Number 18 — May 2014 RESEARCH NOTES THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY Turkey's Presidential Prospects ASSESSING RECENT TRENDS Soner Cagaptay urkey’s incumbent Justice and Development who carried it to power. The CHP, most prominent Party (AKP) won the country’s March 30 local among the opposition parties, seems to be building T elections. In the run-up to the local elections, appeal among urban voters, especially those clustered parties ran nationwide campaigns, rallying voters in wealthy Turkish provinces around Istanbul. The not just behind mayoral and local council candidates traditionally rightist MHP has gained with some but also their national leaders and platforms, delib- disenchanted AKP supporters, along with centrist erately as a “signal” for national popularity. While a and center-right voters, especially in the country’s more-conventional analytical approach compares the middle-income provinces. The BDP, smallest of the parties’ performance in this election to their support four opposition parties and appealing to the Kurdish in the 2009 local elections, an unorthodox analytical vote, has less than 7 percent support, but the Kurd- approach compares this year’s turnout with the most ish nationalist vote could nonetheless be influential in recent 2011 general election results, when parties con- deciding the August presidential outcome by tipping tested for government. it toward either the AKP or its opponents. Most BDP Whichever angle one chooses, however, a new support is concentrated in southeastern Turkey. four-party system has emerged in Turkey, compris- Reading the Election Results ing the ruling AKP—a coalition of center-right and pro-business groups, Islamists, reformed Islamists, The conventional and unconventional analyses of the and conservatives—and the three opposition parties: March AKP victory play out as follows. the secular-leftist Republican People’s Party (CHP), Conventional analysis. All four major parties in Tur- the right-wing Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and key’s political landscape saw gains in the latest vote the Kurdish nationalist Peace and Democracy Party when compared to results of the last local elections1— (BDP). Turkey’s old and established parties, the True the AKP from 39 to 43 percent, the CHP from 23 to Path Party (DYP) of Suleyman Demirel, the Mother- 26 percent, the MHP from 16 to 18 percent, and the land Party (ANAP) of Turgut Ozal, and the Demo- BDP from 5.68 to 6.6 percent. Likewise, following cratic Left Party (DSP) of Bulent Ecevit, have all but a decade-long trend, the formerly prominent DYP, vanished from the political scene with these elections. ANAP, and DSP—which alternated between 1982 In this new system, the AKP remains domi- and 2002 to run the country—effectively went extinct. nant, holding especially strong appeal in rural Turkey, including central and eastern Anatolia, and among the Unconventional analysis. Given that local elections urban working and lower-middle class constituents do not affect representation in the national govern- Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family Fellow at The Washington Institute and author of The Rise of Turkey: The Twenty- First Century’s First Muslim Power. The author would like to thank Turkish Research Program staff Bilge Menekse and Wesley Tom for their assistance with this analysis. © 2014 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. All rights reserved. Cagaptay ment, analysts have typically refrained from compar- ties increased their votes or the unconventional analysis ing parties’ local performance to general and parlia- to suggest that the AKP lost some votes and the MHP mentary election results. However, such a method may gained some, a closer study of the latest election results be called for this time. In the run-up to the March points to new trends along the four-party axis. 30 vote, party leaders ran nationwide campaigns, even MHP though Turks were only voting technically for mayors and council members. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Gains in middle Turkey. In particular, the MHP Erdogan toured the entire country, rallying on behalf gained in the western-central Black Sea coastal and of AKP candidates—and, more important, under the Inner Aegean/Lakes regions. These regions, with banner of his image as the country’s future leader— mixed industrial-agricultural economies, can be con- while the opposition ran anti-Erdogan campaigns, sidered “middle Turkey,” falling as they do between using corruption allegations against the prime minis- the prosperous Mediterranean, Marmara, and Aegean ter as fodder. Hence, the election results can be seen as seacoasts and the poorer areas of central, eastern, and a vote of confidence for Erdogan and his ruling party. southeastern Anatolia. The MHP took between a In comparing the recent local election results with fourth and a third of the votes in these regions, com- the 2011 parliamentary results, one sees a different fortably exceeding its national average of 18 percent. picture from that provided in the above conventional For instance, in the western-central Black Sea coastal analysis. To begin with, AKP support dropped from provinces, again using the 2011 general elections for 50 to 43 percent, while CHP support remained nearly comparison, the MHP increased its votes by 153 per- steady at about 26 percent. Meanwhile, BDP sup- cent in Samsun, 122 percent in Sinop, 80 percent in port stagnated at 6.6 percent, suggesting the party’s Zonguldak, and 77 percent in Bartin. The party also creation of the People’s Democracy Party (HDP), a made major headway in the Inner Aegean/Lakes movement aimed at appealing to left-leaning Turks region provinces, including by 110 percent in Manisa, and Kurds in major cities in Western Turkey, had not 90 percent in Kutahya, 78 percent in Isparta, 67 per- yielded the desired outcome. cent in Usak, and 65 percent in Afyon. The MHP made the most striking gains, from 13 In the past, the DSP and to a lesser extent the to 18 percent. Some of the extra votes may have come ANAP dominated the western Black Sea coastal prov- at the expense of the AKP, which was tarnished by inces. The DSP’s hold on the area was so strong that a high-profile corruption scandal in late 2013 that it was dubbed “Ecevit-land” after the former prime resulted in the resignation of several key AKP min- minister whose name has also been identified with the isters. This move by voters from one right-wing party Turkish left. The DYP once enjoyed similar supremacy to another suggests the traditional left-right split in in the Inner Aegean/Lakes region, which was known Turkish politics is alive. The “leftist” CHP cannot as “Demirel-land” after another former premier, and make significant gains from disillusioned “right wing” president, whose name has stood for Turkey’s center- AKP voters. And even though the CHP and MHP right. In both Ecevit-land and Demirel-land, the leaderships made unofficial election alliances in cer- MHP has emerged as the rising party, as well as the tain provinces, such as Ankara, at least some CHP or main beneficiary of the implosion of the country’s MHP voters did not cross the left-right divide; the centrist and center-right parties. AKP won Ankara by a slight margin. Accordingly, an Makes potential gains from AKP tensions with the MHP-CHP effort to field a joint candidate in the Gulen movement. The split between the AKP and August presidential polls would face challenges unit- the Gulen movement, a conservative social network ing voters and thus blocking an AKP triumph. that broke ranks with Erdogan prior to the March Shifts and new trends in voter behavior. Whether 30 polls, does not seem to have caused large electoral using the conventional analysis to conclude that all par- swings. Nevertheless, in isolated cases, the peeling 2 RESEARCH NOTE 18 ROMANIA BULGARIA Black Sea GEORGIA Kirklareli Istanbul Bartin E Kastamonu Sinop C Tekirdag Istanbul Zonguldak E Edirne Artvin Ardahan E Samsun R Kocaeli Karabuk G Yalova Duzce Rize Ordu Trabzon Sakarya Bolu Cankiri Amasya Giresun Corum Gumushane Kars ARMENIA Canakkale Bursa Bilecik Tokat Bayburt Erzurum Igdir Balikesir Ankara Eskisehir Yozgat Erzincan Agri Kirikkale Sivas Kutahya Kirsehir Tunceli IRAN Manisa Bingol Mus Usak Afyonkarahisar Kayseri Elazig Van Izmir Nevsehir Malatya Bitlis Aksaray Konya Diyarbakir Aydin Denizli Isparta Siirt Nigde Adiyaman Batman Hakkari Burdur Sirnak Mugla Kahramanmaras Mardin G 0 200 Sanliurfa Antalya Karaman Osmaniye R Adana Gaziantep E miles E C Gulf of Mersin E Antalya Kilis Hatay SYRIA Turkey: Provincial Map N Mediterranean Sea O N A B 0 200 E IRAQ L miles ISRAEL JORDAN away of Gulen-affiliated voters from the AKP may ern Anatolian provinces such as Erzincan and Adiya- have aided the MHP. In Erzurum, for instance, the man, where local MHP support increased by 126 and MHP received 85 percent more votes (a total of 25 75 percent, respectively, and where, in both provinces, percent, up from 13 percent in 2011), likely benefit- the AKP lost 19 percent of its backing. ing from the AKP-Gulenist rift. (The movement’s AKP founder, Fethullah Gulen, was born in Erzurum, where the Gulenists are considered to have a rela- Weakens in middle Turkey. MHP gains in middle tively strong following.) Conversely, the AKP saw its Turkey have meant corresponding AKP losses. For support decline from 70 to 54 percent in Erzurum. instance, support for the AKP dropped by 21 percent Gains in conservative central and eastern Anato- in Manisa, 20 percent in Isparta, 19 percent in Afyon, lia. The MHP also gained substantially in conserva- 17 percent in Kutahya, and 16 percent in Burdur. tive-nationalist central and eastern Anatolian prov- Remains strong in central and eastern Turkey and inces where it has traditionally been strong, likely with the urban working classes.