Brexit's Long-Run Effects on the U.K. Economy

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Brexit's Long-Run Effects on the U.K. Economy JOHN VAN REENEN Massachusetts Institute of Technology Brexit’s Long-Run Effects on the U.K. Economy ABSTRACT What will be the long-run economic effects of the United King- dom’s decision to leave the European Union—informally known as Brexit? Compared with remaining in the European Union, there will inevitably be higher trade costs with the rest of Europe, which accounts for about half of all U.K. trade. This will mean lower trade and foreign investment, and thus lower average U.K. incomes. These trade costs will arise from some combination of tariff and non- tariff barriers, and will be larger if there is a “hard Brexit,” whereby the United Kingdom would leave the Single Market and trade under World Trade Organi- zation rules, rather than a “soft Brexit” option of staying in the Single Market (like Norway). Calculations using a standard multicountry, multisector, com- putable general equilibrium model show welfare losses of 1.3 to 2.6 percent, but dynamic models that incorporate productivity effects suggest that these could rise to 6.3 to 9.5 percent. Brexit’s supposed benefits—such as lower immigration, better regulations, and more trade deals with non-EU countries— would do little or nothing to offset these losses. It seems unlikely that voters were fully aware of the magnitude of these costs at the time of the vote. n the referendum held on June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted to Ileave the European Union by a margin of 51.9 percent to 48.1 percent. Although opinion polls had been close, the betting markets had predicted a victory for the campaign to remain, so markets were caught by surprise. Sterling collapsed, from $1.50 to $1.33, within hours after the early results were announced. What are likely to be Brexit’s medium to long-run effects on the U.K. economy? There are many elements in making such an assessment, and many unknowns. Here, I focus on Brexit’s impact via the likely changes in trade patterns, which is the most obvious aspect that will change. I also look at foreign direct investment (FDI), immigration, and regulations. I mainly 367 368 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2016 focus on average effects, but also say some words on the distribution of the costs and benefits. I abstract from short-run effects preceding Brexit actually occurring—it is certainly likely that there will be some costs of policy uncertainty (Bloom 2014; Handley and Limão 2015). Nor do I look at the period from the ini- tial post-Brexit transitional phase to the new steady state. To do this would require a more formal macroeconometric model incorporating adjustment costs (Armstrong and Portes 2016). These aspects are obviously important and would increase the losses discussed here, but my aim is to keep things as simple as possible. The bottom line is straightforward: Under all plausible scenarios, Brexit will make Britain poorer compared with remaining in the European Union. This is because the United Kingdom will have higher trade costs with its closest neighbors in Europe (which account for about half of all U.K. trade), and this will reduce its trade and therefore welfare. The magnitude of these losses will outweigh the modest benefits of lower net fiscal trans- fers to the EU budget. Brexit’s overall net cost will depend crucially on Britain’s final trading arrangement with Europe. A “soft Brexit,” whereby the United Kingdom continues to have close integration with the European Single Market (as does Norway), would have the lowest cost.1 A “hard Brexit,” whereby Brit- ain’s access to EU markets is much lower than now (on par with that of the United States or Japan, for example), would have much more damaging effects. Given that a majority of U.K. voters seem to have acted against their economic self-interest, I end with some speculations about why the campaign to leave prevailed. I. Trade Membership in the European Union has reduced trade costs between the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe. Most obviously, there is a customs union between EU members, which means that all tariff barriers have been removed within the EU, allowing for free trade in goods and services. But equally important in reducing trade costs has been the reduction of nontariff barriers resulting from the European Union’s continuing efforts to create a Single Market within Europe. Nontariff barriers include a wide range of measures that raise the costs of trade—such as border controls, 1. The European Single Market is the name given to the integrated European economy created by removing economic barriers between EU members. JOHN VAN REENEN 369 rules-of-origin checks, cross-country differences in regulations over things like product standards and safety, and threats of antidumping. These reductions in trade barriers have increased trade between the United Kingdom and the other members of the European Union. Before the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, about one-third of U.K. trade was with the EEC. In 2014, the 27 other EU members accounted for 45 percent of U.K. exports, and 53 percent of imports (Office for National Statistics 2015). This higher trade benefits U.K. consumers through lower prices and access to better goods and services. At the same time, workers and busi- nesses benefit from new export opportunities that lead to higher sales and profits, and allow the United Kingdom to specialize in those industries where it has a comparative advantage. Through these channels, increased trade raises output, incomes, and living standards in the United Kingdom. These standard “static” effects of trade have been understood for many centuries, but in recent decades, studies of trade have also revealed trade’s positive effects on well-being via other routes, such as higher productivity and innovation. I.A. Trade’s Static Effects Swati Dhingra and others (2016a) use a modern quantitative trade model of the global economy to estimate Brexit’s effects on trade and living stan- dards, building on the work of Arnaud Costinot and Andrés Rodríguez-Clare (2014). This model incorporates the channels through which trade affects consumers, firms, and workers, and provides a map from trade data to wel- fare. The model provides numbers for how much real incomes change under different trade policies, using readily available data on trade volumes and potential trade barriers. We use the most recent data from the World Input– Output Database, which divides the world into 35 sectors and 31 regions.2 It allows for trade in both intermediate inputs and final output in both goods and services. It is a structural computable general equilibrium model that is consistent with the gravity relationship (geographically closer countries trade more with each other). The model takes into account the effects of Brexit on U.K. trade with the EU, and U.K. trade with the rest of the world. To forecast the consequences of the United Kingdom leaving the Euro- pean Union, we must make assumptions about how trade costs will change 2. Throughout this paper, references to “we,” as in this sentence, refer to the work of the “Brexit team” at the London School of Economics’ Centre for Economic Performance; see the acknowledgments at the end of the paper. 370 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2016 following Brexit. It is not known exactly how the United Kingdom’s rela- tions with the European Union will change following Brexit. To tackle this, we analyze two scenarios: an optimistic, “soft Brexit” scenario, in which the increase in trade costs between the United Kingdom and the European Union is small; and a pessimistic, “hard Brexit” scenario with a larger rise in trade costs. The soft Brexit scenario assumes that the United Kingdom’s trade rela- tions with the European Union will become similar to those currently enjoyed by Norway. As a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), Norway has a free trade agreement with the European Union, which means that there are no tariffs on trade between the two. Norway is also a member of the European Single Market, and thus it has adopted policies and regula- tions designed to reduce nontariff barriers within the Single Market. However, Norway is not a member of the European Union’s Customs Union, so it faces some nontariff barriers that do not apply to EU mem- bers, such as rules-of-origin requirements and antidumping duties. Nauro Campos, Fabrizio Coricelli, and Luigi Moretti (2015) find that Norway’s productivity growth has been harmed by not fully participating in the Euro- pean Union’s market integration programs. In the soft Brexit scenario, we assume that the United Kingdom and the European Union will continue to enjoy deep access to the Single Market— like Norway—and that Brexit will not lead to any change in tariff barriers. In the hard Brexit scenario, we assume that trade between the United King- dom and the European Union will be governed by World Trade Organiza- tion (WTO) rules. This implies larger increases in trade costs than the soft Brexit scenario, because most-favored-nation tariffs will be imposed on trade between the United Kingdom and the European Union, and because the WTO will make less progress on reducing nontariff barriers than the European Union.3 The European Union has always insisted that all countries with deep access to the Single Market must accept the free movement of labor. Even Switzerland, which has access to the Single Market in goods (but not in services, like banking), must abide by this. Because immigration controls were a major issue in the U.K.
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