Privacy and Publicity: the Two Facets of Personality Rights
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Identity Theft Literature Review
The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: Document Title: Identity Theft Literature Review Author(s): Graeme R. Newman, Megan M. McNally Document No.: 210459 Date Received: July 2005 Award Number: 2005-TO-008 This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally- funded grant final report available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. IDENTITY THEFT LITERATURE REVIEW Prepared for presentation and discussion at the National Institute of Justice Focus Group Meeting to develop a research agenda to identify the most effective avenues of research that will impact on prevention, harm reduction and enforcement January 27-28, 2005 Graeme R. Newman School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany Megan M. McNally School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark This project was supported by Contract #2005-TO-008 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. -
Personality Rights in Australia1
SWIMMERS, SURFERS, AND SUE SMITH PERSONALITY RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA1 Therese Catanzariti2 It is somewhat of a misnomer to talk about personality rights in Australia. First, personality rights are not “rights” in the sense of positive rights, a right to do something, or in the sense of proprietary rights, property that can be assigned or mortgaged. Second, personality rights are largely a US law concept, derived from US state law relating to the “right of publicity”. However, it is common commercial practice that Australian performers, actors and sportstars enter endorsement or sponsorship agreements.3 In addition, the Australian Media and Entertainment Arts Alliance, the Australian actors union, insists that the film and television industrial agreements and awards don’t cover merchandising and insist film and television producers enter individual agreements if they want to use an actor’s image in merchandising.4 This paper considers Australian law5 relating to defamation, passing off, and section 52 of the Trade Practices Act,6 draws parallels with US law relating to the right of publicity, and considers whether there is a developing Australian jurisprudence of “personality rights”. Protecting Personality Acknowledging and protecting personality rights protects privacy. But protecting privacy is not the focus and is an unintended incidental. Protecting personality rights protects investment, and has more in common with unfair competition than privacy. Acknowledging and protecting personality rights protects investment in creating and maintaining a carefully manicured public image, an investment of time labour, skill and cash. This includes spin doctors and personal trainers and make-up artists and plastic surgeons and making sure some stories never get into the press. -
E Dawn of Robot Surveillance AI, Video Analytics, and Privacy
e Dawn of Robot Surveillance AI, Video Analytics, and Privacy June 2019 e Dawn of Robot Surveillance AI, Video Analytics, and Privacy By Jay Stanley © 2019 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION Cover: Sources images, shutterstock.com “The robots are here. The robots control your warnings. They analyze and notify, following instructions you have set.” — Promotional web site for “Video Surveillance as a Service”1 “The overwhelming majority of images are now made by machines for other machines” 2 — Trevor Paglen 1 http://www.vsaas.com/. 2 https://thenewinquiry.com/invisible-images-your-pictures-are-looking-at-you/. 1 Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 3 II. WHAT IS AI VIDEO ANALYTICS .......................................................................... 5 The rise of deep learning ........................................................................................... 6 Overcoming challenges with new sources of data .................................................. 8 III. CURRENT DEPLOYMENTS ................................................................................ 9 Government deployments ......................................................................................... 9 Commercial deployments ........................................................................................ 10 Analytics in the cloud .............................................................................................. 11 IV. HOW COMPUTERS WILL -
Federal Income Tax Returns--Confidentiality Vs
Federal Income Tax Returns--Confidentiality vs. Public Disclosure* by Boris I. Bittker* * I. INTRODUCTION This article will examine the relationship between the individual's interest in privacy, reflected in such recent statutes as the Privacy Act of 1974, I and the public's right to know, which underlies legislation like the Freedom of Information Act. 2 The subject is of intrinsic impor tance, but it is particularly appropriate for an article in this lecture se ries, since privacy3 and disclosure4 were values of special interest to Justice Douglas. Neither the individual's right to privacy5 nor the pub lic's right to know6 is explicitly protected by the Constitution, but both do have constitutional overtones, and both are protected by various statutory provisions. Using federal income tax returns as the centerpiece of the discus sion, I propose to show how privacy and disclosure can come into con flict-a possibility that has been insufficiently recognized by the courts and the commentators. The leading treatise on political and civil rights,7 for example, treats the two subjects in separate chapters with virtually no acknowledgement that they are related, let alone that they • Copyright 1981 by Boris I. Bittker. •• Sterling Professor of Law. Yale University. This article is the modified text of a speech delivered at the Fifth Annual William O. Douglas Lecture Series. October 30. 1980. I. Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 3, 88 Stat. 1897 (amended 1975 & 1977) codified at 5 U.S.C § 552a (1976». 2. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (amended 1967, 1974, 1976 & 1978) (codified at 5 U.S.C § 552 (1976». -
The New Frontiers of Personality Rights and the Problem of Commodification: European and Comparative Perspectives
The New Frontiers of Personality Rights and the Problem of Commodification: European and Comparative Perspectives Giorgio Resta* I. TORT LAW AND THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO PERSONALITY RIGHTS ........................................................................ 33 II. NEW DIMENSIONS OF PERSONALITY PROTECTION IN PRIVATE LAW .................................................................................................... 37 A. From ‘Reactive’ to ‘Preventive’ Strategies ........................ 38 B. The Emergence of the Human Body as a Legal Object ................................................................................. 40 C. The Commercialization of Personality ............................... 41 III. WHO OWNS IDENTITY? ...................................................................... 43 IV. THE QUESTIONS AT STAKE ................................................................. 46 V. THE PROTECTION OF PERSONAL AUTONOMY: A MATTER OF PRIVACY OR PROPERTY? .................................................................... 48 A. Incorporeal Attributes and the Dominance of Property Rules .................................................................... 48 B. Body Parts and Liability Rules ........................................... 51 VI. LICENSING IDENTITY? ........................................................................ 54 A. The Human Body and the Gift Paradigm ........................... 54 B. Commercial Exploitation of Personality and the Limits of Freedom of Contract .......................................... -
Freedom of Information: a Comparative Legal Survey
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Image Is Everything Lowenstein Sandler’S Matthew Savare Gives a Comparative Examination of Publicity Rights in the US and Western Europe
Publicity rights Image is everything Lowenstein Sandler’s Matthew Savare gives a comparative examination of publicity rights in the US and western Europe Comedian Steven Wright once joked, “It’s a small world, but I the person’s identity has “commercial value” versus only 10 years for wouldn’t want to paint it”. Over the last decade, the proliferation those whose identity does not. of digital technologies has not made the world smaller or easier to • Remedies – the remedies available to plaintiffs also vary from state paint, but it has significantly hastened the globalisation of content. This to state. For example, New York’s statute provides for injunctions, transformation, coupled with the developed world’s insatiable fascination compensatory damages, and discretionary punitive damages. Ohio’s with fame, has spurred the hyper commoditisation of celebrity. statute, which offers the most remedies of any state statute, permits Despite the universality of celebrity, the laws governing the injunctions; a choice of either actual damages, “including any commercial exploitation of one’s name, image, and likeness differ profits derived from and attributable to the unauthorised use of an widely between the US and the nations of western Europe. In light individual’s persona for a commercial purpose” or statutory damages of the increased trafficking in celebrity personas between the two between $2,500 and $10,000; punitive damages; treble damages continents, a brief comparative analysis is warranted. if the defendant has “knowledge of the unauthorised use of the persona”; and attorney’s fees. A primer on US right of publicity law Courts have used primarily three methodologies or some The right of publicity is the “inherent right of every human being to combination thereof to value compensatory damages. -
Privacy Online: a Report to Congress
PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION JUNE 1998 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION Robert Pitofsky Chairman Mary L. Azcuenaga Commissioner Sheila F. Anthony Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson Commissioner Orson Swindle Commissioner BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION Authors Martha K. Landesberg Division of Credit Practices Toby Milgrom Levin Division of Advertising Practices Caroline G. Curtin Division of Advertising Practices Ori Lev Division of Credit Practices Survey Advisors Manoj Hastak Division of Advertising Practices Louis Silversin Bureau of Economics Don M. Blumenthal Litigation and Customer Support Center Information and Technology Management Office George A. Pascoe Litigation and Customer Support Center Information and Technology Management Office TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary .......................................................... i I. Introduction ........................................................... 1 II. History and Overview .................................................... 2 A. The Federal Trade Commission’s Approach to Online Privacy ................. 2 B. Consumer Privacy Online ............................................. 2 1. Growth of the Online Market ...................................... 2 2. Privacy Concerns ............................................... 3 C. Children’s Privacy Online ............................................. 4 1. Growth in the Number of Children Online ............................ 4 2. Safety and Privacy Concerns ...................................... 4 III. Fair -
The Right to Privacy and the Future of Mass Surveillance’
‘The Right to Privacy and the Future of Mass Surveillance’ ABSTRACT This article considers the feasibility of the adoption by the Council of Europe Member States of a multilateral binding treaty, called the Intelligence Codex (the Codex), aimed at regulating the working methods of state intelligence agencies. The Codex is the result of deep concerns about mass surveillance practices conducted by the United States’ National Security Agency (NSA) and the United Kingdom Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The article explores the reasons for such a treaty. To that end, it identifies the discriminatory nature of the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s domestic legislation, pursuant to which foreign cyber surveillance programmes are operated, which reinforces the need to broaden the scope of extraterritorial application of the human rights treaties. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the US and UK foreign mass surveillance se practices interferes with the right to privacy of communications and cannot be justified under Article 17 ICCPR and Article 8 ECHR. As mass surveillance seems set to continue unabated, the article supports the calls from the Council of Europe to ban cyber espionage and mass untargeted cyber surveillance. The response to the proposal of a legally binding Intelligence Codexhard law solution to mass surveillance problem from the 47 Council of Europe governments has been so far muted, however a soft law option may be a viable way forward. Key Words: privacy, cyber surveillance, non-discrimination, Intelligence Codex, soft law. Introduction Peacetime espionage is by no means a new phenomenon in international relations.1 It has always been a prevalent method of gathering intelligence from afar, including through electronic means.2 However, foreign cyber surveillance on the scale revealed by Edward Snowden performed by the United States National Security Agency (NSA), the United Kingdom Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and their Five Eyes partners3 1 Geoffrey B. -
Much Ado About Newsgathering: Personal Privacy, Law Enforcement, and the Law of Unintended Consequences for Anti-Paparazzi Legislation
MUCH ADO ABOUT NEWSGATHERING: PERSONAL PRIVACY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES FOR ANTI-PAPARAZZI LEGISLATION ANDREW D. MORTONt Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dan- gers to liberty lurk in insidiousI encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. INTRODUCTION: BALANCING THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY WITH LEGITIMATE LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEILLANCE Horror, not humor, brought actors Michael J. Fox and Paul Reiser to testify before a hearing of the United States House Judiciary Committee last summer.2 Fox described the "mercenary tactics of tabloid photographers" who turned his wedding into a "nightmare" as helicopters recklessly jock- eyed for position above the ceremony, then "fired away with high-powered cameras" on the couple's honeymoon suite.3 When Reiser's son was born prematurely, disguised journalists infiltrated the hospital with hidden cam- eras to steal a photo of the infant, and after returning home, the child was photographed in the privacy of the family's backyard by "resourceful" jour- t B.A. 1991, M.P.P. Candidate 2000, University of Maryland; J.D. Candidate 2000, Uni- versity of Pennsylvania. This Comment is dedicated to the memory of Alan Rubinstein- gifted attorney, and the father-in-law I have known only through the many whose lives he touched. I am deeply indebted to Ed Pease, Diana Schacht, the staff and members of the U.S. -
Privacy and the Limits of Law
The Yale Law Journal Volume 89, Number 3, January 1980 Privacy and the Limits of Law Ruth Gavisont Anyone who studies the law of privacy today may well feel a sense of uneasiness. On one hand, there are popular demands for increased protection of privacy, discussions of new threats to privacy, and an intensified interest in the relationship between privacy and other values, such as liberty, autonomy, and mental health.' These demands have generated a variety of legal responses. Most states recognize a cause of action for invasions of privacy.2 The Supreme Court has declared a constitutional right to privacy, a right broad enough to protect abortion and the use of contraceptives. 3 Congress enacted the Privacy Act of 19744 after long hearings and debate. These activities 5 t Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This Article develops some of the themes of my doctoral thesis, Privacy and Its Legal Protection, written under the supervision of Professor H.L.A. Hart. Much of the inspiration of this piece is still his. I am grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Bob Cover, Owen Fiss, George Fletcher, Harry Frank- furt, Jack Getman, Tony Kronman, Arthur Leff, Michael Moore, and Barbara Underwood, who read previous drafts and made many useful comments. I. The best general treatment of privacy is still A. WEsTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOm (1967). For treatment of a variety of privacy aspects, see NoMos XIII, PRIVACY (R. Pen- nock & J. Chapman eds. 1971) (Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy) [hereinafter cited as Nomos]. 2. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 804 (4th ed. -
Defamation and the Right of Privacy
Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 15 Issue 4 Issue 4 - October 1962 Article 4 10-1962 Defamation and the Right of Privacy John W. Wade, Dean Vanderbilt Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Privacy Law Commons, and the Torts Commons Recommended Citation John W. Wade, Dean, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 Vanderbilt Law Review 1093 (1962) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol15/iss4/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Defamation and the Right of Privacy JOHN W. WADE* In this article Dean Wade discusses the scope of the tort of un- warranted invasion of the right of privacy, comparing and contrasting it with the tort of defamation. He observes that the action for invasion of the right of privacy may come to supplant the action for defamation and that this development should be welcomed by the courts and writers. Finally, he concludes that the whole law of privacy may someday be- come a part of the larger, more comprehensive tort of intentional in- fliction of mental suffering. I. INTRODUOTMON The history of the two torts of defamation and unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy has been greatly different. Defamation developed over a period of many centuries, with the twin torts of libel and slander having completely separate origins and historical growth.