Ii UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO States Within
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i UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO States within States: How Rebels Rule A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Jennifer Marie Keister Committee in charge: Professor David A. Lake, Chair Professor Eli Berman Professor Clark Gibson Professor Peter A. Gourevitch Professor Edmund Malesky Professor Branislav L. Slantchev 2011 i ii Copyright Jennifer Marie Keister, 2011 All rights reserved. ii iii The Dissertation of Jennifer Marie Keister is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: __________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________ Chair University of California, San Diego 2011 iii iv DEDICATION To my parents, who believe I can do anything. iv v EPIGRAPH "Now now," he brightened up, "while I'm still confused and uncertain, it's on a much higher plane, d'you see, and at least I know I’m bewildered about the really fundamental and important facts of the universe." Treatle nodded. "I hadn't looked at it like that," he said, but you're absolutely right. He's really pushed back the boundaries of ignorance. There's so much about the universe we don't know." They both savored the strange warmth of being much more ignorant than ordinary people who were ignorant of only ordinary things.” - Terry Prattchett, Equal Rites (1987) page 161 v vi TABLE OF CONTENTS SIGNATURE PAGE .................................................................................................................................. III DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................................ IV EPIGRAPH ................................................................................................................................................... V LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................... VII LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................................... IX ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................................... XIV VITA ....................................................................................................................................................... XVIII ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION ............................................................................................... XIX CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 CHAPTER 2: THEORY........................................................................................................................... 23 CHAPTER 3: INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE .............................................................................. 116 CHAPTER 4: CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF), THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT (MILF), AND THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG) ....................................................................................................................... 200 CHAPTER 5: LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) .................................................................................................................................................... 311 CHAPTER 6: LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG) ................ 387 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 444 WORKS CITED ...................................................................................................................................... 452 vi vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1: The power function and its isoquants ................................................................. 95 Figure 2.3: The rebels' payoff at the budget constraint ...................................................... 105 Figure 2.4: The existence of an interior solution ................................................................... 114 Figure 3.1: Maps of the Philippines and Mindanao .............................................................. 119 Figure 3.2: Moro population and population share in Mindanao (1903-1990) ........ 125 Figure 3.3: The Cases ........................................................................................................................ 196 Figure 4.1: Reported MNLF presence ........................................................................................ 210 Figure 4.2: Reported MILF presence .......................................................................................... 210 Figure 4.3: Reported ASG presence ............................................................................................ 211 Figure 4.4: Survey subpopulations (indicating number of villages in each) .............. 213 Figure 4.5: Rebel groups' implementation of sharia law ................................................... 228 Figure 4.6: Adjudication services (without covariates) ...................................................... 233 Figure 4.7: Adjudication services (with covariates) ............................................................ 233 Figure 4.8: Frequency with which rebel courts return a just and fair verdict ........... 237 Figure 4.9: Rebel groups' assistance with communal projects ........................................ 242 Figure 4.10: Rebel groups’ effect on infrastructure improvement ................................. 244 Figure 4.11: Local public welfare services (without covariates) .................................... 247 Figure 4.12: Local public welfare services (with covariates) ........................................... 248 Figure 4.13: Rebel groups' facilitation of NGO projects ...................................................... 253 Figure 4.14: Rebel groups' provision of club-like welfare services (without covariates) .................................................................................................................................. 256 vii viii Figure 4.15: Rebel groups' provision of club-like welfare services (with covariates) ......................................................................................................................................................... 257 Figure 4.16: Rebel groups' improvement of agricultural production ........................... 259 Figure 4.17: Rebel groups' effect on security in their communities .............................. 264 Figure 4.18: Rebel fighters' propensity to target civilians ................................................ 266 Figure 4.19: Proportion of population that are (or are close to) victims of violence by armed groups: by rebel group perpetrator .................................................................... 269 Figure 5.1: Predicted proportion of civilians accessing MNLF services pre- and post- 1996 in MNLF areas (with covariates) ............................................................................ 372 Figure 5.2: Predicted proportion of civilians accessing MNLF adjudicative services pre- and post-1996 in MNLF areas (with covariates) ................................................ 375 Figure 5.3: Predicted probabilities of civilians accessing MNLF services pre- and post-1996 in MNLF areas (without covariates) ........................................................... 383 Figure 5.4: Predicted probabilities of civilians accessing MNLF adjudication services pre- and post-1996 in MNLF areas (without covariates) ......................................... 385 viii ix LIST OF TABLES Table 3.1: Number of incidents per year civilians are willing to endure to obtain independence............................................................................................................................. 130 Table 3.2: Civilians' average daily attendance at communal prayers ........................... 134 Table 3.3: Civilians' definition of "sharia law" ........................................................................ 135 Table 3.4: Choice of offered definitions of sharia law ......................................................... 137 Table 3.5: Average number of incidents the average civilian is willing to endure to obtain independence .............................................................................................................. 198 Table 3.6: Average daily attendance at communal prayers .............................................. 199 Table 4.1: Survey responses .......................................................................................................... 208 Table 4.2: Covariates by full and subpopulation samples ................................................. 222 Table 4.3: Differences between the rebel groups .................................................................. 229 Table 4.4: Differences between the groups ............................................................................. 234 Table 4.5: Differences between the rebel groups .................................................................