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Congressional Record—Senate S1422 S1422 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE February 25, 2019 and Gynecologists, and the American Thom Tillis, Roger F. Wicker, Lindsey The bill clerk read as follows: Graham, Ben Sasse, Roy Blunt, John Public Health Association state that CLOTURE MOTION the bill ‘‘. injects politicians into Thune, John Boozman, John Barrasso, Joni Ernst, James E. Risch. We, the undersigned Senators, in accord- the patient-provider relationship, dis- ance with the provisions of rule XXII of the regarding providers’ training and clin- The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unan- Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby ical judgement and undermining their imous consent, the mandatory quorum move to bring to a close debate on the nomi- ability to determine the best course of calls have been waived. nation of Eric D. Miller, of Washington, to be action with their patients.’’ The Amer- The question is, Is it the sense of the United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth ican Civil Liberties Union states that Senate that debate on the motion to Circuit. the bill ‘‘. shows a callous disregard proceed to S. 311, a bill to amend title Mitch McConnell, David Perdue, Mike 18, United States Code, to prohibit a Crapo, Johnny Isakson, John Cornyn, for patients in need of compassionate, Pat Roberts, James M. Inhofe, Thom evidence-based care when they face dif- health care practitioner from failing to exercise the proper degree of care in Tillis, Roger F. Wicker, Lindsey Gra- ficult decisions.’’ ham, Roy Blunt, John Thune, John The majority of Americans want the case of a child who survives an Boozman, John Barrasso, James E. more access to reproductive abortion or attempted abortion, shall Risch, Richard Burr, John Hoeven. be brought to a close? healthcare, not less. More than 7 in 10 The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unan- The yeas and nays are mandatory Americans do not want women to lose imous consent, the mandatory quorum access to safe, legal abortion. In 1991, a under the rule. The clerk will call the roll. call has been waived. majority of voters in the State of The question is, Is it the sense of the Washington passed the Washington The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. THUNE. The following Senators Senate that debate on the nomination Abortion Rights Initiative, declaring are necessarily absent: the Senator of Eric D. Miller, of Washington, to be that a woman has a right to an abor- from North Dakota (Mr. CRAMER), the United States Circuit Judge for the tion. Senator from Alaska (Ms. MURKOWSKI), Ninth Circuit, shall be brought to a S. 311 is another misguided attempt and the Senator from South Carolina close? to reduce women and families’ access (Mr. SCOTT). The yeas and nays are mandatory to reproductive healthcare. I strongly The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there under the rule. oppose S. 311 and urge my colleagues to any other Senators in the Chamber de- The clerk will call the roll. vote no. siring to vote? The bill clerk called the roll. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- The yeas and nays resulted—yeas 53, ator from Nebraska. Mr. THUNE. The following Senators nays 44, as follows: Mr. SASSE. Mr. President, I ask are necessarily absent: the Senator unanimous consent to speak for less [Rollcall Vote No. 27 Leg.] from North Dakota (Mr. CRAMER) and than 1 minute. YEAS—53 the Senator from Alaska (Ms. MUR- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there Alexander Fischer Paul KOWSKI). objection? Barrasso Gardner Perdue Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Blackburn Graham Portman Senator from Vermont (Mr. SANDERS) Without objection, it is so ordered. Blunt Grassley Risch is necessarily absent. Mr. SASSE. Mr. President, over the Boozman Hawley Roberts course of this afternoon, we have heard Braun Hoeven Romney The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SUL- a whole bunch of things about what is Burr Hyde-Smith Rounds LIVAN). Are there any other Senators in Capito Inhofe Rubio supposedly in this bill. I know that a Casey Isakson the Chamber desiring to vote? Sasse Cassidy Johnson The yeas and nays resulted—yeas 51, lot of people who are opposed to this Scott (FL) Collins Jones bill, the Born-Alive Abortion Survivors Shelby nays 46, as follows: Cornyn Kennedy Protection Act, sincerely believe the Cotton Lankford Sullivan [Rollcall Vote No. 28 Leg.] Thune talking points that they read from Crapo Lee YEAS—51 their staffs, but, humbly, we have Cruz Manchin Tillis Toomey Alexander Fischer Perdue heard speech after speech after speech Daines McConnell Enzi McSally Wicker Barrasso Gardner Portman about things that have absolutely Ernst Moran Young Blackburn Graham Risch nothing to do with what is actually in Blunt Grassley Roberts NAYS—44 Boozman Hawley Romney this bill. Baldwin Hassan Sanders Braun Hoeven Rounds So as you get ready to cast this vote, Burr Hyde-Smith Rubio Bennet Heinrich Schatz Capito Inhofe Sasse I urge my colleagues to picture a baby Blumenthal Hirono Schumer Cassidy Isakson Scott (FL) who has already been born, who is out- Booker Kaine Shaheen Brown King Collins Johnson Scott (SC) side the womb, and who is gasping for Sinema Cornyn Kennedy Shelby Cantwell Klobuchar Smith air. That is the only thing that today’s Cardin Leahy Cotton Lankford Sullivan Stabenow Crapo Lee Thune vote is actually about. We are talking Carper Markey Tester Coons Menendez Cruz McConnell Tillis about babies who have already been Udall Cortez Masto Merkley Daines McSally Toomey born. Nothing in this bill touches abor- Van Hollen Duckworth Murphy Enzi Moran Wicker Warner tion access. Durbin Murray Ernst Paul Young Warren Thank you. Feinstein Peters NAYS—46 Gillibrand Reed Whitehouse CLOTURE MOTION Harris Rosen Wyden Baldwin Hassan Rosen The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant Bennet Heinrich Schatz to rule XXII, the Chair lays before the NOT VOTING—3 Blumenthal Hirono Schumer Senate the pending cloture motion, Cramer Murkowski Scott (SC) Booker Jones Shaheen Brown Kaine Sinema which the clerk will state. The PRESIDING OFFICER. As a re- Cantwell King Smith The legislative clerk read as follows: minder, expressions of approval or dis- Cardin Klobuchar Stabenow Carper Leahy CLOTURE MOTION approval are not in order. Tester Casey Manchin Udall We, the undersigned Senators, in accord- On this vote, the yeas are 53, the Coons Markey Van Hollen ance with the provisions of rule XXII of the nays are 44. Cortez Masto Menendez Warner Standing Rules of the Senate, do hereby Three-fifths of the Senators duly cho- Duckworth Merkley Durbin Murphy Warren move to bring to a close debate on the mo- sen and sworn not having voted in the Whitehouse tion to proceed to Calendar No. 17, S. 311, a Feinstein Murray affirmative, the motion is rejected. Gillibrand Peters Wyden bill to amend title 18, United States Code, to Harris Reed prohibit a health care practitioner from fail- f ing to exercise the proper degree of care in CLOTURE MOTION NOT VOTING—3 the case of a child who survives an abortion Cramer Murkowski Sanders or attempted abortion. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant Mitch McConnell, David Perdue, Mike to rule XXII, the Chair lays before the The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this Crapo, Pat Roberts, John Cornyn, Senate the pending cloture motion, vote, the yeas are 51, the nays are 46. Johnny Isakson, James M. Inhofe, which the clerk will state. The motion is agreed to. VerDate Sep 11 2014 05:42 Feb 26, 2019 Jkt 089060 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 0624 Sfmt 0634 E:\CR\FM\A25FE6.006 S25FEPT1 February 25, 2019 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S1423 EXECUTIVE CALENDAR were to choose to let medical stand- NOMINATION OF ERIC D. MILLER The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ards, not politics, drive the care you Mr. President, in the very near fu- clerk will report the nomination. offer to your patients. ture, my Senate colleagues will be For families who struggle with the asked to take an unprecedented vote— The senior assistant legislative clerk painful reality that the children they a vote that never should have been read the nomination of Eric D. Miller, had hoped for could not survive, as is scheduled here in the first place. of Washington, to be United States Cir- tragically the case in many of the Republican leaders are demanding cuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit. cases we are discussing, this legislation that we move ahead and vote on Presi- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- would take precedence over families’ dent Trump’s nominee to serve on the ator from Washington. wishes as they grieve. Ninth Circuit Court despite the fact Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I ask This bill is government interference that I and my colleague Senator CANT- unanimous consent to speak as in in women’s healthcare, in families’ WELL have not returned our blue slips morning business. lives, and in medicine on steroids. As I on behalf of our constituents in Wash- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without said, it is anti-doctor, anti-woman, and ington State and despite the fact that objection, it is so ordered. anti-family. It has no place in becom- the hearing for the nominee was a total S. 311 ing law. Its proponents claim it would sham. This is wrong, and it is a dan- Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I am make something illegal that is already gerous road for the Senate to go down. on the floor to talk about a vote that illegal. So why are we debating this Not only did Republicans schedule this simply should not have taken place legislation that would take women nominee’s confirmation hearing during this evening. It was a vote on yet an- backward when there are so many ways a recess period when just two Sen- other attack from our Republican col- we should be advancing medicine, im- ators—both Republicans—were able to leagues on women’s health and their proving women’s healthcare, and sup- attend, but the hearing included less right to access safe, legal abortions— porting families? As far as I can tell, it than 5 minutes of questioning—less this time in the form of an anti-doctor, is because this bill is about something questioning for a lifetime appointment anti-woman, anti-family piece of legis- that Republicans care about more than than most students face for a book re- lation that medical experts strongly almost any other priority; that, unfor- port in school.
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