Identification of Mobile and Iot Devices from (Public) Wifi

You Are What You Broadcast: Identification of Mobile and IoT Devices from (Public) WiFi Lingjing Yu, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences; School of Cybersecurity, University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences; Bo Luo, The University of Kansas; Jun Ma, Tsinghua University; Zhaoyu Zhou and Qingyun Liu, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/yu This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium. August 12–14, 2020 978-1-939133-17-5 Open access to the Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX. You Are What You Broadcast: Identification of Mobile and IoT Devices from (Public) WiFi Lingjing Yu†‡, Bo Luo§, Jun Ma]\, Zhaoyu Zhou†‡, Qingyun Liu†‡ † National Engineering Lab for Information Security Technologies Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China ‡ School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China § EECS/ITTC, The University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA ] Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; \ Pi2star Technology, Beijing, China [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], {zhouzhaoyu,liuqingyun}@iie.ac.cn Abstract and coverage of WiFi will continue to expand, and WiFi traffic will account for 50% of total IP traffic by 2022. Meanwhile, With the rapid growth of mobile devices and WiFi hotspots, the number of public WiFi hotspots will grow 4-fold globally, security risks arise. In practice, it is critical for administrators from 124 million (2017) to 549 million (2022) in a five-year of corporate and public wireless networks to identify the type span [11]. With the significant growth of public Wifi support and/or model of devices connected to the network, in order and usage, security and privacy concerns naturally arise. to set access/firewall rules, to check for known vulnerabilities, or to configure IDS accordingly. Mobile devices are not The administrators of corporate and public WiFi services obligated to report their detailed identities when they join a are concerned with malicious devices connecting to their net- (public) wireless network, while adversaries could easily forge works, which may potentially harm the platform or other users device attributes. In the literature, efforts have been made to in the network, e.g., [4, 45]. The security challenges are pri- utilize features from network traffic for device identification. marily caused by the diversity of devices, potential access to In this paper, we present OWL, a novel device identification critical/core services, lack of proper security management by mechanism for both network administrators and normal users. their owners, and limited auditing capability. On the other We first extract network traffic features from passively re- hand, users of public WiFi also express concerns about the ceived broadcast and multicast (BC/MC) packets. Embedding security of their devices, data, and personal information. How- representations are learned to model features into six inde- ever, they do not always exercise proper privacy protection pendent and complementary views. We then present a new while connecting to unknown networks [5,9, 30]. multi-view wide and deep learning (MvWDL) framework that For system administrators, whenever a new mobile device is optimized on both generalization performance and label- connects to the network, it is critical to identify its manu- view interaction performance. Meanwhile, a malicious device facturer, type, and model, so that proper security precautions detection mechanism is designed to assess the inconsistencies could be taken, e.g., configure firewall rules accordingly, ver- across views in the multi-view classifier to identify anoma- ify if known vulnerabilities are patched, or inform IDS. In lies. Finally, we demonstrate OWL’s performance through practice, identifying the type of mobile/IoT devices is of par- experiments, case studies, and qualitative analysis. ticular interest, since devices of the same or similar types are often managed under similar access control and firewall poli- 1 Introduction cies. For instance, when employees connect smart tea kettles or coffee makers to the network, the corporate security policy Over the past decade, we have observed a steady growth in may place them in the same group that is limited from access- the number and types of portable devices. WiFi and cellular ing any internal resource, while smartphones are expected network remain the two major options for mobile devices to be governed by completely different policies. Meanwhile, 1 to connect to the Internet. Although cellular networks have the manufacturer attribute also provides important informa- improved speed and coverage, and reduced costs in recent tion in device management. The same manufacturer tends to years, WiFi still has the edge in lower cost, better support from share the design and implementation of hardware and soft- devices, and less capacity limits. Cisco predicts that the role ware components across products. As a result, they often have similar vulnerabilities and are patched simultaneously. For L. Yu, Z. Zhou, and Q. Liu were supported in part by the Youth Inno- example, the firmware vulnerability reported in CVE-2006- vation Promotion Association of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the 6292 affects Apple’s Mac mini, MacBook, and MacBook Pro Key Technical Talents Project of CAS (Y8YY041101); B. Luo was supported in part by NSF-1565570, NSA Science of Security (SoS) Initiative, and the Ripple University Blockchain Research Initiative. 1In the rest of the paper, we use manufacturer and make interchangeably. USENIX Association 29th USENIX Security Symposium 55 products. Meanwhile, regular users also have the need to dis- inconsistency across views in the multi-view classifier. cover potentially harmful devices, such as hidden cameras or The technical contributions of this paper are: (1) We pro- a virtual machine with spoofed identity [10, 60], when they pose a multi-view wide and deep learning model to identify connect to WiFi hotspots. While active reconnaissance poses mobile/IoT devices using features from BC/MC packets col- the risk of being detected and denied, users have the option lected through passive reconnaissance over WiFi; (2) Through of passive reconnaissance, where they receive and examine large-scale experiments, we demonstrate the performance of broadcast/multicast (BC/MC) messages to identify other de- the proposed mechanism in identifying the manufacturer, type, vices in the same network, and looks for potential threats. and model of mobile/IoT devices; and (3) OWL is also able to Efficient and accurate identification of mobile devices is effectively detect forged or fabricated devices by identifying challenging, especially when the features are limited and often the abnormal inconsistencies across views. incomplete. There is no standard protocol to actively query The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we define devices for their identities. Even if there were one, devices the problem in Section2, and explain the data collection pro- do not have to provide faithful answers. Existing researches cesses in Section3. We present the OWL algorithm, followed on IoT device identification utilize a small set of network by implementation and experiments in Sections4 and5. We features and were only tested on approximately 20 to 50 de- present case studies of abnormal devices in Section6. We vices in controlled environments, e.g., [43, 64]. With relatively discuss other important issues and review the literature in small feature space, scalability becomes a concern. That is, Sections8 and9, and finally conclude the paper. detection accuracy may drop dramatically with the increasing quantity and diversity of devices in real-world applications. 2 Problem Statement and the Threat Model In this paper, we attempt to answer three questions: (1) When a mobile/IoT device connects to a wireless network, In this section, we formally present the objectives of OWL, what protocol(s) would broadcast information that may be re- followed by an adversary model of abnormal devices. ceived by other devices connected to the same WiFi? (2) What Device Identification. The primary goal of OWL is to iden- information or features contained in the broadcast messages tify devices on a WiFi network through packets they broad- are unique to a device, and how could system administrators or cast/multicast (BC/MC). Formally, device identification is normal users make use of such information to accurately iden- a classification problem: given a set of labeled samples tify the important attributes: manufacturer, type, and model, of f(Di;li)g, find a classifier c : D ! L, which assigns a label the devices? And (3) How can we utilize subtle hints caught lx = c(Dx) to a new sample Dx. In OWL, Di is a device during device identification to discover malicious devices? represented by features extracted from BC/MC packets. De- To answer these questions, we present OWL: overhearing vices are identified at three granularity levels: {manufacturer}, on WiFi for device identification. The key idea is to utilize the e.g., “amazon”; {manufacturer-type}, e.g., “amazon-kindle”; unique features in network packets that are introduced by the {manufacturer-type-model}, e.g., “amazon-kindle-v2.0”. Last, subtle differences in the implementations of network modules we design OWL to only rely on unencrypted passive traffic on mobile/IoT devices. OWL examines and utilizes all the that could be sniffed without any special privilege. features that could be passively collected from broadcast and Abnormal Device Detection. It is beneficial to the adminis- multicast protocols such as DHCP, DHCPv6, SSDP, mDNS, LLMNR, trators/users if OWL could tell if a device appears abnormal, BROWSER, NBNS, IGMP, etc. Distinct features extracted from besides labeling it. Therefore, another objective of OWL is related protocols naturally form a view. Multi-view learning is to identify devices whose BC/MC traffic appears to deviate then employed to utilize views constructed from all available from known benign patterns.

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