Insider Democracy: Private Sector Weakness and the Closed Political Class in Democratic Africa

Insider Democracy: Private Sector Weakness and the Closed Political Class in Democratic Africa The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Pinkston, Amanda Leigh. 2016. Insider Democracy: Private Sector Weakness and the Closed Political Class in Democratic Africa. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33840666 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA Insider Democracy: Private Sector Weakness and the Closed Political Class in Democratic Africa Adissertationpresented by Amanda Leigh Pinkston to The Department of Government in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Political Science Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts June 2016 ©2016 — Amanda Leigh Pinkston All rights reserved. Dissertation Advisor: Steven Levitsky Amanda Leigh Pinkston Insider Democracy: Private Sector Weakness and the Closed Political Class in Democratic Africa Abstract The democratization and market reforms that were implemented across sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s were intended to disperse political and economic power away from the ruling elite. In a comparison study of Ghana and Benin - two of Africa’s most stable democracies - this dissertation shows that neither goal is achieved where the private sector is weak. The result, as demonstrated by the case of Benin, is insider democracy: fully democratic institutions are in place, but government insiders predominate among the political elite; those without pre-existing ties to the state are unlikely to win office. Ghana, with greater private sector strength and many fewer insiders in office, serves as the counterfactual. The analysis draws on interviews with 128 Members of Parliament (64 in each Ghana and Benin) to document the professional trajectories of the political elite and how they got started in electoral politics. Longitudinal exports data, in combination with population and business census data, are used to demonstrate variation in private sector strength and to understand its sources. The concluding chapter compiles biographical data on top presidential candidates in Africa’s competitive democracies to demonstrate that Africa’s competitive democracies are more like Benin than Ghana. Insider rule is the predominant pattern in the region, and this dissertation argues that the cause is private sector weakness rather than institutional structure or poverty per se. iii Contents Abstract iii Acknowledgments vi 1Introduction 1 1.1 Theory....................................... 6 1.2 Testing the Argument . 18 1.3 SurveyDataandMethods ............................ 26 1.4 PlanoftheDissertation ............................. 36 2 Government Insiders 41 2.1 Government Insider: Definition and Examples . 43 2.2 GovernmentInsidersAmongMPsinthe2010s . 49 2.3 GovernmentInsidersintheEarly1990s. 54 2.4 The Policy Implications of MP Professional Backgrounds . 58 2.5 Summary ..................................... 68 3PoliticalSpendingandSelectiontoOffice 70 3.1 DataandMethods ................................ 72 3.2 Political Spending . 73 3.3 Implications . 92 4 Political Finance 98 4.1 Political Finance . 100 4.2 MPResources................................... 108 4.3 Accountability in Developing Democracies . 113 5 Private Sector Strength in Ghana and Benin 118 5.1 TheConceptofPrivateSectorStrength. 119 5.2 Measurement: Private Sector Strength in the 2000s . 128 5.3 Sources of Variation in Private Sector Strength . 144 5.4 Private Sector Strength and the Political Elite . 161 iv 6InsiderDemocracyinAfrica 165 6.1 Insider Democracy in Africa . 168 6.2 TheLimitsofInstitutionalReform . 172 Bibliography 237 v Acknowledgments I didn’t really know what I was getting into when I started this project, and I am deeply grateful to those who helped me through it. Thanks first and foremost to the members of my committee, Steve Levitsky (chair), Catherine Boone, Gwyneth McClendon and Daniel Ziblatt. Though there is not enough space here to describe all the ways in which they made me a better scholar and helped improve this dissertation, I will mention a few. Steve talked with me for many hours about what the interesting findings were and how to make them more compelling to a broader audience. I really appreciate his sustained enthusiasm for the project. Daniel pushed me to add a full comparative case - no small task to be sure, but certainly better than the original plan, especially now that it’s done! Gwyneth talked me through some of the knottier measurement and conceptual issues, helping me to identify fuzzy logic and then fix it. And while I was always fretting about getting data in the field, Cathy made sure I remembered that some of the most valuable information was already written up, sitting in the library. Cathy is also the one who got me interested in African politics. I took her classes as an undergraduate at the University of Texas, and, having never traveled much outside of the South, nor having encountered anything about comparative politics other than the World Cultures class I took in the 9th grade, they were a real eye-opener. I loved all of my classes in government, but it was Cathy who gave me the idea that I could actually have a career in this field. I would not be where I am today without her encouragement. vi Back to the dissertation. Thanks sincerely to Robert Bates, Jeffry Frieden and Peter Hall, who all provided invaluable insights and advice about developing a more general, theoretical understanding of my empirical observations. These talks often helped me get the project moving again when it was stalled. The research that produced those empirical observations was made possible by the fi- nancial support of Harvard University fellowships, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, the Committee for African Studies and the Graduate Student Society, all at Har- vard University. Their support allowed me to spend about a year in Ghana and Benin, first to explore and develop the ideas that form the core of this dissertation, and then to make multiple trips back to finish the data collection. They also gave me time to think about and write up what I had learned (and to spend more time in the library). While I was in Ghana and Benin, I was helped by a great number of people, many of whom were promised anonymity. Thanks to: the Members of Parliament, the national and local government officials, and the business and labor group leaders who agreed to be interviewed; and to the men and women of Djidja, Benin, who participated in focus groups. Thanks to Sarah Brierly, who helped me get situated in Ghana; to Maxwell Bessah and Karl Tufuoh, who helped me obtain economic data there; and in Benin, to Eliot Hazounme and Fidele Dohato for electoral data, Serge Jimaja for his personal insights into local politics, Eloi Djodjo and Kevin for their help arranging focus groups in Djidja, and to Mahamadou Alassane, Corine Hacheme and the ushers in the Beninese National Assembly for helping to arrange the MP interviews. Thanks to Bouraima Zakou and Maame Akosua Kuranchie for their research assistance. Thanks to Sarah Fichtner, Mathew Bachtel, Janine de Zeeuw and Marike Alferink for their friendship in Benin. Thanks to Julie Faller for coming to visit! Thanks to Devon Jenkins for lending me his apartment in Porto Novo. Thanks especially to Jules Daga, for help with economic data in Benin and a friendship that has lasted many years. Finally, a big thanks to all the people I met as I travelled around Benin, who were vii generous in their hospitality and in sharing their own thoughts and experiences about politics with a curious stranger. Ihavehadalotofgoodluckinmylife,thoughperhapsnothingsorareandfortuitous as beginning graduate school with a cohort made up primarily of women, many of whom became my friends and most helpful critics. In particular, I would like to thank Shelby Grossman, Jen Pan, Molly Roberts, Chiara Superti and Vanessa Williamson. For a few years, we met every other week to discuss each other’s work - what was good, what wasn’t working, how to improve - and my dissertation is vastly better for it (as was my graduate school experience in general). Finally, the loved ones! Thanks to my family - Mom and Dad, Matt and Russ - for never asking when I would be "done with school." And thanks most of all to Peter, who was always happy to talk about something other than insider democracy. viii 1 | Introduction The wave of political reforms that brought democratic institutions to sub-Saharan Africa began in Benin. In 1989, with the economy in shambles and the government unable to pay salaries and stipends, teachers, students and civil servants took the streets to protest. At first their demands focused on unpaid wages, but as the movement grew, so too did its goals. Before long, massive demonstrations were calling for free politics and open elections. The army refused to repress these popular uprisings, and by the end of the year, President Kerekou had agreed to convene a National Conference in which a broad array of civil society representatives would discuss reforms. The Conference met for nine days in February, 1990. The delegates soon declared the Conference

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