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Sur LE DIALOGUE NATIONAL AU CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE

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Sur LE DIALOGUE NATIONAL AU CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE u- I I ESPACE REPUBLICAIN POUR | LA DEFENSE DE LA DEMOCRAT1E ET DE L'UNITE NATIONALS ' (ERDDUN) I I I I I I MEMORANDUM DE L'ERDDUN (L'opposition Congolaise) I Sur LE DIALOGUE NATIONAL I AU CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE I I Mars 2000 I I I I I \ I I I INTRODUCTION I I 1 Le 29 Decembre 1999, un Accord de cessez-le-feu et de cessation des hostilites a ete signe a Brazzaville entre le Haut Commandement de la Force Publique et le Haut Commandement I des Forces d'Autodefense de la Resistance d'une part, le representant du President El Hadj Omar Bongo et le representant I du President Denis Sassou - N'GUESSO d'autre part. 2 L'article 13 de cet accord est ainsi libelle : I « Les signataires du present accord conviennent de recommander a son Excellence El Hadj Omar Bongo en sa qualite I de mediateur international, de poursuivre ses efforts en faveur de la paix en Afrique et particulierement en Republique du Congo en organisant des que possible avec le concours de la communaute I internationale, le Dialogue National sans exclusive en vue d'une paix durable et du retour de la democratic en Republique du Congo- I Brazzaville ». II pose sans arnbiguite le probleme du reglement politique et global I de la crise Congolaise dont la cause profonde n'est pas militaire I mais politique. 3 Bien que n'ayant pas ete associee a la negociation et a la conclusion dudit Accord, 1'opposition y a souscrit par principe aux I termes de sa declaration rendue publique le 26 Decembre 1999 qui concluait: « ... Soutient la demarche en cours et souhaite qu'elle ne I debouche pas sur une impasse politique qui compliquerait davantage le retour a une paix durable, a la democratic et la I reconciliation nationale ». 4 Pourtant, des insuffisances notoires et flagrantes relevees I dans 1'accord auraient pu justifier une reserve de sa part, I notamment: I I I I I a)- la non prise en compte du reglement de la question du depart de I toutes les troupes etrangeres du Congo et de celle de I'omnipresence au sein de la force publique de la milice du pouvoir (les Cobras). Ib)- 1'absence de garantie internationale a cet accord du fait de la non participation de 1'O.N.U., de 1'O.U.A. ou de 1'U.E. a ces I negociations, en tant que parties prenantes I c)- le doute sur la credibilite et I'efficacite du Cornite de suivi compose presque exclusivement des seuls combattants sur le I terrain qui, de ce fait, deviennent a la fois juges et parties. d)- le statut du President Omar Bongo, designe mediateur I international par le seul pouvoir de Brazzaville et agissant sous un mandat non defini et surtout non approuve par toutes les parties. I 5 La paix, la reconciliation nationale et la restauration de la democratic etant au-dessus de ces preoccupations parfaitement I fondees, 1'opposition estime que toute initiative qui concourt a ces objectifs majeurs, rencontrera toujours son approbation. I 6 Le present Memorandum a pour but d'informer 1'opinion internationale, le Peuple Congolais et les amis du Congo de notre I attachement a la paix et de notre volonte de privilegier, hier comme aujourdliui, une solution politique a la grave crise que connalt I notre pays et qui ne saurait etre reglee par un accord militaire. 7 II donne le contenu du dialogue national tel qu'il est compris I par 1'opposition et tel que le comprend le peuple Congolais dont la soif de liberte et de democratic ne peut etre etanchee par 1'illusion I de paix qu'offre 1'accord de Brazzaville. 8 Enfin, le Memorandum invite la Communaute internationale I a aider le Congo aim qu'il renoue avec les valeurs de paix, de liberte et de democratic qui fondent les societes modernes et assurent le I developpement economique. I I I I I I I II- POURQUOI UNE AUTRE GUERRE APRES LE 15 QCTOBRE I 1997 9 Au lendemain du coup d'Etat du 15 Octobre 1997, le peuple Congolais avail cru que la guerre etait terminee. I A 1'evidence, elle ne 1'etait pas. La situation de non guerre qui avait succede a la guerre, n'etait pas la paix. Les populations s'en I convaincront tres rapidement dans un pays livre aux hordes de mercenaires et des arrnees etrangeres et ou le pillage des biens I publics et prives etait officiellement ordonne. 10 Deja, devant cette escalade de violence et d'insecurite, le I conseil de securite des Nations Unies exprimait sa vive preoccupation sur la situation au Congo - Brazzaville apres le Coup d'etat, au titre de sa resolution N° CS/867. I En Mars 1998, un rapport du Conseil des Eglises chretiennes parvenu au saint Siege rapportait ce qui suit : I « Malgre les multiples resolutions du Conseil de Securite de 1'ONU, du Conseil de 1'Europe et de son Parlement, le regime de Mr. Sassou N'Guesso persiste et signe dans sa furie et fureur I de tout regimenter au Congo, comrne dans le passe. Au jour d'aujourdTiui, les forces etrangeres, mercenaires I compris, sont toujours au Congo-Brazzaville, semant la terreur. Par ailleurs, il est a noter que des elections presidentielles ne I sont pas pour demain. Meme pas dans trois ans. Mr Sassou N'Guesso veut rester dix ans au pouvoir, sans elecions. Le I monopartisme a repris du poil de la bete ». 11 Comme il fallait s'y attendre, les populations des regions I favorables a I'Opposition et dont sont originaires le President Pascal Lissouba et le Premier-Ministre Bernard Kolelas, particulierement I visees par le pouvoir, subissaient les pires exactions. Pillages, viols, assassinats crapuleux, incestes forces, destructions des habitations, I tel est le sort reserve a ces populations dont 1'unique tort est d'avoir I soutenu le pouvoir democratiquement elu. I I I I I 12 Centre la repression, les populations des regions de la I Bouenza et du Pool notamment celles des localites de Mouyondzi, Kindamba - Ngouedi et Mindouli n'eurent d'autre choix que de prendre les armes pour defendre leur liberte, leur dignite et la I democratic. I 13 Sous le pretexte d'une tentative de putsch, cette repression atteint son summum en Decembre 1998 dans les quartiers sud de I Brazzaville. Scientifiquement planifi.es et froidement executes, les massacres, perpetres centre des populations desarmees, apportent les elements I constitutifs d'un genocide. a) AujourdTiui, un comite des families des 400 enfants I disparus au debarcadere de BRAZZAVILLE, tres probablement enleves et massacres par la milice du pouvoir, s'est constitue et exige du pouvoir que la lumiere soit faite I sur ces disparitions. La materialite du genocide ou du crime contre Hiumanite se precise et se confirme. I b) Alors qu'on la croyait limitee a BRAZZAVILLE, la repression s'etendit dans toutes les Regions-sud. Les mercenaires Rwandais Hutus, les Armees Angolaise et Tchadienne se I livrerent, comme les HUNS du Chef ATTILA a des ravages, massacrant, pillant, brulant tout sur leur passage. I Des scenes insoutenables que la memoire collective ne pourra effacer si rapidement. I 14 Comme 1'attestent les nombreux temoignages joints en annexe du present Memorandum, notamment : I les rapports d'Amnesty International, de 1'Observatoire Congolais des droits de ITiomme ; les messages du Reverend Pasteur NTOUMI, coordonnateur du Conseil National de la Resistance, des nombreux I temoignages des Homines d'Eglises et des personnalites independantes, la guerre de 1998 - 1999, la plus meurtriere et la I plus destructrice que le Congo ait jamais connue, repond a un plan d'extermination des populations proches de 1'opposition, mis a execution par un systeme politique qui a longtemps fait de la I violence, le seul moyen de parvenir et de se maintemr au pouvoir. I I I I I I 15 Les valeurs de paix, de liberte, et de democratic pour I lesquelles ces populations ont accepte de souffrir le martyre, sont celles auxquelles se refere FERDDUN et qui fondent son combat. Au nom de cette communaute d'ideal, 1'ERDDUN avait 1'obligafion I morale de soutenir politiquement le combat legitime de ces populations qui, en plus, payaient le prix fort de leur soutien a sa I cause. I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I III- LA SOLUTION NEGOCIEE : une constante dans la position I de TERDDUN Avant comme apres le coup d'etat du 15 Octobre 1997, I 1'ERDDUN n'a jamais renonce a 1'option du dialogue, seule susceptible de resoudre durablement la crise. I Ainsi il rappelle : 16 Le 27 Septembre 1997 le President Pascal Lissouba I confirmait 1'engagement pris par le Premier Ministre Bernard Kolelas a la rencontre de Libreville du 14 Septembre sur la crise I Congolaise en signant 1'accord de cessez-le-feu defmitif propose par les Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement presents a cette table ronde. L'accord ne fut pas applique, le President Sassou N'Guesso ayant I refuse d'apposer sa signature, laissant envoler les dernieres chances I de paix. 17 le 25 Octobre 1997, le President Pascal Lissouba de son exil I lancait un appel au calme et a la cessation des hostilites tout en invitant le peuple a se liberer de la dictature par la non violence active, notamment par la desobeissance civile tel que prevu par le I preambule de la constitution de la Republique du Congo du 15 Mars 1992.
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