Document of The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized
Report No.19944
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT Public Disclosure Authorized
DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA
EL KALA NATIONAL PARK AND WETLANDS COMPLEX
MANAGEMENT PROJECT
(GRANT NO. 28641-AL) Public Disclosure Authorized
February 8, 2000
Rural Development, Water and Environment Group Public Disclosure Authorized Middle East and North Africa Region
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. EXCHANGE RATE
Currency Unit = Algerian Dinar (DZD) Exchange Rate at Appraisal (April 1994) S$1.00 = DZD23.50 DZD1.00 = US$0.4255 SDR1.00 = US$1.38107
Year Annual Average
1994 DZD35.059 1995 DZD47.663 1996 DZD54.753 1997 DZD57.707 1998 DZD58.739 1999 DZD62.995
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES Metric system
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ANN Agence Nationale pour la Conservation de la Nature BAD Algerian Development Bank ICR Implementation Completion Report DG Director-General El Environmental Inspectorate of the Wilaya EKNP El Kala National Park EKPIU El Kala Project Implementation Unit GEF Global Environment Facility GIS Geographic Infonnation System NGO Non Governmental Organization SDRs Special Drawing Rights UNDP United Nations Development Program
FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30
Vice President: Kemal Dervis Director, Maghreb Unit: Christian Delvoie Sector Director: Doris Koehn Sector Manager: Salah Darghouth Task Manager: Aline Cabal FOR OFFICIALUSE ONLY
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA EL KALA NATIONAL PARK AND WETLANDS COMPLEX MANAGEMENT PROJECT (GRANT NO. 28641-AL) TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE Evaluation Summary ...... i-iv PART I - PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT ...... 1 A. PROJECT DESCRIPTION ...... 1 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES ...... 2 (i) Objectives .2 (ii) Major achievements .3 (iii) Major f-actorsaffecting the project .3 (iv) Project sustainability .5 (v) Bank performance .5 (vi) Borrower performance .6 (vii) Assessment of outcomes ...... 6 (viii) Future operation ...... 7 (ix) Replicability .. 7...... 7 (x) Key lessons learned ...... 7 PART 11 - STATISTICAL TABLES Table 1: Summary of Assessments ...... : 10 Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits .11 Table 3: Project Timetable .12 Table 4: Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements .1 Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation .13 Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation .14 Table 7: Studies Included in Project .15 Table 8A: Project Costs ...... 18 Table 8B: Project Financing ...... 19 Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits...... 19 Table 10: Status of Covenants ...... 20 Table I1: Compliance with Operational Manual Guidelines ...... 21 Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs ...... 21 Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions ...... 21 APPENDIX A-BORROWER'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE ICR ...... 22-31 APPENDIX B-ICR MISSION AIDE-MEMOIRE ...... 33-36 MAP C-IBRD No. 24763R
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwisebe disclosed without World Bank authorization.
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA EL KALA NATIONAL PARK AND WETLANDS COMPLEX MANAGEMENT PLAN
(GRANT NO. 28641-AL)
PREFACE
This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Grant to prepare and implement Management Plan of the El Kala National Park and Wetlands Complex. The Grant, provided through the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in an initial amount of SDR6.7 million (US$9.2 million), was approved by the Board of Executive Directors on April 29, 1994 and became effective on September 13, 1994.
The Grant was closed on June 30, 1999 following two extensions of the original closing date of March 31, 1997. Final disbursement took place on December 14, 1999. An amount of SDR1.47 million (US$2 million) was cancelled, reducing the Grant to SDR5.23 million. Therefore, disbursements totaled US$5.06 million, or 69 per cent of the revised loan amount.
The ICR was prepared by Aline Cabal, Operations Analyst, Rural Development, Water and Environment Group, MNSRE, Middle East and North Africa Region, and was reviewed by Salah Darghouth, Sector Manager, Water and Environment; and Kutlu Somel, Economist, MNSRE. Additional reviewers included Christophe Crepin for the GEF; Marisa Femandez-Palacios, Portfolio Manager, MNCMG; and Thu-Ha Nguyen of the Disbursements Division. Valuable historical details, observations, and information were provided by Laurent Msellati, the Project Officer during the project preparation phase and the early stages of implementation. Syvie Creger provided the administrative support required for completing of the report.
The Borrower's contribution to the ICR is contained in Appendix A.
The ICR is based on infornation from project files, interviews in the field with officers responsible for project assessment and monitoring, and information gathered by the project completion mission, which took place from September 29 to October 13, 1999. The mission team consisted of Aline Cabal, Operations Analyst, Mission Leader, and two consultants, Slimane Bedrani, agricultural economist, and Salah Khemissi, financial analyst.
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA EL KALA NATIONAL PARK AND WETLANDS COMPLEX MANAGEMENTPROJECT
(GRANT NO. 28641-AL)
EvaluationSummary
Introduction
Two important facts which impactedthe implementationof this project are, first, that the project was prepared during the 1991-1994pilot phase of the Global EnvironmentFacility (GEF), when its mechanismswere being establishedand its proceduresand criteria were less clearly defined, and second, that the project was implemented during a difficult period for Algeria characterizedby civil unrest. Today, the situationhas improvedand there is hope that the originalproject developmentobjective, the sustainableprotection of El Kala Park, will be achievedthrough perseverance.
Overall, the project objectiveshave been only partially achieved. Despite two extensionsof the originalGrant closing date and the efforts of project staff in the field, the delays that affected all project componentsfrom the outset were continuedto plague the project until the final closing date. Certain actions produced positive impacts; however, those impacts fall short of the project objectives because those actions alone were not enough to either: (i) halt the degradationof biodiversity in the El Kala NationalPark and Wetlands Complex;or (ii) providea reliable natural resourcesmanagement model for the country's protectedareas. The El Kala ManagementPlan, which was to have servedas a benchmark and model for the managementof other nationalparks has not yet been finalized. However,the project has clearly created the necessary awareness of the need to finalize the managementplan as well as the momentumnecessary to implement its recommendations.It is too early to tell whether the Plan has laid the foundations for long-term financial, environmentaland socioeconomic viability, since that will depend on adoption of the measurestherein recommended.
Project objectives and components
Project objectives. The Grant's three objectives were: (a) mitigation of the degradation of biodiversity in the El Kala National Park and Wetlands Complex region; (b) establishment of a methodologyand procedures to be followed at the Wilaya level for conductingenvironmental impact assessmentstudies; and (c) developmentof a natural resourcesmanagement model for the country's other parks. The project was to introducemeasures for the long-term sustainablepreservation of sites in the region exposed to the pressure generated by groups living in and around the Park, which has an ecologicaland biologicaldiversity that is of criticalimportance for the entire Mediterraneanbasin.
Project components. The project comprised five components: (a) Preparation of the managementplan for the El Kala region wetlandscomplex, through baseline studies, priority actions to stop further degradation and others to be carried out during execution of the management plan; (b) environmental monitoring and adaptive research, through introduction of a geographic informationsystem (GIS),establishment of an environmentalimpact assessmentunit and a subcomponent for environmentalresearch, and assessment of natural resource development potential in different subsectors;(c) environmentaleducation, to sensitizethe population to environmentalproblems, with ii
NGO support; (d) institutional strengthening, focused on the National Agency for the Conservation of Nature (ANN), the Wilaya Environmental Inspectorate, and the El Kala Project Implementation Unit (EKPIU); and (e) creation of a conservation fund.
Implementation experience and results
Project objectives. The three project objectives were only partially achieved, despite two extensions of the closing date and downward revision of the objectives at mid-term: (a) the degradation of biodiversity has not been halted, and while certain sites have been saved as a result of the project, no long-term solutions have been integrated into the Park's Management Plan for sustainable development; (b) environmental impact assessment procedures, while in place for certain activities, have not always proved effective; and (c) a model that would serve as a basis for the development of other parks was also not produced. The overall assessment of the outcome of the project has been therefore rated as unsatisfactory.
Project impact. (a) Although a number of the steps required for preparation of the management plan had been completed by the closing of the Grant, the document of the plan itself has not been issued. There has been an improvement in the ecological status of certain particularly risk-prone sites, thanks to reinforcement of dikes, cleaning of run-off ditches, construction of wastewater settling tanks, and preservation of the Barbary deer; (b) The environmental monitoring and adaptive research component has boosted scientific research about the Park, thanks to participation by university teachers and students in studies and to the establishment of biological conservation plots; (c) Environmental education has sensitized communities and local authorities to environmental problems, through studies and other related activities and through the creation of jobs in a region where unemployment is widespread and endemic; (d) Institutional strengthening of EKNP, ANN, and El Tarf Wilaya's Environmental Directorate and Forest Conservation Agency has made the representatives of the central authorities more aware of environmental problems, particularly in the El Tarf region; and (e) Conservation fund activities have had a positive impact on the participation of local NGOs and communities.
Project sustainability. Project sustainability is uncertain. It will depend mainly on four factors: (a) Ministry of Agriculture commitment to continuing all project actions funded under the national budget and to pressing ahead with finalization of the management plan; (b) the extent to which the Park management agency's field units and its reputation in the Wilaya are strengthened as a result of the project; (c) the degree of ecological awareness shown by the Wali of El Tarf, given his key role in implementing and enforcing regulations governing his region; and (d) the degree of active interest from university faculty and students in the region is reflected in the Park, where research facilities will be established. Long-term sustainability will also be tied to EKNP's capacity to cover some or all of the Park's operating costs. Unfortunately, the study of recurrent costs called for in the project plans did not materialize due to the absence of recommendations that were to be part of the Park management plan. Finally, it is still too early to know whether the long-term financial, environmental and socioeconomic viability of the project can be assured, since this will depend on adoption of the measures recommended in the management plan.
Bank performance. The Bank's performance was marginally unsatisfactory. Project institutional design at appraisal should have been based, from the outset, on more flexible approaches, such as the use of local consultants for day-to-day monitoring, and a longer implementation period. Project scheduling was too ambitious, given the prevailing security situation and the scope and scale of the studies required. A 14-month period was too short for implementation of the Park management plan, prepared by a foreign consulting firm and executed by an agency lacking qualified and experienced personnel. Security issues, which arose after project effectiveness, precluded any field visits for more than three years. The absence iii of regular Bank supervision missions, the lack of certain expertise on the supervision teams, failure to abide by original supervision schedules, and the need to delegate supervision missions to local consultants also disrupted sound project implementation. The belated restructuring of the project, the absence of any system for periodic and systematic review of study findings, the hope that the management plan would eventually be produced, the impossibility, at times, of obtaining reliable data from executing entities, and the fact that there were three project managers in succession, all contributed to the lack of prompt decisions that might have improved project management performance.
Borrower performance. The Borrower's performance was also mixed. It was satisfactory during preparation and appraisal, but, for a number of reasons, fell short during implementation. Those reasons include: (a) frequent turnover of senior-echelon staff, which impaired the quality of project administrative and financial management; (b) difficulties in maintaining necessary teams in the field for implementing a totally decentralized project; (c) lack of autonomy for the Project Implementation Unit vis-a-vis EKNP and ANN headquarters in Algiers; (d) poor performance of the inter-ministerial monitoring coordination committees; (e) poorly planned allocation and improper use of human and material resources; (f) recurring Bank difficulties in obtaining reliable data; (g) difficult relations with consulting firms, especially over tracking of payments and progress with studies; and (h) slow pace of execution of certain activities.
Future operation and key lessons learned
Future operation. The Government intends to pursue funding the activities, started under the project, from the Ministry of Agriculture budget. The fact that the project was innovative in the areas of understanding biodiversity loss, the study of the complex interrelationships between species, and ensuring that various concerned parties assume responsibility for preventing further biodiversity loss, bolsters the argument that action taken so far should be continued. The investment made to date will prove of little long-term value unless the management plan of the Park is fully completed and put successfully into effect. Once the plan has been discussed by all parties concerned and validated by the Inter-ministerial Committee, its recommendations will need to be analyzed and the financial and other means to implement them mobilized. It is only when these conditions are met that external support for a follow-up operation for the El Kala Park could be considered.
Replicability. As Algeria begins to formulate its national biodiversity strategy, its experience with El Kala would provide assistance towards developing: (a) management plans for other parks, especially Tassili and Hoggar, where programs scheduled to start in 2000 will involve Project Implementation Unit staff, as well as university faculty and students who worked on the El Kala project studies; (b) a biodiversity action plan; and (c) plans for the development of the three reserves that were the subject of a request for US$2 million submitted to the Global Environment Facility through UNDP.
However, in future, if the GEF, the Bank and other donors are to be persuaded to fund programs of his type, project design will need to take account of the institutional constraints that the project faced, especially as regards implementation procedures, and quality of monitoring systems. In particular, mechanisms will have to be put in place to ensure that funds reach beneficiaries quicker so that suppliers can be paid and operations schedules adhered to strictly.
Key lessons learned
* When a country's internal situation makes it impossible to conduct procurement proceedings under optimum competitive conditions, large-scale technical assistance contracts should not iv
be put up for bid. Instead, advantage should be taken of the flexibility afforded by short-term purpose-specific missions and maximum recourse to local capabilities.
* When a country's internal socio-political situation is difficult, appropriate project organization and management methods of supervision should be sought by the Bank.
* It is essential to do an in-depth evaluation of the administrative and financial management capacity of any executing agency for implementing a Bank-financed project for the first time. It is also essential to ensure that the supervisory ministry is committed to supporting the agency, which may be unfamiliar with both World Bank and local administrative procedures, and to limit turnover among the agency's senior staff.
* Allowances need to be made in project planning and implementation for the possibly slow pace and complex nature of the borrowing country's financial and administrative procedures, so that bureaucratic entanglements do not undermine achievement of project objectives.
* Team stability, especially at senior staff levels, and reliability of communications systems are essential for effective technical and project-management decision-making, particularly in a difficult operating environment. Team members need access to essential equipment from the outset of the project, and if necessary to prompt training in its optimum use.
* As it is now the practice for all Bank-financed operations, a project needs to establish and evaluate the essential indicators that will be used to monitor its impact.
* In the best interests of environmental protection, supervision through national, regional and local entities must be recognized as important and put on a systematic basis.
- In order to promote participation at the local level, project arrangements need to include provision for early demonstration actions to ensure community support for the proposed project activities.
• It is imperative to ensure before loan signature that the necessary legal arrangements are in place to enable equipment intended for NGOs to be made available to them promptly. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA EL KALA NATIONAL PARK AND WETLANDS COMPLEX MANAGEMENT PROJECT
(GRANT NO. 28641-AL)
PART I
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT
A. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
1. Objectives. The Grant had three objectives: (i) mitigationof the degradationof biodiversityin the El Kala National Park and Wetlands Complex region; (ii) establishment of a methodologyand proceduresto be followed at Wilaya level for conductingenvironmental impact assessmentstudies; and (iii) developmentof a natural resourcesmanagement model suited to densely populated protected areas. The project aimed at preparation and implementationof a management plan for the Park and the neighboringwetlands with a viewto combatingthe environmentaldegradation of this sensitive zone and preservingthe Park and its environsthrough ecological,economic and socioculturalmeasures that would ensure sustainabledevelopment of the zone. The El Kala region was selectedbecause of its exceptional ecologicaland biological diversity, which makes it of critical importance for the entire Mediterranean region. The managementplan was to preserve and maintain the region's unique sites, which are endangeredand at risk of severe degradationowing to mountingdemographic pressure. The project was to develop measures for the long-term sustainablepreservation of the sites in the region exposed to pressure generatedby groups living in and aroundthe Park. It was also intendedto be a pilot operation, suitablefor replicationin other regionsof the country.
2. Components.The project comprisedfive components:
* Preparationof a managementplan for the El Kala region wetlands complex(US$7.8 million) through: (i) baseline studies; (ii) priority actions to stop further degradation;and (iii) other actions to be carriedout duringexecution of the managementplan;
* Environmentalmonitoring and adaptive research (US$670,000),covering: (i) introductionof a geographicinformation system; (ii) establishmentof an environmentalimpact assessment unit and a subcomponentfor environmental research; and (iii) investigation of natural resourcedevelopment potential in differentsubsectors;
* Environmental education (US$850,000), to sensitize the population to environmental problems,and boostthe work of nongovernmentalorganizations;
* Institutionalstrengthening (US$2.37 million), focused on ANN, the Wilaya Environmental Inspectorate,and the El Kala ProjectImplementation Unit, and
* Creationof a El Kala Park conservationfund. 2
3. Contributions. Despite the difficulties that complicated its implementation, the project made it possible to: (i) put the management of El Kala National Park on a firm foundation; (ii) develop local capabilities in natural resource management and environmental impact assessment; (iii) develop a biodiversity benchmarking technique, thanks to the numerous studies made; (iv) develop a solid partnership with universities and associations (NGOs and others) in the region; (v) develop an environmental education and sensitization program targeting local stakeholders, particularly schools; and (vi) carry out urgent biodiversity conservation actions to halt extremely harmful degradation processes.
4. Implementation arrangements. The project was implemented and administered by Agence nationale pour la conservation de la nature (ANN), within the limits of its powers and under the supervision of the Interministerial Committee created by Ministerial Order of December 29, 1991. This committee, made up of representatives of the Ministries of Agriculture, Interior, Infrastructure, and Economy, and of the State Secretariat for Research and the National Planning Council, was charged with monitoring progress with of the El Kala ecosystem development project. The Project Implementing Unit (EKPIU), which reports to ANN and was specially created on October 30, 1993 to manage the project, was made responsible for preparation and implementation of the management plan, procurement of the equipment required, human resource management, financial control, coordination between the Wilaya and the El Kala Park management agency, and monitoring and evaluation. Implementation arrangements required the Beneficiary to respect the principles of the Ramsar Convention and the UNESCO Action Plan, strengthen the staff of the Wilaya Environmental Inspectorate, and increase the number of forest guides.
5. Cost and financing. The Beneficiary received a project preparation advance of SDR 84,600. At appraisal, the project financing plan envisaged a Grant from the Global Environment Facility of US$9.2 million and a contribution of US$2.48 million from the Government to cover the reasonable cost of project supplies and services. A special account of US$500,000 was opened. The project was scheduled for completion in March 1997. However, the Bank consented to two extensions of the Grant closing date, the first of six months, and the second of twelve months. A third request by the Algerian Government for a flrther six-month extension of the closing date was rejected by the Bank. The project was accordingly closed on June 30, 1999. In December 1998, in response to a request from the Government, the Bank also canceled SDR 1.4 million (about 20% of the amount of the Grant) and restructured project expenditure category allocations to reflect the fact that less financing was, needed because the management plan had not materialized.
6. At the time of negotiations, it was anticipated that the main obstacle to on-schedule implementation of the project would be difficulty in recruiting technical assistance personnel to take part in preparation of the management plan, given international consulting firm uncertainty regarding the internal situation in Algeria.
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES
(i) Objectives
7. Project objectives were only partially achieved. On one hand, the operation did result in urgent biodiversity conservation actions to halt the degradation processes, formulation (though not completion) of the El Kala Park management plan, and some strengthening of institutional infrastructure, equipment, and human resources. On the other hand, the Park management plan that was to guide implementation of the project did not materialize, despite two extensions of the project closing date designed to enable the group of consulting firms engaged in preparing it to finalize the necessary studies and deliver their summary and recommendations. This situation was largely the outcome of a political state of affairs, which made international mission entry into the country a daunting prospect. In the end, the preparation 3 of the plan was carried out by one single consulting firm, selected from only two bids; it was the only bidder prepared to send experts to Algeria. During the mid-term review, an interim solution to have a provisional management plan prepared by local consultants was adopted; however, they were not able to complete the work started by the bidder. Following a supervision mission in June 1998, in view of the failure to produce the management plan, the Bank and ANN agreed that the project objectives as defined during the preparation phase had to be revised downward: given the low level of disbursement activity, it was considered that project plans could not be completed in accordance with the original schedule.
(ii) Main achievements
8. The main outcome of the project was to produce a management plan for El Kala National Park. When the foreign consulting firm failed to produce this plan as originally intended, a provisional plan was prepared by a team of local university staff based on knowledge to hand at that time, and was delivered at the end of June 1998. This led to extension of the Grant Agreement to June 30, 1999, by which date no finalized management plan had been delivered by the consultants. Out of the fifteen baseline studies that were to serve as the basis for the plan, only three had been completed, while two others had either not been completed or were barely started. In the case of the studies on subsector natural resource development potential, they were unsatisfactory, being limited to inventories and to summary comments on possibilities identified. On the other hand, the results of the study work performed by local consultants were relatively satisfactory. The priority actions, some identified in the Appraisal Report and others decided on in the course of the project, should have been more substantial, and more quickly implemented, in particular rehabilitation works, since these were activities independent of the management plan. Viewed overall, the achievements of this component have to be considered unsatisfactory, since civil engineering works at various sites had not been completed by the project closing date, and some had not even been started. Project achievements in environmental research, training, and education must also be considered unsatisfactory by comparison with the initial project objectives. The project did however achieve some of its institutional strengthening objectives. ANN benefited from the equipment procured under the project, and the EKPIU has benefited from the experience gained through its monitoring and management of the project. The Wilaya Environmental Inspectorate is vested with the powers that will give it a fundamental role, in conjunction with the Park administration, in the future preservation of the Park's natural resources. The creation of a conservation fund has had a positive impact on the participation of local NGOs and communities.
(iii) Major factors affecting the project
9. Project design. Project implementation plans were based on two optimistic assumptions, which did not materialize. The conditions required for smooth execution of the operation never existed, chiefly because of the country's security problems at the time. The project envisaged development objectives that were unlikely to be achievable in three years, given the implementing entities' limited capacity for managing projects of such magnitude. The technical assistance with implementation and supervision that was to offset this risk could not be provided on a constant basis in the field, although recognized as key for the project success. Given the complexity and scale of the studies to be made, it was also optimistic to envisage finalization of an operational management plan within a fourteen-month period: the international consulting firm that was to perform the work had not yet been selected, and systems for coordinating review of the studies and for consensus-building consultations with all stakeholders had yet to be set up. In hindsight, the decision to award a contract of such size for all of the studies to a firm lacking international experience and with limited linguistic capabilities entailed supplementary risks. In the circumstances that prevailed, this company was unable to deliver the management plan by the time set, given the impossibility of obtaining complete data, the cancellation of missions or their postponement to indefinite dates, the unavailability or lack of motivation of consultants, problems with payment of 4 suppliers, conflicts with the local representative,and difficulties in maintainingcommunication with ANN.
10. At the project design level, certain conditionsshould have been better defined before the project was actually started. In the case of institutionalarrangements in particular, steps shouldhave been taken to: (a) transferthe prerogativesof executiondirectly to the project teams; (b) appointthe project manager with due assurancesas to his level of authorityin the project hierarchy,especially as regards discussions and decision-making,(c) set up mechanismsto enablethe NGOs to function as specifiedin the Appraisal Report and benefit from the equipmentintended for them; and (d) establish effective systemsto ensure that the environmentalimpact assessmentunit had a recognizedrole in the review of all environmental decisions.
11. In addition,the failure to provide for monitoringof results disruptedthe smooth progress of the project, since it had been decided that the key indicatorsnecessary for tracking project impact would be established once the ranagement plan had been drawn up, which, as mentioned above, did not materialize.
12. Factors beyond governmentcontrol. The main factor affecting the project was the general securitysituation in Algeria throughoutthe implementationperiod. From the outset, this complicatedthe hiring of an internationalconsulting firm preparedto send its experts into the field, increasedthe cost of essentialstudies, and interferedwith the hiring of two expatriates,one to assist the managerof the Project ImplementationUnit and the other the Algerian administrative and financial manager. The security situation also precluded field missions by the Bank staff responsible for the project, a problem only partially offset first by meetingsat the Bank's Paris office and later by relying on missionscomposed of local consultants.
13. Factors within government control. The following factors, connected with administrative and banking matters, delayed project implementationsignificantly: (i) time-consumingprocurement procedures: (ii) the slow pace of disbursementsby the AlgerianDevelopment Bank (BAD); (iii) delays in paying suppliersand the complexityof foreign exchangeregulations; (iv) the long lapse before a project directorwas appointedby decree (as the Grant Agreementrequired); (v) staff turnover at the head of the implementingagency (three directors duringthe projectperiod); (vi) failureby the responsibleministry to superviseANN closely, and consequentlyto rectify a number of adverse situationspromptly (systematic use was not made of the entities that wereto have broughtcohesiveness to managementof the Park - the InterministerialCommittee, the Wilaya Local Committee,and the Park SteeringCommittee); and (vii) the absence of legalprovisions governing the administrationof assets acquiredby NGOs.
14. Factorswithin implementingagency control. There were a number of weaknesses at project managementlevel: (i) frequent changes of managementstaff and delays in confirming appointments; (ii) initial centralizationof all decisions at ANN headquartersin Algiers, entailing major delays in the signing and execution of some contracts; (iii) slow decision-makingon civil engineering works, and unwarranted delays in start-up and execution of priority operations and works decided on after restructuringof the Grant; (iv) regarding financial management,payment delays and failure to produce clear financial statements regularly; (v) on the adminitrative front, under-qualifiedand under-trained supervisory staff and poor management of physical resources, factors exacerbatedby the centralized decision-makingarrangements; (vi) failure to hire a national consultant (provided for in the Appraisal Report)to coordinateand summarizethe required managementplan preparatorystudies; and (vii) failure to fill the expatriatemanager position with a nationalconsultant, although Bank approvalwas given. 5
(iv) Projectsustainability 15. Project sustainabilityis uncertain. It will depend chiefly on four factors: (a) Ministry of Agriculturecommitment to financingthe project from national budget appropriationsand to transferring responsibilityfor project actions from ANN to the Park managementagency, once project physical and financial balance sheets have been drawn up (It follows that a new operationunder Park management control will be included in the FY2000budget, with provision for direct financing of all actions under way plus the new actions launchedas part of implementationof the El Kala managementplan. The total appropriationneeded to cover completion of the project and the new implementationschedule will probablynot be known before end December 1999, and once ANN balance sheets have been finalized). (b) The extent to which the Park managementagency's presence in the field and its reputationin the Wilaya are strengthenedby the project, sincethis will augur well for competentassumption by Park staff of responsibilityfor preparationof the managementplan, implementationof its recommendations,and executionof priority works; (c) the degree of ecologicalawareness shown by the Wali of El Tarf, given his key role in implementingand enforcingregulations governing his region; and (d) the degree of active interestuniversity facultyand studentsfrom El Tarf Wilaya and Annaba show in the Park. (The Park is their special research domain and the construction of accommodationfacilities for them can only reinforcetheir willingnessto work in conjunctionwith the Park managementagency.) As regards the long term, however,project sustainabilitywill be tied to EKNP capacity to generate sufficient resources to cover operating expenses at least partially. Unfortunately,the study on recurrent costs included in project plans did not materialize, in the absence of the recommendationsthat were to be part of the managementplan. Finally,it is still too early to know whetherthe long-termfinancial, environmentaland socioeconomicviability of the project can be assured, since this will depend on adoption of the measures recommendedin the managementplan.
(v) Bank performance 16. The Bank's performancewas marginallyunsatisfactory. As indicatedin paragraph 10, the project design should have been based from the outset on more flexible approaches, such as use of local consultantsfor day-to-daymonitoring, and longer implementationperiods. The eventsthat occurredafter project effectiveness,which precluded any field visits for over three years, were not foreseeableat the preparation and appraisal stage, when Bank teams were able to move about the project zone without restriction. The absence of regular Bank supervisionmissions was offset initially by meetings between Bank and ANN teams in Paris, but when even these became impossible,a team of national consultants made up of an economist, a biologistand a financial analyst was recruitedto monitor the project at regular intervals, paying special attention to progress with civil works and production of financial statements. Meetings were then organized between Bank staff and these consultants, following each mission, in order to produce joint reports. In the same way, the lack of interest displayed by foreign consultingfirms in participatingin preparation of the managementplan obliged the project managers to work with a small company lacking internationalexperience but which, during technical discussionsat the Bank's Paris office in 1995, had produced all the qualificationsrequired and was the only one (of the two bidders)to agree to send expertsto Algeria. The lack of certain specializationson supervisionteams and failureto abide by originalsupervision schedules also disruptedsound project implementation. The absence of any system for periodic and systematic review of study findings, the hope that the managementplan would eventuallybe produced,the impossibilityat times of obtainingreliable data from executing entities, and the fact that there were three project managers in succession, all probably contributed to the failure to take prompt decisions that would have improved project management performance. The project was restructuredlater than it should have been, mainly because of the time needed for consultations. 'Whether or not to close the project" was the questionthe project team asked 6 itself throughout the implementation process. The decision to continue with the project, pending finalization of the Park management plan, was always made on a partnership basis and treated as a challenge by all the parties, aware that completion of the plan was fundamental for the biological and ecological protection of the region.
(vi) Borrower performance
17. The Borrower's performance was mixed. It was satisfactory during project preparation and appraisal, but fell short in the implementation phase.
18. The Project Implementation Unit (EKPIU), a new agency created under the project, had to contend, (as ANN, it was the case also for its supervisory agency), with a lack of continuity in management which undermined the quality of project administrative and financial management. There were many periods duling project implementation when nobody seemed to be in charge, making it difficult to obtain reliable data. The role of the EKPIU vis-a-vis EKNP representatives at El Kala and ANN headquarters in Algiers was ambiguous, and remained unclarified since each party's limits and prerogatives were to be set in the management plan. The Interministerial Committee proved unwieldy and ineffective as a coordinating mechanism, and did not meet systematically and regularly. Allocation of human and material resources was slow, and the use made of them poor. On the financial side, shortcomings in data quality and management led to difficulties in drawing up a final comprehensive project financial statement: management records and accounts were scattered in various files and so did not facilitate efficient, flexible tracking of the project or, ultimately, reconstruction of its financial statements. There were also delays in payment of suppliers and consultants.
19. It is regrettable that ANN did not put more pressure on the consultants responsible for the project studies, and did not succeed in resolving payment problems with the signatories of the related consultant's contract. ANN should also have been more consistently thorough in commenting on the interim study reports delivered. The option of relying on an interim management plan produced by university faculty and students should have been pursued.
20. Certain instances of delay in executing works, conducting studies, organizing training courses, and installing equipment cannot be justified, since project activities not dependent on finalization of the management plan could have been completed without difficulty.
(vii) Assessment of outcomes
21. On the whole, the project development objective of bringing the stakeholders in local development to a regional consensus around the theme of biodiversity conservation was largely achieved. In terms of outcomes, on the other hand, the project was unsatisfactory, since numerous planned actions did not go forward. For instance, the central project objective, namely reasonably early formulation and introduction of a management plan for El Kala National Park, was not achieved, although most of the requirements for formulation (baseline and subsector studies) seem to have been in place at the time the Grant closed. No more than minimal progress was made in carrying out the environmental education and training component of the project. Participation by local communities in management plan studies and design work did not eventuate, a situation that could compromise future El Kala development activities.
22. However, some not insignificant results were achieved in other spheres: (a) institutional strengthening of EKNP, ANN, and El Tarf Wilaya's Environmental Directorate and Forest Conservation Agency; (b) improvement in the ecological conditions of particularly risk-prone sites, such as reinforcement of dikes, cleaning of run-off ditches, construction of wastewater settling tanks, and the eminently successful preservation of the Barbary deer; (c) boosting of scientific research in connection 7 with the Park, thanks to participation by many university faculty members and students in the baseline and subsector studies, and also to the establishment of numerous biological plots; (d) sensitization of communities and local authorities to environmental problems in their areas, through the notable momentum created by the project as a result of the studies and other activities associated with it; (e) commitment on the part of the Government to continue funding all project components after the closing of the Grant, clear evidence of the project's positive effect in making the central authorities more aware of environmental problems, particularly in the El Tarf region; and (f) creation of jobs in a region where unemployment is widespread and endemic.
(viii) Future operation
23. The Govenunent intends to pursue funding the activities started under the project, from the Ministry of Agriculture budget. The fact that the project was innovative with regard to how to understand the problems of biodiversity, how to study their complex interrelationships in a coherent way, and how to ensure that the various concerned and/or interested parties assume responsibility for them, serves as an argument for continuation of the action taken so far. However, the investments made so far will prove worthless unless the management plan is completed and put into effect. Once the plan has been discussed by all parties concemed and validated by the Interministerial Committee, its recommendations will need to be analyzed and the means to implement them mobilized.
(ix) Replicability
24. The experience gained at El Kala will be of fundamental importance in the formulation of: (a) management plans for the other parks, especially Tassili and Hoggar, where programs scheduled to start this year will involve Project Implementation Unit staff and university faculty and students who worked on the El Kala study and appraisals; (b) a biodiversity action plan; and (c) plans for the development of the three reserves the subject of a request for US$2 million just submitted to the Global Environment Fund through UNDP.
25. In the future, if the GEF, the Bank, and other donors are to be persuaded to fund programs of this type, project design will need to fit in with the country's constraints, especially as regards program preparation, implementation procedures, and quality of monitoring systems. In particular, mechanisms will have to be put in place to ensure that funds reach beneficiaries quicker so that suppliers can be paid and operations schedules adhered to strictly.
(x) Key lessons learned
* When a country's intemal situation makes it impossible to conduct procurement proceedings under optimum competitive conditions, large-scale technical assistance contracts should not be put up for bid. Instead, advantage should be taken of the flexibility afforded by short-term purpose-specific missions and maximum recourse to local capabilities.
* When a country's intemal socio-political situation is difficult, appropriate project organization and management methods of supervision should be sought by the Bank.
* It is essential to do an in-depth evaluation of the administrative and financial management capacity of any executing agency for implementing a Bank-financed project for the first time. It is also essential to ensure that the supervisory ministry is committed to supporting the agency, which may be unfamiliar with both World Bank and local administrative procedures, and to limit turnover among the agency's senior staff. 8
* Allowances need to be made in project planning and implementation for the possibly slow pace and complex nature of the borrowing country's financial and administrative procedures, so that bureaucratic entanglements do not undermine achievement of project objectives.
* Team stability, especially at senior staff levels, and reliability of communications systems are essential fo:r effective technical and project-management decision-making, particularly in a difficult operating environment. Team members need access to essential equipment from the outset of the project, and if necessary to prompt training in its optimum use.
* As it is now the practice for all Bank-financed operations, a project needs to establish and evaluate the essential indicators that will be used to monitor its impact.
* In the best interests of environmental protection, supervision through national, regional and local entities must be recognized as important and put on a systematic basis.
* In order to promote participation at the local level, project arrangements need to include provision for early demonstration actions to ensure community support for the proposed project activities.
* It is imperative to ensure before loan signature that the necessary legal arrangements are in place to enable equipment intended for NGOs to be made available to them promptly. 9
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA
EL KALA NATIONAL PARK AND WETLANDS COMPLEX MANAGEMENT PROJECT
(GRANT NO. 28641-AL)
PART II
STATISTICAL TABLES 10
TABLE 1: SUMMARYOF ASSESSMENTS
A. Achievement of objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not applicable
Macro policies Sector policies Financial objectives Institutional development / Physical objectives Poverty reduction Gender issues Other social objectives Environmental objectives =X= Public sector management V Private sector development = Other (specify)
B. Project sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain I]1[ Highly C. Bank performance satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient
Identification Preparation assistance Appraisal Supervision (1) HJighly D. Borrower performance satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient
Preparation Implementation Covenant compliance = Operation (if applicable) Highly Highly E. Assessment of outcomes satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory unsatisfactory
(1) Difficult to accomplish because Bank staff was not permitted to visit the project area and it was difficult to organize consultations. 11
TABLE 2: RELATED BANK LOANS/CREDITS
Loan Name/Number Purpose Year of Status Approval
2809-AL: New irrigation infrastructure in 8,000 ha in 1987 Closed Cheliff Irrigation the upper Cheliff valley and rehabilitation 12/1994 Project of 3,000 ha in the lower Cheliff region to increase income and social welfare of families living in the project zone.
3009-AL: Strengthen the Bank for Agricultural and 1988 Closed Agricultural credit rural Development (BADR) by providing 06/1994 financing for agricultural equipment, technical assistance, and training.
3017-AL: Support for Algeria's locust control 1988 Closed Locust control program 12/1991
3076-AL: Increase agricultural production by 1989 Closed Mitidja Irrigation irrigating an additional 14,000 ha in the 12/1996 Project west Mitidja plain
3216-AL: Launch the reform of the national research 1990 Closed Research and system and test new approaches to 12/1996 Extension extension services for agricultural cooperatives
3405-AL: Renovation of oases in the southern Sahara 1991 Closed Sahara Regional and development to promote agriculture 06/1998 Development Project through institutional strengthening, technical assistance, and training
3487-AL: Develop a long-term action plan to 1992 Closed Pilot Forestry and improve protection and management of 12/1998 Watershed Algeria's natural resources, including its Management Project forests, watersheds, and conservation areas
3690-AL: Support for Algeria's locust control 1994 Closed Locust control program 12/1997
4143-AL: Create and promote sustainable 1997 Ongoing Rural Employment employment in rural areas 12
TABLE 3: PROJECT TIMETABLE
Date actual/ Steps in project cycle Date planned latest estimate
Identification (Analytical summary ofthe project) Februaryl992 Preparation April1993 Appraisal June 1993 Negotiations January 1994 Board presentation April 29, 1994 Signing May 6, 1994 Effectiveness June 1994 September 13, 1994 Mid-term review October 31, 1995 July 24, 1997 Date of restructuring June 30, 1998 Project completion December 31, 1997 June30, 1999 Loan/credit closing June 30, 1998 October 29, 1999
TABLE 4: CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS (Millions of US$))
FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99/a FYOO
Appraisalestimates 0.5 3.9 6.9 9.2/a _ _
Actual - 0.47 0.74 2.60 3.16 3.42 5.06 Actual as % of 12% 10% 28% 34% 37.2% 55%/6a appraisal Final disbursement 12/14/99
date______/a An amountof SDRI.47 million,equivalentto US$2million, was canceled;disbursements at project completiontherefore equaled 69 per cent of the revisedloan amount. 13
TABLE 5: KEY INDICATORS FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ...... ,. ... . ,.''.''?''...''.''.'.'...... 't 0'00t PRIORITY ACTIVITIES
1. Improved water management at Lake Tonga * Installation of sluices Unit 4 2 50 * Dam strengthening Unit 1 1 100 * Channel cleaning Unit 1 1 100 * Nesting areas 0 0 2. Protection of the lac des oiseaux site * Plantings Ha 5 5 100 * Dike Unit 1 1 100 3. Protection of humid forests and riverside forests * Fences Km 80 0 0 * Boundaries Unit 200 200 100 4. Restoration of water exchanges Unit 20 0 0 5. Spring protection * Fences Km 15 0 0 0 * Rehabilitation of water Unit 1 1 100 impoundment structures * Construction of troughs Unit 8 0 0 6. Protection of berrihane dune system * Wind-break Ha 0 100 100 100 * Boundaries Unit 200 0 0 * Fence Km 20 0 0 7. Establishment of forest boundaries 0 8. Delimitation of reserves to be 0 completely protected 9. Establishment of biological reserve Unit 5 7 140 areas 10. Protection of cultural sites Unit 1 1 100 11. Protection of the Barbary deer Unit 1 1 100
_" --
1. Fixation of the Messida dune Unit 1 1 100 2. Fixation of the Melloul dune Unit 1 0 0 3 . Replanting of dune areas 0 0 4. Arboreta regeneration Unit 1 1 100 5. Forest development Ha 200 0 0 0 6. Sand quarry regeneration Unit 1 0.3 30 7. Cork-tree regeneration Ha 100 100 100 14
TABLE 6: KEYINDICATORS FOR PROJECTOPERATION
The appraisalreport did not provideany key indicatorsfor project operationbecause it was felt that they shouldbe definedwithin the context of the managementplan. 15
TABLE7: STUDIESINCLUDED IN THEPROJECT
El Infonnationon ecologicalprocesses of wetlands * Local consultants 30 30 100 X * Internationalconsultants 05 05 100 X E2. Biologicaland ecologicalinventories of marinezones * Localconsultants 20 20 100 X * Internationalconsultants 25 16 64 X E3. Inventoryof coral deposits * Localconsultants 05 05 100 X * Internationalconsultants 00 00 00 X E4. Use of touristbeaches * Localconsultants 05 05 100 - * Internationalconsultants 00 00 00 - E5. Inventoryand managementplan for archeologicalsites * Localconsultants 10 05 05 - * Internationalconsultants 00 00 00 - E6. Procedurefor incorporatingadjacent ecosystemsin the Park * Localconsultants 5 - - - * Internationalconsultants E7. Identificationof a protectedarea project * Localconsultants 12 * Internationalconsultants - - E8. Hydrologicalstudies of lakes * Localconsultants 00 00 00 * Internationalconsultants 10 10 100 X E9. Monitoringof dune aquifers * Local consultants PM - - * International consultants - - - E10. Diagnosticstudies of wastewater * Localconsultants 00 00 00 * Internationalconsultants 06 06 100 X El . Studyon agriculturalwater use * Localconsultants 14 14 100 X * Internationalconsultants 24 19 80 X E12. Diagnosisof road system * Localconsultants 08 08 100 X * Internationalconsultants 05 00 00 E13. Socioeconomicstudy of systemsof resourceexploitation * Localconsultants 10 10 100 X * Internationalconsultants 10 09 90 X E14. Productivitysurvey and typologyfor stock livestockrearing * Localconsultants 10 00 00 * Internationalconsultants 20 13 64 E15. Agropastoralstudy 16
* Localconsultants 00 00 00 * Internationalconsultants 10 07 70 X E16. Elaborationof a foreststrategy * Localconsultants 10 10 100 X * Internationalconsultants 10 10 100 X E17. Quarrystudy * Localconsultants 00 00 00 * Internationalconsultants 08 06 75 X E18. Preparationof a conservationplan for the Barbarydeer * Localconsultants 00 00 00 * Internationalconsultants 10 10 100 X E19. Biologicaland ecologicalstudies for improvingknowledge on environment * Localconsultants * Internationalconsultants 60 30 50 TOTAL A * Localconsultants 134 103 76.8 * Internationalconsultants 213 127 59.6
Oliveoil * Localconsultants 5 5 100 X * Internationalconsultants 5 0 00 Briar * Localconsultants 4 4 100 X * Internationalconsultants 5 0 00 Cork trees * Localconsultants 4 4 100 X * Internationalconsultants 5 0 00 Essentialoils -* Local consultants 8 8 100 X * Internationalconsultants 8 4 00 X Honey * Local consultants 4 4 100 X * Internationalconsultants 3 1 50 X Wood * Local consultants PM - - - * International consultants PM. - - - Hunting * Local consultants PM - - * International consultants PM - - Studyof ecotourismmarket * Internationalconsultants 6 4 67 TOTAL B * Local consultants 25 25 100 * Internationalconsultants 32 9 28
Ass1: Evaluationmonitoring * Local consultants 00 00 00 * Internationalconsultants 10 00 00 Ass2:Enviromnental education * Local consultants 00 00 100 * Internationalconsultants 05 00 00 Ass3:Environmental planning * Local consultants 00 00 00 * Internationalconsultants 07 00 00 17
Ass4:Database management * Localconsultants 00 00 00 * Internationalconsultants 03 01 33.3 Ass5:Envirounental legislation * Localconsultants 00 04 100 * Internationalconsultants 04 00 00
Ass 6: Humanresources * Localconsultants 08 08 100 * Internationalconsultants 00 00 00 TOTAL C * Localconsultants 29 01 3.8 * Internationalconsultants 08 12 100 GRAND TOTAL A+B+C * Local consultants 167 140 83.9 * Internationalconsultants 274 137 50
PM= Pour memoire 18
TABLE 8A: PROJECT COSTS
Appraisal estimate Actual/latest Item (US$ 1000) estimate (US$ 1000) Local Foreign Total Local* Foreign Total currency Costs Currency costs
A- National Park management plan 1. Baseline studies 327 762 1,089 776 887 1,663 2. Protected area management 2,819 1,906 4,725 2,385 254 2,639 3. Development and use of 68 134 202 111 15 126 Natural resources
B. Environmental monitoring and research 1. Information management 32 32 64 83 214 297 2. Environmental impact 134 208 343 35 22 57 assistance 3. Research 80 43 123 26 0 26
C. Environmental education 389 281 671 45 45 90
D. Institutional strengthening 1. DGANN 164 356 520 93 81 174 2. ElKala Project Unit (EKPU) 335 333 668 1,542 95 1,637 3. Wilaya technical services 408 327 735 172 220 392
Physical contingencies 469 445 914 Financial contingencies 1,402 225 1,627
Projecttotal 6,628 5,052 11,681 5,268* 1,833 7,101**
* Devaluations ** Project costs restructured in 1998 19
TABLE 8B: PROJECT FINANCING la
Appraisal estimate Actual/latest estimate SOURCES (US$ 1000) (US$ 1000) Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total currency costs currency costs
GEF 3,352 5,052 8,404 2,191 1,833 4,024 'b GOVERNMENT 3,275 0 3,275 3,077 0 3,077 TOTAL 6,627 5,052 11,679 5,268 1,833 7,101
/a Estimatesas of end of Septembre1999 /b Not includingdisbursements between October and December14, 1999. Total disbursementsat closing date amountto US$5.061million.
TABLE 9: ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS (Not applicable to GEF projects) 20
TABLE 10: STATUS OF LEGAL COVENANTS ,".... ""jsii.i''5 _.--...... 'X..s< ...... -...... Cg..g...
. .. , . , .5., ,,, at ,5fi>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...... *,..-.5,--.1.i-i-<,5,.--5ffi>-5a-5,-5-52*s55s,<,>>0r>S .... Section2.02 3 CP . Paymentsto suppliers Delaysin somepayments have been registered Section2.02 (b) 3 C Openingof a specialaccount in the centralbank Accountopened in BAD Section3.01 (c) 10 C Implementationofthe Project with due Deficiencyat implementationlevel. diligenceand efficiency Section3.01 (b) 12 CP hnplementationofthe Projectin accordance Therequirement in Schedule4, section(d), was not met until1998. withthe implementationprogram set forth in Theother schedules have been complied with. Schedule4. Section3.03 (a) 5 NC 6/30/95 Zoningplan for EKNP to befurnished to the Themanagement plan to be preparedby theconsultants was not ready by 1999. Bankby 06-30-95. However,a locallyprepared management plan was furnished in June1998. Section3.05 9 CP Provisionof a semi-annualreport to theBank. Semi-annualreports were often late. Noreport has been submitted yet for1998. Section3.06 12 NC 10/31/95 Preparationof a studyonEKNP'srecuTent Thestudy has not yetbeen started. costsby 31-10-95 Section4.01, 1 CP Provisionof auditreports to theBank Thesereports have been provided only sporadically. (b) ii Section4.01, (c) I CP Maintainaccounts and audits Auditshave been submitted late and accounts have not alwaysbeen maintained. Schedule3, 13 CP Procurement Delayshave occuned and files have been incomplete. sectionI Schedule3, 13 CP Employmentof consultants Considerabledifficulty encountered hiring international consultants (because of sectionI securityconcems).
Status: 3. Flowand utilization of project funds C - Compliedwith 4. Counterpartfunding CD - Complianceafter delay 5. Managementaspects of the project or executingagency NC - Not compliedwith 6. Environmentalcovenants SOON - Complianceexpected in reasonablyshort time 7. Involuntaryresettlement CP - Compliedwithpartially 8. Indigenouspeople NYD - Notyet due 9. Monitoring,review, and reporting 10. Projectimplementation Covenanttypes: 11. Sectoralor cross-sectoral budgetary or otherresource allocation 1. Accounts/audits 12. Sectoralor cross-sectoralregulatory/institutional action 2. Financialperformance/revenue generation from beneficiaries 13. Other 21
TABLE 11: COMPLIANCE WITH THE OPERATIONAL MANUAL STATEMENTS
Number and Title of the Declaration Description and Comments in case missing OD 11.00: Procurement Delays in the bidding process and poor contract management OD 10.70: Monitoring Irregular monitoring OD 12.00: Disbursements Delays in certain payments and in submission of complete disbursement documentation to the Bank
TABLE 12: BANK RESOURCES: STAFF INPUTa
Stage of project Planned Revised Actual
cycle ______
cycle ______Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Weeks US$ Preparation to N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 64.1 appraisal Appraisal to Board N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 148 approval I Supervision 58.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A 171 CompletionX 14 35 - - N/A N/A TOTAL N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A /a Files were not maintainedin this format; accordingly,the data are not available (N/A = not available)
TABLE 13: BANK RESOURCES: MISSIONS
Performance ratina Stageof project MontW Number Days in Specialized Implementation Development Type of cycle year of field staff skills Status Objectives problemsc persons recognzede Through appraisal N/A N/A N/A N/A Appraisal through N/A N/A N/A N/A Board approval Supervision 1 August 1995 1 2 T S S S, P 2 June 1996 T S S S,P,T 4 April 1997 2 20 B, E S S M, P, S 5 Sept.1997 1 2 T U S A,L,M,P, S 6 July 1998 3 47 B, E, F S S A, L, M,P,S 7 Dec. 1998 1 5 B S S A, M, P, S 8 March 1999 3 24 T, E, F U S A, M, P, S
Completion Nov. 1999 3 30 T, E, F /a 1: No problem or minor problems; 2: Moderateproblems; 3: Major problems; S: Satisfactory; U: Unsatisfactory. /b T: Project Officer ; E: Agricultural economist;F: Financial analyst. /c A: Progress with technical assistance ; F: Availabilityof funds ; L: Compliancewith legal covenants ; M: Project management performance; P: Progresswith procurement; S: The securitysituation in Algeria; T: Progress with training. 22
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA EL KALA NATIONAL PARK AND WETLANDS COMPLEX MANAGEMENT PROJECT
(GRANT NO. 28641-AL)
APPENDIX A
BORROWER'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE ICR
OCTOBRE 1999 23 I/INTRODUCTION:
Le projet de plan de gestion du Parc National d'El-Kala a caractere pilote A l'chelle internationale peut etre considere egalement comme la premiere experience du genre en Alg&riedans la mesure ou ii integre une multitude de composantes environnementales, economiques, sociales, scientifiques, institutionnelles, educationnelle etc., a realiser ou a suivre dans un cadre participatif par un grand nombre de parties prenantes concernees telles que les institutions gouvemementales et non gouvernementales, les groupements socio-professionnels, les populations citadines et rurales, etc.
Par la diversit6 de ses composantes et activites, son montage integratif, les difficultes de tous ordres auxquels il a ete confronte et qui constituent une experience aussi int6ressante que les objets A atteindre de projet. Le Projet peut etre consider6 comme une serieuse r6ference pour la planification future d'actions similaires, A condition toutefois qu'une analyse detaillee de son deroulement soit menee pour tirer des enseignements applicables necessaires.
2/ OBJECTIFS DUPROJET:
L'objectif premier et essentiel du projet etait de preparer et mettre en place un plan de gestion du parc national d'El-Kala et du complexe des zones humides limitrophes ou ayant une interaction avec les milieux humides du territoire du parc et ce, partant des necessites suivantes: a/ Preservation et protection de la biodiversite existante. b/ Conception d'un scenario d'eco-developpement a meme de repondre en permanence aux besoins des populations locales et d'ameliorer le revenu de celles-ci. La reponse A ces necessites qui peuvent etre considerees Apriori comme contradictoires permettra de parvenir a cr6er un interface d'equilibre permanent qui concilie ces deux aspirations.
3/METHODOLOGIE:
La demarche repose de maniere resum6e sur: a/ Une analyse du contexte du milieu en general pour determiner son etat initial. b/ La mise en place des dispositifs adequats de contr8le et de gestion rationnelle par application des recommandations issues de l'analyse. c/ Le recours immediatement A des actions prioritaires indispensables et urgentes telles que: - Le renforcement institutionnel; - Les dispositifs participatifs pour orienter toutes les energies vers la concretisation des objectifs globaux. - Les actions de faible envergure pour freiner les degradations constatees afin que celles-ci n'atteignent pas un degre d'irreversibilite. - La mise en ceuvre d'operations durables de formation et de sensibilisation. d/ 1'elaboration d'un plan de gestion qui constituera un programme etale sur le long terme donc a meme de perenniser l'action globale entreprise. e/ La mise en ouvre d'un train de mesures et de r6alisations en premiere application du plan de gestion pour assurer d'une part la continuite de l'couvre et d'autre part maintenir la cohesion des parties permanentes concemres ou intdressees. 4/ COMPOSANTES DUPROJET le projet est structure en composantes majeures et en sous-composantes dont les echeances de realisation sont etalees dans le temps en fonction des priorites et des objectifs A atteindre. 24 1- Etudes et assistance technique Elle se decomposent en quatre lots: a/ Lot etudes de base: 11 comporte quinze domaines d'investigation en rapport avec les necessites de base du parc national. b/ Lot assistance technique : ce sont des interventions considerees comme essentielles car venant en appui a toutes les etudes programmees. c/ Lot etudes <
5IMISE EN (EUVRE Le demarrage du projet devait officiellement avoir lieu des la conclusion des negociations, c'est a dire en janvier 1994 entre la Banque Mondiale et la partie algerienne. Toutefois et pour des imperatifs de procedures, les echeances retenues ont connu des reports et des allongements relativement importants. Ces decalages ont affecte principalement les actions sur lesquelles repose l'6laboration du plan de gestion. Le rappel des dates ci-apres donne une idee de ces retards et de leurs causes essentielles: - N6gociation du Don: Janvier 1994, - Signature de l'accord de Don: Mai 1994, - Elaboration de la fiche technique globale juillet - aofit 1994. - Discussion et agr6ment de la fiche technique: octobre -novembre 1994. - Mise en place des credits : decembre 1994. - Procedures d'invitation, de soumission et de selection d'un bureau d'etude etranger devant necessairement constituer un groupement avec un bureau d'etude national : janvier - mars 1995. - Negociations et etablissement du contrat : mars -juin 1995. - Rencontre entre leader du groupement et representants de la Banque Mondiale : juillet 1995. - Nouvelles negociations ANN - Groupement pour diminution du plafond de l'offre financiere: octobre 1995. - Signature du contrat: novembre 1995. 27 - Elaboration du marche et examen en commission des marches: avril 1996. - Notification officielle et demarrage des etudes: mai 1996. - Differend entre les parties (ANN - Groupement) suite A un retard de paiement: juin - septembre 1995 en raison de non alimentation du fonds par la BM - Demarrage reel des etudes: septembre 1996. Cependant, le demarrage des etudes n'a pas pu avoir lieu A la date prevue, faute de disponibilite des consultants du bureau d'etude international (BEI) accentue par un autre handicap dui a I'absence d'un support cartographique tel qu'exige par BEI. Pour palier cet inconvenient, il a fallu recourir (bien que cela apporte un plus au projet) A la signature d'un avenant (portant cartographie) au contrat de base avec BEI. Celui-ci a e mis en vigueur des sa signature en fevrier 1997. II importe de signaler qu'outre l'avance forfaitaire contractuelle de 10 % du montant global libelle en Deutsch Marks du marche, BEI a facture d'autres avances de 30 % pour etre en mesure d'envoyer ses experts et d'entamer les etudes et ceci apres la non objection et le conseil de la Banque Mondiale. Malgre cette procedure de facilite accord6e, ce bureau d'etudes a failli A ses engagements contractuels et n'a pas transmis les rapports definitifs ainsi que la synthese des etudes qu'il semblerait detenir A son niveau, tant que l'A.N.N. ne lui aurait pas regle la totalit6 du montant des etudes A l'avance. En ce qui concerne les autres volets du projet, notamment sensibilisation, realisations physiques de rehabilitation de sites degrades ou de renforcement institutionnel, l'on peut considerer que ceux-ci ont connu un niveau de r6alisation encourageant. S'agissant des realisations physiques telles que les travaux de genie civil, ce volet a enregistre un taux d'avancement fort appreciable, malgre les difficultes de paiement des situations de travaux dans les temps impartis, cette situation dans le retard des reglements des factures est du aux conditions d'obtention de la non objection -obligatoire de la Banque. L'assistance technique egalement prevue pour concourir A la mise en muvre, notamment dans les domaines de la formation preliminaire, de la mise en place d'une cellule de suivi-6valuation et de creation d'une unite d'etudes d'impact sur l'environnement, ne s'est pas concretisee en raison de certaines lourdeurs administratives relatives notamment aux difficultes de passation de contrats individuels avec les consultants etrangers.
6/EXPERIENCE TIREE DE LA MISE EN (EUVRE Revoir les procedures mises en place notamment en matiere d'ouverture des comptes et de leur alimentation par les differentes banques intervenantes, ainsi que la simplification des mecanismes administratifs et financiers, surtout dans l'obtention des differents visas. Toutefois, il y a lieu de prendre en consideration les elements suivants: - Prevoir un fonds de demarrage du projet (hors budget) qui sera mis a la disposition du chef de projet, en tant qu'ordonnateur et comptable. Ce fonds servira au recrutement d'un personnel d'appui de preparation et de familiarisation avec les donnees de base, et A l'acquisition de certains equipements de bureautique. - Prevoir un temps suffisant pour la mise en vigueur du don ou du pret pour faire face aux lenteurs administratives qui sont pratiquement dans tous les cas incontoumables (fiches techniques, passations de marches, appels d'offres, negociations diverses, jusqu'A l'approbation et la conclusion des marches). - Prevoir une formation (des que le personnel est mis en place) dans le domaine de la conduite des operations pr6alables aux realisations), notamment: - elaboration des contrats et marches; * appels d'offres, soumissions, selection des entrepreneurs et fournisseurs; * contrats intemationaux; * fiches techniques nationales, etc. 28 - Prevoir l'octroi de primes de performance ou le paiement de salaires en adequation avec le niveau des taches requis pour l'ensemble des intervenants sur le projet..
Ces avantages doivent etre attractifs et incitatifs pour un meilleur rendement et une plus grande efficacite. - Prevoir des seances de travail programmees entre la BM et les banques algeriennes pour les sensibiliser sur les objectifs du projet et modalites de fmancement de toute operation programmee. - Ameliorer les mecanismes et les procedures entre la Banque Mondiale et la Banque Algerienne de Developpement pour rendre plus souples et plus rapides les procedures de decaissements. - Reconstituer en permanence dans les meilleurs delais du compte special au titre des op6rations financieres urgentes. - Ne demander la non objection de la Banque Mondiale que pour les operations (outres celles necessitant un examen a priori conformement a l'accord de don) correctives non prevues. - Augmenter la frequence des supervisions des operations par les experts de la Banque Mondiale dans le cadre du suivi technique et financier de l'execution du projet. - Prevoir des reunions planifiees entre la Banque Mondiale et tous les intervenants dans le cadre de l'execution du projet, notamment avec le Comite Interministeriel de Suivi du projet.
7/FACTEURSA YANTAFFECTE LEPROJET La description de ces facteurs, de leurs incidences directes et des effets indirects induits necessiterait un long developpement. Compte tenu du temps imparti relativement reduit pour rediger ce document, il a e retenu de presenter les principaux facteurs d'une facon succincte. a/ Facteurs externes aux parties prenantes: Les bureaux d'etudes etrangers (12 au total) invites eventuellement A soumissionner en vue de la realisation des lots d'etudes n'ont pas marque d'interet pour se produire en Algerie. II s'est avere que le bureau d'etude qui a ete selectionne, parce que s'etant engag6 a faire travailler ses consultants sur site n'a ni les capacites, ni l'envergure, ni les moyens financiers requis pour couvrir son plan de charge. Par ailleurs, le dispositif prevoyant un consultant par etude n'a pas ete respecte par le bureau d'etudes international qui a fiit travailler le mene consultant, en une meme mission, sur deux ou trois etudes. Cette maniere de proceder s'est repercutee sur la facturation et a cree des differends de comptage en hommes/semaines, a l'origine de retards importants de paiements ou des surplus de paiement et par corollaire, eu des consequences fa.cheuses sur le programme convenu. - La non possibilite de transfert de la cartographie a egalement cree des difficultes telles qu'il a fallu recourir Aun contrat cartographique en sus du contrat principal pour pallier l'inconvenient de la non disponibilite de cartes en Allemagne.
Le temps mis pour l'elaboration du contrat cartographique, sa negociation et sa signature (plusieurs mois) a egalement g6ner6 des retards et des reports d'echeances importants. b/ Facteurs relevant des organes de suivi et de controle: - Ni le comite interministeriel, ni le comite local de Wilaya, ni le conseil d'orientation du parc national dont il etait prevu dans le cadre du m6morandum du projet d'intervenir chaque fois que necessaire pour lever les contraintes rencontrees ne se sont reunis de fa,on reguliere ni contribue de fa,on efficace dans l'apport de solutions. - Le changement intervenu A la tete de la Wilaya d'El-Tarf au debut de l'annee 1995 a engendre immediatement un gel dans les relations inter-sectorielles quasi total du projet dans la mesure oiule comite de wilaya s'est d6parti de son devoir de suivi. 29 Par ailleurs, l'incomprehension de la portee du projet par les autorites locales s'est immediatement traduite par des lourdeurs bureaucratiques et procedurieres ayant pour consequences un sureroit de difficultes et de blocage sur la bonne marche du projet, surtout dans les domaines de travaux publics et de batiments. c/ Facteurs relevant des parties prenantes et notamment de l'instabilite de l'encadrement: - Changement de Wali et de Secretaire General de la Wilaya d'El-Tarf: 1995; - Suspension du chef de projet et son remplacement par des interimaires: 1997 et 1998. Ces mouvements ont eu pour consequence une modification de la vision du proj et qui n'a e plus consid6ere que comme une suite d' operations et d'actions sans relations les unes avec les autres au detriment de la vision systematique et coherente initiale. Par ailleurs, les changements intervenus egalement au niveau des secteurs technico-administratifs de Wilaya qui assurent la realisation et le suivi d'actions physiques, d'etudes, de sensibilisation,. ..etc. a eu, de meme, un impact negatif sur la continuite des programmes. A titre d'exemple, cette instabilite a touche les responsables locaux suivants: * Conservateur des Forets A deux reprises :1995-1996. * Directeur de l'Agriculture: 1995. * Directeur de la Planification: 1995. d/ Facteurs relatifs aux procedures et a leurs prealables en particulier. - Difficulte de mise en ceuvre des procedures reglementaires dans des delais de temps planifies souvent tres courts. - Difficulte de suivre normalement les procedures financieres, notamment en matiere de rapprochements des comptes avec l'institution bancaire dont les moyens technico-administratifs sont limites. el Facteurs internes au projet: - Remuneration tres faibles des intervenants etant donne leur alignement sur la grille de la fonction publique. - Aucune formation n'a et6 donnee au personnel du projet pour la maitrise des operations programmees.
8/PERFORMANCE DEL 'A.N.N. D3s la phase pr6paratoire, 1'emprunteur, en l'occurrence I'A.N.N. a marqu6 une disponibilite significative. Des efforts louables ont ete consentis pour repondre aux conditionnalit6s exigees, permettre le d6marrage du projet et en assurer une execution satisfaisante. Malgre de nombreuses difficultes de mise en couvre d'ordre divers, le projet n'a pu atteindre un niveau significatif de realisation au debut de son lancement pour connaAitreun arret brutal en octobre 1997 a la suite d'un changement de personnel au niveau de la cellule technique sur site. Les efforts entrepris pour assurer la meilleure continuit6 possible des programmes en cours, malgre la bonne volonte du personnel de 1'U.P.E.K. et de I'A.N.N. n'ont pu malheureusement atteindre les niveaux necessaires souhaites et ce, jusqu'a la restructuration du don en juin 1998 et la decentralisation a nouveau de la cellule de gestion du projet.
* Le programme issu de la restructuration, a tout de meme pu etre mene Aterme et ce, grace a un renforcement du personnel technique sur site. * Les echeances de remise des documents essentiels (esquisse du plan de gestion et plan de gestion provisoire en juin 1998) ont e respectees par 1'A.N.N. * L'elaboration du plan de gestion definitif qui a e la prdoccupation majeure a ete prise en charge, mais les retards accumules principalement par le Bureau d'etude dans la remise des rapports definitifs d'etudes a serieusement affect6 la finalisation du document dans les delais impartis. Ce dernier aurait pu permettre la mise en place d'un plan directeur et de plannings operationnels de 30 realisation des differentes taches et permettre a I'A.N.N. de ne pas anticiper les operations de r6alisation et d'infrastructures et travaux d'am6nagement. Compte tenu d'imperatifs conjoncturels et des difficultes rencontrees lors de la mise en ceuvre ou durant l'execution du projet, l'on peut considerer la performance de l'emprunteur comme relativement satisfaisante en matiere de realisation et d'equipements, bien qu'il y a lieu de noter tout de meme l'insatisfaction liee au non achevement de l'etude du plan de gestion definitif dans les delais convenus. La demiere prorogation de delai de l'accord de don accordee, de juin 1998 a juin 1999 fut entierement affect6e quant au respect des plannings operationnels 6tablis conjointement entre l'A.N.N. et la Banque mondiale, par des procedures et des exigences supplementaires non prevues initialement. En effet, a titre d'exemple, le planning de realisation des travaux de Genie Civil etabli enjuillet 1998, prevoyait six (06) mois pour les etudes techniques et six (06) mois pour la realisation proprement dite du cadre bati, en passant par un marche de gre a gre tel que recommande par la Banque Mondiale dans un souci de gain de temps. Cependant, au moment de la conclusion des marches, le comite interministeriel de suivi du projet oblige 1'ANN de se conformer a la reglementation des marches publics et de passer imperativement par I'avis d'appel d'offre a la concurrence. De plus, la Banque Mondiale a exig6 la transmission des cahiers des charges et des projets de contrats pour approbation avant le lancement des travaux. Ce qui se manifesta par des retards sur les previsions retenues avec la Banque mondiale. Cette situation amena I'A.N.N. a solliciter une nouvelle prorogation de quatre a six mois, soit une dur6e compensant le temps non utilise consacr6 a la satisfaction des conditions supplementaires et ce, afin de finaliser les actions en cours de realisation y compris la synthese des etudes confi6es au groupement. De plus, le non paiement des situations de travaux qui aurait du etre effectue par la Banque dans le mois qui suit leur reception, ont serieusement mis en difficulte les entreprises de realisation. Ces dernieres, apres d'apres negociations avec l'administration de l'U.P.E.K., ont fini par accept6 de mener avec un leger ralentissement les travaux a leur terne tout en supportant les besoins de fmancement n6cessaire. Encore faut - il citer les difficultes liees a la d6livrance des permis de construire par le biais des autorites administratives locales engendrant de fr6quents arr8ts de chantiers. Par ailleurs, en ce qui conceme l'acquisition des equipements, une partie des dotations prevues n'a pu etre realisee en raison de l'absence de la non objection de la Banque.mondiale; il s'agit notamment des embarcations et de la station m6teorologique qui auraient pu 8tre receptionnees et pay6es avant la cl6ture du don. Les problemes rencontres par la B.M sur son reseau informatique et le demenagement de ses bureaux a Washington au deuxieme trimestre 1999 et ce, durant presque trois mois, se sont soldes par la non alimentation du compte, d'oiu le retard des paiements des situations de travaux jusqu'apres la cl6ture du don. 9/PRINCIPA UX ENSEIGNEMENTS TIRES DEL 'EXPERIENCE.
Bien que tous les objectifs assignes n'aient pas 6te atteints, une multitude d'enseignements ont pu etre tires de l'experience. a/ Nrennite: - prise en charge des problemes du parc national et du complexe des zones humides. Le proj et a influe de facon remarquable sur toutes les spheres locales de decision, les ONG et meme les populations citadines et rurales quant aux retombees positives d'un parc national gere de facon rationnee aux ressources preservees et exploitees d'une maniere convenable au profit de la communaute en general. Cette nouvelle vision due a une sensibilisation opportune va se concretiser par des decisions raisonnees et raisonnables dans le futur par opposition a la demarche ancienne du < b/ - Les le,ons livrees de 1'experience. 1- Le projet aurait du tout d'abord s'appuyer sur les competences nationales et de ne recourir aux bureaux d'etudes etrangers que dans des domaines scientifiques et techniques de pointe bien cibles. 2- Les rapports BM- A.N.N. doivent obeir ai des procedures et des mecanismes administratifs et financiers plus clairs et plus simplifies. 3- Les estimations des couits des differentes operations contenus dans le memorandum doivent faire l'objet d'une etude preliminaire. 4- Un plan directeur aurait duiavoir lieu avant le lancement du projet, avec une 6tude de faisabilite technico-socio-economique permettant une meilleure prise en charge des actions retenues. 5- Une campagne de sensibilisation ciblant toutes les parties prenantes, notamment la population, les autorites locales, les ONG aurait du avoir lieu bien avant le lancement du projet. 6- Toutes les categories des habitants residents auraient du etre impliquees directement dans 1'elaboration du projet et beneficie des aides materielles A l'instar des structures locales de la Wilaya. 7- La BM aurait du designer un expert conseiller permnanentau niveau de la direction du projet. 8- Le prononce de non objection de la BM ne doit concemer que les actions non prdvues dans la memorandum ou bien qu'en cas de depassement des montants retenus. Un rapport detaille d'achevement du projet portant sur tous les volets de l'experience sera transmis ulterieurement a la Banque Mondiale. 32 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA EL KALA NATIONAL PARK AND WETLANDS COMPLEX MANAGEMENT PROJECT (GRANT NO. 28641-AL) APPENDIX B MISSION'S AIDE-MEMOIRE 33 REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE PROJET D'AMENAGEMENT DU PARC NATIONAL D'EL KALA ET DU COMPLEXE DES ZONES HUMIDES DON TF-028641 MISSION D'ACHEVEMENT DE LA BANQUE MONDIALE du 3 octobre au 14 octobre 1999 PROCES VERBAL I. Introduction 1. Une mission de la Banque mondiale (Banque), composee de Madame Aline Cabal (chef de projet), Monsieur Slimane Bedrani (economiste agronome), et Monsieur Salah Eddine Khemissi (analyste financier), s'est deroulee en Algerie du 3 octobre 1999 au 14 octobre 1999 afin de passer en revue 1'6tatd'avancement du projet et de preparer le rapport d'achevement du projet. Ce projet ayant ete cl6ture le 30 juin 1999, il est imperatif que le rapport d'achevement soit rendu au conseil d'Administration de la Banque six mois apres la date officielle de cl6ture du Don, soit donc le 30 decembre 1999. Le rapport qui doit etre remis a cette date doit aussi inclure le rapport prepare par la partie algerienne et nous comptons fermement a ce que toutes les parties algeriennes engagees dans ce processus de revue tiennent leurs engagements pour livrer A temps leur contribution au rapport final d'achevement. Nous avons discute particulierement avec l'ANN et l'UPEK des modalites A mettre en place et des dates qu'il faudra observer afin de respecter le calendrier. 2. La mission s'est rendue dans un premier temps a El Kala pour visiter les realisations faites dans le cadre du projet et pour consulter sur le terrain les principaux intervenants. La mission y a rencontre M. Le Wali d'El Tarf, les responsables de la Conservation des Forets, des Service Agricoles et de l'Inspection de l'Environnement de la Wilaya. La mission a eu des entretiens avec l'equipe d'universitaires qui avait redige le Plan de Gestion interimaire et egalement avec Monsieur Amer, le responsable d'une ONG locale. La mission a travaille quotidiennement avec le personnel de 1'UPEK, notamment avec le chef du Projet, Monsieur Bel Kacem, Monsieur Driss de l'A.N.N et le directeur du PNEK, Monsieur Djeffel. Les cadres de la Direction de la Foret nous ont apporte leur concours pour presenter les programmes forestiers realises dans le cadre de ce projet. Bien que les Services Hydrauliques aient e convoques aux r6unions la mission n'a pas eu l'occasion de les rencontrer. 3. A Alger la mission a tenu des seances de travail avec M. Azzi, Directeur General de 1'ANN, Monsieur Dib, le Directeur Financier de I'ANN, 1'equipe de l'UPEK et du PNEK. La mission a egalement rencontre Monsieur Serai, le representant du groupement de consultants ECOVALOR/AIC, les representants de la Banque Algerienne de D6v&loppement.La missio- s'est egalement entretenue au Ministere de l'Agriculture et de la Peche des problemes rencontres par le projet avec Monsieur Ahmed Bouakane, le Secretaire General du Ministere de l'Agriculture et de la Peche ainsi qu'avec Monsieur Abdelkader Rachedi, le Directeur de la Planification. 34 4 La mission tient a remercier l'ensemble des personnes rencontrees car elles ont toutes, grace a leur devouement, contribue au bon deroulement de cette mission. La qualite de l'hospitalite qui a et temoignee aux membres de la mission a et hautement appreciee. 5. Une reunion de synthese a eu lieu le 13 octobre 1999 avec les responsables du projet. Le contenu de ce proces verbal sera confirme par la Banque apres le retour de la mission a Washington. II. Principales conclusions 6. La restructuration et les deux prorogations de la date de cl6ture du pret n'ont pas permis d'atteindre les resultats escomptes. Le projet n'a pas reussi a rattraper le retard ce qui est demontre par le faible taux de decaissements enregistres et par l'absence jusqu'a ce jour d'elaboration du Plan de Gestion du Parc. Ce document qui aurait du etre remis par le groupement de consultants ECOVALOR/AIC devait permettre a ce projet de demarrer et de deboucher sur un programme de developpement qui assurerait a court et a long terme un cquilibre entre les necessites de protection dans une region a forte pression demographique. 7. Les frustrations sont ressenties a tous les niveaux et par tous les intervenants qui apres avoir caresse de grands espoirs ont conscience que le projet n'est toujours pas a sa phase de concretisation. Le rapport d'achevement analysera de fa,on detaill&e les raisons de cette situation. I1 est evident que les actions engagees ont manque de caractere suffisamment demonstratif et qu'il y a eu beaucoup de promesses sans suite. 8. Depuis la derniere mission de concertation de fevrier 1999, le projet a enregistre certains progres au niveau des travaux et des acquisitions de materiel. Toutefois de nombreuses operations sont en instance et ne pourront etre financees dans le cadre du Don, notamment pour certains gros travaux de genie civil qui ont accuse un retard qu'il n'a malheureusement pas et possible de rattraper. 9. Certaines actions ont ete positives telles que l'amenagement des parcelles biologiques, les r6alisations de certains travaux prioritaires, la sauvegarde du Cerf de Barbarie, l'amenagement de l'arboretum et la sensibilisation environnementale. Il y a eu aussi l'acquisition de materiel, d'equipements et de vehicules. Le renforcement institutionnel a ete effectif puisque le Projet a permis de doter en ressources humaines une structure capable d'operer dans la zone du Parc de fa,on permanente. 10. La mission regrette que le Projet n'ait pas profite du Don dans sa totalite. Cependant la mission a note que le Gouvernement Algerien entend fermement assurer la continuite des op6rationg et finaliser le programrne stlr son propre budget. La mission rappelle qu'il est souhaitable que les autorites algeriennes prennent des mesures pour que le Plan de Gestion du Parc d'El Kala voie le jour tres rapidement afin de retablir la credibilite tant dans la region d'El Kala qu'aupres des organismes susceptibles d'apporter des aides financieres exterieures. 35 III Actions et recommandations 11. En ce qui conceme la Gestion financiere, la mission a fait l'inventaire des factures qui peuvent encore etre presentees au service de decaissements de la Banque avant la date butoir du 28 octobre 1999. La mission recommande A 1'ANN de prendre les mesures necessaires, et de prevoir dans son budget pour l'annee 1999 les cofits afferents pour terminer les travaux engages. 12. En ce qui concerne les services de consultants, la mission a recommande A 1'ANN d'obtenir au plus vite les etudes qui ont et faites par ECOVALOR et qui jusqu'A ce jour n'ont pas encore et officiellement remises par le groupement ECOVALOR /AIC. La mission recommande que, des leur reception, ces etudes soient envoyees aux comites nationaux et locaux charges de la revue et que les commentaires soient envoyes au groupement ECOVALOR /AIC pour la revision finale. La mission recommande que ces rapports soient par ailleurs revus par les universitaires qui ont prepare le rapport de Gestion provisoire du Parc, lesquels pourraient eventuellement par la suite participer a l'elaboration finale du Plan de Gestion du Parc. 13. La mission sollicite que I'ANN, 1'UPEK et le PNEK detiennent chacun un jeu complet de toutes les etudes qui ont e realisees dans le cadre du Projet ainsi que les disquettes correspondantes. Ces rapports doivent etre inventories de fa,on systematique. La Banque exige A ce sujet que 1' ANN lui transmette 6galement un exemplaire et une disquette de toutes les etudes ECOVALOR. 14. I1 est imperatif que 1'ANN et l'UPEK, en cas de defaillance du Groupement ECOVALOR/AIC, veillent a ce qu'un Plan de Gestion soit finalise et qu'une solution alternative soit trouvee en consultation avec des experts locaux. 15. II faudra egalement que les autorites Algeriennes sp6cifient le r6le de l'UPEK vis a vis du PNEK et donnent une large autonomie decisionnelle et de gestion des activites dans le cadre de la Gestion du Parc. 16. La mission recommande a 1'UPEK, apres avoir procede a la finalisation de l'inventaire physique du materiel et de son affectation finale, de preparer avec le concours de Monsieur le Wali un cadre juridique pour que les ONGs puissent disposer des moyens materiels mis a leur disposition dans le cadre du projet. 17. La mission rappelle que I'ANN doit regulariser les situations financi&reset assurer le budget necessaire pour la finalisation des realisations engagees. 18. La mission rappelle qu'en ce qui concerne l'audit financier, conformement a l'accord de projet, 1'ANN doit soumettre Ala Banque le dernier rapport d'audit pour 1'exercice 1999 a la Banque. a 36 19. En ce qui concerne la gestion et la formation, la mission a constate que la formation telle qu'elle avait ete envisagee dans le memorandum pour les services SIG (systeme d'information geographique) est tres insuffisante puisque les operateurs n'ont pas encore acquis la maitrise des equipements et des programmes. La mission recommande donc imperativement que ce complement de formation soit prevu dans un proche delai. III. Prochaines etapes. 20. La mission souhaite que l'ech6ancier des activites pour la finalisation du rapport d'achevement soit observe avec la plus grande vigilance. Dans ce sens, l'ANN et la mission ont convenu du calendrier des activites suivantes: a/ avant le 25 octobre 1999, l'ANN soumettra a la Banque son rapport d'achevement, par envoi DHL sur disquette et papier; b/ avant le 11 novembre 1999, la Banque enverra a I'ANN son rapport pour commentaire par envoi DHL sur disquette et papier; c/ avant le 29 novembre 1999, l'ANN fera ses commentaires sur le rapport definitif et fera parvenir ses commentaires a la Banque. d/ pour le 30 novembre 1999, la Banque achevera la redaction du rapport final avec incorporation des commentaires de l'ANN et lancera la traduction du rapport en anglais e/ 31 decembre 1999: presentation du document au Conseil d'Administration de la Banque Alger, le 14 octobre 1999. IBRD24763R MEDIELA EANse .> -- Bizerte A L G E R I A AREAOF MAP SC ,_\AOK9I 6x IJcrj'; /TUNIS '\ r .EL KALANATIONAL PARK AND WETLANDCOMPLEX / tAnnna'< >~i+ ' /MANAGEMENT PROJECT J ELKALA NATIONAL PARK ® NATIONALCAPITAL A L G E R I A SOusse. [ COASTALDUNES 0 SELECTEDTOWNS Z77/]PILOT MANAGEMENT AREAS - ROADS- APPROXIMATEALIGNMENTS T U N I S I A HILLSIDESAND FORESTS - DAMS . / g B . . LAKES,AND WETLANDCOMPLEX - RIVERS W TOURISTICBEACHES INTERNATIONALBOUNDARIES '\ ½ F.AP 1)1(I.ARiUE CAPROSA CAPROUX ,|VEILLE >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ g /- ~ / --- Ad,l.!)li,.:"ii! 'A!1:.5 VntŽ~arcs ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~as 0 5 10 15 / AOUTELDJA I I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~HFII I KILOMETERS The boundaries,colrs, denominationsand any other information shownon this map do not imply, on the part of TheWorld Bank Group, any judgmenton the legal status of any territory or any I endorsementor acceptanceof such boundaries. JANUARY1994