February 2011

Noref Article

Africa and the : a time for decision

Makau Mutua

Summary

The normal role of elections in creating stability A basic principle of democracy is that elections and entrenching the state’s legitimacy is being should both create political stability and bestow undermined in Ivory Coast. There, the clear legitimacy on the state under which they are result of the presidential election runoff in conducted. Where a number of African states are November 2010 was the defeat of the incumbent concerned, however, elections have in practice by the opposition candidate had an opposite and perverse effect. Kenya and Alassane Ouattara. But Gbagbo refuses to Zimbabwe, where contested or stolen elections accept the verdict, which has been endorsed by have brought society to the brink of catastrophe the country’s independent electoral commission or collapse, are two examples. Now, another post- as well as the international community. The election nightmare is unfolding on the continent: in resulting standoff places a great responsibility on Ivory Coast, where the outcome of the presidential two regional bodies, the (AU) and election runoff on 28 November 2010 could yet the Economic Community of West African States lead the country to break up into two. (Ecowas). Their initial unified response has been complicated by ’s subsequent opposition to The vote appears to have had a clear result: the the use of force against Gbagbo. But has defeat, by a margin of 46% to 54%, of Laurent been firm in pressing Gbagbo to step down, and Gbagbo, the incumbent strongman who has ruled could still play the pivotal role in efforts to install the Ivory Coast since 2000, to opposition leader Ouattara, the rightful victor. The decisions the Alassane Ouattara. The country’s independent AU and Ecowas now take over the Ivory Coast electoral commission (IEC), as well as a host carry great implications for democracy in Africa. of international bodies (the United Nations, the

Makau Mutua is Dean, SUNY Distinguished Professor, and the Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar at Buffalo Law School, The State University of New York. He teaches international human rights, international business transactions, and international law. Professor Mutua holds a doctorate in law from Harvard Law School. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and Chairman of the Kenya Human Rights Commission. Professor Mutua is the author of several books including Kenya’s Quest for Democracy: Taming Leviathan (2008).

February 2011 1 Makau Mutua: Africa and the Ivory Coast: a time for decision

African Union, the European Union, and other major Regional pressure powers) have recognised Ouattara as the winner; but An internationally mediated election eventually took the Gbagbo-controlled constitutional court ruled the place in October 2010. It was inconclusive because result invalid and declared Gbabgo the winner. Thus neither Gbagbo nor his key opponent Alassane fortified, Gbagbo has refused to hand over power. Outtara managed to win a bare majority. But the Will Africa use force to eject him, and install the international community and the IEC adjudged democratically elected Ouattara? Ouattara to have won the second round held a month later. Amid the standoff following Gbagbo’s refusal to accept this verdict, Gbagbo’s forces have been The context of stalemate accused of atrocities that have led to over 200 deaths. The Ivory Coast obtained independence from France The killings look certain to continue as Gbabgo digs in 1960 and quickly prospered under the leadership in and Outtara rightly insists on taking office. of Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The doctor-turned- politician, closely aligned to the former colonial Immediately after the IEC declared Ouattara the power, engineered the “Ivorian miracle” on the winner, the Economic Community of West African back of a cocoa-based economy buttressed by a States (Ecowas) – now headed by President Goodluck professional bureaucracy and light manufacturing. Jonathan of Nigeria – firmly asked Gbabgo to But he ruled with an iron hand, and neither fostered a concede defeat and hand power over to Ouattara. The culture of democracy nor established any democratic African Union and virtually the entire international process for electing a successor. community, including President of the United States, also demanded that Gbagbo The political landscape started to fracture as soon respect the democratic will of Ivorians. But Gbagbo as Houphouët-Boigny was pronounced dead in responded with bellicose rhetoric and intimidation; December 1993. Henri Konan Bédié, the head of his forces confined Outtara and his senior aides in a the national assembly, declared himself president hotel in the former capital, Abidjan. within hours. Bédié’s administration was dogged by corruption, repression, and ethnic division until he Ecowas sent a delegation of three regional presidents was overthrown by General Robert Guéï in December – Ernest Koroma of Sierra Leone, Pedro Pires of Cape 1999. In October 2000, Gbagbo ran against Guéï Verde, and Boni Yayi of Benin – to press Gbagbo in an election boycotted by some parties. Gbagbo to step down; they were joined by Kenya’s prime claimed to be the winner, but Guéï clung to power minister , in the role of AU mediator. until he was deposed by mass protests. Gbagbo was These dignitaries warned him that Ecowas and the then installed as president. AU would use force to dethrone him, and reportedly guaranteed him amnesty if he ceded power (an This troubled history has haunted the Ivory Coast ever offer backed by President Obama’s suggestion of since Gbagbo took power. There was an aborted coup asylum in the American state of Georgia). None of against him in 2002. Sadly, the mutineers succeeded these pressures and enticements has convinced the in taking the north and splitting the country in two embattled Gbagbo to relinquish power. He appears along ethnic lines. The country quickly degenerated determined to use bluff to hold onto office. into a civil war. A French-brokered ceasefire between Gbagbo’s government and the rebels collapsed in 2004. Gbagbo’s term in office formally expired in Does Nigeria hold the key? 2005, but elections could not be held because of Unfortunately, the initial unity among Ecowas states hostilities and his own intransigence. to use force against Gbagbo was dealt a severe blow when President said Ghana would not contribute troops to oust Gbagbo. Nonetheless, reinforced the strong message by sending the retired general Olusegun Obasanjo (also

February 2011 2 Makau Mutua: Africa and the Ivory Coast: a time for decision

one of his predecessors as Nigerian president) to meet presidential elections in April 2011, would be even Gbagbo; Obasanjo is said to have been unequivocal more duty-bound to honour the results of its own vote in telling Gbagbo to realise the “inevitability of the if it intervenes in the Ivory Coast. change of power” and “Africa’s determination to achieve this objective.” Second, Gbagbo’s ouster would send the powerful message across Africa that illegitimate leaders will Obasanjo’s words should be read as Nigeria’s not be allowed to squat in public office against the determination to push Ecowas towards a military popular will. True, Laurent Gbagbo and his Ivorian solution to the Ivorian standoff in spite of Ghana’s backers will talk up the threat that his enforced reluctance to use force. Nigeria, the biggest power overthrow could trigger an all-out civil war between in the region, has the military might to oust Gbagbo. the north and the south. But given the Ivory Coast’s It has led previous Ecowas military missions to relatively large middle class and the blatant nature Liberia and Sierra Leone. It would be backed – at of Gbagbo’s power grab, this is highly unlikely. The least diplomatically – by the AU and the international AU and Ecowas must, after all, be decisive – and community. show by example that the ballot shall rule the bullet.

The African Union’s stance differs from that of its feckless predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), whose anti-colonial origins underscored its total commitment to non-interference in “sister states” (meaning in effect that it never saw a dictator it did not like.) The AU, in contrast, is marketing itself as a champion of democracy, economic renaissance, and accountability to the people of Africa. To be sure, the early report-card is mixed. While the AU usually says the right things, it has utterly failed to repudiate Sudan’s atrocities, including genocide, in Darfur; and, shockingly, opposed the indictments on genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes against President Omar al-Bashir.

The ballot shall rule the bullet This context explains why, in relation to the Ivory Coast, a lot depends on what Nigeria is willing to do. Nigeria – alongside South Africa - could play the decisive role in turning the tide against Gbagbo. But this must involve backing the threat of force with boots on the grounds to force Gbagbo out and install Alassane Ouattara, the rightful victor. Nothing less is acceptable.

A military solution that enforced the proper democratic outcome of the Ivory Coast’s elections would have two enormous implications for the region. First, it would set a precedent that would bind – and could come back to haunt – AU and Ecowas member-states. Nigeria, which will hold its own

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