Bringing Privacy Law out of the Closet: a Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places Andrew Jay Mcclurg

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Bringing Privacy Law out of the Closet: a Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places Andrew Jay Mcclurg NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW Volume 73 | Number 3 Article 3 3-1-1995 Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places Andrew Jay McClurg Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Andrew J. McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 989 (1995). Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol73/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BRINGING PRIVACY LAW OUT OF THE CLOSET: A TORT THEORY OF LIABILITY FOR INTRUSIONS IN PUBLIC PLACES ANDREW JAY MCCLURG* In this Article, Professor McClurg posits that the right to privacy in tort law must be expanded. His proposal offers relief to a class of plaintiffs that are routinely denied a forum for litigation-those who suffer invasions of privacy in a "public" place. McClurg asserts that this lack of protection is ironic: while the right to privacy in tort law has been limited by courts in recent years, the excesses of modern journalism and the proliferation of video camcorders have greatly increased the threat that individual privacy might be invaded, particularly in public places. Consequently, McClurg argues for legal recognition of a right of "publicprivacy." While some courts have intuitively recognized such a right,McClurg asserts that express recognitionof a right of action is necessary. McClurg's proposal redefines the tort of intrusion (as incorporated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS) to allow recovery for highly offensive instances of public intrusion. He enlists a multifactored standard to assess the offensiveness of intrusive conduct, a standardthat balancesprivacy interests against the countervailing interests of free social interactionand free speech. I. INTRODUCrION .................................. 990 II. THE SHRINKING RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN TORT LAW ....... 996 III. THE GROWING THREAT TO PRIVACY: REVISITING THE FEARS OF WARREN AND BRANDEIS ............. 1009 A. The Uncivil Media ............................ 1009 B. Video Cameras: The Newest Threat to Privacy ...... 1017 IV. PROTECTION IN PUBLIC: A THEORY OF "PUBLIC PRIVACY" .. ................. 1025 A. Defining Privacy ............................. 1028 1. Solitude-Physical Access to a Person ......... 1031 2. Secrecy-Information Known About a Person ... 1031 * Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock. The author is grateful to the Arkansas Bar Foundation for its generous research support and to Sherri Arman for her excellent research assistance. NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 3. Anonymity-Attention Paid to a Person ........ 1032 B. Refuting Dean Prosser'sPremises ................ 1036 1. Assumption of the Risk .................... 1036 2. The Relevance of Photography and Videotaping 1041 V. INDIRECT RECOGNITION OF A REMEDY FOR PUBLIC INTRUSION UNDER CURRENT LAW ............ 1044 VI. REDEFINING THE TORT OF INTRUSION TO INCLUDE A RIGHT OF ACTION FOR "PUBLIC INTRUSION".......... 1055 A. ProposedMultifactor Redefinition ................ 1057 B. Commentary on the Factorsfor Evaluating "Offensiveness" . ............................ 1059 1. The Defendant's Motive .................... 1059 2. The Magnitude of the Intrusion, Including the Duration, Extent, and Means of Intrusion ............... 1063 3. Whether the Plaintiff Could Reasonably Expect to Be Free from Such Conduct Under the Habits and Customs of the Location Where the Intrusion Occurred ... 1066 4. Whether the Defendant Sought the Plaintiff's Consent to the Intrusive Conduct ............. 1067 5. Actions Taken by the Plaintiff Which Would Manifest to a Reasonable Person the Plaintiff's Desire that the Defendant Not Engage in the Intrusive Conduct.. 1069 6. Whether the Defendant Disseminated Images of or Other Information About the Plaintiff Acquired During the Intrusive Act ......................... 1070 i. The Importance of Dissemination in Evaluating Offensiveness ......................... 1072 ii. Filling the Gap Left by the Death of the Tort of Public Disclosure of Private Facts .......... 1076 7. Whether Images of or Other Information About the Plaintiff Acquired During the Intrusive Act Involve a Matter of Legitimate Public Interest ........... 1078 VII. CONCLUSION ................................... 1085 I. INTRODUCTION One lesson of modem privacy law in the tort arena is that if you expect legal protection for your privacy, you should stay inside your house with the blinds closed. Tort law clings stubbornly to the principle that privacy cannot be invaded in or from a public place. However sound this rule once may have been, it is flawed in a modem technological society where the video camcorder has become 1995] PUBLIC PRIVACY a permanent fixture and where invasive tabloid and reality television' programming have become standard forms of journalism and entertainment. Instances of intrusive conduct in public places are becoming increasingly common and more brazen.2 This Article posits that invasion of privacy law should be modified to allow a cause of action in limited circumstances for the tort of "public intrusion."3 The tort of intrusion is one of four invasion of privacy torts widely recognized by American courts.4 It is intended to protect against intrusions, physical or otherwise, "upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns ... if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."5 As interpreted by almost all courts, the tort does not protect persons in places accessible to the public.6 Thus, tort law 1. "Reality" television is a label used to describe a genre of television programming often featuring live video coverage of dramatic events. Popular segments include footage of police officers stopping, questioning, searching, or arresting motorists, and emergency response teams, such as firefighters or paramedics, responding to calls for assistance. See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the threat that reality television programming poses to privacy. 2. This Article discusses many examples of such intrusions. A notorious recent illustration involved the publication of photographs of Princess Diana of Wales taken as she exercised at a London fitness club. The camera was hidden in the ceiling and captured the Princess in various suggestive poses as she exercised on a leg press machine. See WOWI Di as you've never seen her before, STAR, Nov. 23, 1993, at 1, 35-37 (publishing several of the photographs). As used in this Article, the term "public place" refers broadly to any place accessible to one or more members of the public. This categorization includes health clubs, restaurants, shopping mails, and other businesses, as well as public parks and streets. 3. This Article involves only the right to privacy under tort law. It does not address constitutional rights to privacy. 4. The four invasion of privacy torts are intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, appropriation, and false light. See infra notes 39-42, 56-66 and accompanying text for a general discussion of these torts. Most states that recognize the four privacy torts adhere to the definitions offered in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-652E (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS]. See infra note 41 and accompanying text (citing cases). 5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652B. The full text of the Restatement definition of intrusion reads: "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." Id 6. See, e.g., Hartman v. Meredith Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (D. Kan. 1986) ("The plaintiffs must show that there has been some aspect of their private affairs which has been intruded upon and does not apply [sic] to matters which occur in a public place or place otherwise open to the public eye."); Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[T]his tort does not apply to matters which occur in a public place or a place otherwise open to the public eye."); Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101,1116-17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) ("There is no liability for observing him in public NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 currently provides little protection from intrusive videotaping, photography, or surveillance, so long as the activity occurs in a public place. The steadfastness with which courts have clung to the rule that what occurs in public cannot be private traditionally has meant that most instances of public intrusion do not result in litigation. When they do, the plaintiffs lose early and often. Consider the results in the following cases: e Without her consent, a woman who belonged to a health club was videotaped while exercising at the club. A portion of the video was shown on television as part of a commercial for the health club. Summary judgment for the defendant was upheld.7 * Police conducted surveillance (for no legitimate purpose discernible from the opinion) of employees of a company who were meeting to organize a union. The police recorded and traced
Recommended publications
  • Privacy and Publicity: the Two Facets of Personality Rights
    Privacy and publicity Privacy and publicity: the two facets of personality rights hyperbole. In this context, personality In this age of endorsements and rights encompass the “right of privacy”, tabloid gossip, famous people which prohibits undue interference in need to protect their rights and a person’s private life. In addition to coverage in the media, reputations. With a growing number images of celebrities adorn anything from of reported personality rights cases, t-shirts, watches and bags to coffee mugs. India must move to develop its This is because once a person becomes legal framework governing the famous, the goods and services that he or commercial exploitation of celebrity she chooses to endorse are perceived to reflect his or her own personal values. By Bisman Kaur and Gunjan Chauhan, A loyal fan base is a captive market for Remfry & Sagar such goods, thereby allowing celebrities to cash in on their efforts in building up Introduction a popular persona. Intellectual property in India is no longer Unfortunately, a large fan base is a niche field of law. Stories detailing also seen by unscrupulous people as an trademark infringement and discussing opportunity to bring out products or the grant of geographical indications services that imply endorsement by an routinely make their way into the daily individual, when in fact there is no such news headlines. From conventional association. In such cases the individual’s categories of protection such as patents, “right of publicity” is called into play. trademarks, designs and copyright, IP laws The right of publicity extends to every have been developed, often by judicial individual, not just those who are famous, innovation, to encompass new roles and but as a practical matter its application areas of protection.
    [Show full text]
  • Image Is Everything Lowenstein Sandler’S Matthew Savare Gives a Comparative Examination of Publicity Rights in the US and Western Europe
    Publicity rights Image is everything Lowenstein Sandler’s Matthew Savare gives a comparative examination of publicity rights in the US and western Europe Comedian Steven Wright once joked, “It’s a small world, but I the person’s identity has “commercial value” versus only 10 years for wouldn’t want to paint it”. Over the last decade, the proliferation those whose identity does not. of digital technologies has not made the world smaller or easier to • Remedies – the remedies available to plaintiffs also vary from state paint, but it has significantly hastened the globalisation of content. This to state. For example, New York’s statute provides for injunctions, transformation, coupled with the developed world’s insatiable fascination compensatory damages, and discretionary punitive damages. Ohio’s with fame, has spurred the hyper commoditisation of celebrity. statute, which offers the most remedies of any state statute, permits Despite the universality of celebrity, the laws governing the injunctions; a choice of either actual damages, “including any commercial exploitation of one’s name, image, and likeness differ profits derived from and attributable to the unauthorised use of an widely between the US and the nations of western Europe. In light individual’s persona for a commercial purpose” or statutory damages of the increased trafficking in celebrity personas between the two between $2,500 and $10,000; punitive damages; treble damages continents, a brief comparative analysis is warranted. if the defendant has “knowledge of the unauthorised use of the persona”; and attorney’s fees. A primer on US right of publicity law Courts have used primarily three methodologies or some The right of publicity is the “inherent right of every human being to combination thereof to value compensatory damages.
    [Show full text]
  • Much Ado About Newsgathering: Personal Privacy, Law Enforcement, and the Law of Unintended Consequences for Anti-Paparazzi Legislation
    MUCH ADO ABOUT NEWSGATHERING: PERSONAL PRIVACY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES FOR ANTI-PAPARAZZI LEGISLATION ANDREW D. MORTONt Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dan- gers to liberty lurk in insidiousI encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. INTRODUCTION: BALANCING THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY WITH LEGITIMATE LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEILLANCE Horror, not humor, brought actors Michael J. Fox and Paul Reiser to testify before a hearing of the United States House Judiciary Committee last summer.2 Fox described the "mercenary tactics of tabloid photographers" who turned his wedding into a "nightmare" as helicopters recklessly jock- eyed for position above the ceremony, then "fired away with high-powered cameras" on the couple's honeymoon suite.3 When Reiser's son was born prematurely, disguised journalists infiltrated the hospital with hidden cam- eras to steal a photo of the infant, and after returning home, the child was photographed in the privacy of the family's backyard by "resourceful" jour- t B.A. 1991, M.P.P. Candidate 2000, University of Maryland; J.D. Candidate 2000, Uni- versity of Pennsylvania. This Comment is dedicated to the memory of Alan Rubinstein- gifted attorney, and the father-in-law I have known only through the many whose lives he touched. I am deeply indebted to Ed Pease, Diana Schacht, the staff and members of the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Privacy and the Limits of Law
    The Yale Law Journal Volume 89, Number 3, January 1980 Privacy and the Limits of Law Ruth Gavisont Anyone who studies the law of privacy today may well feel a sense of uneasiness. On one hand, there are popular demands for increased protection of privacy, discussions of new threats to privacy, and an intensified interest in the relationship between privacy and other values, such as liberty, autonomy, and mental health.' These demands have generated a variety of legal responses. Most states recognize a cause of action for invasions of privacy.2 The Supreme Court has declared a constitutional right to privacy, a right broad enough to protect abortion and the use of contraceptives. 3 Congress enacted the Privacy Act of 19744 after long hearings and debate. These activities 5 t Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This Article develops some of the themes of my doctoral thesis, Privacy and Its Legal Protection, written under the supervision of Professor H.L.A. Hart. Much of the inspiration of this piece is still his. I am grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Bob Cover, Owen Fiss, George Fletcher, Harry Frank- furt, Jack Getman, Tony Kronman, Arthur Leff, Michael Moore, and Barbara Underwood, who read previous drafts and made many useful comments. I. The best general treatment of privacy is still A. WEsTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOm (1967). For treatment of a variety of privacy aspects, see NoMos XIII, PRIVACY (R. Pen- nock & J. Chapman eds. 1971) (Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy) [hereinafter cited as Nomos]. 2. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 804 (4th ed.
    [Show full text]
  • Defamation and the Right of Privacy
    Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 15 Issue 4 Issue 4 - October 1962 Article 4 10-1962 Defamation and the Right of Privacy John W. Wade, Dean Vanderbilt Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Privacy Law Commons, and the Torts Commons Recommended Citation John W. Wade, Dean, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 Vanderbilt Law Review 1093 (1962) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Defamation and the Right of Privacy JOHN W. WADE* In this article Dean Wade discusses the scope of the tort of un- warranted invasion of the right of privacy, comparing and contrasting it with the tort of defamation. He observes that the action for invasion of the right of privacy may come to supplant the action for defamation and that this development should be welcomed by the courts and writers. Finally, he concludes that the whole law of privacy may someday be- come a part of the larger, more comprehensive tort of intentional in- fliction of mental suffering. I. INTRODUOTMON The history of the two torts of defamation and unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy has been greatly different. Defamation developed over a period of many centuries, with the twin torts of libel and slander having completely separate origins and historical growth.
    [Show full text]
  • Three Milestones in the History of Privacy in the United States
    Three Milestones in the History of Privacy in the United States Vernon Valentine Palmer* I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 67 II. A FIRST MILESTONE: WARREN AND BRANDEIS’S INVENTION OF PRIVACY ........................................................................................ 70 A. Intervening Years 1890-1970 ............................................. 79 III. A SECOND MILESTONE: PROSSER’S REFORMULATION OF PRIVACY ............................................................................................. 82 A. Prosser’s Methodology Revisited ....................................... 85 B. Finding Order, Losing Sight of Privacy ............................. 89 C. The Four Privacies Enter American Common Law ........... 91 IV. THE THIRD MILESTONE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF LIBERTY INTO PRIVACY ................................. 93 V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 97 I. INTRODUCTION The subject of privacy rights fits somewhere within the far broader subject of personality rights. Personality rights of course are numerous and diffuse. As Jean Dabin defined them, they are “rights whose subject is the component elements of the personality considered in its manifold aspects, physical and moral, individual and social.”1 They may be classified by general headings under which related interests are grouped together. On the Continent and in countries where a general theory of personality rights has
    [Show full text]
  • With Malice Toward None: a New Look at Defamatory Republication and Neutral Reportage James E
    Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal Volume 13 | Number 3 Article 3 1-1-1991 With Malice toward None: A New Look at Defamatory Republication and Neutral Reportage James E. Boasberg Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/ hastings_comm_ent_law_journal Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons Recommended Citation James E. Boasberg, With Malice toward None: A New Look at Defamatory Republication and Neutral Reportage, 13 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 455 (1991). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol13/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. With Malice Toward None: A New Look at Defamatory Republication and Neutral Reportage by JAMES E. BOASBERG* Table of Contents I. Unknowing Republication of Falsehood .................... 457 A . Background .......................................... 457 B. Origins of the Wire Service Defense ................... 458 C. The Wire Service Defense Since Sullivan .............. 459 D. Beyond Wire Services ................................ 462 II. Knowing Republication of Falsehood ...................... 465 A. Introduction of the Neutral Reportage
    [Show full text]
  • Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma
    INTRODUCTION: PRIVACY SELF-MANAGEMENT AND THE CONSENT DILEMMA Daniel J. Solove∗ INTRODUCTION During the past decade, the problems involving information priva- cy — the ascendance of Big Data and fusion centers, the tsunami of data security breaches, the rise of Web 2.0, the growth of behavioral marketing, and the proliferation of tracking technologies — have be- come thornier. Policymakers have proposed and passed significant new regulation in the United States and abroad, yet the basic approach to protecting privacy has remained largely unchanged since the 1970s. Under the current approach, the law provides people with a set of rights to enable them to make decisions about how to manage their data. These rights consist primarily of rights to notice, access, and consent regarding the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data. The goal of this bundle of rights is to provide people with control over their personal data, and through this control people can decide for themselves how to weigh the costs and benefits of the collection, use, or disclosure of their information. I will refer to this approach to pri- vacy regulation as “privacy self-management.” Privacy self-management takes refuge in consent. It attempts to be neutral about substance — whether certain forms of collecting, using, or disclosing personal data are good or bad — and instead focuses on whether people consent to various privacy practices. Consent legiti- mizes nearly any form of collection, use, or disclosure of personal data. Although privacy self-management is certainly a laudable and nec- essary component of any regulatory regime, I contend that it is being tasked with doing work beyond its capabilities.
    [Show full text]
  • Copyrighting Personal Letters, Diaries, and Memorabilia: a Review and a Suggestion Robert C
    University of Baltimore Law Review Volume 13 Article 3 Issue 2 Winter 1984 1984 Copyrighting Personal Letters, Diaries, and Memorabilia: A Review and a Suggestion Robert C. Hauhart University of Baltimore School of Law Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Hauhart, Robert C. (1984) "Copyrighting Personal Letters, Diaries, and Memorabilia: A Review and a Suggestion," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 13: Iss. 2, Article 3. Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol13/iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. COPYRIGHTING PERSONAL LETTERS, DIARIES, AND MEMORABILIA: A REVIEW AND A SUGGESTION Robert C. Hauhartt Controllingthe unauthorizeduse ofprivate writings hasfor cen- turies challengedthe ingenuity o/courts and legislatures. Begin- ning in England in the seventeenth century and continuing through the recent revision of thefederal copyright laws, several different approaches have been taken to protect the letters and diaries of private persons. The author traces the historicalde- velopment of these various strategies to demonstrate that none evidence a realistic appreciationof the unique issues associated with private writings. Following this anaysis, the author con- cludes with a proposed amendment to thefederal copyright stat- ute that would betterprotect authors ofprivate writings. I. INTRODUCTION Until recently, common law copyright provided state law protec- tion against the unauthorized use of unpublished works.
    [Show full text]
  • Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Novel Search Technologies: an Economic Approach Steven Penney
    Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 97 Article 3 Issue 2 Winter Winter 2007 Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Novel Search Technologies: An Economic Approach Steven Penney Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons Recommended Citation Steven Penney, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Novel Search Technologies: An Economic Approach, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 477 (2006-2007) This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 0091-4169/07/9702-0477 THEJOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 97, No. 2 Copyright © 2007 by NorthwesternUniversity, Schoolof Law Printed in U.S.A. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY AND NOVEL SEARCH TECHNOLOGIES: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH STEVEN PENNEY* The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, which defines the scope of constitutionalprotection from governmental privacy intrusions in both the United States and Canada, is notoriously indeterminate. This indeterminacy stems in large measure from the tendency ofjudges to think ofprivacy in non-instrumentalistterms. This "moral" approach to privacy is normatively questionable, and it does a poor job of identifying the circumstances in which privacy should prevail over countervailing interests, such as the deterrence of crime. In this Article, I develop an alternative,economically-informed approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy test. In contrast to the moral approach, which treatsprivacy as a fundamental right, the economic approach views it as an (normatively neutral) aspect of self-interest: the desire to conceal and control potentially damagingpersonal information.
    [Show full text]
  • Right of Privacy and Rights of the Personality
    AGTA Instituti Upsaliensis Iurisprudentiae Gomparativae VIII RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND RIGHTS OF THE PERSONALITY A COMPARATIVE SURVEY Working paper prepared for the Nordic Conferen.ee on privacy organized by the International Commission of Jurists, Stockholm M ay 1967 BY STIG STRÜMHOLM STOCKHOLM P. A. NORSTEDT & SÜNERS FÜRLAG ACTA Institut! Upsaliensis Iurisprudentiae Oomparativae AGTA Instituti Upsaliensis Iurisprudentiae Comjmrativae Edidit ÂKE MALMSTROM VIII RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND RIGHTS OF THE PERSONALITY A COMPARATIVE SURVEY (Working Paper prepared for the Nordic Conférence on Privacy organized by the International Commission of Jurists, Stockholm May 1967) By STIG STRÜMHOLM S T O C K H O L M P. A. N O RSTEDT & S ONE R S FÜRLAG © P. A. Norstedt & Sôners fôrlag 1967 Boktryckeri AB Thule, Stockholm 1967 PREFACE One of the author’s most eminent teachers in private law in the Uppsala Faculty of Law once claimed that an action in tort ought to lie against those légal writers who take up a subject to treat it broadly enough to deter others from writing about it but not deeply enough to give any final answers to the questions discussed. Were the law so severe, the present author would undoubtedly have to face a lawsuit for venturing to publish this short study on a topic which demands lengthy and careful considération on almost every point and which has already given rise to an extensive body of case law and of légal writing. This préfacé can be considered as the au­ thor’s plaidoyer in that action, fortunately imaginary. The present study was prepared at the request, and with the most active personal and material support, of the International Commis­ sion of Jurists as a working paper for the Nordic Conférence of Jurists, organized by the Commission in Stockholm in May, 1967.
    [Show full text]
  • The Privacy, Data Protection and Cybersecurity Law Review
    The Privacy, Data Protection and Cybersecurity Law Review Editor Alan Charles Raul Law Business Research The Privacy, Data Protection and Cybersecurity Law Review The Privacy, Data Protection and Cybersecurity Law Review Reproduced with permission from Law Business Research Ltd. This article was first published in The Privacy, Data Protection and Cybersecurity Law Review - Edition 1 (published in November 2014 – editor Alan Charles Raul). For further information please email [email protected] The Privacy, Data Protection and Cybersecurity Law Review Editor Alan Charles Raul Law Business Research Ltd THE LAW REVIEWS THE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS REVIEW THE RESTRUCTURING REVIEW THE PRIVATE COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT REVIEW THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION REVIEW THE EMPLOYMENT LAW REVIEW THE PUBLIC COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT REVIEW THE BANKING REGULATION REVIEW THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION REVIEW THE MERGER CONTROL REVIEW THE TECHNOLOGY, MEDIA AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS REVIEW THE INWARD INVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION REVIEW THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW THE CORPORATE IMMIGRATION REVIEW THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS REVIEW THE PROJECTS AND CONSTRUCTION REVIEW THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS REVIEW THE REAL ESTATE LAW REVIEW THE PRIVATE EQUITY REVIEW THE ENERGY REGULATION AND MARKETS REVIEW THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW THE ASSET MANAGEMENT REVIEW THE PRIVATE WEALTH AND PRIVATE CLIENT REVIEW THE MINING LAW REVIEW THE EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION REVIEW THE ANTI-BRIBERY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION REVIEW THE CARTELS AND LENIENCY REVIEW THE TAX DISPUTES
    [Show full text]