History of the Blue Slip
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The Blue Slip Process for US Circuit and District
The Blue Slip Process for U.S. Circuit and District Court Nominations: Frequently Asked Questions (name redacted) Analyst in American National Government October 2, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R44975 The Blue-Slip Process for U.S. Circuit and District Court Nominations: FAQs Summary The blue slip process used by the Senate Judiciary Committee (the committee) for U.S. circuit and district court nominations has received renewed interest from Senators. The committee’s use of the blue slip has been, since at least 1917, a feature of its consideration of U.S. circuit and district court nominations. After a President selects a nominee for a U.S. circuit or district court judgeship, the chairman sends a blue-colored form to the Senators representing the home state of the nominee. The form seeks the home state Senators’ assessment of the nominee. If a home state Senator has no objection to a nominee, the blue slip is returned to the chairman with a positive response. If, however, a home state Senator objects to a nominee, the blue slip is either withheld or returned with a negative response. Since the use of blue slips is not codified or included in the committee’s rules, the chairman of the committee has the discretion to determine the extent to which a home state Senator’s negative, or withheld, blue slip stops a President’s judicial nomination from receiving a committee hearing and a committee vote and, consequently, whether it reaches the Senate floor. Over the century of the use of the blue slip, different chairmen have used the blue slip in different ways. -
Congressional Record—Senate S1929
March 22, 2017 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S1929 claims are simply unfounded scare- contempt or obloquy, or will represent a (4)(a) The committee may poll— mongering. If this resolution is en- clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy (i) internal committee matters including acted, it will repeal only a specific of an individual; those concerning the committee’s staff, (d) will disclose the identity of any in- records, and budget; rulemaking at the FCC that has yet to former or law enforcement agent or will dis- (ii) steps in an investigation, including be implemented. What we are talking close any information relating to the inves- issuance of subpoenas, applications for im- about here hasn’t even been imple- tigation or prosecution of a criminal offense munity orders, and requests for documents mented yet. It will not touch the FCC’s that is required to be kept secret in the in- from agencies; and underlying statutory authority. In- terests of effective law enforcement; or (iii) other committee business that the deed, the FCC will still be obligated to (e) will disclose information relating to the committee has designated for polling at a trade secrets or financial or commercial in- meeting, except that the committee may not police the privacy practices of formation pertaining specifically to a given broadband providers, as provided for in vote by poll on reporting to the Senate any person if— measure, matter, or recommendation, and the Communications Act. The new (i) an act of Congress requires the informa- may not vote by poll on closing a meeting or chairman of the FCC confirmed this tion to be kept confidential by Government hearing to the public. -
Notre Dame Lawyer—2018 Notre Dame Law School
Notre Dame Law School NDLScholarship Notre Dame Lawyer Law School Publications 2018 Notre Dame Lawyer—2018 Notre Dame Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_lawyer Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Notre Dame Law School, "Notre Dame Lawyer—2018" (2018). Notre Dame Lawyer. 39. https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_lawyer/39 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Lawyer by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Q&A with Dean Newton Pg. 2 Big Ideas The expansion of ND Law’s intellectual property program is bearing fruit Pg. 20 20 18 A DIFFERENT KIND of LAWYER PHOTOGRAPHY Alicia Sachau and University Marketing Communications EDITOR Kevin Allen Notre Dame Lawyer 1337 Biolchini Hall Notre Dame, IN 46556 574-631-5962 [email protected] Inside 2 Dean Newton 4 Briefs & News 10 Profiles: A Different Kind of Lawyer 16 London Law at 50 20 Intellectual Property 26 Father Mike 30 Faculty News 36 Alumni Notes 44 In Memoriam 46 The Couples of ’81 48 Interrogatory Briefs Dean Newton Steps Down Joseph A. Matson Dean and Professor of Law Nell Jessup Newton will conclude her tenure as dean of Notre Dame Law School on June 30, 2019, after 10 years of service. What was your rela- ÅZ[\\QUMIVLM^MVUMM\QVO sion that leads to follow-up tionship with Notre Dame Fr. Ted. These memories MUIQT[)_ITSIZW]VL\PM before you became the Law are even more tender TISM[WZ\W\PM/ZW\\WKIV School’s dean? because Rob died in 1995 provide a moment to be My brother Rob Mier of lymphoma caused by his grateful for all the ways that attended ND on a Navy exposure to Agent Orange the Notre Dame community ROTC scholarship. -
The Collision of Institutional Power and Constitutional Obligations: the Use of Blue Slips in the Judicial Confirmation Process
The Collision of Institutional Power and Constitutional Obligations: The Use of Blue Slips in the Judicial Confirmation Process Ryan C. Black Michigan State University Ryan J. Owens University of Wisconsin Anthony J. Madonna University of Georgia The authors would like to thank Mitchell Sollenberger for making his data available. Additional thanks to Ryan Bakker, Jamie Carson and Richard Vining for helpful comments. Abstract In recent years, judicial nominations to lower federal courts have been blocked privately by negative blue slips returned by home state senators. We examine the conditions under which senators return these negative blue slips and whether judicial qualifications can mitigate the possible negative effects of ideological distance. We discover two results. First, consistent with existing work, ideology plays a strong role in blue slipping. Second, and more important, we find that nominee qualifications mitigate ideological extremism--but only for district court nominees. That is, while past presidents could nominate well-credentialed ideologues to the circuit courts of appeals and see them confirmed, today’s presidents cannot. In short, if presidents nominate ideologues--even those who are well qualified--to circuit courts, we will continue to observe lengthy vacancies and bitter nomination struggles between the president and Congress over those important courts. 1 Former Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once stated about government: “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants” (Brandeis 1913). While few would argue with the normative premise behind Brandeis's comment, many consequential policy decisions occur in private. Perhaps nowhere is the deviation from transparency-in-government more profound than in nomination politics, where the Senate's most unique institutional power (to defeat measures via obstruction) intersects with its most unique constitutional power (advice and consent) and can thwart the goals of nominating presidents. -
The Breadth of Congress' Authority to Access Information in Our Scheme
H H H H H H H H H H H 5. The Breadth of Congress’s Authority to Access Information in Our Scheme of Separated Powers Overview Congress’s broad investigatory powers are constrained both by the structural limitations imposed by our constitutional system of separated and balanced powers and by the individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Thus, the president, subordinate officials, and individuals called as witnesses can assert various privileges, which enable them to resist or limit the scope of congressional inquiries. These privileges, however, are also limited. The Supreme Court has recognized the president’s constitutionally based privilege to protect the confidentiality of documents or other information that reflects presidential decision-making and deliberations. This presidential executive privilege, however, is qualified. Congress and other appropriate investigative entities may overcome the privilege by a sufficient showing of need and the inability to obtain the information elsewhere. Moreover, neither the Constitution nor the courts have provided a special exemption protecting the confidentiality of national security or foreign affairs information. But self-imposed congressional constraints on information access in these sensitive areas have raised serious institutional and practical concerns as to the current effectiveness of oversight of executive actions in these areas. With regard to individual rights, the Supreme Court has recognized that individuals subject to congressional inquiries are protected by the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, though in many important respects those rights may be qualified by Congress’s constitutionally rooted investigatory authority. A. Executive Privilege Executive privilege is a doctrine that enables the president to withhold certain information from disclosure to the public or even Congress. -
The Religious Affiliations of Trump's Judicial Nominees
The Religious Affiliations of Trump's Judicial Nominees U.S. Supreme Court Religion Federalist Society Member Neil Gorsuch Catholic/Episcopal Listed on his SJQ U.S. Court of Appeals Amul Thapar Catholic Former John K. Bush Episcopal Yes Kevin Newsom Yes Amy Coney Barrett Catholic Yes Joan Larsen Former David Stras Jewish Yes Allison H. Eid Yes Ralph R. Erickson Catholic Stephanos Bibas Eastern Orthodox Yes Michael B. Brennan Yes L. Steven Grasz Presbyterian (PCA) Yes Ryan Wesley Bounds Yes Elizabeth L. Branch Yes Stuart Kyle Duncan Catholic Yes Gregory G. Katsas Yes Don R. Willett Baptist James C. Ho U.S. District Courts David Nye Mormon Timothy J. Kelly Catholic Yes Scott L. Palk Trevor N. McFadden Anglican Yes Dabney L. Friedrich Episcopal Claria Horn Boom Michael Lawrence Brown William L. Campbell Jr. Presbyterian Thomas Farr Yes Charles Barnes Goodwin Methodist Mark Norris Episcopal Tommy Parker Episcopal William McCrary Ray II Baptist Eli J. Richardson Tripp Self Baptist Yes Annemarie Carney Axon Liles C. Burke Methodist Donald C Coggins Jr. Methodist Terry A. Doughty Baptist Michael J. Juneau Christian A. Marvin Quattlebaum Jr. Presbyterian Holly Lou Teeter Catholic Robert E. Wier Methodist R. Stan Baker Methodist Jeffrey Uhlman Beaverstock Methodist John W. Broomes Baptist Walter David Counts III Baptist Rebecca Grady Jennings Methodist Matthew J. Kacsmaryk Christian Yes, in college Emily Coody Marks Yes Jeffrey C. Mateer Christian Terry F. Moorer Christian Matthew S. Petersen Former Fernando Rodriguez Jr. Christian Karen Gren Scholer Brett Joseph Talley Christian Howard C Nielson, Jr. Daniel Desmond Domenico Barry W. Ashe Kurt D. -
051205 Congress Reform
SPECIAL PRESENTATION “A PROPOSAL TO MAKE CONGRESS WORK AGAIN: A PANEL DISCUSSION ON PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE RULES AND PROCEDURES OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES” MODERATOR: SCOTT LILLY, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS FEATURING: REP. DAVID OBEY, (D-WI), RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS REP. BARNEY FRANK, (D-MA), RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES REP. DAVID PRICE, (D-NC), MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS REP. TOM ALLEN, (D-ME), MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE NORM ORNSTEIN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE; COAUTHOR, BROKEN BRANCH 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM MONDAY, DECEMBER 05, 2005 TRANSCRIPT PROVIDED BY DC TRANSCRIPTION & MEDIA REPURPOSING JOHN PODESTA: (In progress) – Center for American Progress. And I want to welcome you here for the presentation of “A Proposal to Make Congress Work Again.” I want to begin by welcoming our panelists. We’re joined, in addition to our senior fellow, Scott Lilly, by Congressman David Obey, Congressman Barney Frank, Congressman David Price, Congressman Tom Allen, and Norm Ornstein. I think that people on both sides of the aisle will join me in saying, in addition to these senior members and Norm, these are people who care about Congress, who care about the House, who indeed care about our democracy. And I think, as the title of this panel implies, “Making Congress Work Again” – I think it is clear that things on Capitol Hill, and I think particularly in the House of Representatives, have gotten seriously off-track. That’s why I think this package that these senior members have pulled together is so vital. -
The Senate in Transition Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Nuclear Option1
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\19-4\NYL402.txt unknown Seq: 1 3-JAN-17 6:55 THE SENATE IN TRANSITION OR HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE NUCLEAR OPTION1 William G. Dauster* The right of United States Senators to debate without limit—and thus to filibuster—has characterized much of the Senate’s history. The Reid Pre- cedent, Majority Leader Harry Reid’s November 21, 2013, change to a sim- ple majority to confirm nominations—sometimes called the “nuclear option”—dramatically altered that right. This article considers the Senate’s right to debate, Senators’ increasing abuse of the filibuster, how Senator Reid executed his change, and possible expansions of the Reid Precedent. INTRODUCTION .............................................. 632 R I. THE NATURE OF THE SENATE ........................ 633 R II. THE FOUNDERS’ SENATE ............................. 637 R III. THE CLOTURE RULE ................................. 639 R IV. FILIBUSTER ABUSE .................................. 641 R V. THE REID PRECEDENT ............................... 645 R VI. CHANGING PROCEDURE THROUGH PRECEDENT ......... 649 R VII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL OPTION ........................ 656 R VIII. POSSIBLE REACTIONS TO THE REID PRECEDENT ........ 658 R A. Republican Reaction ............................ 659 R B. Legislation ...................................... 661 R C. Supreme Court Nominations ..................... 670 R D. Discharging Committees of Nominations ......... 672 R E. Overruling Home-State Senators ................. 674 R F. Overruling the Minority Leader .................. 677 R G. Time To Debate ................................ 680 R CONCLUSION................................................ 680 R * Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy for U.S. Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid. The author has worked on U.S. Senate and White House staffs since 1986, including as Staff Director or Deputy Staff Director for the Committees on the Budget, Labor and Human Resources, and Finance. -
Trump Judges: Even More Extreme Than Reagan and Bush Judges
Trump Judges: Even More Extreme Than Reagan and Bush Judges September 3, 2020 Executive Summary In June, President Donald Trump pledged to release a new short list of potential Supreme Court nominees by September 1, 2020, for his consideration should he be reelected in November. While Trump has not yet released such a list, it likely would include several people he has already picked for powerful lifetime seats on the federal courts of appeals. Trump appointees' records raise alarms about the extremism they would bring to the highest court in the United States – and the people he would put on the appellate bench if he is reelected to a second term. According to People For the American Way’s ongoing research, these judges (including those likely to be on Trump’s short list), have written or joined more than 100 opinions or dissents as of August 31 that are so far to the right that in nearly one out of every four cases we have reviewed, other Republican-appointed judges, including those on Trump’s previous Supreme Court short lists, have disagreed with them.1 Considering that every Republican president since Ronald Reagan has made a considerable effort to pick very conservative judges, the likelihood that Trump could elevate even more of his extreme judicial picks raises serious concerns. On issues including reproductive rights, voting rights, police violence, gun safety, consumer rights against corporations, and the environment, Trump judges have consistently sided with right-wing special interests over the American people – even measured against other Republican-appointed judges. Many of these cases concern majority rulings issued or joined by Trump judges. -
Enforcing the Origination Clause in the House of Representatives
Blue-Slipping: Enforcing the Origination Clause in the House of Representatives October 1, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46556 SUMMARY R46556 Blue-Slipping: Enforcing the Origination Clause October 1, 2020 in the House of Representatives James V. Saturno Article I, Section 7, clause 1, of the U.S. Constitution is known generally as the Origination Specialist on Congress and Clause because it requires that the Legislative Process All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills. As generally understood, this clause carries two kinds of prohibitions. First, the Senate may not originate any measure that includes a provision for raising revenue, and second, the Senate may not propose any amendment that would raise revenue to a House-passed non-revenue measure. However, the Senate may generally amend a House-originated revenue measure as it sees fit. Although the House may choose to enforce its prerogative through any of several methods, the most common is through the adoption of a privileged resolution returning the measure to the Senate. Because this resolution has historically been printed on blue paper, this is known as blue-slipping. This report also includes a table identifying all measures returned to the Senate as a result of a blue-slip resolution during the 102nd-116th Congresses (1991-2020). For more information on the Origination Clause and its enforcement, see CRS Report RL31399, The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement, by James V. Saturno. Congressional Research Service Blue-Slipping: Enforcing the Origination Clause in the House of Representatives Contents Tables Table 1. -
Congressional Membership and Appointment Authority to Advisory Commissions, Boards, and Groups
Congressional Membership and Appointment Authority to Advisory Commissions, Boards, and Groups Updated February 12, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL33313 Congressional Membership and Appointment Authority to Advisory Bodies Summary Over the past several decades, Congress, by statute, has established a wide array of commissions, boards, and advisory bodies to provide it with assistance in meeting various legislative, investigative, and administrative responsibilities. Some of these entities are temporary and created to serve specific functions, such as studying a discrete policy area or performing one-time tasks. Others are permanent, serving an ongoing purpose, such as overseeing an institution or performing a regular administrative function. The majority of these congressional bodies provide that Members of Congress, particularly the leadership, be intimately involved in the appointment process, either through direct service on a commission, or by appointing or recommending candidates for membership. The choice of a particular mechanism for membership appointment may have implications for the ability of these entities to fulfill their congressional mandates. Examination of the statutory language creating these bodies reveals several common approaches to membership selection. Each alternative schema has its advantages. For example, a commission or board composed entirely of Members permits a high degree of congressional control over the entity’s operations. Bodies composed mainly of qualified private citizens or executive branch appointees may provide a broader expertise than Member-only bodies. Assemblages of mixed membership provide some of the advantages of both Member and citizen-only appointment schemes. This report contains a compilation of existing commissions and boards that demonstrates the range of alternative membership-appointment structures. -
Congress's Contempt Power: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure
Congress’s Contempt Power and the Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure Todd Garvey Legislative Attorney May 12, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL34097 Congress’s Contempt Power and the Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas Summary Congress’s contempt power is the means by which Congress responds to certain acts that in its view obstruct the legislative process. Contempt may be used either to coerce compliance, to punish the contemnor, and/or to remove the obstruction. Although arguably any action that directly obstructs the effort of Congress to exercise its constitutional powers may constitute a contempt, in recent times the contempt power has most often been employed in response to non- compliance with a duly issued congressional subpoena—whether in the form of a refusal to appear before a committee for purposes of providing testimony, or a refusal to produce requested documents. Congress has three formal methods by which it can combat non-compliance with a duly issued subpoena. Each of these methods invokes the authority of a separate branch of government. First, the long dormant inherent contempt power permits Congress to rely on its own constitutional authority to detain and imprison a contemnor until the individual complies with congressional demands. Second, the criminal contempt statute permits Congress to certify a contempt citation to the executive branch for the criminal prosecution of the contemnor. Finally, Congress may rely on the judicial branch to enforce a congressional subpoena. Under this procedure, Congress may seek a civil judgment from a federal court declaring that the individual in question is legally obligated to comply with the congressional subpoena.