rticles RICHARD SEMON AND RUSSELL’S ANALYSIS OF MIND Christopher Pincock Philosophy / Purdue U. West Lafayette, in 47907, usa
[email protected] Russell’s study of the biologist and psychologist Richard Semon is traced to contact with the experimental psychologist Adolf Wohlgemuth and dated to the summer of 1919. This allows a new interpretation of when Russell embraced neutral monism and presents a case-study in Russell’s use of scientific results for philosophical purposes. Semon’s distinctive notion of mnemic causation was used by Russell to clarify both how images referred to things and how the exist- ence of images could be reconciled with a neutral monist metaphysics. i f the many shifts in Russell’s philosophy, one of the most dra- matic concerns the metaphysics of neutral monism in the 1913– O27 period. According to neutral monism all particulars fall into a single metaphysical category. The position is neutral, though, because, unlike materialism or idealism, this one metaphysical category is made up of entities that are intrinsically neither physical nor mental. Mental or physical entities arise, on this view, only when the neutral elements are related in appropriate ways. In 1913,intheTheory of Knowledge manu- script, Russell ascribes neutral monism to Mach and William James, and criticizes it at length. By 1927’s Analysis of Matter Russell identifies his own metaphysics of events with neutral monism. Sitting nearly in the middle of this period is the vexing book The Analysis of Mind (1921), and one of its most troubling features is Russell’s indecisiveness about neutral monism and the compatibility of neutral russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s.