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S Ubject L Ist N O. 100 [DISTRIBUTED t o t h e 0 ffid N C . 4 3 1 . M . 1 4 3 . 1929. MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE] U J I . L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s G E N E V A , September 4th, 1929. S ubject L ist N o. 100 OF DOCUMENTS DISTRIBUTED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE DURING AUGUST 1929. (Prepared by the Distribution Branch.) Key to Signs. § Distributed previously. Key to Abbr eviations. A. * Assembly Jan. J anuary A. and A.P. Allied and Associated Powers L. of N. League of Nations Add, Addendum, Addenda Memo. Memorandum Addit. Additional Mtg. * Meeting Ad\. Advisory Min. Minutes Agrt. Agreement Nov. November Ann. Annex Observ. Observation App. Appendix Oct. October Arh. and Sec. Cttee. Arbitration and Security Committee o .J. Official Journal Arrgt. Arrangement Org. Organisation Art. Article P- Page Ass. Assembly P.A. and A.P. Principal Allied and Associated Aug. August Powers C. * Council Para. Paragraph Chant. Chapter Perm. Permanent Cl. Council Pet. Petition C.L. * Circular Letter Plen. Mtgs. Plenary Meetings C.M. * Council and Members Prelim. Preliminary Comm. Commission Prep. Preparatory Conf, Conference Pres. President Conidt. Consultative Prov. Provisional Conv. Convention Pt. P art C.P.J.I. * Permanent Court of International Recomm. Recommendation Justice Redist. Redistributed Cttee. Committee Rep. Report Dec. December Repres. Representative Del. Delegation Resol. Resolution Disc. Discussion Sec.-Gen. Secretary-General Dist. Distribution and Distributed Secret. Secretariat Doc. Document Sect. Section Eng. English Sept. September Err. Erratum, Errata Sess. Session Extraord. Extraordinary S.H.S. Serb, Croat and Slovene Feb. February Spec. Special Fr. ** French Supp. Supplement Govt. Government Techn. Technical I.L.O. International Labour Office Tel. Telegram fet. Lab. Conf. International Labour Conference Temp. Temporary Int. Lao. Org. International Labour Organisation U.S.A. United States of America Intell. Co-op. Cttee. Intellectual Co-operation Committee U.S.S.R. Union of Socialist Soviet Re­ Intell, Co-op. Insti­ Intellectual Co-operation Institute publics tute Vol. Volume Used for numbering only. Usod for language only. * Used for numbering only. Disputes, International Pacific settlement of A Treaty to strengthen means for preventing war Model adopted Sept. 20, 1928 by Ass., as basis of Armaments, Reduction of (C. 535- M, 162. 1928. VII) Conf. Int., on Adoption by the following countries of Comm., Prep, for Netherlands C. 327. M. 113. 1929. VII Docs., of 8th Series C 195. M. 74. 1929. IX 6th Sess. (1st Pt.) April-May 1929, Geneva Mins, of C. 195. M. 74. 1929. X I Economics and Finance Arbitration Clauses Assembly, League 9th Sess., Sept. 1928, Geneva Protocol opened for signature Sept. 24, 1923, Geneva on (A. 83. 1923, Ann.) 2nd Cttee. to Conv. opened for signature Sept. 26, 1927 at Mins, of Geneva for the execution of arbitral awards O. J., Spec. Supp., No. 66 * abroad completing (A. 106. 1927, Ann.) 10th Sess., Sept. 1929, Geneva Ratification by Sweden Agenda for Note Aug. 26, 1929 by Sec.-Gen. to Members of the League and non-Members mentioned Texts of in Art. 5 of Protocol announcing deposit Aug. 2, 1929 A. 2 (1). 1929 of instrum ent of C. L. 215. 1929. II Ratification by Sweden Note Aug. 26, 1929 from Sec.-Gen. to Members Cinematograph of the League and to States non-Members Institute, Educational, Int., Rome referred to in Art, 5 of the Protocol, announc­ Rep. July 1929 by Governing Body (M. Rocco) ing deposit of instrument of to Intell. Co-op. Cttee. on activities since begin­ ning, on Nov. 1928, of C. L. 216. 1929, II A. 20. 1929, Ann. 6 Council, League Bills of exchange, Promissory notes and Cheques Representation of Great Britain on Conf., Int., Feb. 1930, Geneva Tel. June 1929 from British Repres. (Sir Austen Convocation of Chamberlain) on occasion of end of his term of Letter Aug. 27, 1929 from the Sec.-Gen. to office as British Repres. on Cl. Members of the League and certain non- Members announcing convocation of this O. J., Spec. Suppl., No. 73, p. 5 Conf. for Feb. 17, 1930 and requesting information, before Jan. 15, 1930, as to 48-52nd Sess., Dec. 1927, March, June, Aug. and Sept. whether they intend to be represented thereat 1928, Geneva and if so, as to composition of their del. Mins, of (O. J., IX, Nos. 2, 4, 7 and 10) Index to C. L. 213. 1929. II Err. to Docs., Prep, for O. J., Spec. Suppl., No. 72, Err. C. 234. M. 83. 1929. II * 56th Sess., Aug. 1929, Geneva Letter, Aug. 27, 1929 from Sec.-Gen. to Members Agenda for of the League and certain non-Members of Texts of League forwarding prep. docs. Aug. 13, 1929 C. 318 (a). M. 109 (a). 1929 ** C. L. 213. 1920. II Aug. 24, 1929 Conv. adopted 1912 at The Hague concerning bills C. 318 (1). M. 109 (1). 1929 and Err.*** of exchange and promissory notes C. 234. M. 83. 1929. II. Chapter II * D Conv. (draft) submitted April 1928 by Cttee. of Legal Danzig, Free City of Experts concerning bills of exchange and pr0" missory notes Financial situation of Loan 1927, State (Tobacco monopoly) C. 234. M. 83. 1929. II. Chapt. II * Trustee for C. 175. M. 58. 1928. II § Reps. Annual, by No. 2 (July 1, 1928-June 30, 1929) Conv. (draft) submitted April 1928 by Cttee. of Legal Experts concerning cheques C. 332. M. 118. 1929. II C. 234. M. 83. 1929. II. Chapt. I; * Containing an index to be revised and co-ordinated in an index C. 175. M. 58. 192S. II § to all the Records of the 1928 Ass. ** Addit. items only. *** Err. to Fr. tex t only. * Dist. with C. L. 213. 1929. II. Economics and Finance (continued) Economics and Finance (continued) Bills of exchange, etc. (continued) Bills of exchange, etc. (continued) Letter July and Oct. 1928 from Sec.-Gen. to Members Regulation, Uniform, adopted 1912 at The Hague and certain non-Members of the League for­ concerning bills of exchange and promissory warding rep. of the Cttee. of Experts and request­ notes ing observs. thereon before Jan. 31, 1929 and C. 234. M. 83. 1929. II. Chapt. II * opinion as to whether discs, contained therein could serve as basis of disc, for Conf. to be con­ vened (C. L. 131 and 131 (a). 1928. II) Regulations (draft) submitted April 1928 by Cttee. of Legal Experts concerning bills of exchange Replies from following Govts, to and promissory notes Albania C. 234. IV 83. 1929. II * Australia C. 234. 83. 1929.II * C. 234. M. 83. 1929. II. Chapt. II * Austria C. 234. 83. 1929. II * C. 175. M. 58. 1928. II § Belgium c. 234.1 83. 1929. II * Brazil C. 234.IV 83. 1929. II * Regulations (draft) submitted April 1928 by Cttee. Bulgaria C. 234. A 83. 1929. II * of Legal Experts concerning cheques Colombia C. 234. A 83. 1929. II * C. 234. M. 83. 1929. II. Chapt. II * Czechoslovakia c. 234.> 83. 1929. II * C. 175. M. 58. 1928. II § Danzig c. 234.1 83. 1929. II * Denmark C. 234.IV 83. 1929. II * Rep. April 1928 by Cttee. of Legal Experts sum­ Estonia C. 234. 1 83. 1929.II * marising work of its three sess., submitting Finland C. 234. IS 83. 1929. II * 2 draft convs. and 2 draft regulations, proposing France C. 234. 83. 1929. II * communication thereof to Govts., for observs., Germany C. 234. IV 83. 1929. II * eventual modification bv the Cttee. and submis­ sion to an Int. Conf. on Great Britain c. 234. 83. 1929.II * Hungary C. 234. 1 83. 1929. II * C. 234. M. 83. 1929. II. Chapt. II * India C. 234. 1 83. 1929. II * C. 175. M. 58. 1928. II § Italy C. 234. 1 83. 1929. II * Japan C. 234.1 83. 1929. II * Resol. adopted 1912 by 2nd Hague Conf. concerning Latvia c. 234. IS 83. 1929.II * unification of law on cheques Luxemburg C. 2343 83. 1929. II * C. 234. M. S3. 1929. II. Chapt. II * Netherlands C. 234.1 83. 1929. II * New' Zealand c. 234.1 83. 1929. II * Comm., Economic and Financial Norway C. 234. IN 83. 1929.II * Cttee., Economic Poland C. 234. IV 83. 1929.II * 29th Sess., July 1929, Geneva Rou mania C. 234. IV 83. 1929. II * Rep. July 1929 S. H. S. Kingdom c. 234.3V 83. 1929.II * Err. to C. 307. M. 106. 1929. II. Err. South Africa C .2 3 4 3 83. 1929. II * Sweden C. 234. IV 83. 1929. II * Switzerland c. 234. IV 83. 1929. II * Customs formalities U. S. A. C. 234.» 83. 1929. II * Abolition of export and import prohibitions and restrictions Venezuela C. 234. IV 83. 1929. II * 2nd Conf., July 1928, Geneva Act, Final, concluded July 11. 1928 by Note July 1929 by Secret, giving historical survey of question of C. 350 (1). M. 106 (1). 1928. II § C. 234. M. 83. 1929. II. Chapt. I * O. J., IX, No. 8, p. 1268 § C. 611. M. 1S7. 1928. II * * Observs., detailed of Govts, on every Art. of draft Con vs. and Regulations submitted by Cttee of Agrt., Supplementary to the Conv. of Nov. 8, Experts 1927, adopted by C. 234. M. 83. 1929. II. Chapt. IV * See : ECONOMICS AND FINANCE Customs, etc. Observs. Gen. of individual Govts. Abolition, etc. See : ECONOMICS AND FINANCE Conv. Protocol and annexed Decla­ Bills of exchange, etc. ration, etc. Letter, July and Oct. 1928. etc. Agrt., Supplementary, etc. Replies to Meetings, Plenary, of 1 bservs. Feb. 1929 by Rome Int. Institute for unification of private law- on drafts Con vs.
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