Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Cleanup, and Litigation: a Collection of Social-Impacts Information and Analysis

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Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Cleanup, and Litigation: a Collection of Social-Impacts Information and Analysis Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Cleanup, and Litigation: A Collection of Social-Impacts Information and Analysis Final Report, Volume I: Final Comprehensive Report Prepared for: Michael Baffrey, Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative U.S. Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service Environmental Studies Section 949 East 36th Avenue, Suite 300 Anchorage, Alaska 99508-4363 Prepared by: Impact Assessment, Inc. 2166 Avenida de la Playa, Suite F La Jolla, California 92037 John C. Russell, Ph.D. Michael A. Downs, Ph.D. Betsy R. Strick, Ph.D. Michael S. Galginaitis August 2001 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE OF THE REPORT 1.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE REPORT 2.0 BACKGROUND: CONTEXT AND EVENT CHARACTERISTICS 2.1 ESSENTIAL FACTOR: BIOPHYSICAL CONTEXT 2.2 ESSENTIAL FACTOR: SOCIOCULTURAL CONTEXT 2.3 A SUMMARY OF EVENT CHARACTERISTICS 3.0 COMMUNITY BY COMMUNITY SUMMARY 3.1 NONNATIVE COMMUNITIES 3.1.1 Valdez 3.1.2 Cordova 3.1.3 Whittier 3.1.4 Seward 3.1.5 Seldovia 3.1.6 Homer 3.1.7 Kenai 3.1.8 Kodiak 3.2 NATIVE COMMUNITIES 3.2.1 Kodiak Island Native Communities 3.2.2 Alaska Peninsula Communities 3.2.3 Kenai Peninsula Native Communities 3.2.4 Prince William Sound Native Communities 4.0 COMMUNITIES AND CONFIGURATIONS OF SOCIAL FACTORS 4.1 NATIVE PATTERN 4.2 FISHING DEPENDENT ECONOMY PATTERN 4.3 DIVERSIFIED COMMUNITY ECONOMY PATTERN 4.4 INDUSTRIAL COMMUNITY PATTERN 4.5 SUMMARY OF SOCIAL FACTOR CONFIGURATIONS 5.0 LESSONS LEARNED, EVENT DEMANDS, ANDRECOMMENDATION 5.1 COMMUNITY CULTURE 5.1.1 Differences Between Native and Non-Native Culture Resulted in Different Assessments of the Event and Its Impacts 5.1.2 Differences in Organizational and Community Culture Complicated Response Efforts 5.1.3 Values About Place and Natural Resources Contributed to How Communities Perceived and Experienced Impacts 5.1.4 Community/Traditional Ecological Knowledge Implied Different Outcomes Than Those Assessed by Government and Exxon 5.1.5 Traditional and “Expert” Cultural Constructs Determined Explanations of the Environmental and Health Effects of the EVOS 5.1.6 Culture Was Not “Lost” or “Damaged” 5.1.7 “Culture” is a Better Explanation of Different Responses to the EVOS than Either Ethnicity or Class 5.1.8 Archaeological and Historical Resources Were Vulnerable to Lossor Damage 5.1.9 Demands on Community Culture 5.1.10 Recommendations Regarding Culture 5.2 LESSONS LEARNED: SUBSISTENCE 5.2.1 Native and Non-Native patterns of subsistence are different in Alaskan communities 5.2.2 Subsistence as an institution in Native communities has multiple overlapping connections with other cultural, social, and economic institutions 5.2.3 The Contamination of Natural Resources Disrupts the Pattern of Subsistence in Native Communities 5.2.4 Disruption of Subsistence Raises Concerns about the Effects on Transmission of Cultural Knowledge to Children 5.2.5 Contamination of Resources Created Unfamiliar Conditions for Subsistence Hunters and Fishers 5.2.6 Cultural Imperatives Exist for Consumption of Wild Foods in Native Diets 5.2.7 The Contamination of Subsistence Resources Results in Concerns about Food Safety 5.2.8 Damage to Subsistence Resources Results in Economic Costs to Native Communities 5.2.9 EVOS Damages to Subsistence Resources Alienated Natives From Connections with other Social, Cultural, and Psychological Elements of Native Life 5.2.10 Subsistence: Demand Conditions 5.2.11 Subsistence: Recommendations 5.3 LESSONS LEARNED: SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 5.3.1 The Political Structure of Communities Provided Different Resources for Community Response to the EVOS 5.3.2 The Disruption of Governance and Municipal Functions by the EVOS Cleanup had Adverse Effects on Communities 5.3.3 Leaders Were Essential to Effective Community Response to the EVOS, but They were Often Exhausted by the Demands of EVOS Response Efforts 5.3.4 Unfamiliarity with the Political Structures and Processes of Native Communities Resulted in Misunderstandings and Conflicts between Natives and Outsiders 5.3.5 Federal or State Agencies within Communities were Important Assets for Disaster Response Activities 5.3.6 Multi-Agency Coordinating Committees, Incident Command Systems, and Emergency Service Councils were Effective Response Organizations 5.3.7 Information Dissemination Meetings about the EVOS were Essential for Community Information Gathering and Rumor Control 5.3.8 The Social Organization of Native Communities Buffered Some Social Impacts from the EVOS 5.3.9 Changes in Traditional Roles and Status in Native Communities During the Cleanup Created Social Tensions 5.3.10 Social Statuses within Fishing Communities Were Disrupted by the Cash Received from Cleanup Employment 5.3.11 Emergent Groups Were A Source of Solidarity as Well as Conflict 5.3.12 Demand Conditions for Social Organization 5.3.13 Recommendations For Social Organization 5.4 LESSONS LEARNED: SOCIAL HEALTH 5.4.1 Mental Health Conditions Vary with Exposure to the Effects of the EVOS, Occupation, Resource Dependence, Culture, and Gender 5.4.2 EVOS Related Psychosocial Problems Contributed to Social Disruption 5.4.3 Native and Non-Native Patterns of Mental Health Problems are Different 5.4.4 Children Were Adversely Affected by the EVOS 5.4.5 Stress Resulted from the Direct Effects of the EVOS and the Social Disruption Associated with the Cleanup 5.4.6 Community Resources were Limited for Response to Mental Health Needs 5.4.7 Cleanup and Disaster Response Personnel Are Prone to Stress Related Psychosocial Problems 5.4.8 The EVOS Changed Residents Perceptions of Their Vulnerability to Oil Spill Event 5.4.9 Social Conflicts Undermined Community Solidarity and Social Support 5.4.10 The “Therapeutic Community” Process was Undermined by the Nature of the Cleanup 5.4.11 Promote Recovery 5.4.12 Baseline Information about Social Health is Limited 5.4.13 Demand Conditions: Social Health 5.4.14 Recommendations: Social Health 5.5 LESSONS LEARNED: ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 5.5.1 Community Economic Structure Buffered the Economic Impacts on Affected Communities 5.5.2 Some Businesses Prospered and Some Floundered Because of the EVOS 5.5.3 Small Businesses Were Highly Vulnerable to Economic Loss 5.5.4 Economic Losses Among Commercial Fishermen Were Unevenly Distributed 5.5.5 Assessing the Long-Term Economic Effects on Commercial Fishing is Complicated 5.5.6 The “Money Spill” Created Social Impacts and Did Not Mitigate All the Economic Losses 5.5.7 Local Governments Experienced Fiscal Impacts Related to the EVOS 5.5.8 Economics: Demand Conditions 5.5.9 Economics: Recommendations 6.0 OBSERVATIONS: LITIGATION ISSUES AND THE EVOS 6.1 LITIGATION IS INEVITABLE 6.2 LITIGATION IS DIVISIVE 6.3 LITIGATION INHIBITS RESOLUTION OF THE EVOS 6.4 LITIGATION MAY NOT FAIRLY COMPENSATE ALL AFFECTED 6.5 LITIGATION CAN INHIBIT DATA COLLECTION OR PREVENT PUBLIC RELEASE OF DATA 6.6 CONFIDENTIALITY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA DOES NOT HAVE STANDING IN THE COURTS 6.7 SOCIAL SCIENCE RELATED TO EVOS LITIGATION IS CONTROVERSIAL 7.0 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 7.1 INFORMATION RECOMMENDATIONS 7.2 PLANNING RECOMMENDATIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY LIST OF ACRONYMS ADF&G Alaska Department of Fish and Game CESD Center for Epidemiologic Studies of Depression EVOS Exxon Valdez oil spill event, including the clean up phase GAD Generalized Anxiety Disorder MMS United States Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service PTSD Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 1.0 INTRODUCTION An element of the legacy of the Exxon Valdez oil spill event (EVOS) is awareness of the risks and costs to human communities of oil transport in Alaska. In the Spring of March 1989, there were a few vigilant fishermen and other Alaskans who understood the potential consequences of a catastrophic oil spill. Many other Alaskans did not expect and could not foresee the effects of a grounded supertanker on Bligh Reef. Fishermen and other residents of Kodiak Island and the Alaska Peninsula were concerned about competition for fish, salmon prices, summer recreation, and the details of life in rural Alaskan fishing communities. In Native villages throughout the region, the concerns were about fishing, hunting, visiting with friends and relatives, and the cycles of life built around harvesting fish, game, plants, and berries. For Natives and non-Natives alike, an oil spill was a distant threat, a relatively unknown risk. An oil spill in Prince William Sound was far away and would likely be someone else’s problem. 1.1 PURPOSE OF THE REPORT The events of March 24, 1989 changed perceptions about who is at risk as well as the costs and consequences to all Alaskans of a major oil spill. What should not have happened, did. What could have been prevented was not. A low probability of occurrence event became a reality. The “big one” happened and set in motion unpredictable events with consequences for human and biological communities in the Alaskan ecosystem. Neither the most vigilant fisherman nor the most concerned stewards of Alaska’s resources could predict the range of impacts from nearly 11 million gallons of oil spilled into a complex ecosystem with commercial, spiritual, and cultural importance for Alaska’s residents. With hindsight, there are lessons to carry forward about the human and social dimensions of these effects. In this Comprehensive Report we examine some of these lessons as indicated by our analysis of the published literature about the oil spill and its aftermath presented in the Factor by-Factor Analysis. We also develop the implications of these lessons for those who live in Alaska’s at risk communities and for those who are the developers, managers, and stewards of Alaska’s natural resources. These “implications” are presented as recommendations to natural resource managers and others who need information about how social factors affect the response of communities to a technological disaster such as the EVOS.
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