Guerrilla War Programme & Abstracts
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Seán Keating, The Men of the West (courtesy of TCD Library) Unconventional Warfare: Guerrillas and Counter-Insurgency from Iraq to Antiquity Trinity College Dublin Centre for War Studies The Printing House, Trinity College 6-7 March 2015 Programme Friday, 6 March 2015 1.00-1.30 Registration, Tea/Coffee 1.30-1.45 Opening Remarks (Fergus Robson and Brian Hughes, TCD) 1.45-3.15 Civilians, Insurgents and Counter-Insurgency in the 20th Century. Chair: Anne Dolan (TCD) Matthew Hughes (Brunel University) Terror in Galilee: British-Jewish collaboration and the Special Night Squads in Mandate Palestine Brian Hughes (TCD) ‘The entire population of this God-forsaken island is terrorised by a small band of gun-men’: guerrillas and civilians during the Irish Revolution’ 3.30-5.00 Guerrillas in Colonial and post-Colonial Warfare in the 19th Century. Chair: William Mulligan (University College Dublin) Daniel Sutherland (University of Arkansas), American Civil War guerrillas Guillemette Crouzet (Paris IV) ‘Pirates, bandits and fanatics’. Taxinomia and violence as a tool of empire-building in the Persian Gulf (c. 1800- 1890) 5.00-5.30 Tea/Coffee 5.30-7.00 Keynote Address Michael Broers (University of Oxford), ‘Napoleon’s Other War’: A watershed? Guerrilla warfare in the age of Revolution & Counter-Revolution, 1789-1815 and beyond. 2 7.30 Conference Dinner Saturday, 7 March 2015 9.30-11.00 Guerrillas, Bandits and Counter-Insurgency in Early Modern Europe. Chair: Joseph Clarke (TCD) Fergus Robson (TCD) Insurgent identities, destructive discourses and militarised massacre: French armies on the warpath in the Vendée, Italy and Egypt Tim Piceu (Leuven) Unconventional warfare and the origins of the Dutch contributions system during the Dutch Revolt (1584-1609) 11.00-11.30 Tea/Coffee 11.30-1.00 Small War in Antiquity and the Medieval World. Chair: Terry Barry (TCD) Alastair Macdonald (University of Aberdeen), Good King Robert’s testament? Guerrilla war in late medieval Scotland Brian McGing (TCD), Guerrilla warfare and revolt in 2nd century BC Egypt 1.00-1.15 Closing Remarks John Horne, (TCD) 3 Abstracts Panel 1. Civilians, Insurgents and Counter-Insurgency in the 20th Century Matthew Hughes (Brunel University), Terror in Galilee: British-Jewish Collaboration and the Special Night Squads in Mandate Palestine' This paper is an empirical study of how the British and Jews in Palestine in the late 1930s collaborated to defeat Arab rebels. It touches on joint intelligence gathering operations between the British Army and Jewish agents but the focus is on joint military operations in the field, notably the Special Night Squads that operated in Galilee in 1938. The British led the Jewish-manned Special Night Squads with small teams of officers and soldiers; the idea for the squads came originally from the unorthodox British officer, Orde Wingate. Wingate and the Special Night Squads are generally well covered in the literature. The originality of this paper comes from its dissection of how the British brutalised Jewish troops by training them in well-established British counter-insurgency methods that targeted whole villages close to rebel attacks. Away from the control of the usual British military chain-of-command, the Special Night Squads became especially brutal in their dealings with Palestinians, an operational method readily absorbed by the many Jewish soldiers who served in the unit under British command. Through its examination of the Special Night Squads, this paper opens up wider issues of how imperial powers collaborate with loyalist colonial minorities, of how they use of irregular forces in pacification campaigns, and how post-colonial regimes carried over methods of control from the imperial era. Brian Hughes (TCD), ‘The entire population of this God-forsaken island is terrorised by a small band of gun-men’: guerrillas and civilians during the Irish Revolution. One of the cornerstones of the traditional nationalist narrative of the ‘four glorious years’ of the Irish Revolution (c. 1918-1922) is majority public support for the Irish Republican Army’s guerrilla campaign. It was accepted then, and widely accepted since, that the success of their guerrilla war depended on the support of the public, offered either actively or passively. Reports from government and police officials, however, continually emphasised that the public 4 were terrorised by a few men with guns and that most nationalists were moderate, if easily frightened, and in favour of dominion home rule and peace. This paper will question these competing narratives by exploring guerrilla attempts to discourage, stifle, and punish dissent among the civilian population, and the actions by which dissent was expressed or implied. An examination of low-level, ‘everyday’ (and mostly non-violent) acts of defiance and punishment will show that civilian interaction with the IRA was far more fluid than is usually allowed. While the ‘everyday’ acts of resistance discussed here could be inconsequential in isolation, their cumulative effect was important. To achieve hegemony over local populations, guerrillas had to punish even small acts of dissent and ensure that they were not repeated. It will be seen that the nature of this punishment was dictated by the perceived seriousness of the offence and, more importantly, by local conditions. Rather than fitting in to one of two neat categories, civilians generally operated in a substantial, often vague, middle ground. As will be argued here, it was not necessarily loyalty and ideology that motivated the actions or inactions of most civilians, but rather concerns about their personal and economic welfare. While the assumption that the IRA relied on the support, either active or passive, of the general population is to a large extent true, it oversimplifies or misses many of the complexities inherent in the local relationships between civilians and guerrillas – complexities that are not unique to the Irish case. Panel 2. Guerrillas in Colonial and Post-Colonial warfare in the 19th Century Daniel Sutherland, (University of Arkansas), American Civil War guerrillas The guerrilla conflict spawned by the American Civil War is often misunderstood as a purely military phenomenon. In point of fact, while Confederate guerrillas could pose serious threats to Union communications, supply lines, and small units of soldiers, their over-arching purpose was to defend the people and property of their communities against invading armies and disagreeable neighbours. Both sides organized irregular bands in the South for that very purpose, although rebel guerrillas easily outnumbered their Unionist counterparts in most places. People spoke not so much of preserving the Union or winning Confederate independence as they did of “home protection.” 5 Of equal note, with most guerrillas acting “on their own hook,” acknowledging no rules or regulations that might restrain them, they too often treated non- combatants with a ruthlessness and cruelty that made them more outlaw than irregular soldier. Appalled by this brand of “uncivilized warfare,” the Union army began to treat captured rebel guerrillas as marauders or brigands, an action. However, that only added to a vicious cycle of retaliation and counter- retaliation. As a consequence, the entire war became far more brutish than anyone could have imagined at the onset of hostilities. Guillemette Crouzet, (Paris IV) ‘Pirates, Bandits and Fanatics’: Taxinomia and violence as a toll of empire-building in the Persian Gulf (c.1800-1890). This paper seeks to explore an important episode of the Persian Gulf history, related to the two first British interventions in this space in 1809 and 1819 against what was called “Gulf piracy” or the “Gulf pirates”. It will describe how the Bombay Presidency justified from British India the two violent expeditions against Ras el Khymah and other port cities of the Persian and Arabian shores by creating a rhetorical frame permeated with violence against the populations of the Gulf. Called from the end of the 19th “pirates” or bandits”, the Qawasimis and other populations of the Gulf were accused of leading a violent warfare against Anglo-Indian commercial and political interests in the Gulf and of being “enemies of all mankind” by restricting the access to this main water highway. This paper will describe the “invention” by the British of a Qawasimi violence and piracy and of practises of warfare against British and Anglo-Indian ships. It will highlight that this invention served as a justification and rested upon a deep misunderstand of Gulf societies. Finally, this communication will highlight how to an imaginary piratical warfare, the British answered by a two violent armed interventions which led to the slow enforcement during the long 19th century of Anglo-Indian rule in this space. Keynote Address: Michael Broers (University of Oxford) ‘Napoleon’s Other War’: A watershed? Guerrilla warfare in the age of Revolution & Counter- Revolution, 1789-1815 and beyond. The vast European conflagration sparked by the French Revolution of 1789 and fanned by the Revolutionary-Napoleonic wars raged for over a generation, and engulfed almost all of Europe and Latin America. In a plethora of contexts, and for a multitude of complex, often highly localised reasons, the policies imposed 6 by the French revolutionaries and Napoleon, within France and beyond, as French domination spread, produced popular, overtly counter-revolutionary revolts and local risings of less markedly political character, but equally opposed to many the reforms of the new regimes. As the wars intensified, and the new phenomenon of mass conscription was imposed on bewildered communities, open rebellion evolved into guerrilla warfare, which was itself often, but not always, rooted in atavistic social and economic forms of banditry and smuggling. This period, which saw the birth of mass mobilisation, of warfare waged on a scale hitherto unheard of ( if hardly that of ‘total war’ as it has become fashionable to assert), ironically also saw the emergence of the ‘guerrilla’ on an equally unprecedented scale.