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Home , German rearmament, World War II

Strategic Long-Term Deception: The Rearmament of the German , 1919–39 Brian J. Gordona

In March 1935, British and Ger- tailed as of the Weimar man officials scheduled a meeting of claimed in the nor as with several members of formidable as Hitler bragged in 1935. the British cabinet to discuss Lon- That both claims were plausible can ’s continuing apprehension over be attributed to policies of decep- Frequent public expres- . Though Prime tion pursued by successive German sion of British fears of Minister had assured governments, beginning immediately his government and the public that after the signing of the Versailles growing German air- the arms restrictions imposed after Treaty in 1919 and into the Nazi power had revealed to World I provided Britain an ad- regime. Frequent public expression the vulnerability vantage in aerial capability over Ger- of British fears of growing German many, British concerns had exponen- airpower had revealed to Berlin the of its former enemies to tially grown as Hitler’s foreign policy vulnerability of its former enemies to deception. became increasingly belligerent. such deception.2 The meeting never took place. The Its effects were felt not only in release of a British Foreign Office intelligence analysis of German white paper critical of German poli- strength but also in the political cies prompted Hitler to cancel, using debates and policy formation partially the pretext that he had a cold. Shortly fed by that analysis. For example, thereafter, the German government as tensions between and announced not only that Britain increased with Hitler’s rise to in Germany had been power, the repainted Ju-52 reinstituted, but that it had rebuilt a transports to appear as if they were functioning and powerful air capabil- newly built and had bays, then ity superior to the .1 flew them in massive aerial demon- How could the Germans have built strations.3 Joining the transports up an effective air force seemingly were impressive He-51 and Ar-65 under the nose of the fighters that exceeded the capabil- so quickly and so quietly? ities of British fighter . But unbeknown to British observers, The answer, apparent in hindsight, these did not yet have suitable was that Germany had not. Germa- .4 ny’s airpower was neither as cur-

a. For a more in-depth discussion of frameworks to analyze long-term deception, as well as deception in German rearmament, see: Gordon, Brian J., Deception in Covert Nuclear Weapons Development: A Framework to Identify, Analyze, and Mitigate Future Long-Term Deception Efforts (RAND Corporation, 2016). Available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertatio ns/ RGS D370.htmI. The views, opinions, and findings of the author expressed in this article should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any compo- nent of the government.

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Inflated estimates of German capabilities resulting from these may have made policymakers reluctant any possession of D.VIIs.5 to contemplate the use of force to counter German actions. These fighters were the only category of equipment specif- Inflated estimates of German back as Hitler’s installation as ically mentioned in the Versailles capabilities resulting from these de- , because the actual story restrictions, a testament to Allied ceptions may have made policymak- of German air force development fear of German airpower. ers reluctant to contemplate the use stretches at least as far back as the Evasion (1919–26) of force to counter German actions. Versailles Treaty. Though this type The new post-war government in From the view of the historian, it of deception may not always be Berlin was initially assisted in its air- appears British policymakers and a coherent or perfectly executed power deception by private interests. analysts accepted low estimates of effort, its cumulative effect compli- Anthony Fokker, the Dutch manufac- German air strength for years and cates analysis and can lure govern- turer of several successful German then, seamlessly, accepted inflated ments into incorrect or ineffective WWI aircraft, including the D.VII, estimates in just a matter of months. action—or no action at all. Rec- was among the first to aggressively ognizing this long-term effort as circumvent Versailles restrictions. He As more recent events have a distinct type of deception builds and his hid aircraft in barns shown, long-term deception of the upon the work of Whaley and other and buildings throughout the German type involved in masking and then scholars and can help analysts countryside, covertly put exaggerating German military de- identify, understand, and mitigate on trains under tarps and rigging velopment continues to be common deception in long-term efforts. practice, having been seen in efforts that hid the outlines of the aircraft, to mask nuclear weapons programs, and created diversions as the trains crossed the German-Dutch border military research and development Reexamining German Re- into Holland, all to save 120 D.VIIs, (R&D), and foreign policy ini- armament (1919–39) tiatives by multiple governments 400 engines, and an estimated $8 6 over the years. This deception is The three periods of German million of material. They also left often treated as a series of discrete rearmament Whaley proposed remain a handful of airframes in Germany events, matched to the deceiver’s useful, however. But rather than for Allied arms inspectors to find, to policies and specific goals. survey broad policies and R&D avoid the suspicion that anything had initiatives in each as Whaley does, been removed. Fokker’s motivation In his definitive research on the this article presents a very brief sum- may have been largely personal in case of German rearmament, the mary of one particular R&D thread, ensuring he could continue his busi- late Barton Whaley, a foremost airpower development, to show how ness, but after his departure for the scholar on , deception can evolve and continue United States in 1923, the German divided the period between the First independent of changes in govern- government continued to benefit in and into three ment and foreign policy. air R&D from both planes and design distinct phases, each with distinct information that should have been German foreign policy goals and Intent on preventing the German destroyed under Versailles. approaches to strategic deception. aggression they held to have caused For the historian or researcher seek- I, the Allies in 1919 Those inspectors were from the ing to understand this period or the imposed stringent restrictions on Inter-Allied Control Commission qualities of deception better, this is Germany’s military capabilities as (IACC), a of military offi- an entirely appropriate approach. part of the Versailles Treaty. Most cers headquartered in Berlin, whom But the intelligence analyst can- were in nature, including the Allies had designated to ensure not afford to be so discriminating those limiting conscription and the German compliance with the treaty in evaluating evidence. A British manufacture of and . restrictions. The inspectors were analyst assessing German airpower But the Allies were particularly not idle, conducting more than 800 in 1938 would have been unwise concerned about German aviation, inspections over a six week peri- to look at information only as far as evidenced by the prohibition of od alone between September and

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The Army Peace Commission, a liaison group within the October 1924.7 Their efforts and German Defense Ministry, was responsible for much of frustrations would be familiar to any the work of undermining the IACC’s efforts. who followed arms control inspec- tions in Iraq almost 70 years later. was not in Germany at all, but in an Ministry in Berlin that were not IACC inspectors spent a significant unexpected place the IACC could not detected by the IACC. The aviation amount of time inspecting facilities reach, the newly established USSR. staff was designated the “Army that had been warned in advance of Command Inspectorate of Weapons their arrival as well as chasing down In 1922, Germany and the Soviet Schools” and immediately absorbed meaningless rumors, such as that Union concluded secret military 120 former army and pilots into baby carriages were being manufac- agreements. One agreement estab- the newly established state-owned tured that could be reassembled into lished an aircraft testing and training , Lufthansa, or into several machineguns.8 center in Lipetsk, , where Ger- “advertising squadrons.” It did so man pilots and plane designs would The Army Peace Commission, through false job descriptions and be developed away from the prying a liaison group within the German secret training pipelines. eyes of the IACC. The deceptive Defense Ministry, was responsible measures necessary to protect this After initial training at a new- for much of the work of undermining effort were complex. German officers ly established (1922) Commercial the IACC’s efforts. German officials sent to train there were “discharged” Flying School, the new pilots were and the commission’s commander, for the duration of their training. A brought to Lipetsk for specialized Gen. August von Cramon, had been customs office was established at military training.11 The entire enter- shocked that the Allies had permitted Lipetsk to clear parts and schedule prise was financed through the state the formation of such a liaison group, shipments away from normal points budget. Each year the chancellor’s assuming the IACC would just travel of entry in Germany that might be office and Defense Ministry would and inspect whatever it wished and under observation, and aircraft were submit budget requests with inflated without warning. The Germans used flown to Lipetsk disguised as “mail estimates for items such as parts and the peace commission to obstruct and planes.”10 labor. When legislators approved this thwart the IACC’s efforts at every budget, the excess funds were then opportunity.9 Arguably, however, the These efforts complemented bu- diverted to secret programs such as real story the Allies were interested in reaucratic actions within the Defense air training and the Lipetsk facility.12 This effort, simple in description, must have involved significant work and coordination among the various offices and individuals responsible for budget formulation in the .

Not all efforts to develop the Ger- man air force were so , and in fact some were taken with the concurrence of the Allies themselves. The Commercial Flying School was established publicly and eventually did feed into Lufthansa. German arguments that they should not be denied the benefits of aircraft for mail delivery, advertising, and sports led to a relaxation on restrictions of Feared Fokker D.VIIs in front of a hangar at the secret flight center in Lipetsk, limited-performance aircraft. Perhaps USSR, 1925. Photo: © Sueddeutsche Zeitung Photo / Alamy Stock Photo even more significant, the Air

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Though the commission was no longer a barrier to rear- mament, the German government continued to take steps was likely caught by the IACC as it to ensure its covert buildup would remain undetected. toured the country. But following the disestablishment of the commission, Agreement of 1926 granted Germany Rearmament (1927–35) the Germans were able to rapidly construct airfields and other facilities the ability to build high-performance Though the commission was no in parts of the country less frequent- aircraft to compete in air shows and longer a barrier to rearmament, the 13 ly traveled and hence unlikely to set speed records. These aircraft German government continued to be toured by military attachés.16 A designs would be the foundation for take steps to ensure its covert buildup budget of 10 million ear- aircraft tested at Lipetsk and other would remain undetected. In 1932, marked for the aviation office through facilities throughout the 1920s and the Defense Ministry classified its what was known as the “” budget . lists for the first time. Two financed the construction. These secrets would have been revealed funds were diverted from the Defense This period of German rearma- had the Allies been able to review Ministry’s public budget in secret and ment came to a close on 31 January these lists. The first was that the total administered by a special branch of 1927, when the Allies officially with- number of officers in the army and the Audit Office that dealt with drew the IACC. Any observation of navy exceeded the number permitted these covert programs.17 German military development would under the Versailles restrictions. The now rest solely with military attachés, second was that through the secret The rise of the brought generally controlled and monitored in training programs in Lipetsk, fed by their travels around the country. The about more aggressive deception to the commercial training pipeline, the match this increase in activity. Two commission’s final report stated that Germans had managed to train a suf- Germany had never had any intention events are notable. The first is an ficient number of pilots to man their announcement in 1933 that foreign of disarming and had done everything rapidly expanding air force.15 in its power to circumvent the work of had flown over Berlin and 14 dropped leaflets. Though no evidence the commission. But with no “smok- That air force would be built in was provided, the German Foreign ing ” proving German deceit, the factories and based at airfields almost Ministry insinuated that the bombers report apparently fell on deaf ears in completely unknown to the Allies. were Soviet. In fact, this incident and Paris. British and French officials had a was completely manufactured—no good understanding of the location flyover had occurred. But Hitler of German air facilities built during used it to claim that aggressive and , and what little construction technologically superior adversaries occurred immediately following

Heinkel He. 111, in passenger mode, ca. 1940 on the left. In this configuration, the interior was designed in such a way that it could readily be converted from a comfortable passenger compartment, as in the image on the right from another aircraft, into a bomb bay. Photo: © Sueddeutsche Zeitung Photo / Alamy Stock Photo

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surrounded Germany and that the large numbers of deceptively paint- Among them was , country was completely, and unrea- ed transport aircraft and fighters who was granted special permission sonably, defenseless against them.18 that were actually still inoperable as to tour German facilities and even The second event, far less dramatic, wartime aircraft. Other aircraft were fly German aircraft. Lindbergh was was the quiet formation of the Central shown more selectively. The Do-17 convinced the Germans had not Bureau for German Rearmament in “Flying Pencil” concerned only designed superior aircraft but 1934. This group was formed to co- the Allies because it had outpaced that they could mass-produce them. ordinate what were by then numerous several foreign-built fighters during He reported to Allied officials that complex efforts throughout the De- air trials and shows and presumably Germany was strong enough to make fense Ministry to increase Germany’s would outrun any British or French any British and French military action military capabilities in violation of fighter. But the Germans had con- against it foolhardy. Prime Minister Versailles restrictions.19 structed the demonstration model by carried this hand, and mass production of that assessment to the Conference Rearmament and Bluff (1935–39) quality was impractical. The fol- in 1938.22 Hitler’s 1935 announcement of the low-on aircraft had smaller engines existence of the is unlikely and considerably less speed.20 The Luftwaffe continued its to have caught the British and French buildup of highly trained and skilled completely by surprise, though they Allied military officials had more personnel during this period as well, were not certain of the strength of to fear from the He-111. This aircraft through training more realistic than German airpower. The confusion had entered commercial service with that conducted at Lipetsk. Despite experienced in London and Paris was Lufthansa and accommodated 10 pas- the Versailles Treaty’s continuing also felt in the Air Ministry in Berlin, sengers with a compartment amid- prohibition against committing forces which, judging by its later actions, used as a smoking lounge. The to in foreign lands, Germany appeared not to have been ready to go lounge’s true purpose was to provide sent a significant number of “vol- public. To reinforce Hitler’s sudden space in future military construction unteers” from its armed forces to claims of aerial superiority, for a bomb bay; the military version take part in the Spanish , would be required. went into mass production soon after providing them false papers, Spanish the Luftwaffe announcement.21 currency with which to travel, and Luftwaffe officials began to Spanish uniforms. While the partic- conduct large exhibition flyovers to The German government sup- ipation of Germans in the conflict impress both the German population plemented this selective showing was well known, perhaps the Allies and foreign observers. As previously of new aircraft by targeting certain underappreciated the effects. By noted, these demonstrations included experts to deliver the message. Whaley’s estimation, 32 months of combat in provided Germany with more than 14,000 pilots with combat experience, validation of aircraft such as the Messerschmitt Bf- 109, and practice with such tactics as saturation bombing.23

All this required resources. As in other periods, the German gov- ernment was compelled to go to extraordinary bureaucratic lengths to disguise the funding of Luftwaffe development. The Nazi bureaucracy was similar to that of the Weimar The He. 111 depicted in its wartime mode on a cigarette card produced during WWII. Pho- Republic and in the years leading up to: © SIconographic Archive/Alamy Stock Photo to World War II maintained a policy

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of making budget data public. The ational denial and deception. Some way of categorizing such data using publicized portion was known as the authors—including Whaley, Michael two aspects of deception. First, de- “white” budget, and it should have Mihalka, and Abram Shulsky, among ceivers must take two types of actions: provided clues to attentive military others—specifically address strategic revealing information or concealing attachés about German military R&D deception. Others, such as it. Second, there are two types of and procurement. The white budget Jervis and Michael Handel, have information: factual and fictitious. steadily rose throughout the 1930s to addressed the effects and policy im- These categorizations form the ma- reach approximately 340 million re- plications of government manipula- trix devised by Bennett and Waltz in ichsmarks in 1936. But also mirror- tion of information. But these studies figure 1, below. ing Weimar-era budgets, there was are primarily theoretical and case- more to the story. A “” budget, study driven. They provide agencies Bennett and Waltz’s matrix can which more accurately reflected gov- and analysts few tangible methods be modified in one key area to better ernment spending, totaled over three by which to organize the massive address long-term deception. As billion reichsmarks in 1936.24 The amount of data likely to result from shown in figure 1, “Conceal Fiction” same office within the investigation of deception efforts actions pertain to actions that protect compiled and issued these budgets, that span multiple governments and the deception itself. But in cases meaning that numerous individuals perhaps decades. such as long-term R&D programs, were knowledgeable of this decep- there is an element of coordination tion and likely working overtime to Michael Bennett and Edward that we must consider part of this produce the required documents. Waltz propose a simple but effective effort. Though coordination is also

By the time of the Munich Figure 1: The Deception Methods Matrix25 Conference, the British and French Reveal Fact Conceal Fact governments found themselves in a Information: Information: seemingly unsolvable policy prob- lem. Having underestimated Hitler’s • Release true information that ben- • (clearance programs, aggressive intentions, they now efits the deceiver (e.g., the double physical security, and INFOSEC) bluff ruse) overestimated the armed force with • Withholding information to create a which he could pursue his policies Physical: false or misleading impression and deter any efforts to counter him. • Display real equipment or facilities Physical: Their estimates during this period (e.g., to build a source’s credibility) • , concealment, signal were driven by ignorance of German reduction (e.g., stealth designs development in the years following and materials, spread spectrum , in demonstra- communications), disguises, dazzling tions carefully managed by German officials, and Hitler’s confidence that • Nonverbal deceit he had a force that could back up his Reveal Fiction Conceal Fiction policy goals. All of which were sup- Information: Information: ported by long-term deception, albeit • , which includes • Suppress a lie by different governments and with lying or providing information Physical: different short-term goals. known to be untrue or dazzling (e.g., providing large volumes of • Hide a sham information) Analyzing Long- Physical: Term Deception • Decoys, diversions (feints and A significant amount of literature demonstrations), duplicates, dis- guises, dummy positions, equip- and doctrine is focused on the prac- ment, and facilities tice and effects of tactical and oper- • Nonverbal deceit

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important in other types of deception, Employing this framework, the In application, this matrix would longer term programs such as Ger- categorization of data points will of- of course be of significant size and many’s rearmament involve signifi- ten be matters of analytical judgment, would likely need to be broken up cant funds, numbers of participants, which will depend on examining the into lines of effort such as diplomatic and bureaucratic entities. Managing preponderance of evidence for the actions, budget and finance, etc. But such programs, and the deception enterprise as a whole and asking how sorting data in this manner and mov- protecting them, requires an organi- each data point fits into that story. For ing the data points around as new zation with expertise and clout. The example, the Luftwaffe aerial demon- judgments are made will give an an- establishment or existence of such strations were clearly intentional gov- alyst an increasingly coherent picture an organization, and the coordinating ernment revelations of information. of potential long-term deception. actions required for the deception, An analyst would then need to judge may provide vital clues to identifying whether that information was factual, Special attention should be paid long-term deception. and thus represented a previously to any information in the “Conceal undetected significant capability, or Fiction” category. In the example of Using the sample of data points whether the German government had Germany organizations, the Army on German airpower development the means and motive to be deceitful Peace Commission and Central Bu- already presented, a matrix specific about the number of strategic bomb- reau for German Rearmament were to this case might look like figure 2, ers it could field. established to manage an inspection below. regime and coordinate illicit activity across the government.

These types of organizations have Figure 2: The Deception Methods Matrix–German Rearmament been seen in other cases of long-term Reveal Fact Conceal Fact deception as well. In Iraq’s pursuit of • agreement • Establishment of Lipetsk training nuclear weapons, Saddam Hussein • Establishment of Lufthansa as a and development center established the Oversight Commit- state controlled airline • Military training requirement for tee ostensibly to coordinate with Lufthansa pilots UN weapons inspectors following • Classification of officer lists starting the first , but in reality it in 1932 was designed to interfere with UN • Construction of new air facilities in efforts.26 The Iraqis also established remote areas organizations such as the Special • Disguising of German air involve- Security Organization and elements ment in the within the Ministry of Industry and through use of “volunteers” Military Industrialization to manage Reveal Fiction Conceal Fiction the nuclear weapons development ef- • The 1933 overflight of Berlin by • Establishment of the Army Peace fort, mirroring Berlin’s establishment “Soviet” aircraft Commission and its actual mission of the in 1934.27 • Mass aerial demonstrations of to hinder lACC inspection efforts bombers and fighters not actually • Creation of the Central German Such information on the internal operational Rearmament Bureau in 1934 workings of a deceiver’s bureaucra- cy may be among the most difficult • Appearance that the Do-17 “Flying • “Blue” budget diversion of funds Pencil” was in mass production under the Weimar Republic. data to collect, but analysts should be and the He-111 was a passenger “White” and “Black” budgets of the vigilant for any such information and aircraft Nazi-era government drive collection efforts to determine • Information and tours provided whether such organizations exist and to Charles Lindbergh giving the how they function. appearance of a more advanced production capability

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Recommendations throughout the 1930s. She offers one seen. If long-term deception is and Conclusion very plausible explanation: that plac- suspected, then analysts should be ing the estimates higher would have looking for evidence of coordinat- The recognition of long-term necessitated some form of action on ing organizations and actions. If no deception as a unique type of decep- the part of the British government such evidence is seen, it may indi- tion is of little value without propos- that officials did not want to take.28 cate no deception or it may indicate ing practices to mitigate its effects. Intelligence professionals have no the need to drive collection towards Numerous analytic techniques, such role in the formation of policy, and suspected data points. as backcastinga or identification strategic long-term deception will of scenarios and indicators, hold likely be very difficult to “prove,” but The final recommendation is less promise to help analysts categorize using analytic techniques effectively about analytic technique than ap- evidence and assess the likelihood will strengthen one’s case that such proach. The deceiver is operating on that long-term deception is taking an effort is taking place. Categorizing a long-term schedule but is deceiving place. The “Reveal/Conceal Fact/ and displaying data points to show perhaps without a clear idea of the Fiction” framework presented in how the determination was reached target’s level of attention. Therefore, this article provides another tool for will present policymakers with a though policymakers require time- analysts to assess the possibility of coherent roadmap of what is known ly and relevant assessments of the deception. But in addition to identify- about an R&D program and perhaps deceiver’s activity, there may be an ing the likelihood of such deception, a more persuasive argument. opportunity to permit teams of ana- these frameworks must also inform lysts the time and space to undertake practices to mitigate its effects. Second, analysts and organi- a systematic review of all available zations need to ensure that every evidence. This is important for two The first is the essential practice available channel of information is reasons. First, a group—preferably of intelligence professionals speak- utilized and must drive and synthe- made up of specialists in various ing truth to power. A conclusion that size the results of collection. The intelligence disciplines—can better a long-term R&D effort is being continuous nature of long-term utilize analytic techniques to review pursued and concealed will often deception means the deceiver will the evidence, judge the likelihood of be a problematic development for need to consistently coordinate a deception, and attempt to develop a a policymaker. The final report of complex effort throughout a bu- cohesive picture of the effort. Sec- the IACC, stating that Germany had reaucracy. This will both increase ond, temporarily removing analysts consistently tried to undermine the the number of individuals aware of from any pressures of immediate pro- commission and did intend to rearm, such an effort and necessitate some duction or quick turnaround tasking is an example of this. The warning form of coordinating mechanism, will permit the intellectual space to went unheeded and perhaps, though such as the Central Bureau for do the “deep dive” on the information it is difficult to find evidence of this, German Rearmament or Saddam’s necessary to see these patterns. the practice of arguing that Ger- Special Security Organization. many was continuing to violate the Additionally, the expenditure of Developments such as interna- Versailles arms restrictions to senior resources will need to be done in a tional treaties, enforcement regimes, British policymakers was abandoned surreptitious manner but will still and improvements in intelligence in subsequent years. likely result in some detectable gathering have complicated the effort required to pursue long-term R&D In her work on self-deception, signatures. Each of these necessi- without detection. Programs to en- Roberta Wohlstetter points out that ties on the part of the deceiver is hance military capabilities or develop British estimates of operable Ger- an opportunity for analysts willing weapons of mass destruction depend man aircraft were consistently low to perform an exhaustive search of available information. Again, the now more than ever on deception to framework presented in this article conceal them, or at least make them provides one way of categorizing plausibly deniable for the deceiver. a. Backcasting is an analytical technique information. But it also shows Countering the deception that protects to help identify prerequisites to reaching a these long-term projects requires given (desired or hypothetical) end state. where expected information is not

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further research on historical exam- of lessons learned and best practices, analysts the time and tools they need ples of such activities, formulation and organizational flexibility to give to detect and mitigate these efforts.

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The author: Brian J. Gordon is an all-source analyst in the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Underground Facility Analy- sis Center (UFAC). This article is an adaptation of his PhD. dissertation. He earned his doctorate from the Pardee RAND Graduate School at the RAND Corporation.

Endnotes

1. D. C. Watt, “The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment,” The Journal of Modern History 28, no.2 (1956): 155–56. 2. Michael Mihalka, German Strategic Deception in the 1930s (RAND Corporation, N-1557-NA, 1980), 111. 3. Richard Suchenwirth, The Development of the German Air Force, 1919-1939, USAF Historical Studies, ed. Harry F. Fletcher (Arno Press, 1968), 57. 4. Barton Whaley, Covert German Rearmament, 1919–1939 (University Publications of America, 1984), 57. 5. Barton Whaley, “Conditions Making for Success or Failure of Denial and Deception: Authoritarian and Transition Regimes,” in Roy Godson and J.J. Wirtz, eds., Strategic Denial and Deception in the 21st (Transaction Publishers. 2002), 47. 6. Whaley, Conditions, 47. 7. Whaley, Covert Rearmament, 9. 8. Ibid., 35. 9. Whaley, Conditions, 44. 10. Suchenwirth, 26–30. 11. Ibid., 26; Whaley Conditions, 53. 12. Whaley, Conditions, 53. 13. Mihalka, 45. 14. Whaley, Conditions, 57. 15. Whaley, Covert Rearmament, 51. 16. Suchenwirth, 121. 17. Ibid., 20. 18. Whaley, Conditions, 63. 19. Ibid., 64. 20. Whaley, Conditions, 72. 21. Ibid., 56. 22. Whaley, Conditions, 75. 23. Whaley, Covert Rearmament, 62. 24. Suchenwirth, 159–60. 25. Michael Bennett and Edward Waltz, Counterdeception Principles and Applications for (Artech House, 2007), 52. 26. Mahdi Obeidi and Kurt Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden: The Secrets of Saddam’s Nuclear Mastermind (John Wiley and Sons, 2004), 144. 27. Ibrahim al-Murashi, “How Iraq Conceals and Obtains Its Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Review of International Affairs 7, no. 1 (March 2003): 60. 28. Roberta Wohlstetter, “The Pleasures of Self-Deception,” The Quarterly 2, no.4 (1979): 56.

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