Top10vpn Free VPN Risk Index

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Top10vpn Free VPN Risk Index Free VPN Risk Index: Android Apps Network Test Results App Name Publisher APK Name Major Abnormalities Minor Aberrations Major Abnormality #1 Major Abnormality #2 Major Abnormality #3 Major Abnormality #4 Minor Aberration #1 Minor Aberration #2 Minor Aberration #3 Minor Aberration #4 Minor Aberration #5 Minor Aberration #6 Minor Abberation #7 Minor Abberation #8 Minor Abberation #9 We received unexpected and possibly dangerous Your DNS resolver returns Certain TCP protocols Certain UDP protocols We detected an HTTP The detected HTTP You are listed on a results when looking up IP addresses for names are blocked in outbound are blocked in outbound We detected at least one proxy due to IP address proxy blocks malformed Not all DNS types were Hotspot Shield Free VPN Proxy & Wi-Fi Security AnchorFree GmbH hotspotshield.android.vpn 3 6 significant DNS blacklist important names that do not exist traffic traffic proxy differences HTTP requests correctly processed Your ISP's DNS server is The packet loss was The network indicated Some DNS resolvers SuperVPN Free VPN Client SuperSoftTech com.jrzheng.supervpnfree 1 3 slow to lookup names somewhat high bursts of packet loss appear to be down Certain TCP protocols Your DNS server are blocked in outbound The network indicated Some DNS resolvers accepts unusual glue Hi VPN - Super Fast VPN Proxy, Secure Hotspot VPN Hi Security com.ehawk.proxy.freevpn 0 4 traffic bursts of packet loss appear to be down records We received unexpected Your DNS resolver returns and possibly dangerous IP addresses for names Certain TCP protocols Certain UDP protocols We detected an HTTP The detected HTTP You are listed on a results when looking up that do not exist are blocked in outbound are blocked in outbound We detected at least one proxy due to IP address proxy blocks malformed Not all DNS types were Hotspot Shield Basic - Free VPN Proxy & Privacy AnchorFree GmbH hssb.android.free.app 3 6 significant DNS blacklist important names traffic traffic proxy differences HTTP requests correctly processed Certain UDP protocols are blocked in outbound We detected at least one Some DNS resolvers Psiphon Pro - The Internet Freedom VPN Psiphon Inc. com.psiphon3.subscription 0 3 traffic proxy appear to be down Turbo VPN – Unlimited Free VPN & Fast Security VPN Innovative Connecting free.vpn.unblock.proxy.turbovpn Blocks Test Traffic Blocks Test Traffic VPN Master - Free unblock Proxy VPN & security VPN Innovative Connecting free.vpn.unblock.proxy.vpnmaster Blocks Test Traffic Blocks Test Traffic Snap VPN - Unlimited Free & Super Fast VPN Proxy Lemon Clove free.vpn.unblock.proxy.vpnpro Blocks Test Traffic Blocks Test Traffic Fragmented UDP traffic We detected at least one Not all DNS types were Hola Free VPN Proxy Hola org.hola 0 3 is blocked proxy correctly processed Certain TCP protocols Your ISP's DNS server is are blocked in outbound The packet loss was Some DNS resolvers SpeedVPN Free VPN Proxy GoSpeed Software us.gospeed.speedvpn 1 3 slow to lookup names traffic somewhat high appear to be down Network packet buffering Some DNS resolvers VPN Private VPN Private us.unbounded.vpn_private 0 2 may be excessive appear to be down We received unexpected and possibly dangerous Your DNS resolver returns Certain TCP protocols Certain UDP protocols We detected an HTTP The detected HTTP results when looking up IP addresses for names are blocked in outbound are blocked in outbound We detected at least one Network packet buffering proxy due to IP address proxy blocks malformed Not all DNS types were VPN Free - Betternet Hotspot VPN & Private Browser Betternet LLC com.freevpnintouch 2 7 important names that do not exist traffic traffic proxy may be excessive differences HTTP requests correctly processed Certain TCP protocols The NAT's DNS proxy You are listed on a are blocked in outbound doesn't fully implement Not all DNS types were Touch VPN -Free Unlimited VPN Proxy & WiFi Privacy TouchVPN Inc. com.northghost.touchvpn 1 3 significant DNS blacklist traffic the DNS standard correctly processed Certain TCP protocols Certain UDP protocols The time to set up a are blocked in outbound are blocked in outbound TCP connection was AnonyTun Art Of Tunnel com.anonytun.android 0 3 traffic traffic somewhat high Network packet buffering Super VPN - Best Free Proxy SuperVPN Inc com.chengcheng.FreeVPN 0 1 may be excessive Certain TCP protocols The time to set up a Only some root servers are blocked in outbound The network latency was TCP connection was Network packet buffering Some DNS resolvers returned DNSSEC EasyOvpn - Plugin for OpenVPN Easy4U Ltd. com.easyovpn.easyovpn 0 6 traffic somewhat high somewhat high may be excessive appear to be down information Certain TCP protocols Certain UDP protocols are blocked in outbound are blocked in outbound Some DNS resolvers Secure VPN – A high speed, ultra secure VPN Signal Lab com.fast.free.unblock.secure.vpn 0 3 traffic traffic appear to be down Certain TCP protocols Certain UDP protocols are blocked in outbound are blocked in outbound Some DNS resolvers Thunder VPN - A Fast , Unlimited, Free VPN Proxy Signal Lab com.fast.free.unblock.thunder.vpn 0 3 traffic traffic appear to be down Yoga VPN - Free Unlimited & Secure Proxy & Unblock Sarah Hawken com.yogavpn Blocks Test Traffic Blocks Test Traffic Certain TCP protocols Certain UDP protocols Your DNS server are blocked in outbound are blocked in outbound We detected at least one Not all DNS types were accepts unusual glue X-VPN - Free Unlimited VPN Proxy Free Connected Limited com.security.xvpn.z35kb 0 5 traffic traffic proxy - VERY LONG correctly processed records Certain TCP protocols Certain UDP protocols Unable to fetch are blocked in outbound are blocked in outbound The network indicated Not all DNS types were DNSSEC information TunnelBear VPN TunnelBear, LLC com.tunnelbear.android 0 5 traffic traffic bursts of packet loss correctly processed from the roots Only some root servers Fragmented UDP traffic Some DNS resolvers returned DNSSEC FlashVPN Free VPN Proxy FlashSoftware net.flashsoft.flashvpn.activity 0 3 is blocked appear to be down information VPN Robot -Free Unlimited VPN Proxy &WiFi Security Lemon Clove free.vpn.unblock.proxy.freenetvpn Blocks Test Traffic Blocks Test Traffic Unlimited Free VPN Monster - Fast Secure VPN Proxy Autumn Breeze 2018 free.vpn.unblock.proxy.vpnmonster Blocks Test Traffic Blocks Test Traffic Certain TCP protocols are blocked in outbound Not all DNS types were TapVPN Free VPN Mobbo pm.tap.vpn 0 2 traffic correctly processed Certain TCP protocols You are listed on a are blocked in outbound Fragmented UDP traffic We detected at least one The network latency was The network indicated Network bandwidth may Network packet buffering Your DNS server accepts Ultrasurf (beta) - Unlimited Free VPN Proxy Ultrareach us.ultrasurf.mobile.ultrasurf 1 8 significant DNS blacklist traffic is blocked proxy somewhat high bursts of packet loss be low may be excessive unusual glue records Free VPN Unlimited Proxy - Proxy Master Hotspot VPN( Proxy & Securitycom.freevpn.unblock.proxy ) Blocks Test Traffic Blocks Test Traffic Zero VPN TNTAPP net.tntapp.app.zerovpn Blocks Test Traffic Blocks Test Traffic HOT VPN- Free・Unblock・Proxy Autumn Breeze 2018 co.acnet.hotvpn Blocks Test Traffic Blocks Test Traffic Certain TCP protocols are blocked in outbound The network indicated Hammer VPN TunnelGuru com.in.hammervpn 0 2 traffic bursts of packet loss Certain TCP protocols are blocked in outbound Some DNS resolvers Troid VPN Free VPN Proxy TunnelGuru com.in.troidvpn 0 2 traffic appear to be down VPN 360 - Unlimited Free VPN Proxy TouchVPN Inc. co.infinitysoft.vpn360 Blocks Test Traffic Blocks Test Traffic Certain TCP protocols Certain UDP protocols are blocked in outbound are blocked in outbound Not all DNS types were Free Unlimited VPN Proxy: VPNhub - Safely Hide IP AppAtomic Limited com.appatomic.vpnhub 0 3 traffic traffic correctly processed Not all DNS types were VPN super free proxy master unblock sites SHSApps com.baaghidevelopers.proxy.vpn 0 1 correctly processed You are listed on a Not all DNS types were Browsec VPN - Free and Unlimited VPN Browsec LLC com.browsec.vpn 1 1 significant DNS blacklist correctly processed A detected in-network Certain TCP protocols The time to set up a A detected in-network You are listed on a HTTP cache incorrectly Your ISP's DNS server is are blocked in outbound TCP connection was The network indicated Network packet buffering HTTP cache exists in Not all DNS types were Free & Premium VPN - FinchVPN Finch Technology Enterprisecom.finchvpn.android 3 6 significant DNS blacklist caches information slow to lookup names traffic somewhat high bursts of packet loss may be excessive your network correctly processed Content filters or compression proxies Certain TCP protocols Certain UDP protocols The network path does appear to be present in are blocked in outbound are blocked in outbound not reply when it eneds We detected at least one The network indicates the network (MP3 / Not all DNS types were Your DNS server accepts Speedify - Bonding VPN Connectify Inc com.speedify.speedifyandroid 0 8 traffic traffic to fragment traffic proxy bursts of packet loss Torrent / Exe) correctly processed unusual glue records Hotspot VPN - Super Free VPN Unlimited Proxy Hotspot VPN( Proxy & Securitycom.supervpn.freevpn ) Blocks Test Traffic Blocks Test Traffic Certain TCP protocols The time to set up a Only some root servers are blocked in outbound The network latency was TCP connection was Not all DNS types were returned DNSSEC
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