Long-Term Deception: the Rearmament of the German Air Force, 1919–39 Brian J

Strategic Deception Long-Term Deception: The Rearmament of the German Air Force, 1919–39 Brian J. Gordona In March 1935, British and Ger- tailed as chancellors of the Weimar man officials scheduled a meeting of Republic claimed in the 1920s nor as Adolf Hitler with several members of formidable as Hitler bragged in 1935. the British cabinet to discuss Lon- That both claims were plausible can don’s continuing apprehension over be attributed to policies of decep- Frequent public expres- German rearmament. Though Prime tion pursued by successive German sion of British fears of Minister Stanley Baldwin had assured governments, beginning immediately his government and the public that after the signing of the Versailles growing German air- the arms restrictions imposed after Treaty in 1919 and into the Nazi power had revealed to World War I provided Britain an ad- regime. Frequent public expression Berlin the vulnerability vantage in aerial capability over Ger- of British fears of growing German many, British concerns had exponen- airpower had revealed to Berlin the of its former enemies to tially grown as Hitler’s foreign policy vulnerability of its former enemies to deception. became increasingly belligerent. such deception.2 The meeting never took place. The Its effects were felt not only in release of a British Foreign Office intelligence analysis of German white paper critical of German poli- strength but also in the political cies prompted Hitler to cancel, using debates and policy formation partially the pretext that he had a cold. Shortly fed by that analysis. For example, thereafter, the German government as tensions between Germany and announced not only that military Britain increased with Hitler’s rise to conscription in Germany had been power, the Germans repainted Ju-52 reinstituted, but that it had rebuilt a transports to appear as if they were functioning and powerful air capabil- newly built and had bomb bays, then ity superior to the Royal Air Force.1 flew them in massive aerial demon- How could the Germans have built strations.3 Joining the transports up an effective air force seemingly were impressive He-51 and Ar-65 under the nose of the British Empire fighters that exceeded the capabil- so quickly and so quietly? ities of British fighter technology. But unbeknown to British observers, The answer, apparent in hindsight, these aircraft did not yet have suitable was that Germany had not. Germa- weapons.4 ny’s airpower was neither as cur- a. For a more in-depth discussion of frameworks to analyze long-term deception, as well as deception in German rearmament, see: Gordon, Brian J., Deception in Covert Nuclear Weapons Development: A Framework to Identify, Analyze, and Mitigate Future Long-Term Deception Efforts (RAND Corporation, 2016). Available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertatio ns/ RGS D370.htmI. The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any compo- nent of the United States government. Studies in Intelligence Vol. 62, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2018) 1 Strategic Deception Inflated estimates of German capabilities resulting from these deceptions may have made policymakers reluctant any possession of Fokker D.VIIs.5 to contemplate the use of force to counter German actions. These biplane fighters were the only category of equipment specif- Inflated estimates of German back as Hitler’s installation as ically mentioned in the Versailles capabilities resulting from these de- chancellor, because the actual story restrictions, a testament to Allied ceptions may have made policymak- of German air force development fear of German airpower. ers reluctant to contemplate the use stretches at least as far back as the Arms Control Evasion (1919–26) of force to counter German actions. Versailles Treaty. Though this type The new post-war government in From the view of the historian, it of deception may not always be Berlin was initially assisted in its air- appears British policymakers and a coherent or perfectly executed power deception by private interests. analysts accepted low estimates of effort, its cumulative effect compli- Anthony Fokker, the Dutch manufac- German air strength for years and cates analysis and can lure govern- turer of several successful German then, seamlessly, accepted inflated ments into incorrect or ineffective WWI aircraft, including the D.VII, estimates in just a matter of months. action—or no action at all. Rec- was among the first to aggressively ognizing this long-term effort as circumvent Versailles restrictions. He As more recent events have a distinct type of deception builds and his company hid aircraft in barns shown, long-term deception of the upon the work of Whaley and other and buildings throughout the German type involved in masking and then scholars and can help analysts countryside, covertly put airframes exaggerating German military de- identify, understand, and mitigate on trains under tarps and rigging velopment continues to be common deception in long-term efforts. practice, having been seen in efforts that hid the outlines of the aircraft, to mask nuclear weapons programs, and created diversions as the trains crossed the German-Dutch border military research and development Reexamining German Re- into Holland, all to save 120 D.VIIs, (R&D), and foreign policy ini- armament (1919–39) tiatives by multiple governments 400 engines, and an estimated $8 6 over the years. This deception is The three periods of German million of material. They also left often treated as a series of discrete rearmament Whaley proposed remain a handful of airframes in Germany events, matched to the deceiver’s useful, however. But rather than for Allied arms inspectors to find, to policies and specific goals. survey broad policies and R&D avoid the suspicion that anything had initiatives in each as Whaley does, been removed. Fokker’s motivation In his definitive research on the this article presents a very brief sum- may have been largely personal in case of German rearmament, the mary of one particular R&D thread, ensuring he could continue his busi- late Barton Whaley, a foremost airpower development, to show how ness, but after his departure for the scholar on denial and deception, deception can evolve and continue United States in 1923, the German divided the period between the First independent of changes in govern- government continued to benefit in and Second World Wars into three ment and foreign policy. air R&D from both planes and design distinct phases, each with distinct information that should have been German foreign policy goals and Intent on preventing the German destroyed under Versailles. approaches to strategic deception. aggression they held to have caused For the historian or researcher seek- World War I, the Allies in 1919 Those inspectors were from the ing to understand this period or the imposed stringent restrictions on Inter-Allied Control Commission qualities of deception better, this is Germany’s military capabilities as (IACC), a group of military offi- an entirely appropriate approach. part of the Versailles Treaty. Most cers headquartered in Berlin, whom But the intelligence analyst can- were general in nature, including the Allies had designated to ensure not afford to be so discriminating those limiting conscription and the German compliance with the treaty in evaluating evidence. A British manufacture of rifles and artillery. restrictions. The inspectors were analyst assessing German airpower But the Allies were particularly not idle, conducting more than 800 in 1938 would have been unwise concerned about German aviation, inspections over a six week peri- to look at information only as far as evidenced by the prohibition of od alone between September and 2 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 62, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2018) Strategic Deception The Army Peace Commission, a liaison group within the October 1924.7 Their efforts and German Defense Ministry, was responsible for much of frustrations would be familiar to any the work of undermining the IACC’s efforts. who followed arms control inspections in Iraq almost 70 years later. was not in Germany at all, but in an Ministry in Berlin that were not IACC inspectors spent a significant unexpected place the IACC could not detected by the IACC. The aviation amount of time inspecting facilities reach, the newly established USSR. staff was designated the “Army that had been warned in advance of Command Inspectorate of Weapons their arrival as well as chasing down In 1922, Germany and the Soviet Schools” and immediately absorbed meaningless rumors, such as that Union concluded secret military 120 former army and navy pilots into baby carriages were being manufac- agreements. One agreement estab- the newly established state-owned tured that could be reassembled into lished an aircraft testing and training airline, Lufthansa, or into several machineguns.8 center in Lipetsk, Russia, where Ger- “advertising squadrons.” It did so man pilots and plane designs would The Army Peace Commission, through false job descriptions and be developed away from the prying a liaison group within the German secret training pipelines. eyes of the IACC. The deceptive Defense Ministry, was responsible measures necessary to protect this After initial training at a new- for much of the work of undermining effort were complex. German officers ly established (1922) Commercial the IACC’s efforts. German officials sent to train there were “discharged” Flying School, the new pilots were and the commission’s commander, for the duration of their training. A brought to Lipetsk for specialized Gen. August von Cramon, had been customs office was established at military training.11 The entire enter- shocked that the Allies had permitted Lipetsk to clear parts and schedule prise was financed through the state the formation of such a liaison group, shipments away from normal points budget.

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