of a whole people, actually systematized to fom a judgment or express a will; would be the effect or greater science and genius, than could be employed on the discipline of an army; ~d have means of security and defence, which no mercenary force could destroy, without extirpating the inhabitants of the country (1789: 36-37; Williams' ernp hasis).

If a society were in a poor arrangement, it would be susceptible to tyrannical regimes; yet, if society were to live according to the £ktpnnciples of happiness and self- presewation and were harmonized with its govemment, progress would continue unobstnicted. Often, the governments under Montesquieu's consideration were not in good order but were nevertheless described as though certain principles were well applied. Williams, however, countered that these governments operated by tymmically imposing lowly passions on the populace - who were themselves aiready arranged in a harmful manner. Yet, because Montesquieu had given priority to political principles, he masked and justified the lowly or even tyraMical passions as true principles desening the respect of both the government and the populace dike. More relevant to this discussion, however, is that Williams's treatment of Montesquieu's political principles diminished the claim of the regime as the prime causal factor for a society. By rejecting

Montesquieu's metaphysical conception of political principles, Williams urged the consideration of broader extra-political factors. In other words, how well the society as a whole is harmonized with its formal govemment dictates the possiblities of political

A usefùl contrast of Montesquieu's and Williams's approach lies in their treatment of the despotic regimes endured by the Romans. Here, Montesquieu's political determinism was quite pronounced.

When Sulla wanted to return liberty to Rome, it could no longer be accepted; Rome had but a weak remnant of virtue, and as it had ever less, instead of reawakening after Caesar, Tiberius, Caius, Claudius, Nero, and Domitian, it becarne ever more enslaved; al1 the blows were stnick against tyrants, none against tyranny (Montesquieu, 1989: 111-3).

The senes of tyrannical govements had rendered Roman society incapable of receiving, let alone supporting, a more jua regime. The enormous influence of the despotic regimes in shaping the character of the Romans caused the populace to thwart attempts at political reform. Roman society, then, was transformed into a despotic society.

Williams unequivocally rejected the idea that any society was irretrievably under the yoke of tyranny. He argued that Montesquieu's argument relied on the erroneous notion that society is essentiaily inert matter to be used by an indefînable principle.

It is owing to ignorance of the nature of society, men ahof any people, they are incapable of liberty, or incapable of becoming happy. The general mas of a community, like the mass of any other materiais, may ofien be in a state, not admitting of much reflection or judgment. And they may be seduced out of this state, into insidious and deceitful propos&. But they mut be excited by the prospect or hope of security and happiness: they never lose sight of that hope; and are never reduced into an incapacity of realizing it (1 789: 34-35).

Again, Williams argued that al1 aspects of society, including government, are ultimately determined by the arrangement of society. Thus, one could not view Roman society as incapable of having good govemment; rather, it was in poor order after a prolonged penod of despotism.

if the Romans had lived in a harmonious fashion with their political institutions, then a moderate and just govemment could have been possible. Williams's The Nature und E~tenloflntellectual Liberty [1779] and Lectures on the Unviversal Principles and

Dirfirs of Religion and Morality [1779] explored the idea of harmonizing government with ignored elements of society. Williams, as mentioned, rejected the notion that governments couid be the only source of the populace's sentiments. Instead, he looked to those organizations created independently of government, for example, the press, as having the capacity to uncover and difise the hidden sentiments and opinions of society.

Williams contended that if these organizations, fieed from governmental interference, were to continue to structure public opinion, then, at some point the governent would cease to be the generator of public sentiments. Increased hannonization beîween government and society, then, would result in the former becorning an eEect of the latter

(Gunn, 1983 :2 15). In short, Williams argued that a society in a hedthy state would have the potential to fashion its poiiticai institutions in a salubrious marner.

Williams's criticisms of Montesquieu's political ideas might give the erroneous impression that he was offering arguments on behaifof the democratic regime. In brief, 50 several defenders of'democracy have aiso asserted that extra-governmental organizations, which consolidate the opinions of the populace, yield several advantages. These organizations could stimulate the citizens' faculty of judgment and thus could be important elements for the improvement of their lives. This argument, which relies on presumptions of political determinism, concludes that democratic regimes are desirable becituse they foster the sdutary conduits of opinion, which are basic to a citizen's moral developrnent. Williams's main intention for supporting these independent organizations. however, was not to assert the superiority of the democratic regime. Rather, Williams's arguments aimed to illuminate society's inherent powers and to demonstrate that society is the ultimate foundation of any regime. Williams, moreover, viewed the govemment, and not the citizens, as the primary beneficiary of increased harmonization with society.

The attachent of political institutions with society would eventually extirpate compt practices - which were oAen justified by the erroneous view of society as an effect of govenunent - encumbering the govemment's performance. Williams, then, asserted that an unfettered society could improve the "nation" beyond al1 previous expectations.

Therefore, in conadistinction to pro-democratic arguments, Williams's re flections on

Montesquieu differed from pro-democratic arguments in two ways: the form of govemment, although not unimportant, was of secondary importance and the chief benefit of increased harmonization between political institutions and society would be the establishment of a strong and efficient government, rather than the promotion of individuals' moral development.

in summary, Williams forcefully asserted that the regime itself is aot a powemil 5 1 factor in shaping a society and that political institutions rest on a foundation of extra- political factors. Thus, Williams's cornmentaries on Montesquieu offer perhaps the earliest statements on the specific idea that the regime is an effect of broader social conditions. Williams, however, did not become a pivotal figure in the dissemination of this idea. This idea wouid not become influentid until the Bourbon Restoration.

II - The Development of Social Determinism in France

A - Louis de Bonald's Contribution to Sociological Thought

Conceming the development in France of a sociological approach to political issues, it would be usefùl to discuss briefly the influentid counter-revolutionary thinker

Louis de Bonald. In several respects, Bonald was opposed to Montesquieu. He insisted that Montesquieu had placed too great an emphasis on climate. He also rigorously opposed Montesquieu's favorable opinion of the ancient democracies as the zenith of al1 regimes. In spite of these differences, however, Bonald did develop some of the sociological trajectories set by Montesquieu. In particular, he stressed the importance of relations amongst the regime and other vital social elements. As a resuit of these investigations on ideas of social cohesion, Robert Nisbet's The Sociological Tradition argued that Bonald was a crucial figure in the development of a sociologicai approach to politics (1 966: 12-13). According to Nisbet, Bonald was one of those thinkers whose ideas ". .. which penist throughout the classicai age of modem sociology, extending indeed to the present moment" (1966: 5).

Bonald's Théorie dupouvoir [1794] asserted the superiority of the absolute monarchy that France had once been able to display as the mode1 to the world. An absolute monarchy is the greatest regime because it operates according to three fundamental laws necessary for the stability of any society. First, there must be the firm recognition of Chnstianity as the public religion dong with a strong clergy to promote and preserve this religion throughout the populace (1 845: 203). Second, it is necessary to have a unique power firmly in place, which is embodied in the king - the solitary figure of political power. Third, it is necessary to enforce social distinctions by protecting the rights and privileges of the nobles, diat is, members of distinguished families (cf. Bonald,

1836: 357-359). The period when France conformed to these principles was what Bonald referred to as the "life" of power or the age of "public" power when both the regime and society had reached their acme (cf. Bonald, 1836: 294). Pnor to this age, there was the birth of power or the age of personal power. The power of kings dissipated quite quickly and chaotically because there were no fixed lines of descent. Moreover, caprice rather than the recognition of fiindamental principles of wise leadership inspired the kings of this age. In addition, the Revolution introduced a degenerate age of power that Bonald refers to as the death of power or the age of popular de.In this period, the rabble had established itself as derand this had led to the decay of French society. What Bonald charactenzed as the rampant ignorance of the revolutionaries had destroyed both the society and the remarkable achievements of absolute monarchy.

While Bonald's observations reveal a sociological sensitivity to the relations between political and extra-political factors in a society, Bonald retained Montesquieu's fundamental orientation of political determinism. In particular, these three ages of power

- personal, public, and popular - provided the framework fiom which Bonald located lùndarnentai differences between France and other European societies. One could argue that this historical framework demonstrates a fundamental agreement between Bonald and Montesquieu that outweighs the former's cnticisms OFthe latter. Bonald's three eras of power indicated the view that the condition of the regime is the most important consideration for the examination of societies. In other words, Bonald shared with

Montesquieu a variation of political determinism.

In "De la manière d'écrire l'histoire" [1807], Bonald asserted that histoncal study of society rnust first take a general approach by identifying the stage of power. The historian would then consider the relevant details within this context. In particular,

Bonald insisted that the examination of a period's political conditions was crucial for the understanding of the whole society. Bonald's cornrnentary on the use of powoir, ministre, and stljei as terms for political analysis demonstrated his emphasis on the regirne for the histoncal study of societies,

Les rapports qui existent entre ces trois personnes publiques forment les lois politiques; et leur manière d'être fuce ou mobile, c'est-à-dire héréditaire ou temporaire, forme les différentes constitutions des Etats. Ainsi, dans le gouvernement monarchique, où lepouvoir et le minisire, qu'on appelle le roi et la noblesse, sont fixes ou héréditaires, l'état du sujet, au bonheur de qui se rapporte toute la société, est fixe aussi et héréditaire: ce qui veut dire que l'acquisition, la jouissance et la transmission paisible de sa propriété morde et physique sont pleinement assurées, et mieux garanties contre les révolutions que dans toute autre combinaison de société. Là où le powoir et ses fonctions, confondus dans des corps délibérants, sont mobiles ou temporaires, ce qui constitue la démocratie, l'état du sujet en aussi mobile ou incertain, et la famille plus exposée à souffrir des troubles et des révolutions de l'Etat (1882: 355-356).

Moreover, Bonald's assertion that the study of France would provide the most revealing studies on societies also indicated a definite political determinism.

Et pour ne parler ici que du pouvoir, et faire Papplication à notre propre histoire de cette manière générale de considérer cette première des personnes publiques, cause politique de tous les effets, c'est-&-direde tous les faits de la société, on peut remarquer dans I'histoire, ou plutôt dans la vie politique de la France, trois âges du pouvoir, qui sont, à la vérité, plus distinct en France que dans toute autre société, parce qu'ils correspondent en général et assez exactement à ce que nous appelons les trois races de nos rois; mais qui représentent tous les âges du pouvoir dans toutes les sociétés, c'est-à-dire toutes ses manières possible d'être (1 882: 357; my emphasis).

The notion that the regime fundamentally characterizes its society was also employed in several other essays. For instance, Bonald argued in "Des progrès ou de la décadence des lettres" [18 1O] that fundamental shifis in literary styles have their ongin in changes within the conditions of the political regime (1882: pp. 470-478).Or, in "Des Lois et des moeurs considérées dans la société en général" [18 1O], he argued (in a similar vein with

Montesquieu) that the Romans' inadequate understanding of the true political prïnciples, which support a stable constitution, ultimately led to the destruction of Roman society

(1 882: 479-488). In short, although this counter-revolutionary diinker developed certain themes of modem sociology, he nevertheless preserved Montesquieu's emphasis on the political regime.

B - François Mignet's Minor Contribution Before discussing Guizot's revend on Montesquieu's political detemiinism, it would be useful to discuss Mignet's contribution to this notion. Yvome Knibiehler's

Naissance des sciences humaines: Mignet et 1'histoire philosophique au xk siide offers the only major work on this thinker. Knibiehier's effort, however, is unsatisfactory in part because she tends to view Mignet tbrough the filter of the vocabulary of the twentieth century and is quick to identify Mignet with neo-Marxist thinkers (e-g., 1973: 10,34).

Most significantly, however, Knibiehler portrays Mignet as a follower of Montesquieu's ideas and thus fails to grasp Mignet's fundamental departure from Montesquieu's emphasis on the regime. As Knibiehler erroneously asserts, "Toutefois l'influence majeure qu'il a subie est évidement celle de Montesquieu .. ." (1973 : 35).

One of Mignet's earliest essays indicates othenvise. Mignet, in 1820, entered a cornpetition from L' Academie des inscriptions where the topic was the legacy of the reign of Saint-Louis. The question was put forth as follows:

Examiner quel était à l'époque de l'avènement de Saint Louis au trône l'état du gouvernement et de la législation, et montrer quels étaient à la fin de son règne les effets des institutions de ce prince (quoted in KnibieNer, 1973: 27).

Mignet, however, answered this question in an unexpected manner by de-emphasizing the accomplishments of Saint-Louis. Instead, much of the work focused on social conditions prior to, and during, Saint-Louis's reign. Saint-Louis's role was reduced to being only one factor, albeit an important one, amongst several others that were even more decisive.

Here, he asserted that it was necessary to consider a whole range of extra-political factors before one cm understand the regime. In particular, Mignet provided an early instance of historical rnaterialisrn where the condition of the lands and class relations determined the kinds of political institutions that are possible.

In 182 1, Mignet had the essay published as a book entitied De lafëodaliié with a structure and certain modifications that reinforces hidoncal materialism. It is tehgthat

Mignet did not even consider Saint-Louis's dein the fust half of this work. instead, full attention was directed toward the social conditions in France prior to the theof Saint-

Louis.

In particular, the chapter "État des terres", which was added to the original essay, indicated most clearly the rejection of the causal primacy of the regime. As Mignet wrote at the beginning of the chapter,

Ce chapitre mérite attention; il explique l'influence des terres sur le gouvernement politique (1822: 35). in this chapter, Mignet demonstrated the manner in which sweeping changes in land ownership led to a significant change in govemment. The lesser landownea had begun to demand that their ownership have some semblance of permanence by securing Iines of inheritance. According to Mignet, these demands were the main driving force of political change. As Mignet asserted,

La propriété qui ne dure qu'un temps, n'est qu'une demi-propriété. Les concessions précaires devaient devenir permanentes, parce que ceux qui possèdent aspirent à garder. La force des chose poussait là. Les intérêts les plus forts dictent la loi, et arrivent à leur but (1822: 47).

To the seigneur, Le., the local king or lord, who would eventually lose direct control of the land as a result of this demand for secure lines of inheritance, there were two options.

First, he could establish 1'hirédifi des bénéfices, which secured the allegiance of the landowner securing him as a vassal in exchange for securing lines of inheritance.

Alternately, he could stand by idly and allow the proliferation of fieeholds, othenvise known as changement en alleu' to occur. This would have resulted in the lesser landowner becoming independent without reference to the seigneur, who would then not be able to offer securîty in order to maintain allegiance. Whereas the former option presented fewer problems for the seigneur in that he codd at least retain the loyalties of the proprietors, the latter wodd have caused the loss of both land and loyal subjects. This push for definitive ownership fiom the lesser landowners, therefore, was crucial for understanding the maintenance of the relations berneen siegnetîrs and their vassals. The traditional approach of focusing on the regime and its legislative activities could not have accurately described these important relations, which were the foundation of later political institutions.

Les réclamations ne viennent pas de ceux qui ont concédé, mais ceux qui ont reçu; ce ne sont pas les rois qui se plaignent de ce qu'on rend leurs bénéfices héréditaires, mais leurs vassaux, qui se révoltent parce qu'on ne les rend pas tels (1822: 48).

Mignet thus offered a new mode of expianation. His extended description of the conditions of the land point to the pnmacy of non-political factors in the establishment of the political institutions. Mignet, however, never did develop these ideas of social determinism any further during his long career as a historian. De la féodalité, then, remained his sole treatise on sociaI determinism. Guizot, on the other hand, continued to develop these ideas both in his capacity as a historian and as a politician.

C - The Social Determinism of Guizot

Guizot was bom into a Protestant family at mesin 1787. The Tenor had claimed his father as one of its many victirns and thus forced the family to seek refuge.

His mother eventually settled in Geneva. These circumstances provided Guizot the opportunity to receive a thorough Swiss education where he learned several languages and was exposed to philosophical and historical studies. This education had a profound effect on Guizot, as he had once remarked, "Geneva was my intellectual cradle". In particular, this education was significant because Switzerland had retained close ties with

Britain, even during the tumulhious years of Napoleon's conquests. Guizot, then, was brought into eariy contact with the ideas of the Scottish Enlightement and it remained for him an important intellectual source.

1 - Essai$ sur lrhLSfoire de la France

While the Scottish Enlightenment regarded political institutions as an effect of social and econornic relations, not al1 the implications of this idea were explored in depth.

In particular, political issues were only secondary considerations for the Scots, who

Focused on global schemes that could serve to characterize al1 civilizations. Guizot, however, provided a more explicit and systematic explanation of how social conditions effect political institutions. This intention was quite clear in his Essais sur 1 'histoire de la

Fronce in 1822. This statement of Guizot closely resembled Mignet's observations in De

C'est par l'étude des institutions politiques que la plupart des écrivains, érudits, historiens ou publicistes, ont cherché a connaître l'état de la société, le degré ou le genre de sa civilisation, il eût été plus sage d'étudier d'abord la société elle-même pour connaître et comprendre ses institutions politiques. Avant de devenir cause, les institutions sont effet; la société les produit avant d'en être modifiée; et au lieu de chercher dans la système ou les formes de gouvernement quel a été I'état de peuple, c'est l'état du peuple qu'il faut examiner avant tout pour savoir quel a dû, quel a pu être le gouvernement (1 847: 59).

Furthemiore, Guizot pointed to the importance of class relations for understanding the origin of those govemmental institutions then in place.

La société, sa composition, la manière d'être des individus selon leur situation sociale, les rapport des diverses classes d'individus, I 'état des personnes enfin, telle est, à coup sûr, la première question qui appelle l'attention de l'historien qui veut assister à la vie des peuples, et du publiciste qui veut savoir comment ils était gouvernés (1857: 60).

Yet, in order to understand properly the état des personnes, it is imperative that the historîan engages in the study of the property relations. L'état des terres est devenu ainsi le signe de l'état des personnes; on s'est accoutumé à présumer la condition politique de chaque homme d'apres la nature de ses rapports avec la terre où il vivet. Et comme les signes deviennent promptement des causes, I'état des personnes a été enfin non- seulement indiqué, mais déterminé, entraîné par l'état des terres; les conditions sociales se sont pour ainsi dire incorporées avec le sol; les différences et les variations successives de la propriété temtoriale ont réglé presque seules le mode at les vicissitudes de touts les existences, de tous les droits, de toutes les libertés (1847: 61).

Accordingly, the proper order of study was quite clear in light of this argument. As Guizot asserted,

L'étude de l'état des terres doit donc précéder celle de l'état des personnes. Pour comprendre les insititutions politiques, il faut connaître les diverses conditions sociales at leurs rapports. Pour comprendre les diverses conditions sociales, il faut connaître la nature et les relations des propriétés (1847: 61).

Hence, unlike Montesquieu who investigated extra-political factors only in relation to the type of regime, one can see in Guizot a systematic revend of this emphasis and consequently a reduction of the impact of political organization. The structure of this work is indicative of this novel approach: only after an extensive discussion of the state

OFproperty relations and then of the state of class relations did Guizot begin to offer an account of French political institutions.

2 - Example: The Origin of the Nobility

At one point in this work, Guizot rejected Montesquieu's account of the ongin of the nobility. He had identifïed the leudes ,i.e., vassals, of the king, otherwise known as the antnlsiions, as the medieval precurson of the nobility. As Guizot summarized,

Montesquieu Pa cherchée dans la qualité de leude; selon lui, les fidèles du roi, les antrustions ont formé les premiers un corps de notables, et de la toute la noblesse est sortie (1 847: 145-146). More specifically, Montesquieu and other historians had sought answers by looking into the legal status of the leudes. As Guizot wrote,

On a laborieusement recherché, surtout pour les leudes du roi, quels avantages y était attachés; on a prétendu qu'ils formaient, dès l'origine, une classe distincte, investie de priviléges légaux ( 1847: 145).

In particular, Guizot referred to the last book in The Spirit ofthe Laws as exemplifying this mode of explmation.

In this book, "The theory of the feudal laws among the Franks in their relation to the revolutions of their monarchy", Montesquieu explained the origin of the nobility in the eighth chapter, "How the ailods were changed into fiefs". Essentially, Montesquieu located the changes in the shift fiom the "allod", Le., the land owned by fieemen, to the

"fiefs", i.e., which were owned by the kings' vassais. It is crucial that Montesquieu argued that the laws had given greater rights and privileges to the owners of the fiefs- The freemen had given up their allods and willingly served the king in order to gain greater rights and privileges and also to secure lines of inheritance. As Montesquieu summarized,

"One gave one's land to the king; he returned it to the giver as a usufkuct or benefice, and recommended (the giver's) hein to the king" (1989: XXXI - 8). Here, then, is the origin of the nobility: the changes in the laws of the kings had created the nobility. As

Montesquieu wrote, "In order to discover the reasons for a man thus to change the nature of his allod, 1 must seek, as in the very depths, the old prerogatives of that nobility which for eleven centuries has been covered with dust, blood, and sweat" (1989: M

Guizot, however, argued that Montesquieu's explanation began in the wrong place and consequently his analysis was distorted. The laws only reflected certain patterns of social relations that were aiready in place. As he wrote,

C'est une erreur. Leurs avantages, c'étaient les chances de fortune et du pouvoir; Leurs priviléges, c'étaient la supériorité de fait qu'ils acquéraient sur leur concitoyens. Que fallait41 de plus pour exciter l'ambition des individus? Les prééminences sociales ne deviennent légales qu'après avoir été longtemps réelles; c'est seulement quand elles se sont clairement constatées et affermies par la possession qu'elles passent dans les institutions et les Lois (1847: 145).

Rather, the kings had first imposed the superionty of their vassals or leudes before any

Law was established to this effect.

De très-bonne heure les rois s'efforcèrent de placer leurs leudes au premier rang de la société, et les leudes de s'y placer eux-même; mais, .. . on ne voit pas que cette supériorité ait été légalement consacrée avant le IXe siècle .. . (1 847: 145).

In fact, Guizot argued that there was no real nobility f'tom the fifth to the tenth centuries.

There was neither enough time nor adequate stability to establish their supenonty clearly

( 1847: 147). A few slaves had even successfilly gained prominence amongst the king's leudes ( 1 847: 147). The histonan investigating only formal laws, then, might overlook the intitial dissonance between the laws and the actual social conditions.

Montesquieu's explanation was mistaken because he identified the effects, that is, the political institutions, as the source of social organization. As Guizot argued,

.. . l'histoire générale de la France n'est guère plus que celle du roi et de ses leudes; l'histoire de chaque localité, celle du chef dont l'influence y domine et des leudes qui se sont ralliés autour de lui. C'est part les leudes enfui qu'a commencé la société féodale; ils sont placés entre les cornpangons errants des chefs germains et les vassaux du moyen âge, comme les bénéfices entre les présents de chevaux ou d'armes et les fiefs. Nous retrouverons, en traitant des institutions politiques, les mêmes transitions, les mêmes phénomènes, car l'état des terres, l'état des personnes at les institutions ont toujours marché de concert (1847: 148).

In bnef, Montesquieu's and Guizot's contrasting interpretations of the origin of nobility depict the fundamental shift of orientation fiom the regime to society. III - Guizot's Decisive Contribution to Social Determinism

Having described the process that had reversed the emphasis on the regime in both Britain and France, a review of Guizot's importance in the development of social determinism can be given. Although several notions of social deteminism were in existence prior to Guizot, this section argues that these were either not clearly articu or simply forgotten. Guizot's works, therefore, are here recognized as the beginning social determinism. Unlike the Scots, Guizot had dealt with the issue of political institutions in a direct and thorough marner. Similar to Bonald, he had also developed ideas on the relations between the regime and society; yet, he had done so within the matrix of social deteminism. Finally, unlike Williams, he became a highly influentid figure in the development of a sociological approach to political institutions.

A - Guizot vs. the Scots

Generally speaking, there were two similarities in the approaches of Guizot and the Scottish Enlightenment. The primary influence was that Guizot had become farniliar with the political econornists' views on the interactions between economic relations and political institutions, a development of certain ideas onginating fiom both Montesquieu

(Siedentop, 1997: xx) and Hume (Forbes, 1975: 320). Another similarity was that their general approaches of examining social causes were early manifestations of histoncd sociology. Guizot agreed with the Scots that the use of narrative histories was an effective method for uncovering the causes and effects within society (Siedentop, 1997: xxi). By attempting to locate certain Fundamental permutations, especially changes in the mode of subsistence, they revealed patterns of social development. For example, fundamental 63 irnprovements in economic organization result in the development of more civilized govemments.

Yet, Guizot differed from the Scots because he provided an application of social determinism to specific political issues. In particular, Guizot incorporated his ideas on the primacy of social conditions to proposals on the actual reconstruction and preservation of existing political institutions of the Restoration. On the other hand, the Scottish

Enlightenment opted for a "universal scope" and attempted to conceive of a general scheme, based on modes of subsistence, which could be applied abstractly to any given society. In other words, whereas the Scottish thinkers did not have as a pnmw aim the reversal of political determinism, Guizot, as a result of the pressing political issues of the

Restoration, confronted this mode of expianation in a moa direct manner (Siedentop,

1979: 158-9).

As mentioned above, Guizot's Essais sur /'histoire de la France argued that it was necessary to begin with the study of property relations and ciass relations in order to understand political institutions properly. Prior to this work, as Montesquieu exemplified, the practice was to study the forms of govermnent frst. As the example illustrated above, whereas Montesquieu had sought the ongin of the nobility in the laws, Guizot argued that laws wouid only later reflect long-entrenched social patterns. The proper study of the condition of land ownership, then, would have revealed Montesquieu's error. Now, while

Millar had studied a wide variety of societies by examining primarily social conditions, his Distinction of Ranh offered an explanation on the ongin of the no bility. His explanation revealed how the Scots' broad scope tended to overlook the impact of social deterrninism on issues of political theory. Millar maintained and referenced directly the explanation given by Montesquieu in the Spi& of the Laws. The source of the nobility lay in the agreements that required the independent landowners to relinquish their autonomy to a powefil lord for the sake of security.

The nature of these important transactions, the solemnities with which they were accompanied, and the views and motives fiom which they were usually concluded, are sufficiently explained from the copies or forms of those deeds which have been collected and handed domto us (Millar, 1771: 165).

Moreover, Millar emphasized the role of the public assemblies in France. When autonorny was forfeited, the independent ownes also gave up the nght to partake in the assembly with the king. As this process continued, the members' numbers became smaller but they themselves became more powerful. Millar's explanation was then consistent with the manner in which political institutions were usually described; that is, he began with both the laws and forms of government themselves. As Millar concurred with Montesquieu,

The gradua1 advancement of the aristocracy in these kingdoms has accordingly been remarked by every historian who has given any geneml view of their political constitution (1 771 : 167-168).

It would not be until the Bourbon Restoration fi@ years derthis statement that this explanation would be rejected on the grounds that it begins with the effects and not the causes. In short, whereas Guizot systematically applied social detenninism to the snidy of political institutions, Millar, in this instance, looked to the impact of legislation for the origin of the aristocracy.

B - Guizot vs. Bonald

Ro ben Nisbet's The SocioIogicaZ Tradition bas argued that Bonald was a pivotal 65 figure in the transition to modem political sociology. More recently, both Irving Zeitlin's

Ideology and the DeveZopment of Sociological Theory and David Klinck's The French

Cocinterrevokrtionary Theorist Louis de Bonald have advanced this identification of

Bonald with twentieth-century sociology. These interpretations point to Bonald's emphasis on the necessity for a certain social organization that could support a stable monarchical govemment, which, of course, focused on the relations between a regime and its society. Yet, the above works identiQ too readily the similarities at the expense of overlooking the fundamental divides between Bonald and later sociological figures.

Bonald's insistence on the superiority of the monarchical regime, for instance, indicates one such variance. In the eighth chapter of Théorie du pouvoir, Bonald summarized the hee fundamental laws of a monarchical society. Bonald's title to this chapter, however, refered to the "propriétés générales de la société," thus implying that there is but one true society. As Siedentop has pointed out, Bonald's approach did not allow for social change or even a variety of societies (1 979: 159, 162). Bonald envisioned society as a monarchical and any deviation fkom this was viewed as evidence of disorder, that is, the disintegration of society.

Another problem of identimg Bonald as a decisive figure in the development of a sociologicai analysis of politics is that he, as mentioned above, shared with

Montesquieu a fm political detemiinism. Guizot's and Bonald's competing interpretations of Charlemagne illustrate this point.

- Example: Charlemagne

Guizot's History of CiviIi'ation in Europe Cl8281 presupposed that the early Europe could not have sustained the innovations of later periods. The representative govemment of modem Europe, for example, could not have been established in the midst of the instability characteristic of the earlier periods. A civilization must develop to the point that there are certain extmpolitical factors that enable certain kinds of regimes to exist. In other words, the manifestation of the kinds of political institutions unique to modem Europe was possible because of the sufficient development of material, social, and inteliectual conditions.

This notion is evident, for instance, in Guizot's discussion of Charlemagne, who attempted to recreate the Roman Empire with a highly centraiized govemment in the midst of the barbarous condition of the ninth century (1 997: 52). According to Guizot, the

"barbarian epoch", the period after the fa11 of the Roman Empire in the West, was the early infancy of modem Europe. There was much confusion due to the general shift away from a wandering way of Iife to a sedentary one (1997: 53). As a result, class relations were unstable and property rights were becoming parochial (1997: 52-53). Royal, aristocratie, and fiee institutions, therefore, enjoyed a chaotic coexistence. Moreover, relentless invasions by barbarians required any stable government to undergo constant battles simply to survive (1997: 54). These invasions also had a definite moral or intemal implication. niese conquerors of Europe diffused an extreme principle of individuality, which accepted that one need only to obey one's own passions (1 997: 56). This hyper- individualism spilled into and permeated the barbarian epoch. Stability in the social reaim, therefore, was highly improbable (cf. Guizot, 1972: 337-340).

Under such conditions, Charlemagne sought to establish an extensive govemment. 67

Not only did neighboring barbarian countries continually compel Charlemagne to wage war, he also had to contend with chaotic conditions intemally (1997: 61). Although

Charlemagne endeavoured to reform the conditions of his kingdom - for example, by vigorously promoting the advancement of learning - when he had died, there was no longer a vigilant eye to prevent the deterioration of these efforts ( 1997: 6 1; cf. Guizot,

1972: 327-8). His subjects seized this event as an opporîunity to revert to their former ways. Hence, according to Guizot, Charlemagne's grand project was bound to fail because the social relations, and consequently the ideas, of this epoch were contnry to his goals (cf. Guizot, 1972: 33 1-2). European civilization during this period was unstable, inchoate. limited, and parochiai. Thus, an expansive and centralized regime could not be sustained under these conditions.

Guizot's discussion of Charlemagne's efforts clearly indicates a reversal of

Montesquieu's view of the relation be~eenpolitical institutions and social structures.

Montesquieu asserted that so long as a regime's principle is upheld, by means of an astute legislator's etrom, the social conditions that support the regime would be maintained. Yet, why then did not Charlemagne's shrewd manoeuvres promote the principle needed for an extensive central state? Would not al1 of his efforts in protecting and promoting his regime result in an overall change in the social conditions? Would not the barbarian epoch have been curtailed? As Guizot wrote in The History of Civilizution in France [1838-18301,Montesquieu's neSpi* of the Law, alîhough a g'glorious" work on the history of civilization, was essentially Limited to the sphere of political institutions (1972: 336). 68

Bonald, similar to Montesquieu, viewed Charlemagne as the catalyst ending the primitive use of power and marking the beginning of the salubrious age of public power.

Charlemagne was a genius of the highest order who was able to grasp the necessary pnnciples for a great society. Thus, we see here a reflection of Bonald's political determinism whereby the judicious use of political principles could fundamentally alter a society. As Bonald had strongly asserted, Charlemagne raised modem Europe (1 836: 166,

173). This illustration of Charlemagne is in sharp contrast with Guizot's image of a great man who was nevertheless doomed to failure because the social conditions could not permit the attainrnent of his designs.

These contrasting images of Charlemagne are instructive of Guizot's emphasis on society itself and Bonald's insistence on the important effects of the regime on society.

While Bonald had a holistic view of political institutions and, udike the Scots, confionted the pressing political problems brought on by the Napoleonic era and the

Restontion, he nevertheless continued to adhere to a form of political determinism similar to that of Montesquieu.

C - Guizot vs. Williams Unlike the Scots and Bonald, Williams' cornmentary on Montesquieu in his

Lectures on Political Principfes, had rejected the causal primacy of the regime as well as focusing directly on issues of political theory. Why not, then, designate Williams as the crucial figure advancing the notion of the social determinism? The reason is that

Williams' influence did not extend very far. Guizot, however, was an enormous influence on key figures, both inside and outside the liberal tradition, who have shaped much of modem social science (Siedentop, 1997: xxx). For example, Guizot's Lectures during the

Restoration profoundly affected Alexis de Tocqueville (Siedentop, 1997: mi).

Tocqueville's acceptance of the notion that political institutions are effects of social conditions prompted his scepticism concerning the ending of the Revolution and the reforming of the state's overpowering tendency to engulf the whole country through centralization. Tocqueville argued that the absence of a strong aristocracy, which was a necessary element for the local autonomy found in England, would make the achievement of this autonomy unlikely in post-Revolutionary France. In other words, Tocqueville was pessimistic conceming lasting political reform in France after the Revolution because of the ultimate dependence of govemments on social conditions. As Siedentop summarized,

Tocqueville learned from Guizot the following:

Social structure set limits on political choice. If, for exarnple, the subdivision of property, the spread of education, and social rnobility had undermined the caste system inherited nom feudalism, then no goverrunent - whatever its bravado - could re-create an aristocratie society in France (1994: 23).

Karl Marx provides another example of the influence wielded by Guizot. As Siedentop stated, "Marx was enormously impressed by the way Guizot used property relations and class structure to get beneath the surface of political events and analyse the dynarnics of social change" (Siedentop, 1997: ~ii).Marx's application of social determinism to political institutions is so well known through his historical rnaterialism that Guizot's influence in this regard has been overlooked In conclusion, unlike Williams, whose ideas do not extend to conternporary social science, Guizot was the most important figure in the reversal of political determinism in part because of the debt that modem social science owes to him. CHAPTER 4 TmIMPACT OF BOTH POLITICAL DETERMINISM AND SOCIAL DETERMINISM DURING THE BOURBON RESTORATION

This cliapter begins with a discussion of the challenges that faced the Bourbon

Restoration due to unresolved tensions between the defenders and the detractors of the uncien rlgime. In particular, this discussion emphasizes the Right's tendency to rely on political determinism and the LeRs adherence to social deteninism. Next, there is a contrast between the positions of Guizot and the Royalists, who were often influenced by

Montesquieu, which illustrates the two competing interpretations of the Charter of 18 14.

Finally, this chapter closes with an exarnination of the parliarnentary debates, which dealt with the bills on the armed forces, the electoral process, and primogeniture. These debates contained notable statements illustrating both Montesquieu's and Guizot's competing views on the appropriate role of the govemment.

1 - The Challenges of the Bourbon Restoration

When Louis XVIII retumed to France in that very April in which Napoleon abdicated, the daunting task of rebuilding the country lay ahead. Moreover, the task was made even more difficult since France was then a country that would have been virtually unrecognizable to his predecessoa prior to 1789. As one twentieth-century student of the

Restoration wrote, the major challenges of the Restoration were many:

To bind up the wounds of war; to rebuild the house of France fiom the nins of the great European Empire; to fit the monarchical, patriarchd, theocratic, and feudal institutions into the new Napoleonic national, secular, and administrative state; to balance the new society emerging fkom the Revolution with the old privileged classes who intended to reoccupy their places dong with the king (Bertier de Sauvigny, 1967: 56- 57). 7 1 nie first goal was to re-establish the monarchy that had been absent in France since 1793.

How, then, did Louis XVIII and his supporters approach the problern of establishing a monarchy that could be reconciled with the new society? On the one hand, they held the conviction that France could only be unified under monarchical dein which the Bourbon line possessed the divine right to rule. On the other hand, they agreed that there would have to be constitutional limitations set on the king's power, if there was to be any hope of overcoming the deep divisions stemming fiom the Revolution. Accordingly, Louis had a cornmittee write a constitution that would strive for these goals. On June 4, 1814 Louis's constitutional cornmittee had completed the Charter, which summarized the rights and limits of the monarch and the organization of the new government.

A few brief and usefui points about the Charter can be made here. First, the Charter granted the king sole executive power, including ultimate control of the armed forces (Art. 13,

14). Defenders of the Restoration saw this aspect of the Charter to be the foundation of security.

This provision also addressed an imperative difficulty: the army, the instrument by which

Napoleon gained control, still contained factions that maintained their loyalty to the late

Emperor. The king, then, must be placed in a position of supreme authority that would enable him to secure the devotion of the army. Funbermore, the Charter established a parliament with two chambers. The Chamber of Peers consisted of members who were appointed by the king

(Art. 27) and the lower chamber or the Chamber oCDeputies consisted of elected memben who were at least thirty years old, able to aord the heavy tax irnposed on al1 candidates, and were elected by limited sufhge. The last condition of limited suffrage required that one had to be at

Least moderately wealthy in order to vote. Moreover, the king chose his Ministry, sometimes 72 referred to as the Govemment, which consisted of mernbers fiom either chamber. Laws could be proposed (Art. 16) as well as sanctioned and promulgated (Art. 20) in the king's narne alone.

Either chamber, however, could subject al1 iaws proposed on behalf of the king to examination and cnticism. Thus, while both chamben could only receive and debate the king's bills, they nevertheless retained the significant power to reject the king's proposals. Further, they had the right to petition the king to introduce bills (Art. 19). in short, Louis XVIII hoped to communkate to France with the Charter that the restoration of the Bourbons was not a prologue to the return of absolute monarchy but rather the first step toward reconciliation.

Perhaps inevitably however, the Charter provoked for the most part dissatisfaction. Many believed that the Charter was more the result of foreign intervention than it was an expression of the wishes of France. The fact, for instance, that the cornmittee drafted the Charter very quickly in order to comply with the Allies' deadline of Iune 3 to evacuate Paris - but only on the condition that there be a firm constitutional bais established - obviously contributed to this sentiment. Yet, the basic division of France into two peoples was the most fundamental threat to the new government. On the one hand, those on the Right representing the interests of the ancien régime, especially the émigrés - that is, those aristocrats who had found refuge abroad - demanded at the very Ieast a stronger recognition of the institutions of the old France. Some of these, most notably the Ultra-Royalists, were exceedingly disappointed with the Charter and regarded it as a lost opportunity to regain those former rïghts and privileges of the aristocracy that had been unjustly taken away since the Revolution. Furthemore, many of these were critical of the refusal to remto the absolute monarchy prior to the Revolution. They believed that a rnonarchy that was anything less than absolute could not sustain itself. This rniscalculation would 73 lead to a complete downfall of the old order and the renewal of the disorder endured during the

Revolution. Put differently, the Right argued that the Charter compromised too readily with the new elements of France, which would inevitably compromise the Bourbon monarchy itself. On the other hand, some far to the Left who represented the interests of revolutionary France were displeased to see the remof the monarchy, regardless of the constitutional limitations imposed on the king. They viewed the Charter as the harbinger of a reactionary movement aiming to destroy al1 of the accomplishrnents resulting from the Revolution. They feared that the Royalists would use the Charter to dismiss altogether the principle of equality in favour of the strict ranlcing system of the ancien régime. These two competing views of France placed Louis

XVIII's Charter at a tremendous disadvantage from its very inception; instead of marking the firm beginning of a new era, it tended to revive latent hatreds.

- Incidents Contributing to the Political Divide

The supporters of the Charter hoped that it would eventually receive suffïcient support - if only for the sake of peace - and that the conflict between the Right and the

Left would become a manageable one after a penod of adjustment. There were, however, certain incidents that contributed to the perpetuation of this political divide.

The fust major incident was Napoleon's spectacular attempt to restore his position as Emperor otherwise known as the One Hundred Days (March to My, 18 15). Until

Napoleon was fmally defeated at Waterloo, Louis XWI and his most prominent supporters were forced to fiee to Ghent thus ending First Restoration. The question of how Napoleon could have escaped from the Isle of Elba and somehow go on to force the king into exile once more was, as expected, a heated issue among those taking refuge at 74

Ghent. Many of the Royalists were convinced that the One Hundred Days was tragic proof of the Charter's inherent flaws. They asserted that a monarchical govemment could not survive being comprornised by the principles of a republican govemment The

Charter reflected the failure to recognize that stability was possible only through the renirn of an absolute monarchy and the protection of the institutions of the uncien rig'rme.

The defenders of the Charter disputed this claim, and these included Guizot himself, who argued that it was a necessary foundation for a peaceful and progressive France. Guizot maintained the position that Napoleon's return was not due to a flawed constitution but rather that he possessed the genius to detect and manipulate the various powers that are fond in society. To blme the Charter for the One Hundred Days on the grounds that it was a poorly conceived constitution that encouraged rebellion is to ask too much from any constitution, no matter how wisely written. This early misfortune and the ensuing controversy would set the tone for the Second Restoration.

The assassination of Louis XVIII's heir was another calamity that exacerbated the divisions within the circle of supporters of the monarchy to the point of open hostility. On the night of February 13, 1820 a republican fanatic mortally wounded the duc de Berry - the only one capable of continuing the royal he. The king's ministry at this point, headed by Decazes, quickly felt the wrath of the Royalists over the assassination. The vigorous attempt of the Decazes Ministry, the most centrist of al1 the ministries of the

Restoration, to reconcile the two peoples of France was ineffective and provoked the condemnation of both the Left and Right. The murder intensified the fierce attacks against the Decazes Ministry by the Right and some went so far as to insinuate complicity with the assassin. Although the more extreme accusations were not taken very seriously, the underlying sentiment contributed to the popular royalist notion that a monarchical governrnent could not be based on a constitution with democratic elements without jeopardizing the monarchy itself. The ultimate consequence of the assassination, according to the historian Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, was that it marked the beginning of the end for the Bourbon Restoration. From that point, the conflict between the Left and the Right would escalate to open hostility.

... in the country, as Louis XVIII hed, there were now two hostile peoples, victirns of their own katricida1 hatred. This explains why that ill- starred date of February 14, 1820 is a dividing Iine in the history of the Restoration ( 1967: 167).

As during the One Hundred Days in Ghent, therefore, the assassination of the duc de

Berry resulted in the hardening of positions of how best to secure the monarchy: should the king have been granted greater powee and not succumb to revolutionary pressures or was it absolutely necessary for the king to acknowledge the society transformed by the

Revolution?

II - Fundamental Orientations of both the Left and the Right

Martin de Gray, as a Liberal Deputy, stated the following during his attack against the Royalists' electoral bill in 1820:

Le droit du peuple de nommer ses représentants n'est point confër, mais reconnu par la Charte; il remonte au berceau de la monarchie ou plutôt à la source de toute société humaine (Archives parlementaires, vol. 27: 663; May 17, 1820; my emphasis).

Gray had descnbed aptly the positions held by the Right and the Lefi. The Right, guided by notions of political detemiinism, interpreted the Charter the key legislative act that 7 6 would "confer" the social order necessary for a monarchy. The Left, who generally accepted the aims of the Revolution, regarded the Charter as the document testieing the new monarch's cornmitment to "recognize" the fundamental changes that had taken place in France since 1789. This section starts with a description of Guizot's adherence to the latter position.

A - Guizot: The Charter as Recognizing the New Society

Guizot's rejection of the prevailing political determinism compelled him to oppose the Royalists and offer theoretical justification to the Center in their approach to the problem of stability. Essentially, this position started from the argument that political institutions are ultimately subordinate to general social patterns. Accordingly, a regime does not have the power to shape its society in order to promote its own stability. The government of the Restoration, then, would not be prudent in attempting to alter the society with the view of making its characteristics suitable to a monarchy. Furthemore, the govemment must grasp that the source of political power is not to be found within itself but rather in the society. The monarchy would make a fatal error if it were to take a course that was at variance with the new elements of French sociev. But if the govemment were to conduct itself so as to capitalize on the strengths that the new France had to offer, its survival could be ensured. In fact, Guizot argued this path would lead to a stronger and more effective government never before realized.

Guizot at the very beginning offered his full support to Louis XVIlI and the

Charter both for the reasons above and because it seemed a promishg beginnllig for the reconciliation of a divided country. As Guizot stated in his Memoirs to nlustrate the Hereditary monarchy, become constitutional, presented itself to my mind both as a principle of stability, and as a natural and worthy means of reconciliation and conversion arnongst the classes and parties who had been so long and continuaily at war (1 858: 143).

On a practical level, then, Guizot believed that the renini of the House of Bourbon was the only reasonable option available during the crisis of 18 14 when France had been completely ovemn by the Allies. The force of the circumstances dictated that the restoration of Louis XVIII was "the oniy measure that could be reconciled to principles not dependent on the influence of force and the caprices of human will" (1858: 30).

More important to Guizot, however, was that the Charter was an expression of both the past and future of France. In other words, the Charter represented the historical continuity necessary for a progressive society. As Guizot recalled in his kfernoirs:

Some alarm might thence be excited for the new interests of French society; but with the act of institutions mutually accepted, the two benefits of which France stood most in need, and of which for twenty-five yean she had been utterly deprived, peace and liberty, might also be confidently looked for (1858: 30).

"The new interests of French society" was an unavoidable reality that the new government mut corne to accept fully and learn to utilize. The Revolution had irrevocably changed French society to the point that the recovery of old France was unattainable. Nor was it desîrable, for there were now new and unrealized potentiais that couid impel France to unprecedented progress. Guizot, however, parted ways with revolutionary interests because they tended to reject unequivocally the ancien régime.

Guizot maintained that this typical rejection fkom the far Left effectively amounted to a complete denial of France's valuable heritage. As Guizot stated: ... but because our social system is filled with new elements, it is not therefore new in itselt it can no more deny what it has been, than it cm renonce what it has become; it would stimulate perpetual confusion and decline with itself, if it remained hostile to its true history. History is the nation, the country, viewed through the ages (1858: 28).

The new society would consequentiy do well to view the old France as an integral part of itseK Because the Charter expressed the new social realities, it could bridge these deep divisions.

What, then, were these new social realities? In the realm of ideas, the new society valued the principle of equaiity under the law and the rejection of the old ascribed privileges. Outwardly, French society was also changed fundamentally by the rising middle class that had initiated a new dynamic in social relations (cf. Guizot, 1972).

Guizot. then, explained the strength of the Charter as follows:

In Our own days, a decisive battle has been fought. That battle is cdled the Revolution. .. . The resuit was not doubûul. Victory declared for those who had been so long subdued. In turn they conquered France, and in 18 14 were in possession beyond dispute. The Charter acknowledged this fact, proclaimed that it was founded on right, and guaranteed that right by the pledge of representative government. The King, by this single act, established himself as the chief of the new conquerors (1 858: 284).

The Charter, then, was an indication of the new regirne's willingness to govem in accordance to the new society. As Guizot strongiy asserted, ". .. the Charter implied such an engagement, beyond all question .. ." (1858: 285).

The system of representative government sanctioned by the Charter contained

"the essentid means of regular government and of effective opposition, which the sincere fnends of power and liberty could desire" (1858: 28). The object of Guizot's Des moyens de gouvernement et d'opposition dans Mat actuel de la France [182 11 was to demonstrate how the regime could benefit fiom the new society by understanding the purpose behind the institutions of representative government. The essential argument of this work was that the source of the means of government to strengthen its position is to be found in society. As Guizot stated,

Le public, la nation, le pays, c'est donc là qu'est la force, là qu'on peut la prendre. Traiter avec les masses, c'est le grand resort du pouvoir. Vient ensuite l'art de traiter avec les individus; art nécessaire, mais qui, à lui seul, a peu de valeur at produit peu d'effet ( 182 1: 133; CE Pouthas, 1923: 293).

The government could proceed in this rnanner by finding within the new French society the sentiments, ideas, prejudices, interests and so on that could solidify and empower the constitutional monarchy (Pouthas, 1923: 291). Guizot described this aspect of governing in the following statement.

Tout peuple, tout parti, vu en général, a des opinions, ou si l'on veut, des préjugés qui y dominent, des intérêts qui le dirigent, des passions qui fermentent dans son sein. C'est par-la qu'il se laisse conduire; ce sont les anses par où on peut le prendre; là résident les moyens de gouvernement qu'il offre au pouvoir (182 1: 133).

Moreover, the opposition is one of the vital avenues through which the important interests of society can continue to be heard. The Charter, for example, granted the opposition the opportunity to criticize; and, to a degree, control the governrnent's actions without conspiring (1858: 289-290). Ideally, the opposition could best serve by obliging the government to act in a just and wise manner. As Guizot stated, the tme means of government,

... resident au sein de la société elle-même et peuvent en être séparés. C'est là qu'il faut les chercher pour les trouver, là aussi qu'il faut les laisser pour s'en servir (182 1: 129).

Thus, the discovery of the powers that reside in society must be the primary objective of the government and this ultimately rests on the notion that the govenunent is but a mere instrument of society.

Guizot's vision of representative government was in sharp contrast with the political determinism that was widely held by the Right. Legislation, Guizot argued, attempting to control society in order to make it conform to the dernands of the regime would be at besr the futile application of an erroneous conception of political power. At worst, such legislation could estrange the regime Eom its source of strength and stability and thereby threaten its existence. Guizot, in fact, insisted that the govemment would be ultimately powerless were it so unfortunate as to be in the midst of an uncooperative society.

Ce n'est pas que j'ai dessein de tout imputer, de tout demander au pouvoir lui-même. Je ne lui dirai pas, comme on le fait souvent: - Soyez juste, sage, ferme et ne vout inquietez de rien. - Le pouvoir n'est pas libre d'être ainsi excellent à lui tout seule. 11 ne fait pas la société, il la trouve; et si en effet la société est impuissante à le seconder, si des principes anarchiques la possèdent, si elle renferme en son propre sein les causes de la dissolution, le pouvoir aura beau faire; il n'est pas donné a la sagesse humaine de sauver un peuple incapable de concourir lui-même à son salut (182 1: 126-127; cf. Guizot, 1858: 291).

Thus, this statement fdyindicates the limitations of the regime and its dependence on social conditions. It is crucial, then, that the government secure the consent of society if it is not to be severely disabled.

It is noteworthy that Guizot's criticism of the causal primacy of the regime indicated a far broader conception of political analysis than cm be seen in either

Montesquieu or his contemporaries. As Pouthas commented,

Sa vision politique s'est élargie. Ii place le secret de l'art de gouverner dans une collaboration intime et profonde du pouvoir avec toutes les forces vives du pays (1923 : 293).

The collaboration between the government and society, which Guizot deemed as vital, necessarily dismissed the notion of the Royalists that the govenunent mut impose an order on to society fiom above.

(Guizot) est à L'opposé de la conception napoléonienne ou monarchiste de l'État. d'un systeme de machines superposées au pays et le faisant mouvoir sous I'impulsion du pouvoir centrd (Pouthas, 1923 : 293).

This erroneous conception of governmental power stemmed from mistaking the government itself to be the source of power. As Guizot stressed,

C'est qu'en effet les vrais moyens de gouvernement ne soit pas dans ces instruments directs et visibles de l'action de pouvoir (1 82 1 : 129; cf. Guizot, 186 1: 56).

This argument is also found in Guizot's lectures, The Hisfory of the Origin of

Representative Government in Eirrope [1820- 18221, which offered an explanation for this cornmon error. Guizot argued that Montesquieu and his adherents had followed the long- enduring habit of confusing the visible signs of power with power itself. As a result, they regarded the regime as the source of power when in fact it was merely the culmination of social powen (186 1: 56).

B - The Royalists: The Charter as Conferring Social Order

The Royalists, following the lead of Montesquieu, believed that the regime itself was the source of power. Accordingly, they argued that only political leadership that decisively and consistently conducted the &airs of govemment as a monarchicd regime could secure the stability of France. The primary task, then, was to promote the regime by controlling the essential elements of society that were necessary for a monarchy. In particular, laws that protected the aristocracy and other pre-Revolutionary institutions were necessary rneasures for stability. Many nobles drew fiom the Spirit of the Law to justiS this position where Montesquieu had declared, "no nobility, no monarchy; no monarchy, no nobility" (1 989: 11-4). In short, the nobles had based their argument on the notion that a regime, with the sagacious application of the correct principles, could alter the crucial elements within society and this would in tum enhance the strength and stability of the regirne.

Many of those who were supportive of the Charter held that the only way to preserve the Bourbon Monarchy was to view the Charter as the guiding set of principles to which society mua conform. Moreover, this was certainly within the limits of possibility so long as the govenunent confomed to the Charter. Suard, the secretary of the French Academy, clearly comrnunicated this theme in Le Moniteur universelle with the exhortations in his speech honouring a highly-esteemed essay on Montesquieu.

Tout présage au monarque que nous avons recouvré le bonheur que méritent la sagesse et la bonté, et une gloire aussi pure que nouvelle. Eclairé par les lumiéres de son siècle, par celle de l'expérience, et par celle d'un esprit supérieur, il vient de donner à l'autorité royale un appui qu'aucun autre ne peut remplacer, dans cette Charte qui consacre tous les droits du monarque en même tems (sic)qu'elle garantit à la nation tous ceux qui constituent le vraie et légitime liberté. L'instabilité des gouvernemens (sic) tient d'ordinaire à l'indécision dans les principes qui doivent régler l'exercise des pouvoirs; ce qui arrive toujours lorsque la Législation n'a pas suivi dans sa marche celle des moeurs et de l'opinion. Un bienfait inappréciable de la Charte sera de fixer, d'une manière certains, l'action et les bornés des pouvoirs, et de prévenir par lii ces suites d'autorité qui ont inquiété le gouvernement pendant presque toute la durée de 18e siécle, et qui ont préparé, plus qu'aucune autre cause, la terrible explosion d'où sont sortés tant des crimes at des malheurs. Rallions-nous à ce signe d'alliance entre le peuple et son Roi. Leur union est le seul garant assuré du bonheur de I'un et de l'autre. Que la Charte soit pour nous ce qu'était pour les Hébreux l'Arche-Sainte qui contenait les tables de la loi: défendons-la contre les derniers efforts d'une faction abattue: ce voeu est celui qui retenti aujourd'hui dans la France entière. Si l'ombre de grand publiciste qui a répandu la lumière sur les principes des monarchies constitutionelles pouvait assister au triomphe que nous lui décernons, elle appuierait de son autorité les sentimens (sic) que j'ose exprimer (August 3 1, 18 16: p.984; cf. Guizot, 1858: 139- MO).

Guizot, of course, viewed this sentiment as an indication of the widespread misconceptions about the Charter and the new system of representative governrnent. As

Suard reveals, the adherence to the basic principles of the Charter points to the causal primacy of the regime. The Charter, in a manner simila to the Ten Commandments, had the capability to impose the necessary social order because it embodied the necessary principles of monarchical regimes. The failure of society to conform to the Charter would result in the downfall of the regime. Many of the supporters had placed their hope for stability in this presumption. Indeed, they looked to the newly restored monarchy as the source of the peace long sought after by France.

III - The Presence of Political Determinism and Social Determinism in Political Debate

There are three debates of the Bourbon Restoration that most clearly represent the innuence of Montesquieu's politicai determinisrn and Guizot's social determinisrn. First, the bill of 18 18, which aimed to reform the =y's recruiting and promoting practices, caused a visible rift between those who adhered to Montesquieu's ideas and those who followed Guizot's notions on society. This debate, in fact, directly involved both Guizot, as the speechwriter for the Minister of War, and Bonald, who delivered an attack against the bill in the Chamber of Deputies. Second, the Royalists introduced an electoral bill into the Chamber of Deputies, which argued for a system favouring the arîstocratic 8 4 voters. Here, the Leftist Général Foy attacked the Royalists' claim that the aristocracy required special protection fkorn the govemment. The comte de Labourdonnaye's speech irnmediately followed with the argument that the govemment must control the deleterious republican elements of French society in order to protect the monarchy. Foy's and

Labourdonnaye's speeches, then, definitely pointed to notions of social determinism and political determinisrn, respectively. Third, in 1826 the Right introduced a bill that attempted to give symbolic recognition to the nght of prirnogeniture. This highly controversial bill provided another instance of this division of political thought in the

Charnber of Peers. In this debate, Guizot's political theories were well represented by his close colleague, the duc de Broglie. Further, Montesquieu's ideas were explicitly employed by the marquis de Maleville in defence of the bill. These three debates, then, clearly illustrate how both the Right maintained that the regime is the main determinant of a society and the Left applied the notion that political institutions are ultimately dependent on the social conditions.

A - Promotion and Recruitment in the Armed Forces

The Imperial Army had gained the reputation as the only institution in France that welcomed al1 who wished to serve, regardless of one's social background. Imperialists often claimed that Napoleon's army was "open to talents"; thus it received a great wave of resources, which transformed it into the greatest army in Europe. Yet, the state of the army was problematic for the new regime because it contained within itself hostile political elements keen on disnipting the monarchy. The aim, then, of the Decazes

Ministry in 18 18 was to remove imperialist factions fiom the army while at the same the 8 5 harnessing the incredible power of this army, which would be used in the service of the

King. In Ianuary of that year, therefore, the Minister of War, le maréchal Gouvion-Saint-

Cyr, attempted to restore the strength and glory of the French army by presenting a bill to the Chamber of Deputies, which would change the methods of recruiting and promoting and thus keep the army "open to talents".

Guizot was then working for the Ministry and served by writing the speeches in defence of the bill. In Gouvion-Saint-Cyr's final and decisive speech, Guizot employed his emerging ideas on the relations between society and the political regime. He argued that the bill's recognition of the powen found in society was consistent with the proper undentanding of the relation between political institutions and society. Put differently,

Guizot's speech asserted that the bill was a positive measure that would facilitate the stability of the govemment because it began with the recognition of the new elements of

France. The services that the new society could offer would be invaluable for the monarchy .

Briefly, this bill consisted of three main parts, al1 of which the Right had contested (Bertier de Sauvigny, 1967: 147). Fust, the army was to recruit in part by voluntary enlismient and in part by conscription. The Right, however, challenged this cal1 for conscription on the grounds that this measure was a violation of the Charter. Second, the bill proposed that active service would last for six years; and, if required, the army could extend duties with the home guard after the six years of regular service. Further, the reserve army would make use of the veterans of the imperial army. The Right also hotly contested this component since they saw this as a protection of the imperhl factions of 8 6 the army. Third, the bill modified the requirements for an officer's commission: either one could serve for two years as a non-cornmissioned oficer or one could graduate From military school. Moreover, the bill emphasized seniority: when one has served in a rank for four years, promotion would be gnnted for the next rank. Further, this system of seniority applied to two-thirds of the commissions and the other third was to be left to the discretion of the King. This last part of the bill sparked the outrage of the nobles. Prior to the Revolution, the nobles had reserved for themselves practically every commission in the army because this was vital for establishing one's place. In addition, the king's court regarded the nobles as having the role of soldiers. The Right, therefore, viewed this bill as nothing less than an direct attack against the old nobility as a class.

Now, the major argument advanced by the Right in the Charnber of Deputies was that the bill, in effect, forced the king to surrender his prerogative to appoint oficers. The king, therefore, would no longer be the sole possessor of executive power as was proscribed by the Charter. This weakening of the king's executive powers would make it al1 too easy for a coup attempt by those oficers not screened by the monarchy's representatives. Rather, the king must retain the right to appoint all officers in order to protect his position as the legitimate derof France. This sentiment, of course, was undentandable in light of the One Hundred Days. In short, the Right took the position that the bill weakened the king's position: this compromise of complete executive power would place the monarchy in a precarious position.

That the legislators must first consider the necessities of the regime instead of attempting to harmonize govemmentai institutions with society was a fundamental 87 presumption behind the arguments offered by the Right. Thus, the preservation of the king's position as ruler must be the immediate concern of the govemment. Bonald conveyed this thought in his speech against the bill on January 19, 18 18.

Ainsi, tout État qui veut régler son établissrnent militaire doit, avant tout, se demander s'il est ou s'il veut être monarchie ou république ... (Archives parlementaires, vol. 20: p.384; January 19, 18 18).

Here, one can see a definite notion of political deteninism that was similar to

Montesquieu's emphasis on the type of regime. One must first understand and then consistently apply the principles of a particular regime, othenvise legislation would be incoherent and ultimately Iead to the downfall of the regime itself. Bonald argued, then, that Gouvion-Saint-Cyr's bill would be dangerous because it did not recognize that

France was a monarchy. This bill, instead, aimed to impose a law appropnate for republics. Bonald predicted that this bill would lead to a pronounced change, not only in the army, but also within the govemrnent itself. As Bonald argued,

... en changeant la nature de son gouvernement, elle a changé la nature de son esprit militaire (Archives parlementaires, vol. 20: p.350; January, 19, 1818).

Furthemore, the introduction of conscription would eventually Iead to consequences in the society as a whole. Such development would be difficult to counter in the future.

Bonald's warning rested on the presumptive notion that a regime has the capacity to alter society. The ministry's bill represented an irresponsible mesure that would bestow on the populace an "esprit militaire" (p.350). The number in the army would quickly increase and the soldiers would carry with them a passion for fighting and a yeamuig for the Republic. Bonald insisted that prudence dictates a monarchical regime could only be supported by an mybased on voluntary recruitment. If the government were to infuse a monarchicd spirit in the army, the potential to alter the army to a moderate one willing to serve the king would be improved.

The political determinism underlying Bonald's arguments was quite clear. The

Iaws and the actions of the government could either promote its stability or lead to its demise. Gouvion-Saint-Cyr's bill to reform the recmiting and promoting practices of the anny ignored this fundamental assertion.

Gouvion-Saint-Cyr responded to the many criticisms based on political determinism through Guizot's speeches. He conveyed the argument that a regime would be helpless if it resisted the demands of society. The following statement fiom the closing speech of the debate indicated this social determinism:

Messieurs, il y a dans l'intérêt de l'autorité une premiere question, qui est de savoir s'il y a aujourd'hui plus de force dans la loi que dans l'arbitraire. Or, Messieurs, quand l'arbitraire répugne aux besoins, aux idées, aux moeurs de tout un peuple, il est condamné à la faiblesse, il devient aussitôt impuissant. L'autorité s'affaiblit alors de tout l'arbitraire qu'elle essaye de retenir; elle se fortifie, au contraire, de tout ce qu'elle reçoit de la loi (Archives parlementaires, vol. 20: p.5 14; January 26, 18 18).

Here, one can see Guizot's rejection of the sort of political determinism akin to

Montesquieu's thought He argued that a government that tries to shape the curent state of society would doom itself to perpetual weakness and possible dissolution. Further,

Gouvion-Saint-Cyr claimed that the biii stood by the interests of the new society. This was in accordance with the spirit of the Charter as a recognition of the principle of equality of al1 under the law. To maintain the preferential treatment of the aristocracy in this vital institution wouid amount to the inevitable dienation of the govemment fiom 8 9

French society. If the king's govemment, however, were to open the officers corps to the whole of France, then the army would become as strong as in the days of Napoleon's reign. The difference, of course, is that the anny would be in service to the king, who was the only true source of stability and liberty for France.

In sumrnary, this debate reveals the cornpetition between those political theories that could be traced to Montesquieu and the new ideas that were fiom Guizot. On the one hand, the Right held on to Montesquieu's notion that the requirements of the regime were the first prionty because this is the crucial factor for a society's stability. On the other hand, Guizot, through his speeches, called for the reversal of these priorities and argued that the demands of society to be the tira consideration. It is only by recognizing and then harnessing the powers of the new society of France that the Bourbon Monarchy could achieve stability.

B - Altering the Electoral System

Shoaly after the assassination of the duc de Berry, the Royalist majority pressured the Richelieu Ministry to conform to their agenda. One of the immediate results was the passing of a bill that enforced increased censorship of the press, especially publications from the Lefi. The Chambers, however, remained immune to the new restrictions and so the Left voiced its opinions mostly through the debates of this penod. As a result, the debate in the Chamber of Deputies fiom May 15 to June 12, 1820 on the Royalists' bill to reform the electoral process was a focus of intense public interest (Bertier de Sauvigny,

1967: 170).

This electoral bill of 1820 aimed to alter the relatively Liberal bill of 18 17. In 90 particular, many Royalists had regarded the resulting election in 18 17 as dangerous to the regime because some notorious Leftists had been elected under this system. The bill of

1820, then, proposed a system that would help filter out persons who posed a threat to the government. The proposed system called for a greater nurnber of persons in the

C harnbers. tnstead of the 23 8 deputies, who were elected in the electoral colleges by those possessing a certain level of wealth, there would be 430. The controversial aspect of this bill, however, was that the Royalist proposed a two-tiered system. Two hundred and thirty-eight would be elected in arrondissement collèges, which comprised of voters who were able to contribute at least 300 francs in taxes per year. The remaining 172 would corne fiom the "higher colleges", which would comprise of the top quintile of taxpayers in each départment. The top twenty percent of voters, therefore, would be able to vote twice. Consequently, the elctoral bill of 1830 became known as "the law of the double vote" (Bertier de Sauvigny, 1967: 171).

The Left predictably viewed the bill as a blatant attack against the basic principles of the Charter and a denial of new social realities. Amidst the LeEs outrage and mounting public hostility, the Royalists nevertheless defended the bill on the basis that it reflected the duty of the regime to maintain social hierarchies. niey argued that favouring the highest quintile was necessary because they tended to be the most important class for the protection of the monarchy. That is, these were the aristocracy or tlie large landowning class, who, not only had money, leisure, and knowledge to be responsible voters, they also were the strongest supporters of the regime. Some of the lower echelons, however, had amassed their wedth in the cities. This industrial class, the Royalists insisted, had Meloyalty to the monarchy and whose arnbitious traits encouraged political unrest (Spitzer, 1983: 63). Alan Spitzer stated the division between the Lefi and

Right as follows:

Royalists, distressed by the bad results of elections since 18 17, were convinced that what they called the "great mass of electon," those in the 300- to 700- franc category, could be hustled into deplonble decisions. The view fiom the left perceived the wealthiest stratum at the top of the electoral pyramid as virtually constituting a faction by social definition and especially vulnerable to the manipulations of the ministry through the favors and official appointrnents in its gift (1983: 68).

Moreover, the debate over the "law of the double vote" revealed a more fiindamental divide between the Right and the Left. On the one hand, many of the arguments of the Royalists pointed to notions of political determinism. They assumed that this legislation could enforce a certain social order that would be amenable to a monarchical regime. On the other hand, the Left demonstrated an adherence to social determinism. They countered that the bill would silence the voices of the new society and thus contribute to the alienation frorn the very foundations of representative govemment.

The Left, then, continually rerninded the Royalists of the ultirnate dependence of the regime on its society.

The speeches of Général Foy and the comte de Labourdomaye on the first day of debate illustrated this conflict between political detemiinisrn and social determinism.

Général Foy had served under Napoleon and gained widespread respect for his valour in combat. As the Biographie universelle wrote of him, "II était le répresentative des souvenirs militaires et de la gloire fiançaise" (Desplaces, ad.: 587). He later became a prominent deputy of the Left and attacked throughout his political career what he considered to be the aristocratie pretensions on the Right. In this debate, Foy argued on the basis that the new society demanded the rejection of this bill. To favour the pnvileged classes would be an act appropriate to the ancien régime, an unrecoverable era. The comte de Labourdonnaye, on the other band was well known as an overbearing Roydist.

His tendency to chmcterize the Left as a collection of regicidal factions often resulted with the opposition ridiculing him and the Right disowning him. In spite of this,

Labourdomaye's speech in defence of the bill provided perhaps the clearest instance of political determinism from the Right.

Throughout his speech, Foy conveyed a sense of urgency. He stressed the

Royalists' project was inherently dangerous because it ignored the social basis of political power. As Foy insisted,

11 n'est pas permis de prêter gratuitment à l'élite d'une nation le projet d'un suicide (Archives parlementaires, vol. 27: p.596; May 15, 1820).

This electord bill was suicida1 because rejected the source of true legitirnacy for the regime that could only corne from society. Foy wamed as follows,

Arrêtons-nous, Messieurs, quand il en est temps encore. Nous qui ne voulons d'autre Charte que la Charte, ne d'autre Roi que le Roi, arrêtons-nous pour sauver le Roi at la Charte; gardons notre loi éléctorale que le peuple a adoptée avec passion; mettons nos autres institutions en harmonie avec elle. C'est dans l'organisation des commerces, dans l'assimilation des administrations départementales aux formes représentatives, que les notabilités personelles ou héritées, les bonnes renommées at toutes les influences légitime trouveront leun places. C'est là que Les suffrages populaires iront les prenâres pour les porter à la direction du corps sociale. Mais malheur à vous, malheur au pays, si, rebelles aux arrêts du destins, vous entreprenez de placer la puissance politique ailleurs qu'où se trouve la puissance morde et la force matérielle. Adosser le trône a l'aristocratie, c'est commencer une révolution, c'est initier le peuple, c'est trahir à la fois et Le peuple et le trône (Archivesparlementaires, vol. 27: p.60 1; May 15, 1820). Foy, then, argued that the "corps sociale" was the ultimate source of political stability.

Moreover, Foy's criticisms repeatedly imply that the state of society is the main determinant of pol'itical institutions. Foy, for example, attacked the provision favoring the top twenty percent of taxpayers, which the Right defended on behalf of the "interests of society".

Où sont donc vos pouvoirs, à vous, dépositaires de tous les intérêts sociaux, pour classer arbitrairement la propiété en grande et petite, comme si dans tous les pays où l'impôt est assis proportionellement la grande et la petite propriété ne supportaient pas également les charges publiques. .. . En vain vous arguez de la disposition fondamentale qui confie à la loi de l'organisation des collèges électoraux. Les droits des électeurs ont la même origine que les vôtres. Ce serait commettre une crime que d'y porter atteinte. Il vous appartient seulement d'en régler l'exercise (Archives partementaires, vol. 27: p.598; May 15, 1820).

Instead of engaging in the futile atternpt to inhibit the voices of society because of some predetermined notion of a monarchical society, Foy clairned that a good electoral law must embrace the sentiments of society. The electoral law of 18 17, according to Foy, fulfilled this purpose. As Foy stated,

Voilà, Messieurs, la loi du 5 fëvrier 18 17; c'est la loi de vérité; c'est le miroir de l'opinion, et cette opinion n'est pas à craindre. Elle veut le repos et la liberté. le Roi et la Charte. La loi a été mise en pratique peu de temps après de funestes catastrophes, et les élections ont repousé ceux auteurs de nos dernièrs inaiheurs (Archivesparlementaires, vol. 27: p. 596; May 15, 1820).

Foy's passionate rhetoric, then, revealed the idea that society could be the only foundation of lasting political stability. The Royalists' ignorance of this notion, Foy maintained, would lead to another period of unrest.

Guizot's alarming tone in his closing paragraph of Moyens was quite similar to

Foy's statements in the Chamber. Guizot described the growing distance between the

Royalists' aims and the demands of the new France as follows. Pour tout dire, enfi, elle [the new France] demande un gouvemement, un gouvemement qui soit le sien, qui I'affrsuichisse à la fois, au-dehors, de l'étranger, au-dedans, de l'ancien régime et de toutes les factions. La vraie monarchie selon la Charte répondrait seule & son véritable voeu. Elle l'obtiendra. Après ce voeu qui domine tout, elle en forme un autre, c'est que l'accomplissement du premier ne lui coûte pas trop cher. 11 dépend du pouvoir de les accomplir tous les deux. Par le système qu'il adopté, il s'en éloigne et nous en éloigne chaque jour (182 1: 378- 3 79).

Foy's adherence to a notion of social deteminkm similar to Guizot's is unrnistakable.

This electoral bill was merely one instance of the Royalists' erroneous ideas on the relations between the govemment and French society.

As strongly as Foy asserted the ultimate dependence of a government on its society, Labourdomaye's speech assumed that a government has the ability to dictate the state of its society. Furthemore, he called for the govemment to take responsible action by controlling France's republican elements. He insisted throughout that one rnust begin with the recognition that France is a monarchy. As Labourdo~ayeasked,

.. . quel pays est plus essentiellement monarc hique que la France (Archives pudementaires, vol. 27: p.604; May 15, 182O)?

Moreover, an agricultural society with a powerful aristocracy - a hierarchicd amngement of society enforced by the regime, which Labourdomaye referred to as the

"pacte social" - necessarily supports al1 monarchies. A good electoral law, then, would take into account this "pacte social"; the electoral law of 18 17, however, failed to do so.

Labourdonnaye described the shortcomings of this law as follows,

Et par la nison que les corps, de même que les individus, sont le plus souvent entraînés dans la ligue de leurs intétrêts, l'esprit d'une bonne loi d'élection doit être de donner l'influence des suffrages aux hommes non-seulement intéressés au maintenir de l'ordre, mais encore à la stabilité du gouvemement, c'est-à-dire à la conservation de ses formes tutélaires a la division, à l'indépendance des pouvoirs de la société, garantie de la liberté publique et des Libertés privées, et à la transmission légale at légitime de ces pouvoirs, principe conservateur de pacte social (Archives parlementaires, vol. 27: p.603; May 15, 1820).

The core problem of 18 17 electoral law, then, was that it gave too strong a voice to the self-interested elements of society at the expense of those with an interest in maintaining the "pacte social".

This self-interested class, according Labourdonmye's, was the industriai class who tended to occupy the middle range of eligible voten. Unlike the aristocracy, moreover, this city-dwelling class had no attachent to the soi1 that anchors an agricultural society. Labourdonnaye thus viewed these voters as inherently inimical to a monarchy. As Labourdo~ayesuggested,

Enfin, lorsque l'expérience de tous les peuples, d'accord avec les écrits de tout les publicistes, démontre que la richesse industrielle est essentiellement indépendante par sa position que l'esprit du commerce est républicain de sa nature, est-il convenable de lui accorder la prépondérance des suffrages, dans une monarchie constitutionelle, où les intérêts de la démocratie doivent être réprésentés, mais ou son esprit ne pourrait prévaloir sans remuser (Archives parlementaires, vol. 27: p.604; May 15, 1820)?

For the sake of the regime, Labourdo~ayeargued that these republican voices must be minimized by altering the electoral law of 18 17.

C'est surtout parce que les factions s'agitent pour défendre une loi qui donne la plus grande Tinfluence aux derniers degrés de l'échelle éléctoral, à la portion des coiléges la moins intéresée à l'ordre et la stabilité du gouvernement parce qu'elle est la moins attaché au sol, qu'il est nécessaire de la modifier (Archives parlementaires, vol. 27: p.604; May 15,1820).

Further, not only did Labourdomaye contend that the government must control the influence of these republican elements in French society, he aiso emphasized that it mua protect the aristocracy by granting them disproportionate representation.

La France agricole, livrée presque tout entière a la petite culture, occupera toujours la majorité de sa population aux travaux de la terre et des arts mécaniques qu'ils [the aristocracy] emploient. Elle sera constamment monarchique par système parce que la propriété attachée au sol a besoin de l'appui du trône: la grande propriété, parce qu'isolée dans les villes elle ne pourrait y lutter contre la prépondérance de la richesse industrielle qui envahirait la pouvoir . .. (Archives pcirkmeniaires, vol. 27: p.604; May 15,1820).

Labourdonnaye thus defended the bill on the grounds that it controlled the influences in society harmfil to the monarchy.

Throughout Labourdo~aye'sspeech was the presumption of political determinism. Because he relied on the traditional notion of the regime as having causal primacy, he was able to assea that the electoral bill would manage society and maintain the "pacte social". This idea rejected Foy's social determinism, which clairned that the regime is ultimately dependent on the sway of society. These speeches, therefore, demonstrated how Montesquieu's and Guizot's codicting accounts of the relations of the regime and society significantly stnictured the course of debate.

C - The Symbolic Recognition of Primogeniture

When Louis XVIII died and his brother, the Comte d'Artois, succeeded the throne and became Charles X. Liberals were wary of Charles X because of his association with the Ultra-Royalists, who demanded the remof the absolute monarchy and the recovery of the ancien régime (Bertier de Sauvigny, 1967: 384). In fact, because there had been a

Royalist majority in the Chamber of Deputies since 1820, Liberal anxieties over the designs of the Ultras were already widespread before the ascent of Charles X. The

Royalists immediately began to petition the new king to modify the Civil Code on the issue of inheritance.

In particular, these Royalists wished to address the dwindhg of large estates into 97 small oncs - a result of equal partitioning pemlltted by the Code, which charnpioned social equality of a sort inimical to aristocracy and monarchy. Prior to the Revolution, the nual aristocracy maintained their large estates by means of the practice of primogeniture, which maintained the droit d'uinesse, a right of inheritance favoring the eldest son. In this system, the ainé or the eldest son received the main estate, which consisted of the principal manor or cade as well as the greatest portion and most advantageous allotment of the land. The cadets or the younger brothea, however, received amongst themselves the remaining property in equal shares or what was then called les appanages. Moreover, there was also the practice of substitution that supplemented the principle behind the droit d'aînesse, The use of szrbstittrtions made it dificult for the sor. next in the line of descent to receive his elder brother's inheritance, even if the ainé were to die. To ensure the perpetuation of the line From eldest male to eldest male, the entailer, that is, the father, would make use of the rule of sltbstitzrtion whereby the first son of the ahé had the main estate reserved for himself. This use of substitutions, however, could be problematic for the entailer who sometimes encountered the situation in which he was forced to relinquish the estate to an irresponsible child. Thus, by the middle of the sixteenth century, dus practice was limited to extendhg the line to two degrees or generations

(Rockiey, 1895: 94).

During the Revolution, the decree of August 4, 1789 by the National Assembly called for the complete abolition oFall feudal institutions. This was followed by the decrees of October 25 and November 14,1792 by the National Convention which demanded the complete abolition of the practices of substitutions and primogeniture 98

(Rockley, 1895: 97). Yet, with the rise of Empire, Napoleon demanded the reintroduction of these practices for he had believed it necessary to have his own class of nobility to support his nile. In the Napoleonic Code (896,897, 1O48), then, a testator was able to pass over an unuustworthy eidest son and reduce his position to that of a mere trustee for his own children. The eldest son in this position was then compelled to distribute the estate in equal portions amongst al1 his children (Rockley, 1895: 95). However, although article 745 provides for the equal partitioning of a father's property amongst al1 the children, there were two options given to the entailer, which were used fiequently, and these could be used to favour a piuticular child, which usually tumed out to be the aîné

(Rockley, 1895: 98). First, the father could increase the share of one child by bequeathing to him a quofidé disponible, that is, a disposable share that consisted of the reciprocd of the number of children plus one. An entailer, for example, with three children would have been able to divide his property into four parts and the extra part could be given to the favored child. Second, the father could also have augmented the favored child's share by granting him apréciput [égal or a legal extra share based on a certain percentage of the total value of the property.

The Villèle Ministry, responding to the Royalists' pressure but at the same tirne recognizing the Liberals' burgeoning opposition, introduced in 1826 a diluted bill that was lirnited to revening the aforementioned optional provisions in the Code. [nstead of the father having to make the necessary arrangements in order to favour a certain child, this bill proposed that the Code ought to assume that the father would favour the eldest son. So, this bill would require the father to state specifically in his will ifhe wished to 99 distribute his property equally. Otherwise, the préciput légal and the quotidé disponible would go to the aîné. As de Bertier de Sauvigny summarized, "In a word, optional before, inequdity became the general nile, and equality, no longer automatic became optional"

(1967: 384); in other words, this bill would require "opting out" instead of "opting in" a moderate version of primogeniture.

The reaction to this bill by the opposition was swift and fierce. The Lefi viewed the bill as a harbinger of an attempt to return to the ancien régime. The outrage of the public was no less severe and several pamphlets denouncing the unjust motives behind the bill were distributed. For instance, a pamphlet entitled Lettre d'un cadet de province ci son ainé a Paris sur le droit d 'ahesse et la liberté de la prase vigorously protested the moderate alterations.

Oui, mon ami, cette loi sur le droit d'aînesse est un coup qui nous tue; car qu' est-ce qu' un homme sans argent, par le temps qui court? Un corps sans âme, par davantage (Cadet de Province, 1826: 6).

Yet, the Royalists were also outraged at the Villèle Ministry for the introduction of a sheepish bill that conceded too much to the enemies of the ancien régime. The Villèle

Ministry. therefore, by attempting to ingratiate two opposing parties only succeeded in alienating both sides, that is, the Royalist majority and the opposition in public opinion.

From March 11 to April8, 1826, the Chamber of Peers debated this bill. The debates offered another illustration of the reliance on both Montesquieu's and Guizot's politicai theories. Among those who employed Montesquieu in defence of the bill was the

Marquis de Maleville. On the fmt day of debate, Maleville presented the bill. The czntral reason, he argued, for supporthg the bill was that it was necessary to modd French society according to a monarchical regime.

Le but qu'il se propose est essentiellement monarchique; mais il est loin de menacer l'existence de la liberté constitutiomelle. II ne s'agit pas de rendre la société stationnaire; mais d' en régler le mouvement (Archives pliriementaires, vol. 46: pp. 264-265; March 1 1, 1826).

Hence, the notion that the regime, applying the right principles, could modim society and thus ensure stability was utilized. Now, as mentioned above, Montesquieu asserted in his

Spirit of fhe Lms that a monarchy must establish and preserve intermediary powers, that is, an aristocracy, otherwise there would be a shift to either despotism or a republic

( 1989: V-9,lO). Accordingly, Maleville dnws from these arguments in his speech:

La monarchie c'est-à-dire le gouvernement dont la nature est la stabilité, ne peut se concevoir, si tous les auxiliaires qui 1' entourent sont dans une perpétuelle mobilité (Archives parlementaires, vol. 46: p.254; March 1 1, 1826).

Thus, primogeniture was vital for a monarchy because it stabilized the wealth of the nobility and thereby protected this necessary element. In short, Maleville claimed?

On peut donc chercher à diviser les fortunes dans une république; mais on doit tendre a les concentrer dans une monarchie (Archives parlementaires, vol. 46: p.254; March 1 1, 1826).

To aspire ro the principle of equality and to reject primogeniture would be, in effect, to endanger the monarchy. This would exacerbate the threat posed by the influence of certain countries with an industrial or commercial spirit that fosters "une tendance démocratique qui avait besoin de correctifs" (p.255). In other words, the provisions on primogeniture in the Civil Code encouraged the democratic spirit and ultimately threatened the monarchy. Further, the current laws on inhentance would replace with widespread aggression the kind of tranquil character that a monarchy demands of its inhabitants.

... les cohéritiea voulant jouir chacun de leur part, quelque exiguë quelle Et, menaient presque tout une vie agreste, oisive, casanière...( Archives parlementaires, vol. 46: p.254; March 1 1, 1826).

These harrnfil conditions, Maleville asserted, could be ameliorated if primogeniture were re-established. The institutions necessary for the regime would be fimly established and the populace would eventually respect their importance. Moreover, the much-needed talents of the cadets would be diverted and used in ecclesiastical, commercial, and other sectors of society (p.254). Thus, Maleville argued that it is in the interest of a monarchy to protect and strengthen the nobility who in tum would anchor the necessary changes in disposition throughout the whole society.

Especially important to this argument was the assumption behind Maleville's argument: effective legislation must begin with the recognition and understanding of the type of regime in place. Good laws, then, start fiom this notion and carry out the necessary measures to conform society to the needs of the regime.

Although there were severd mernorable attacks against the bill, perhaps the best known was the speech delivered by Guizot's close fnend, the duc de Broglie. Broglie's response rested on Guizot's argument that politicai institutions are not the main determinkg factors of a collectivity. Instead, the political regimes are ultimately the effects of sociai conditions such as cIass relations, property relations, systems of ideas, and so on. Broglie îhus argued that the invalid argument - that a regime has the capacity to alter the state of society - supported the motive behind this bill. The expectations of the

Roy alists, therefore, would inevitably become disappointments, alienate several secton of France, and threaten the stability of the government. This bill, therefore, as modest as it may have been, represented a portent of counter-revolution. As Broglie forcefully stated,

Cette loi n' est pas un loi, amis un manifeste contre l'état actual de société; cette loi n' est pas un loi, mais une pierre d' attente; mais I' introduction, mais le préliminaire de vingt autres lois, qui, si votre sagesse n'y met ordre, vont fondre sur vous tout à coup, et ne laisseront ni paix, ni tiene à la nation française, telle que les quarante derniers années nous l'ont faite (Archivesparlementaires,vol. 46: p.620; April4, 1826).

Broglie also argued that this bill reflected the Royalists' fixation on the principle of inequality, a tenet gmunded in on enoneous conception of the relation between the regime and society.

Le droit de primogéniture, c'est le fondement de l'inegalité des conditions; c'est le privilège pur, absolu, sans déguisement ni compensation; ... c'est I'inegalité des conditions par amour pour elle-même; ... c'est une révolution sociale et politique, une révolution qui s' est faite en France il y a bientôt quarante ans (Archivesparlementaires, vol. 46: pp. 620-62 1 ; Apni 4, 1826).

The crucial point, however, was that the theory behind the bill was grossly mistaken. As

Broglie characterized the bill,

Le temps est venu de refondre la société à priori; nous sommes à notre insu des républicains; il faut nous faires royalistes! ... Refaire la société à priori, étrange enterprise! (Archivesparlementaires, vol. 46: p.62 1; April 4, 1826).

The motive behind the attempt to restore primogeniture, Broglie claims, was due to the influence of certain publicistes, especially Montesquieu. The bill also represented the misguided idedism of the Royalists. They envisioned themselves as establishg a true aristocncy that would be "libre et fière" and protect the liberties of al1 under the protection of the king. Yet, the current state of society in France could not permit this vision of France. As Broglie asserted, Les temps se sont passés; désormais toutes les classes de la nation française sont également émancipées (Archivesparlementaires, vol. 46: p.623; April4, 1826).

Broglie's rejection of the regime's causal primacy thus had formed the bais of the speech that had delivered the final blow to the bill. In short, the bill on primogeniture offers a clear illustration of how considerations on the relation between political institutions and social conditions significantly structured this important debate.

Before closing this section, it is worthwhile to point out that some of the opposition to this bill dl1championed the views of Montesquieu. The comte de Roy, for exarnple, agreed with Maleville's argument that one must legislate in accordance with the type of regime. As Roy remarked on the necessary laws of inhentmce for a monarchy,

11 faut concentrer les propriétés foncière dans les mains de L'aîné, parce que leur trop grand divisions détruit la famille, parce quelle est opposé à la nature du gouvernement monarchique et à sa stabilité (Archives parlementaires, vo 1.46: pp. 42-43; May 28, 1826).

Roy. however, differed fiom Maleville by asserthg that the Royalists had mistakenly identified the govemment of the Restoration as a monarchy.

La nature de notre gouvernement est bien définie, bien connue: de n' est ni une démocratie ni une monarchie absolue; mais un gouvernement mixte, une monarchie constitutionnelle dans laquelle le roi est le chef suprême de l'État, et dans laquelle la puissance législative s' exerce cumulativement pout le roi, par la Chambre des pairs et la Chambre des députés (Archives parlementaires, vol. 46: pp. 452453; May 28,1826).

According to Roy, then, an incorrect application of Montesquieu's political thought had informed Maleville's argument. Roy's staternents, then, are instructive because they illustrate the powerfid presence of Montesquieu's ideas and demonstrate the flexibility of IV - Conclusion

These debates offer illustrations of the Right's tendency to found arguments on

Montesquieu's presumption that the primary task of the govemment was to regulate society. To reject this proscription, they argued, arnounted to the rejection of the fundamental task of govemment: to preserve itself by controlling crucial elements of society. Thus, they cnticized Gouvion-Saint-Cyr's bill on the basis that it was a declaration of the govemment's unwillingness to carry out this primary task. Further, an electorai system favoring the aristocracy was necessary because this was the crucial class for a monarchial regime and they would neutralize the republican elements in society.

They also regarded the bill on primogeniture as a necessary mesure for the protection of the nobility that would in turn ensure the stability of the monarchy. Guizot, however. asserted the need for the governrnent to adapt to the new society because al1 regimes are ultimately dependent on social conditions. This approach would not only secure the monarchy but it wodd also e~chit with its vast reservoir of powers that were not available to the monarchy prior to the Revolution. Accordingly, Guizot's arguments in

Gouvion-Saint-Cyr's speech asserted that the army could only benefit fiom the power to be gained by an officers corps drawn fiorn al1 of France and not only from a privileged minority. Further, the duc de Broglie attacked the bill on primogeniture on the grounds that it was an imprudent attempt to prevail over the new society on the grounds of a predetermined notion of the proper order of a society dedby a monarchy. in short, these notions of society and its relation to its regime significantly ioformed the political discourse of the Bourbon Restoration. CWAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

As the final chapter demonstrated, political determinists and social determinists of the Bourbon Restoration disagreed on how governments either succeed or fail to secure stability. On the one hand, if the regime were the main determining factor, then the appropriate role of government would be to confer order on society. As Montesquieu advised, prudent leadership would demand the consistent adherence to the correct political principle and regulate accordingly the key elements of society. On the other hand, if govemmental institutions were effects of social conditions, then stability would be possible only through the recognition of society. Guizot thus argued that governments must End their strength within society, rather than within themselves. The failure,of governments to recognize their ultimate dependence on society would result inevitably in their collapse. This analysis of the Bourbon Restoration thus illustrated how both political determinism and social determinism intluenced predominant views on the government's appropriate role.

The debates of the Bourbon Restoration, fùrthermore, suggest the need for careful consideration of how ideas on the relation between the regime and society might today affect both academic and political debate. Of course, in order to consider adequately this issue, the social scientist must take seriously the notion of political determinism, an idea that is now often viewed as antiquated. Yet, it is not at dlclear that social detenninism has made obsolete the older view of the regime's causal primacy. One might consider, for example. how implicit orientations to political detemünism continue to ùiform certain explanations concerned with political instability. In particular, it is punling how several nations have been prone to instability in spite of painstaking efforts to constnict a coherent consitution that would firmly establish the government. The fa11 of Weimar

Republic and the severai bouts with political uprisings in nineteenth-century France offer only a few instances of this problem. How, then, might ideas of the causal eficacy of either the regime or society inform certain assumptions that guide explanations of these phenomend On the one hand, explanations that accept notions of social deterrninism generally suggest that precarious governments often look for their stability by observing pre-determined notions on sound goveming, rather than trying to harmonize themselves with the particular set of social conditions - for example, the sentiments that are imbedded within society. Governments ignorant of their social foundations fail to reûlize the importance of securing the consent of society and this predictably results in a distancing fiom the very source of stability. These conditions will ultimately lead to the downfall of any govemment. On the other hand, those implicitly appropriating notions of political determinism contend that such govemments do not enact the necessary measures

- for exarnple, the promotion of civic virtue - for the establishment of an orderly society.

Any governrnent that does not maintain its society in good order will inevitably succumb to instability. Issues such as this, then, indicate how assumptions of political determinism continue to direct certain widespread arguments. This work, therefore, asserts that this problematic remains relevant. Through the cornparison of Montesquieu with Guizot, this thesis has thus offered a certain clarification of both political detemiinisrn and social determinism that tacitly influences these two competing modes of explmation.

More generally, Guizot's social determinism completed the break away fkom the 107 classical idea of the regime as the sole consideration for the study of collectivities. This break began with Montesquieu. Although Montesquieu emphasized the regime, he had also facilitated this movement away fiom classical political philosophy. Because

Montesquieu asserted the causal primacy of the regime, he had also necessady accepted a distinction between the regime and society. This distinction had led other thinkers to speculate on how societal factors could shape the regime. Guizot's consistent and explicit assertions that a regime could not fashion its society thus represented a decisive transformation in political thought. Guizot intluenced later prominent thinkers who widely dissemminated both the rejection of the regime as the main unit of analysis and the acceptance of society as the foundation of political institutions. These general remarks thus fl~rmthat the study of the political theories of the Bourbon Restoration provides an important contribution to political theory: the implications of this particular rnovement away fiom the classical notion of the regime to modem notions of society are perhaps most evident because of the enormous impact of both Montesquieu's and Guizot's ideas during this penod. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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