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Assessing the Performance of South Africa's Constitution Chapter 5. The Assessing the Performance of South Africa’s Constitution Chapter 5. The Performance of the Judiciary Linette Du Toit © 2016 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance This is an unedited extract from a report for International IDEA by the South African Institute for Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law, a Centre of the University of Johannesburg. An abridged version of the report is available for download as an International IDEA Discussion Paper: <http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/assessing-the-performance-of-the-south-african-constitution.cfm>. Chapter 5. The Performance of the Judiciary Linette Du Toit 5.1. Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the performance of the Constitution in respect of the judiciary. In order to measure the performance of the Constitution in this regard, we have to consider the performance of the judiciary itself: whether it has been structurally and operationally transformed according to constitutional prescripts and whether it is fulfilling its constitutional purposes. While thin compliance with concrete goals are easily measurable, the achievement of these goals in a ‘thick’ sense, as well as abstract objectives are more complex and challenging to determine. We shall examine some of the problems of the design of judicial institutions in South Africa in the Constitution as well as the manner in which they have functioned in relation to key stress points which have arisen in the past 20 years. 5.2. Goals of the Constitution No feature of the South African state escaped the depredations of apartheid. The judiciary was no exception. On the one hand, the judiciary sought to cultivate an aura of independence and excellence. There was a strong attempt to separate law from politics and suggest it was value neutral.1 On the other hand, none of this was possible given the nature of the apartheid system which attempted massive social engineering through law. As a result, the judiciary, of necessity, became implicated in enforcing measures which were repugnant to basic values of equality and social justice.2 Furthermore, in a system of parliamentary sovereignty, the judiciary did not have the authority to consider the substance of legislation and could only pronounce upon procedural aspects of the adoption and application of laws.3 Under these circumstances, there were instances where the judiciary showed itself committed to justice and prepared to use the little room that it had to ameliorate the effects of apartheid policies. In a study of the Appellate Division from 1950 to 1980, Forsyth finds that the Court was ready to restrain the executive and legislative branches of government within the bounds of the law during the earliest years of official apartheid. In 1950, the Appellate Division formulated a principle that legislation cannot be interpreted to sanction unequal treatment where this was not expressly provided for.4 The principle was applied in at least two other cases with the effect that the unequal treatment of people of different races were invalidated.5 In the matter of R v Ngwevela6, the Appellate Division held that a person was entitled to a hearing before being ‘restricted’ in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act7 since it was not expressly enacted that the audi alteram partem rule should not apply.8 The ‘coloured voters’ saga’ is perhaps the best illustration of the judiciary’s predicament in the context of a ruthless regime determined to give effect to its apartheid policies. The National Party won the national election in 1948 with a small majority. The United Party continued to exercise control over the Cape Province. At the time, the electorate in this province was not exclusively white but included ‘coloured’ (mixed-race) people on a common voters roll if they earned a threshold annual salary and owned property.9 The NP government wanted to remove ‘coloured’ voters from the common voters’ roll in the hope of strengthening its hold over the province 1 Cameron, 1998: 436. Dugard also famously wrote that ‘[m]any South Africans … attribute the “excellence” of the South African … judiciary to their acquiescent, neutral, “objective” attitude to the will of the Parliament.’ He asserted that the judiciary under apartheid claimed to be ‘politically neutral’ while they were, in fact, blind to their own prejudice in favour of the status quo; 1981: 372. 2 Corder, 1984: 240. 3 Dugard, 1978: 14. 4 The first of these cases was R v Abdurahman 1950 (3) SA 136 (A). In this matter, signs were introduced at a railway station indicating that people of different races ought to use different carriages. The accused had incited a large group of people to ignore these signs. The Appellate Division held that the Railways and Harbours Regulation and Control Act 22 of 1916 did not expressly authorise unequal treatment and must not be construed to do so. 5 Tayob v Ermelo Local Road Transportation Board 1951 (4) SA 440 (A) and R v Lusu 1953 (2) SA 484 (A). 6 1954 (1) SA 123 (A). 7 44 of 1950. 8 Ngwevela 131 H to end. 9 Davis, 2009: 19. 5. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE JUDICIARY in future elections.10 The NP passed the Separate Representation of Voters Act 46 of 1951 by using the ordinary bicameral procedure11 in order to place coloured persons in the Cape Province on a separate voters’ roll.12 However, section 152 of the South Africa Act of 1909 (which was the Constitution of the Union), read with section 35 provided that any law which sought to change the common voters’ roll had to be passed by a joint sitting of the two Houses of Parliament and had to be ‘agreed to by not less than two thirds majority of the total number of members of both Houses’. In the matter of Harris v Minister of Interior13, the Separate Representation of Voters Act was successfully challenged. The Appellate Division held that the Statute of Westminster had not repealed the provisions of the South Africa Act which entrenched the common voters’ roll and therefore an Act which changes the composition of the voters’ roll had to be passed by a special majority.14 Subsequent to the Harris case, Parliament enacted the High Court of Parliament Act 35 of 1952 under which a ‘High Court of Parliament’ was established. This body consisted of all the members of Parliament from both Houses and it was given the jurisdiction to review judgments of the Appellate Division in which an Act of Parliament had been declared invalid.15 Unsurprisingly, the Harris case was brought before the ‘the High Court of Parliament’ and overruled. The High Court of Parliament Act was challenged in the Appellate Division and held to be invalid.16 A few years later, the relentless NP came up with a legislative strategy to remove coloured voters from the common voters’ roll.17 The government enacted the Appellate Division Quorum Act in 1955 in order to increase the quorum of the Appellate Division to eleven where the validity of an Act of Parliament was considered.18 At the time, there were only six members of the Appellate Division and five new appointments had to be made. The five new members were chosen on the basis of their proven willingness to defer to the executive. The government also enlarged the Senate and changed the way in which Senators were elected in order to add many more NP senators to a joint sitting of the two houses of parliament.19 The Prime Minister brazenly expressed that the purpose of the enactment of the Senate Act of 1955 was primarily to ensure that coloured voters are placed on a separate voters’ roll and secondly, to assert the sovereignty of Parliament.20 Subsequently, the Separate Representation of Voters Act 46 of 1951 was reinstated using the entrenched procedure.21 The Senate Act was challenged in the matter of Collins v Minister of the Interior22. The Court was clearly no longer prepared to resist government to the same extent as it had done previously.23 The majority of the reconstituted Court presiding over the Collins matter held that the Senate Act was valid as no fault could be found with the procedure according to which it was passed.24 Schreiner JA wrote a lone dissent in which he held that a Senate created simply to ensure the necessary two-thirds majority for the National Party when the two houses sat jointly was not a ‘House of Parliament’ within the meaning of section 152. The government, in its unwavering 10 Davis, 2009: 20. 11 Following the ordinary bicameral procedure meant that the passing of the Act was agreed to by a simple majority only. 12 Forsyth, 2014:34. 13 1952 (2) SA 428 (A). 14 Davis, 2009: 24. The Statute of Westminster, 1931 gave the Parliaments of ‘Dominions’ (which is what South Africa was prior to 1961) the power to legislate contrary to the law of England. The Harris case turned on what was meant by ’Parliament’: the Appellate Division held that the rules identifying Parliament were to be found in the South Africa Act of 1909 and that the Act required a special majority in order to change the common voters’ roll. Forsyth, 2014: 34-35. 15 Forsyth, 2014: 36. 16 The Appellate Division held that this ‘High Court of Parliament’ was simply ‘Parliament functioning by another name’. It was not a court which could be approached by citizens to appeal against decisions of the Appellate division. Minister of Interior v Harris 1952 (4) SA 769 (A) at 784D. 17 Davis, 2009:27. 18 Forsyth, 2014: 36. 19 Senate Act 53 of 1955.
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