C UINR-M-90-002 C2

EIMMT55 CSI» SelSraat Ihpository

EDITORS Christopher M Dewees and Edward Ueber

~ A I'uhIieation of the C aiifornia Sea Irant Coiieg< ~ The California Sea Grant College is a statewide, multiuniversity program of marine research, education, and advisory services, administered by the Universityof Califorii, SeaGrant-sponsored research contributes to the growing bodyof knowledgeabout our coastaland ocean resources and, consequently,to the solutionof many marine-relatedproblems facing our society. Throughits MarineExtension Program, Sea Grant transfers informationand technology developed in researchefforts to a widecommunity of interestedparties and actual users of marine informationand technology,not onlyin Californiabut throughout the nation. SeaGrant also supportsa broad range of educationalprograms for universitystudents, public school teachers and students, and the general public so that our coastal and ocean resources can be understoodand usedjudiciously by this and future generations.

ROSEMARY A MIDEI COMM UNICA TIONS COORDINATOR

I Publishedby theCalifornia Sea Grant College, University of California, La Jolla, California, 1990. Additional copies are available from Sea Grant at: Umversity of California, 9500 Gilman Drive, La jolla, California 92093-0232, Thiswork wassponsoredin partby NOAA, NationalSea Grant CollegeProgram, Departmentof Commerce,under grant no. NA85AA-D-SG138,Project ¹A/P-1 and by theCalifornia State Resources Agency. The U.S. Governmentis authorizedto produce and distributereprints for governmentalpurposes.

On the cover: Pish prints by Christopher M. Dewees, Marine Fisheries Specialist for the California Sea Grant Marine Extension Program. EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT FISHERY MANAGEMENT SCHEMES ON BYCATCH, JOINT CATCH, AND DISCARDS

Summary of a National Workshop Sponsoredby the California Sea Grant College and the National Marine Fisheries Service

January 29 3 l, l 990 San Francisco, California

EDITORS Clttisu>pheI M. Dett ees Marine Fisheries Specialist Sea Grant Extension Program and Edvtat d Uebet Manager Gulf of the Farallons Marine Sanctuary

l 990

Report No. T-CSGCP-019 California Sea Grant College University of California La Jolla, California 92093-0232 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

PARTICIPANTS

INTRODUCTION

UNRE IUI.ATED FISHERIFS Abstract: Richard B. Allen, 10 DiscussionSummary; Court Smith 11 Small Group Recommendations . i3

SEASONS Abstract: Stephen Turner 16 DiscussionSummary: JohnRichards 17 Small Group Recommendations, 20

QUOTAS Abstracts: Walter T. Pereyra, Rick Stanley 22 DiscussionSummary: Connie Ryan 25 Small Group Recommendations . 26

MFSH RFSTRICTIONS Abstracts: Edward Ueber, Steve Murawski, Susan Hanna 30 DiscussionSummary; FrancisHenry 34 Small Group Recommendations. 36

LIMITED ENTRY Abstracts: Sam Pooley, Dorothy M. Lowman 40 DiscussionSummary. Betsy Andrews . 42 Small Group Recommendations. 43

INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS Abstracts; DouglasB. Gordon,Christopher M. Dewees, James E. Wilen 48 DiscussionSummary: Bonnie McCay . 52 Small Group Recommendations.. , 54 ACKNOWLED xMENTS

I would especiallylike to thankEd Ueberwho initiated the workshop and helpedidentify participants.Ed did an outstandingjob of making local arrangementsfor guestmeals and housing. DavidHull of'the J. PorterShaw Library providedan excellentworkshop site. Jill Frommelt typedthe proceedingsand helpedwith workshoplogistic». Finally, thanksto theworkshop participants for sharingtheir expertise fully in theirpapers and in-depthdiscussions. Participants Betsy Andrews, FrancisHenry, Bonnie McCay, Ed Melvin, John Richards,Connie Ryan, and Court Smith wrotesummaries of the panel»and discussions. The CaliforniaSea Grant College provided primary fundingfor the workshopproceedings, expenses, and travel of threeparticipants. The National Marine Fisheries Service funded travel for their participating staff andhelped with workshopexpenses. The New JerseySea Grant CollegeProgram, Western Pacific FisheriesManagement Council, and fishing industry participantsprovided additional travel support. This work is a resultof researchsponsored in partby NOAA, NationalSea Grant CollegeProgram, Department of Cornnierce,under grant numberNA89AA-D-SG138, project numberM/P- l, throughthe California SeaGrant College, and in part by theCalifornia State ResourcesAgency. The U.S. Governmentis authorizedto reproduceand distribute for governmental purposes. I

ChristopherM. Dewecs PARTICIPANTS

Norm Abram son Frank Henry National Marine Fisheries Service California Department of Fish 3150 Paradise Drive and Game Tiburon, California 94920 411 Burgess Drive Menlo Park, California 94025 Richard B, Allen Atlantic Offshore Fishermen Joe Hightower P.O. Box 3001 National Marine Fisheries Service Newport, Rhode I»land 02840 3150 Paradise Drive Tiburon, California 94920 Betsy Andrews Sea Grant Extension Program Bill Lenarz Department of Wildlife and National Marine Fisheries Service FisheriesBiology 31SO Paradise Drive University of California Tiburon, California 94920 Davis, California 95616 Dorothy Lowman Christopher M. Dewees Western Pacific Fisheries Sea Grant Extension Program Management Council Department of Wildlif'e and 1164 Bishop Street, Suite 1405 Fisheries Biology Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 University of California Davis, California 95616 Bonnie McCay Department of Human Ecology Douglas B. Gordon and Social Sciences American High SeasFisheries Cook College Association P,O, Box 231 3040 West Commodore Way New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903 Seattle. Washington 98199 Edward F. Melvin Susan Hanna Washington Sea Grant Extension Department of Resource Program Economics 19 Harbor Mall Oregon State University Bellingham, Washington 9822S Corval lis, Oregon 97331-6403 Steven A, Murawski Stephen Turner U.S. Departmentof Commerce National Marine Fisheries Service NOAA S.E. Fisheries Center Northeast Fisheries Center 75 Virginia Beach Woods Hole, Massachusetts 02543 Miami, Florida 33149

Wal ter Pereyra Edward Ueber Profish International Gulf of the Farallons Marine 1011 SW Klickitata Way Sanctuary Seattle, Washington 98134 Building 201 Fort Mason Sam Pooley San Francisco, California 94123 U.S. Departmentof Commerce NOAA James E. Wilen National Marine Fisheries Service Department of Agricu ltural 2570 Dole Street Economics Honolulu, Hawaii 96822-2396 University of California Davis, California 95695 John Richards Sea Grant ExtensionProgram 5266 8, Hollister Avenue, Suite 215 Santa Barbara, California 93111

Connie Ryan SeaGrant Extension Program P.O. Box 34066 San Francisco, California 94134

Court Smith OregonState University Departmentof Anthropology Waldo Hall 238 Corvallis, Oregon 97331-6403

Rick Stanley Departmentof Fisheriesand Oceans Pacific Biological Station Nanaimo British Columbia, Canada V9R 5K6 INTRODUCTION

In all fisheries, some fish, shellfish, or other organisms are discarded at sea. Fishery management regulations and market conditions are primary inHuence». Discards include those fish and shellfish which have lower or no market value, are damaged during harvest, or cannot be legally sold. Other organisms such as marine mammals, birds, and turtles are accidentally caught and discarded in some fisheries. Fishery management has intensified and undergone many changes worldwide in the last ten years, Methods used include restrictions of the catch quantity, fish size, and sex, Limited entry, trip limits frequency and landing liniits!, gear restrictions, area closures, and seasonsfurther restrict the fishing industry. Often more than one method is employed simultaneously. Great interest has been shown recently in privatizing harvestrights for fish and shellfishthrough individual transferablequotas ITQs!. All of thesemanagement options strongly inHuencebycatch and discardrates by either changingfishermen's behavior or altering the type of fishing technology used. Discarding of bycatch or lower valued fish high-grading! is among the most difficult fishery management challenges, Bycatch and discards make the attainment of the conservationand economicgoal» of fishery managersand the fishing industry problematic, The California SeaGrant College,in cooperationwith the National Marine FisheriesService, sponsored a nationalworkshop to addressthis critical issue. Twenty-two people from industry, agencies,and universitieswith knowledgeof discardproblems met in SanFrancisco January 29-3 l, 1990. Participants came from the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts as well as Hawaii and Canada. The goal of the workshop and this publication is to stimulate multidisciplinary research,discussion, and innovative fishery management techniques directed at lessening fishery hycatchand discardproblems. The hrst two days of the workshop consisted of panel presentations and discussionsfocused on likely bycatchand discardproblem consequencesunder six primary managementschemes: unregulated, seasons,quotas, mesh restrictions, limited entry, and individual transferablequotas, On the final day, small discussiongroups brainstormedabout discard problems under each managementscheme and recommendedresearch needs and ideasfor lesseningbycatch problems. The informal style of the workshop yielded useful discussion of the problemsfrom both a biologicaland socioeconomicperspective. Weorganized these proceedings into the six management schemes discussed.Abstracts of thepanel presentations are followed by a summaryof theensuing discussions, Each management section scheme endswith the summariesof the small discussiongroup ideasand recommendations.Transcripts of mostof thepanel presentations are availabledirectly from theindividual authors. Authors' addresses are listed at the end of this publication. Severalkey termsused throughout these proceedings need to be dehned."Bycatch" and "joint catch" are used interchangeably to refer to fishor shellfishor otherorganisms captured together with thetargeted species."Discards" are the portion of thetotal catch that is discarded at sea."High-grading" is the practice of discardingthe lower valued portionof thecatch, usually to staywithin quotas and increase revenues. Aftertwo days of intensediscussion, it was clear that bycatch/discard problemsare complex and difficult to solve. Some participants feltthat privatizingharvest rights i.e., ITQs! was the best approach. Others thoughtthat combinations of other management techniques could lessen problems.Workshop participants expressed concern about the lack of nationalcommitment to findingmethods to reducebycatch problems. A cooperativenational approach through government, industry, and universitieswould be desirable. Workshop participants expressed concernthat therewas a lackof communicationnationwide and that regionalgroups were "re-inventing the wheel," Some workshop participantssuggested I forming a nationalbycatch committee toattack generalbycatch problems, suggest ways to implementmanagement changes,and share ideas and research results nationwide, Wehope that this workshop and proceedings will startthis communicationprocess and that innovative research and fishery managementtechniques will result.

Christopher M. Dewees Edward Ueber Editors and Workshop Conveners UNREGULATED FISHERIES THE EFFECTS OF DISCARDS ON MANAGFMENT GOALS UNDER SELF-REGULATION

RICHARD B. ALLEN, Atlantic Offshore Fishermen's Association, Newport, Rhode Island

ABSTRACT' The conceptof a self-regulatingfishery meansdifferent thing»to differentpeople, requiring us to defineour terms. I wouldsuggest that threetypes of self-regulatingfisheries exist; I, The term "self-regulatingfishery" is mostcommonly used by participantsin a fisheryin anattempt to maintainan unregulated fishery. Proponentsof this approachmaintain that market forces alone will result in the achievement of optimum yield. Optimum yield is thendefined as the yield producedby unfetteredmarket force». This circular logic is irrefutable,but it is rapidly losing credibility and acceptanceas physicaland economic yields in major fi sherie» decline. 2. A secondtype of self-regulatingfishery is one in which the participantsassume authority f'or creatingand enforcing regulationsgoverning the conduct of thefishery. The establishmentof territoriesby local groupsof iobstermenin Maine is often'cited as an exampleof this type of self-regulation. 3. A third type of self-regulatingfishery is one in which the sovereignstate delegates to the participantsthe authority to create regulationsand then the sovereignstate enforces those regulations. The extent to which it is appropriate to make general statements about the effects of discards on the goals of various management regimes,and vice versa, i» questionable,A keyfactor with anyform of self-regulatingfishery is theextent to whichthe participants represent all interestsin all coinponentsof thejoint catch. If somecomponents of the joint catchhave significant constituencies that are not part of theself- regulatorymechanism, pressure from those constituencies is likely to modify or destroy the self-regulatory system. In the caseof self-regulationas non-regulation,it is especially difficult to imagineany case in whichsuch a regimewould not be self-

'A ranscriptof the completepresetnatioa is availablet'rom the author. extinguishing also. Social, economic, and technological progress also work against the long term viability of self-regulation in which participants have simply assumedauthority. In Maine, for example, the state is now prosecuting fisherinen who defend their territories through the traditional means, which comes under a legal prohibition on "trap molestation. ' Self-regulation under the authority of the state is merely one end of the spectrum of industry participation exhibited by all fishery management regimes. The effects of discards on the goals of such a fishery regime are determined by the nature of the fishery and its joint- catch components relative to the participation by various constituencies and the nature of the rights delegated by the regulatory body.

SELF-REGULATION AND JOINT CATCH

COURT SMITH, Department of Anthropology, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon

DISCUSSION SUMMARY

The general view was that self-regulation was not an effective way to manage fisheries and regulate joint catches. No substantive examples wereoffered, The meaningof self-regulationled to muchdiscussion; four perceptions prevailed, One was of an unregulated fishery with no manageinent regime, Another was of a fishery in which the participants placed informal regulations on themselves with no government participation. Cooperative management, in which the industry and managers both have a say in the formulation of regulations, was a third view. A fourth perspective was of a fishery managed by participants without any external authority. All fisheries that have gone through the fishing down process become regulated in some way as a result of reduced yields. The California sardine fishery earlier in this century is an example of the results of having no or ineffective regulations. Although no examples of unregulated fisheries were cited, there are fisheries with relatively simple regulatory structures, An example is the Pacific Coast dungenesscrab fishery which has season,size, and sex rules. This fishery fluctuates dramatically, but the regulations are believed to prevent overharvest, and the variability is the result of oceanographic factors. Soine examples were cited of fisheries in which participants had

11 developedtheir own informalregulations. The Maine lobster hsherinen'» perimeter-defendedterritories and Columbia River drift rightswere cited. A problemwith theseinformal regulations is thatthese systems tend to break down as new fishermen enter or as external authorities iinposemanagement control. At timesfishermen may regulate themselvesio protecttheir enterprise from a greaterthreal., In Alaska, concernabout the effectsof fishing on marinemaminals motivated soine fishermen to change their practices. Cooperativemanagement, which allows cooperation between industryand management in developing regulations, helps people feel theyhave more input and control over the rules, If participantsfeel pari of theprocess, they are more likely to abideby therules. Enforcementis veryexpensive, so self-regulationcan reduce some of thesecosts. The PugetSound salmon fishery is perhap»the most complex illustration of cooperative management. The U.S. menhadenfishery illustratesa fisherymanaged by participantswithout external authority. Participants also cited examples of native groupsmanaging their lisheries. If themanageinent system effectively solves the overall problems of a fishery,it will alsosolve joint catchproblems. Fishery management is veryexpensive. Self-regulation and cooperative management have the potential for reducing these costs. Examplesof successfulmanagement were characterized by a clear I understandingof the goalsto be met, The managementapproach was tailoredto the needsof the fishery. Peopleinvolved in managementneed to be awareof the unwritten goalsand overall systemof value~in which fisheriesoperate. These goals and values affect implementation of fishery management schemes. Managersneed to givemore thought to socialand political processes whendealing with fisherymanagement issues. They should consider howpeople are likely to respondto theproposed changes. Which individualsand groups have an interest in themanagement process'? Mostmanagement situations can be reducedto the issueof allocation: this means there are winner» and losers. How can these individuals and groupsbecome involved? We canall citecases where fishermen were left out of themanagement process. There are also cases where scientists with valuable information have been excluded, Thegeneral evolutionary pattern of thefishery management process i» towardmore regulatory complexity. Fishery science deals increasingly with speciesassemblages. Some fishing enterprises are increasingly diverse,while othersare becoming more specialized,The effectsof

12 fishing have become very complex. Overfishing can have selective pressureson stocks, Ecological and economic change requires inanagernent flexibility. But the pattern toward greater complexity is not fixed, and efforts to simplify fishery management should be encouraged. We should recognize that there is no single solution to the general problemof fisherymanagement. Fishery management i» a processof continual learning and growth. Incentives are a key to fishery management and positive incentives are preferred to negative ones. Positive incentives come from a process that is proactive, progressive, participatory, and anticipatory. Fishery management involves managing people and their expectations. One of the enduring issues in hshery management is the relation between conservationgoals and economic efficiency. Economic pressurestend to be shortterm, whileconservation is long term. The conservation perspective is on limits, while economic thinking focuse» on improved productivity,new stocks and fishing approaches,and substitutions of new opportunitie~ t'or old, Are there ways to make conservation and economy complementary",

U!V RECmUI ATE D FISHERIES

SMALL GROUP RECOMIVIEN DATION S

Participants; Norm Abramson,Dick Allen, Betsy Andrews, Ed Melvin, Rick Stanley,Jim Wilen. Summarizer:Betsy Andrews

Most fisheries are not formally regulated at their initial stage of exploitation. As fishing effort build» and catch-per-unit-effort CPUE! begins to decline, managers must decide whether to develop a regulatory system for the fishery. The aspectsof the fishery that managers could consider goals in this initial, unregulated state include I! maximizing fishermen'sindividual freedom and choice,! maximizing the effect of market forceson the structureof the fishery,! the absenceof costs for managetnent and research, and ! the actual state of no regulation, The effect of no regulations on bycatch and discard problems in a fishery depends completely on the characteristics of the fi»hery, A» with regulated fisheries, if the targeted species occurs in single species aggregations, with only individuals of the desired lifestage, there will be little catch of undesired animals. The further the stocks differ from this ideal,the greaterwill be thebycatch problem. Since most fisheries harvest stocks with a mixture of species or life»tage», the potential for bycatch and discards in an unregulated fishery depends on the availability and cost-effectiveness of selective gear. Where selective gear is not available or there is not the economic incentive to use it, discardand bycatchproblems may be severein a fisherythat is not regulated,

Recommendations Researchinto the characteristicsof unregulatedfisheries, with particular regard to their successor failure as sustainable systems, is timely becauseof the increasing costs of regulatory development and enforcement. We chose four important objectives: l. Understand the transition of a fish species from unutilized to targeted to overfished relative to the economics and biology of the fishery. 2. Compare the economic and biological characteristics of regulated and unregulated fisheries. 3. Analyze the cost-effectiveness of management re»ource assessment,regulation promulgation, enforcement! relative to the economic output of the industry. Consider managed and nonmanaged situations. Include an analysis of producer vs. consumer surplus model». 4. Analyze the types of fish/shellfish and fisheries which best lend themselves to different management regimes, Consider, for example, short-lived pelagic versus long-lived demersal fisheries.

14 SEASONS EFFECTS OF SEASONAL MANAGEMENT OPTIONS ON JOINT CATCHES

STEPHEN TURNER, National Marine Fisheries Service, Miami, Florida

ABSTRACT Seasonalmanageinent measures combined with catchor effort restrictionsare commonlyapplied in fisheriesand have beenextensively used or considered in west Atlantic fisheries, Seasonalregulations are usuallyenacted with arealimitations as well, Theeffects of seasonal restrictionson discardsis directly relatedto the type of catchor effort restrictionswith which they are combinedand the areato which they apply. The typesof catchand effort restrictionsdiscussed are prohibitionof fishing,catch restriction, and gear modification. In most fisheriesdiscards are presumablyall dead,while in a few fisheries,such as longline fisheries,some discarded fish arealive. Time and/or area differences in numbers alive at release,observed in some longlinefisheries, can affect attainment of managementgoals. The selectionof the time periodwhen fishing is permittedcan influencediscarding. With very short openperiods, as with Pacific halibut,or at theend of longeropen periods, cuHing may occur if vessel capacitybecomes limiting. Timingof closedseasons/areas designed to reducediscards is critical. Improperdefinition or changesin distribution can decreaseeffectivehess. Closures of time and/or area strata can result in transfer of effort and associateddiscard mortality to open strata, such as in the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery. Ttme/areaclosures for one purposecan be beneficialby reducing discardsof other species.The closureof Gulf of Mexico shrimpingareas canproduce increases'in yield per recruit and reduce bycatches of millions of juveniles of recreationallyand commercially important species. Within closedtime/area strata, management measures that effectively prohibitfishing may be unrealistic. Alternative restrictions usually result in somediscarding. Management measures designed to protecta species inaybe impeded by discardingfrom fishingdirected at associated species,such as seasonal longline bycatches of bluefintuna in theGulf of Mexicoand possibly with swordfishunder various management schemes that havebeen considered. Similarly, different gearmodifications, such

'A raoscriptof thecomplete presentation is availablefrom the author.

16 as TEDS in the shrimp fishery, may be equally effective in reducing bycatch of one specie»group, but have very different impacts on other target and nontarget species, Informationon discardingand associatedmortality is importantfor proper assessmentof management techniques. High quality information can be obtained at high cost with observers. Log and interviews from fishermen provide information of uncertain quality at potentially lower cos'ts.

SEASONS AND JOINT CATCH

JOHN RICHARDS, Sea Grant Extension Program, Santa Barbara, California

DISCUSSION SUIVIMARY

Participants perceived the effectiveness of seasonsin reducing joint catch problems as partially successful in some fisheries. They gave examplesof seasonalmanagement coupled with gearmodifications, catch restrictions, effort limitation, or geographic restriction. They commented on the effectiveness of these various measuresin preventing or reducing joint catch problems. Accurate determination of information needed to set seasons is important in reaching the management goals for any species. The traditional purpose of closing seasonsis to enhance the quality and value of the product by allowing fishing only when the target species is in prime condition or at optimum size. Determiningthe variation in the distribution of a species was also mentioned as information vital to setting effective seasons. Several examples were given of how joint catches were affected by the accuracy with which seasonswere defined or the geographic distribution of target species determined, Dungenesscrab on the West Coast was considered to be fairly well managed by using seasonrestrictions along with sex and size restrictions! to protect the crab during molting and mating. Quality and marketdemand also play a role in determiningthe seasonalopening. Since oceanographic conditions vary from year to year, a rigid opening date can lead to the harvest of crabs with low meat yield. The joint catch of a high percentageof low quality crabs, usually rejected by processors or wholesalers, leads to waste. Delaying the seasonor instituting a sliding opening ensures improved quality, but can cause operational and economic problems for both fishermen and processors.

17 In the Gulf of Mexico, managersset seasonson shrimp in specific areasto increaseyield per recruit by reducingfishing whenjuveniles are growingfast and migrating offshore. The season in thiscase prevents the catchof small shrimp beforethey reachoptimum size and reduces thecatching and discarding of economicallyimportant juvenile fish. Participantscited exainples of theproblem of a specieshaving a broad geographicdistribution across political boundaries. Often one state will imposeseasonal regulations on a fisherywithout adjacent states agreeing to implementa similarseason. This can result in themigration of vesselsto theopen areas of a neighboringstate. For example, Texas bannedtrawling for shrimpin estuariesand nearshore areas to endthe joint catchof juveniles,but Louisiana did not. Solarger Texas shrimpers migratedinto Louisiana waters to competewith smallercoastal and estuarine fleets, thus incrca»ing Louisiana's joint catch problems. Similar situations were described on the Pacific coast. Dungeness crabwa» again cited as a fisheryin whichthe»oft-»helled joint catch issueannually confound» managers because the variation in moltingtime andcrab quality over the crab'» geographic range makes it difficult to»et season»optimal 1y. A seasonmay be seton thetarget species to preventthe joint catchof anothervaluable»pecies, Participants cited the seasonon pollock, set to lessenthe take of juvenile Pacific halibut as an example. Turner describedseason/area regulation in the shrimp fishery in Texasand a!sopelagic longline fisheriesfor tuna and swordfishin the westAtlantic and Gulf of Mexico to protect spawningareas and reduce catchesof juvenilefish. Theeffectiveness of thernea»ure» in reducing jointcatche» depends on how well the areas are defined and the quality of datacollected on the joint catch or discards!. Reductionof joint catchesthrough the useof seasonsin different geographicareas in managinga fisherywith morethan two specieswas identified as one of the most difficult problems facing manager». Participantsused the Pacific Coast groundfish fi»heries as example» of multispecie»fisheries in whichtrawler» harvest different assemblages of hsh, amountingto asmany as 20 different speciesin somecases. Definingthe boundaries of theseassemblages e,g., deep water, shallow water,rocky area assemblages, or water teinperature, etc.! canbe costly andtiine consuming, The natural abundance and distribution of each specieswill vary.Management of groundfish assemblages byseason and area clo»ures is also difficult because fisherinen move between areas dependingon theabundance of highvalue species and favorable market conditions. The different assemblagesmay alsooverlap in someareas,

18 The joint catches and discards become an even more complex problem when there are limits or seasonsimposed on single species within an assemblage. The trip limit on sablefish, which are caught jointly with Dover»ole and thornyhead rockfish, is an example. Several participants noted that enforcement of these types of regulations is nearly impossible or prohibitive due to the cost. The idea of requiring the landing and utilization of all joint catcheswas suggested as a way to reducediscards and obtain betterdata on the extentof joint catches. Adoption of this requirement, however, could place a severe economic burden on both the fishermen and processors if markets and processing capability did not exist for the less valuable species. Fishermencan affect joint catchesby the distribution of their fishing effort. Fishing effort often changes in responseto seasonalregulations in combination with quotas or with the setting of quotas alone. Even if quotas are not tied to a season,they can produce a seasonality to certain fisheries. This often resultsin a largeinflux of vessel»and gearto an area. In some cases, such as the longline fishery for Pacific halibut, thi» causesaccelerated fishing, which can leadto high-gradingor culling, In Briti»h Columbia,quarterly quotas are set for Pacific oceanperch and severalrockfish speciesfor different fishing areas. Discardsof joint catches are said to occur in this fishery, but may be reduced becauseof intensiveseasonal and quotamanagement. The behaviorof fishermenis constantlychanging in responseto marketdetnands. Participants identified this issueas an importantfactor in consideringseasonal closures to reducediscards and wastage. Looking beyond the harvesting sector at the needs and limitations of the processorsand wholesalerscould help managersto predict the harvest decisions of various fleets or to at least understand the reasons for the discardingor landingof fishwhich vary in marketvalue and/or quality. Oneeffect that seasons especially short ones! have on processors and wholesalersis the flooding of the marketfor certainspecies. This resultsin wastedue to spoilage,lack of processingcapability, or limited refrigeration/freezerspace, At the otherend of the spectrumis the loss of marketswhen the seasonfor certainspecies i» closed. The issueof seasonsvs, quality occursin the bluefin tuna fishery on the EastCoast, wherethe fishery opensJune 1st,but tunaquality andprice aremuch better later in the season. One participant noted that there is no mechanism within the current management structure of the Pacific Fisheries Management Council to set seasonsfor groundfishbased on socialor econotnicreasons. They must havea biologicalbasis. This limitation will be rectified uponthe

19 adoption of an amended groundfish management plan in late 1990. Additional effort by fishery managersin gaining an understandingof the motivation and behavior of fishermen and involving fishermen more in cooperative management schemes would be a positive step in reducing the joint catch and discard problem.

SEASONS

SMALL GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS Participants:Norm Abramson,Dick Allen, Betsy Andrews,Ed Melvin, Rick Stanley, Jim Wilen. Summarizer; Betsy Andrews The managementgoals of regulatinga fisherywith seasonal restrictions are to conserve the stocks and in some cases to increase the value of the product. Some common objectives include protecting vulnerable life history stages, manipulating the duration of the fishery, and optimizing product quality e.g., harvesting herring when the roe yield is highest!. Problems with bycatch and discards in fisheries managed with seasonalrestrictions depend to a largeextent on the temporalvariability of the fish stocks. Seasonscan affect the species complex and therefore the compositionof bycatch. The mixing of desiredand undesired speciesand lifestageseill affect the amountof discards.

Recommendations Areas of need in evaluating the interaction of seasonal restrictions and bycatch problems include: 1. The relative spatial and temporal abundanceof specie». This i» a top priority, Information can be derived from fishermen interviews, logbook»! and by monitoring pre-discard catch rates. 2. On a casehistory basis, evaluate how well the use of seasons fulfills the stated management goals of a fishery from the perspective of managersand fishermen.

20 QUOTAS IMPACT OF DISCARDS IN FISHERIES MANAGED UNDER QUOTA SYSTEMS WALTER T. PEREYRA,Profish International, Seattle, Washington

ABSTRACT Discardsoccur in all fisheriesmanaged under a quotasystem and resultfrom many factors. The discard issue itself is intertwinedwith the issueof wasteand full utilization, where"one man's wasteis another's profit margin." Theprimary management goals in quota-managedfisheries might be statedas the protnotion of efficiency,minimization of costs,and maximizationof benefitsto the participantsand the nation. Discards exacerbatethe attainmentof thesefishery managementgoals and can resultin thewaste of potentiallyvaluable protein. In certaincases, such as the discardof carcassesin the pollock roe fishery,discards can acceleratethe fishery and bring about an earlier attainment of quotas. Tripquotas limits! can increase discards by highgrading and discarding catchin excessof thetrip limit. Whenfishing power is greatrelative to availablequota, managing by quotacan result in a veryfast fishery e.g Pacifichalibut! with increasedwastage from gearleft on thegrounds and quality deterioration. As a resultof economic,social, and political considerations, solutionsto discardprdblems are difficult. Total prohibition on discards full utilization!could reduce profitability of fisheriesby requiring additionalequipment, labor, and other production costs that are not offset bythe added value of productsproduced. Also total trip length would be shortened,which may reduce profitability and slow down the fishery, Requiringfull usemight bring the discard problem on shore and thereby createpotential pollution difficulties. A recentlyproposed regulation in thepollock roe fishery intended to eliminate carcass discards through the impositionof mandatoryproduct recovery rates. This regulation may actuallyresult in substantialwaste of thevaluable roe because the proposedrecovery rates are not refiective of actualrecovery rates. In quota-managedfisheries, bycatch limits are often used to reduce the interceptionand potential discard of bycatchspecies. Caps may be establishedonthe quantity of prohibitedspecies that can be taken, Such capscan result either in thedirected fishery being forced into areas of lowerproductivity or beingshut down entirely before the attainment of quota.This causes waste of a resource.! fa targetspecies also feeds on a bycatchspecies, nonattainment of quota of thetarget species could

22 result in greater loss to the bycatch species through increased predation, Closing certain areas to reduce bycatch of one speciescan result in increased bycatch of other species which are more vulnerable in the open areas. Bycatch interception can be tninimized in»en»itive area»by requiring observers on all boats and excluding "dirty" boats from the area. The negative economic effect of discards in quota-managed fisheries could be reduced by allowing or requiring retention or processing of valuable bycatch. The fishermen or processor»would only be allowed to recover their direct costs. The residual value of the bycatch could then be placed in a trust fund for research and observer programs. The opportunity costs associatedwith target catch processing! foregone should be a disincentive to target on the bycatch species. Just as there is no simple answer to the question of what is waste, there is no simple solution to the discard problem in quota-managed fisheries. A clear definition of the management goals and policy vis-a- vis discards is needed before solutions can be crafted.

THE EFFECT OF JOINT CATCHES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE BRITISH COLUMBIA. TRAWL ROCKFISH SEBASTES! FISHERIES

RICK STANLEY. Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Nanaimo, British Columbia, Canada

ABSTRACT'

Joint catches in British Columbia's trawl fishery for rockfish include bottom trawl catches of Pacific ocean perch Sebastesalutus! and yellowmouth rockfish S. reedi! at depths of 200 to 350 meters, bottom trawl catches for canary $. pinniger! and silvergray rockfish S. brevispinis! in depths of l00 to 250 meters, and midwater catches of yellowtail S. flavidus! and widow rockfish S, en omelas!. The exception is the Goose Island Gully fishery for Pacific ocean perch which is captured during sumtner month» within a large mix of slope and shelf rockfishes and, to a lesser extent, sole and Pacific cod Gadus mat rocephalus! fisheries. The management goal for these fisheries is to maximize sustained

'A transcriptof the completepresentation is availablefrom the author,

23 harvestwhile meetingthe industry's requestfor: ~ a 10-monthlong fishery Januaryto October! ~ maximum price/quality af product ~ equalopportunity for all vessels ~ minimal discarding at sea ~ minimal regulations. Additionalobjectives include reducing enforcement costs while managingthe fisheryto providethe best possible information for management,enforcement, and research. Sinceall but the six most importantrockfish speciesare assessed and managedon a stock-specificbasis, these joint catchescreate the predictableproblems of discardingor quotaoverruns while trying to achievestock specific harvest targets in a multispeciesfishery, They also lead to extensive data contamination as industry commonly rnisreports speciesmixes and amounts to avoidviolations, To meet the harvestobjectives within the joint fisherycontext, managersuse a complexmanagement regime of quotascombined with other measures: ~ limited entry ~ annual and quarterly quotas ~ area and species specific quotas e speciestrip limits ~ multispecies assemblagemanagement. To improve the quality of fishery information, managers implementedmandatory telephone hails 4-hours beforelanding!, logbooks,sales slips, and sorting by quotaspecies at theprocessing plant. Joint catchescause many problemswhich percolatethrough all our management,enforcement, and research initiatives, However, managers havebeen fairly successfulfor mostof thesestocks in maintaining harvestswhich generally represent a reasonablecompromise among the varied objectives. Themajor exception has been the Goose Island Gully Pacificocean perchstock where annual harvests are significantly above the managementobjective of catcheswhich would permit rehabilitation of this overfishedstock within its multispeciesfishery. This fisherymay well be fished down to a level where incidental catches may suppressit

24 well below optimum productivity over the long term,

QUOTAS CONNIE RYAN, SeaGrant ExtensionProgram, San Bruno, California

DISCUSSION SUMMARY Quotasresult in discards.The type of quota influencesthe amountof discards,the reasonfor discarding,and fishing strategy. When trip limits areimposed, discards often increase as fishermen practice high-grading to maximizetheir profits while stayingwithin the trip limit. Discard ratesmay also increasewhen a quotais placedon one speciesin a multi-speciesfishery. In somecases, the imposition of a bycatchquota maycause fishermen to moveto anarea where the speciesunder bycatch quotais not present.Changing fishing location can changethe compositionof the bycatch. This occurredin the pollock fishery in Alaskawhen vesselsmoved into halibut groundsto avoid catchingking crab which wereunder quota. Now overrunof the halibut bycatchquota is causingcessation of pollock fishing beforethe pollock quota is reached. The group discusseda numberof waysto reducediscards. These rangedfrom prohibiting all discardsto providing incentivesnot to discard. Prohibitirtgdiscards full utilization of the catch! presentsa numberof problems,including enforcementdifficulties and decreased profits. Perhapsthe wayto reachfull utilizationis throughprofit incentives rather than regulation. At some point, it becomesmore profitableto retaina fishthan to discardit. Incentivesare needed to encouragethe useof lessvalued species. One suggestionfor reducing the discardof bycatchthat is underquota is to allow or requirequota overrunsto be landedand to usethe profits from selling the fish for researchand management.Many enforcementagencies object to the sale of quotaoverruns because of monitoringdifficulties. However, this systemhas been successful in thehighly monitored and regulated San Francisco Bay herring fishery. The overriding goal of quotasis the maintenanceof fish stocks. However,quotas are usedto reacha numberof other managementgoals, suchas prolonged fishing seasons and equal fishing opportunities. In quotasystems, as in all fisherymanagement systems, there is an interplaybetween the short term and long term needs of thesociety and the individual, between human behavior and fish biology, and between

25 the conservation of resources and short-term profit.

QUOTAS

51VfALL GROUP RECOMMENDAT1ONS Participants;Christopher Dewees, Susan Hanna, Francis Henry, Steven Murawski. Summarizer: Francis Henry The group identified both primary and secondarygoals of quotas. Theprincipal goal of quotamanagement is biological conservation, achievedby managingto a targetharvest level. Somesecondary goals are allocation,market stabilization through season extension, and social goals. Secondarygoals of quota managementoften intensify a discard problem. For example,using trip limits to extenda seasoncan encouragehigh-grading or the discardof lower-valuedfish to avoid exceedinga trip poundagelimit. Most fishing gears,except hook-and- line, do not allow fishermento catcha veryspecific quantity of a species, yet vesseltrip limits areroutinely employed to moderatelanding rates. Consequently,discarding of marketablespecies is commonplaceunder quotamanagement. In an assemblagefishery, discarding of one species may occurif fishing continuesfor other speciesafter a speciesquota is attained. At times,quotas for bycatchspecies have led to underutilizationof a targetspecies by forcing the cessationof fishing upon bycatchquota attainment. Participantscited Pacific halibut bycatchin the eastern Pacific and river herring in the Atlantic mackerelfishery as examplesof this situation. Quotas,unlike gearrestrictions, do not put the responsibilityon fishery managersto stayahead of technicalinnovation. Quotasalso can createthe right incentivestructure because fishermen can harvestthe quotain whatevermanner they choose. However,a generalfailing of quotasis thatthey imply a levelof precisionin stockassessments that is rarely met.

Recommendations 1. Further work on the economics of fishing operations under quota managementis needed,considering such aspects as the cost structures of differing fishing modes.

26 2, Because recruitment rates of most marine fishes are highly variable, a continuing at-sea discard monitoring program and/or pre-recruit surveys to forecast encounter rates should be given high priority. Managers and industry alike should realize that discard monitoring is a long-term commitment. Discard data shouldbe disaggregatedto the set or trawl tow level. 3. Managers manipulate quotas on an increasingly finer scale e.g., quarterly and boat quotas!, which places extraordinary demands an current fisheries databasesand monitoring programs. Attention should be given to this issue because such management regimes may outstrip our ability to both administer and evaluate them effectively. 4. Finally, greater consideration should be given to maintenance of the long-term viability of our fish stocks. One method is to account explicitly for expected bycatch or discard mortality when establishing quota levels.

27 MESH RESTRICTIONS USING MESH SIZES TO REDUCE DISCARDS

EDWARD UEBER, Gulf of the Farallons Marine Sanctuary Meshselectivity can result in a greaterdegree of lish selectivitythan cangenerally be obtained with otherfishing gear. Generally, mesh selectivityis moreeffective if thenet is stationary.When a netis movingthrough the water,the mesh can fill, andthis condition can cause thenet to loseits selectivity.However, when the bag of a trawlnet fill~, catchabilityof thenet decreases because of thepressure at thenet mouth, Netdesign can change the selectivityof'a givenmesh size, Meshselectivity is greatestin single-speciesfisheries such a» Pacific herring.Effective regulation of fishsize decreases as the number of specieswithin a fisheryincreases. For example, f]atfrsh will gothrough themesh differently than lingcod Ophlodonelonq>ates! or rockfish. An effective net for a fiatfishmay be ineffective for a roundfish, resultingin a catchof round fish that may be too young for breedingor too small to besold. You mustbe very careful when you design your mesh size that youknow what the net's effect will beon the long-term productivity of a fishery. One associateddiscard problem is the simultaneouscatch of marketable and nonmarketable sizes of the same species. Increasing the sizeof themesh may enable smaller fish to escapeto becaught later whenthey arebigger and more marketable. Mesh sizes on the West Coast have also been implemented to stop thegiiling problem.Some people don't perceivegilling asa problem, butfish do getgilled in themeshes and must be extracted. An instance wheregilling causeda majorproblem occurred in thePacific sardine fisherywhen a netwould "Christmas tree" with smallsardines, and almostevery mesh would contain a sardine,1 havespoken with a fishermanout of Coos Bay who use»five-inch meshto hsh for widow rockfish Sebastesentonrelar!. He said he had a gilling problem,but all of thefish gilled weresaleable. If he hadused a smallermesh net, he would have had to remove and discard the smaller fish becausethey would have been too small to sell. Sometimesmesh is usedin gillnet fisheriesto selecta certainspecies or certain sizeof fish, ln SanFrancisco Bay, the California Department of Fish andGarne has increased the meshsize for gillnets usedto fish for herring.The larger mesh nets, when fished over a giventime period, increasethe sizeof herring being caught. Larger herring tend to be female and this results in the overall herring catch having a greater roe female and this resultsin the overall herring catch having a greaterroe contentand greater value. In this roe fishery worth$20 million,almost all male fish caught are discarded. Fishermendo not discard them at sea becauseit is difficult to separatethe males from the females there, As much as SOpercent of the catch may not have roe and be discarded by the processor.

MESH SIZE REGULATIONS AND DISCARDS: SOME OBSERVATIONS FROM THE NORTH ATLANTIC

STEVE A. MURAWSKI, National Marine Fisheries Service, Woods Hole, Massachusetts

ABSTRACT'

Minimum-mesh size regulationshave been implementedas a primary or secondarymanagement measure in many fisheriesof the North Atlantic. In all casesthe intent of meshrestrictions is to improve the selection pattern catch-at-length! by reducing fishing mortality on small fish. Small fish include pre-spawners juveniles! or sub-marketable sizes. Minimizing their catch can have significant conservation and/or economic consequences. Mesh regulations do not by themselves determine the fishing mortality rate on partially- or fully-selected size categories. Mesh restrictionssimply shift the window of vulnerability, dependingon the selectioncharacteristics of the gear. In fisheries that are heavily dependenton the incomingyear classes recruitmentfisheries!, discard ratesof partially recruited cohortsmay be high and extremely variable. In several North Atlantic fisheries, for example, yellowtail Hounderin New England and haddockin the North Sea, discardrates are year-class size dependent. Currentmesh regulations in thesefisheries do little to infiuence the rate or variation in discard mortality rates on small fish. Mesh selectionis imprecise becauseof a variety of factors, including variability in body proportions of the animals being selected and operational factorssuch as trawl towing speed,fish density,and net- fullness. Discardsattributable to mesh restrictionsoccur when: I! gear catches fish that are otherwisenot legally landable a minimum fish length is in force!, or ! when nontargetspecies or size groupsare

A transcriptof thecotnplete presentation is availablefrotn the art thor. selectedin mixed-speciesfisheries. Withoutother management measures, mesh size restrictions have provenproblematic for severalreasons. Even if "legal"mesh sizes are used,the selectivity characteristics of themesh are relatively easy to circumventthrough practices such as using double cod-ends or by lengtheningthe extension piece in trawlnets. Meshrestrictions are extremelydifficult andexpensive to enforceat sea.As a result,mesh sizeis usuallysupplemented by additional regulations intended to removethe incentiveto useundersized nets. Incompatibilitiesbetween meshrestrictions and other primary or secondaryregulations e.g., minimumlanded lengths, bycatch percentages on a species-by-species basis,or catchquotas! have increased the rate and importance of discards in some fisheries. Considerabletechnological development has proceeded with thegoal of improvingthe precision of the selectionprocess and separating undesirablespecies and sizes while the net is still fishing. Experimental evidenceshows that the useof netshung on the squaremay have improvedselectivity characteristics forroundfishes, while standard diamondmesh nets remain preferable for fiatfishes.When both types of speciesoccur together, the choice of appropriatenet configuration becomesa trade-offof conservationand economicconsiderations. So- calledseparator trawls are under development for someNorth Atlantic fisheries,including those aimed at pandalidshrimp, to minimizethe bycatchof juvenilesthat serve as target species for larger-meshfisheries. Severalrecent studies show the potential for gear-inducedmortality of animalsescaping through trawl meshes. If theseresults are correct, then the conservationvalue of meshregulations may be seriously compromised,particularly where fishing effort is high. Where mesh size has been used as the primary management measure NewEngland groundfish!, conservation targets relating to spawning stockpreservation generally have not beenachieved. This is dueto ! highdiscard rates in large-meshfisheries resulting from the incompatibilityof meshand minimum size restrictions, ! highrates of fishingmortality on all sizes,and ! discardof juvenilesof large-mesh targetspecies in small-meshfisheries. Where mesh restrictions have supplementedquota-based management in theNorth Sea, significant discardprobleins exist for soinespecies such as cod and haddock. This is primarilydue to theadoption of a universalmesh standard 90 rnm! for a varietyof discretefisheries targeted at varyingmixed-species assemblages.

32 MESH SIZE REGULATIONS AND BYCATCH IN THE WEST COAST GROUNDFISH FISHERY SUSAN HANNA, Departmentof ResourceEconomics, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon

ABSTRACT'

Minitnum mesh size has been used to regulate groundfish catch since the 1930s. Mesh size regulations were initially adopted for conservation reasons and have continued to be used for that aim. Researchers are currently examining the benefits and costs of a change in minimum mesh size. Mesh size is now part of a package of management tools used to regulate the Pacific coast groundfish fishery. The fishery is also subject to annualsingle-species quotas, trip sizeand frequencylimits, and a minimum size for sablefish.Managers regulate the fishery within the context of three general management goals: conservation of stocks, maximization of economic value of the groundfish resource, and minimization of waste. Fishingpatterns are basedon multispeciesassemblages, and this results in mixed species catches. Speciesoccurring together have a wide range of ex-vessel values. These mixed catches define the nature of the bycatchproblem. Although the Pacific FisheriesManagement Council's Groundfish Management Plan was originally multispecies in intent, in practicethe Council applieslimits to individual speciesas theyjudge them to be distressed.Trawl gearis relatively nonselective,and the extent to which trawlers can avoid a single species is limited, Single species limits placed on assemblagecomponents result in bycatch and discards, and involve trade-offs between species. These tradeoffs are inevitable at current levels of exploitation. The extent to which meshsize regulationscan be usedto reduce bycatchis limited in a multispeciesfishery. Changesin meshsize to avoid limited speciesmay alsoresult in the underfishingof somespecies or overfishing of other species. Mesh size regulations also have distributional implications, Becauseportions of the fleet specializein different fishing strategies, all members of the fleet do not absorb selectivity effects in equal proportions. Because of the range of managementgoals for the fishery, the diversity of operations,the variation in catchcomponents, and the wide

'A transcriptof the comple epresentation is availablefrom the author,

33 rangeof ex-vesselprice, therewill be no one optimum meshsize regulationfor this fishery.Instead, managers will facea choiceof mesh sizesrepresenting different tradeoffs between species. The need to make tradeoffs will take the mesh size problem into the political arena, an arenafor which biologistsand economistsare poorly equipped, The managementresult and the success of regulationsin mitigatingbycatch problemswill dependas much on theinstiiutianal process used to arrive at a tradeoffdecision as on the particulardecision reached. Because the behavior of fishermen is a critical factor in the success or failure of managementcontrols, the integrity of thechosen mesh regulation will dependon thefull incorporationof fishermenas equal players in the decision process.

MESH RESTRICTIONS FRANCIS HENRY, California Departmentof Fish and Game,Menlo Park, California

DlSCUSSION SUMMARY Ed Ueberbegan the discussionwith an overviewof meshrestrictions asapplied to trawland gill netfisheries. He statedthat one of the primarygoals of meshregulations is to increasethe yield perrecruit of a targetspecies or severaltarget species in an asseniblagefishery. In the Washington-Oregon-Californiaroller-trawl fishery, a goalof ineshsize regulationhas been to reducethe gilling of rockfishes Sebastes spp.!. In a single-speciesfishery, mesh restrictions can be quite effective, but in an assemblagefishery their efficacy declines substantially as a resultof their disproportionateeffects on different species. This discussionalso touchedon severalpoorly understoodaspects of meshregulation. Participants noted that the design and manner in which nets are fished, as well as the variation in mesh size as it comes from the manufacturer,can significantly alter the performanceof a givenmesh regulation.Latent or "pass-through"mortality of escapingfishes, which maybe quite high, was identified as another area of increasingconcern and study. SteveMurawski focusedhis presentationon recentexperiences with meshrestrictions in the New Englandtrawl fisheries. He touchedon severalpertinent considerations when evaluating mesh size as an alternativeto other regulatorytools which causediscards. He notedthat mesh restrictions alone offer no direct control of fishing mortality rates,

34 for a given mesh size only shifts selectivity patterns. In New England, mesh restrictions have been coupled with minimum fish length regulations to discourage circumvention of the required mesh size. However, the minimum lengths chosen were incompatible with the selectivitycurves of the minimum meshsize, resulting in discardrates as high as 35 to 40 percent. Additionally, a "black market" of unknown size arose for sublegal fish, The New England fishing industry responseto mesh regulations has been positive, at least until recently. Initially, fishermen complained of reduced fish volumes, but such reductions were ameliorated by higher ex-vesselprices. The recentcollapse of fish pricesin New Englandis expected to sour industry opinions about mesh regulations. This experiencewith highly dynamic fish pricesillustrates the difficulty in optimizing the value of multi-species catches with mesh size. Many of the commercially important groundfish speciesoff New England have been intensively fished for a long time and are presently below long-term sustainable levels. Minitnum mesh size as a rebuilding strategy for these stocks is of dubious value becauseof the very large mesh needed to rebuild stocks significantly. In summary, the group agreed with Dr. Murawski that sole reliance on mesh regulations for the New England groundfish fishery has not minimized discards nor has it afforded adequate safeguardsagainst over-exploitation. Susan Hanna presented an evaluation of West Coast experiences with groundfish trawl mesh regulations. Trawl tnesh regulations have been a primary regulatorytool for 50 to 60 years,with few changesover this period.These restrictions are now employedalong with quotasand a minimum size limit for sablefish Anoplopoma fimbria!. Many groundfish trawlers have recommended that, with increasingly complex quotas, trip limits, and other direct controls, more effort should be devoted to passive controls, like mesh size. Their lobbying efforts helped initiate a coastwide mesh study presently in its third year of field work. The results of this study must be examined with the consideration of the Pacific Fishery Management Council's groundfish management objectives, of which the prevention of overfishing is paramount. As in earlier discussions, the group talked about limitations of mesh regulations. Sometrade-offs must be evaluatedwhen changing mesh size. Susan Hanna stated that mesh size is a difficult tool to use to optimize a mixed-species yield due to the differing selectivities of roundfish and fiatfish to a particular mesh size. A single mesh size applied across al] bottom trawl strategies e,g., bottom rockfish,

35 nearshoremixed! creates additional inefficiencies becausevarious fieet sectorsspend differing amounts of timein eachtrawl strategy. From an economicstandpoint, mesh size selectionbased on maximizing current net revenue should be avoided, as value by species will change. SusanHanna and Dick Allen both voiced the opinion that substantial industryinvolvement in thedevelopment phase is vital to thesuccessful implementationof meshregulations. JohnRichards pointed out an economic cost to fishermen for such involvement, particularly if they are nota partof anorganized, cohesive group. Douglas Gordon commented thatin NewEngland the industry was involved in designof a meshsize managementscheme, but hefelt thatsome members designed a system thatthey knew could be easily subverted. Bonnie McCay commented that the National Marine Fisheries Service NMFS! suffered from poor credibilitywith NewEngland fishermen, with few acceptingNMFS stock assessments as credible. Finally,Wally Pereyrasaid that, despite obvious fiaws, mesh regulationsstill haveappeal, because they have a mathetnaticalelegance.

MESH RESTRICTIONS

SMALL GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS Participants:Norm Abramsan, Dick Allen,Betsy Andrews, Ed Melvin, RickStanley, Jim Witen. Summarizer: Betsy Andrews Mesh size restrictions are an example of gear modification for fisheriesmanagement. The goal of restrictingmesh size is to conserve the fish stocksby reducingthe mortality of specificsize classesand optimizing harvest, As with many managementmethods, the effectsof meshsize restrictionsare species,gear, and fishery specific. However,restricting meshsize is an effective techniquein reducingthe discardsof most targetspecies. Mesh size restrictions are most useful in managinga singlespecies fishery where the value of thefish is closelycorrelated with size, In somecases, fishermen may favor a reducedmesh size to reducethe amountof gilling. Meshsize restrictionscan be contrasted with minimum size limits which encourage discards.

36 Recommendations Suggestedresearch on the effectiveness of mesh size restrictions in reducing discard and joint catch problems includesboth on-the-water tests and computer modelling. 1. Studies of pass-through and drop-out mortality by species and gear type. 2, Selectivity studies on mesh size in traps,gill nets, and trawls with different netting materials and webbing types under real fishing conditions. Include the effects of other aspects of gear configurationon selectivity, 3. Systems modelling to examine the long-term effects of mesh size regulation. Is there an optimal mesh size and is the relationship stable over time?

37 LIMITED ENTRY LIMITED ENTRY AND HAWAII'S FISHERIES INTERACTION PROBLEM

SAM POOLEY, National Marine Fisheries Service, Honolulu, Hawaii

ABSTRACT' Limited entry aloneoffers little solacefor a fisheryfaced with discardsor bycatch. Limited entry schemesmay intensify discard problemsin multispeciesor multipurposefisheries. Discards and bycatch,particularly in a niultipurposefishery, may weaken limited entry schemes.However, limited entry may reducethe scopeof the discards or bycatchregulatory problem, As a result,the problem of limitedentry as an economist'ssolution to fishery problemsmay be reduced, Limited entryshoukl not be viewedas generating a singleoptimum solution frequentlyviewed as monopolistic!, but as contributing to a multi-sided solution to a multi-sided problem. Limited entry initially wasproinoted because of two salient observations: I! unrestrictedaccess to a fisheryresults in biological and economicdepression; and ! directregulations on theoperations of individual harvestingfirms i.e., quotas,area and gearrestrictions, etc,! provideone-sided constraints on production i.e., they are inefficient!,~ Limited entry providesthe advantageaf restrictingan easily quantifiable input numberof vessels!and thus provides a constrainton fishingeffort without restrictingactual fishing practices. Unfortunately,regulation of bycatchor discardsis a form of direct regulation,since output taxeshave not been considered in U.S, fisheries. Interestingly, McConnell and Norton identified bycatchin a limited entry systemoriented toward a multispeciesfishery anecosystem basis! as a majorproblem. Therefore, the problem is to adjustlimited entry schemesto accountfor the joint productionnature of the discardsor bycatchfisheries. Managershave used limited entry primarily in fisherieswhere bycatchis not a majorproblem, However,in its currentapplication in Northwestern Hawaiian Islands bottomfish and its proposed application to main HawaiianIslands pelagics tunasand billfish!, bycatchcan be a major portion of the production. One shouldview limited entry in thesesituations as placing a general

'A transcriptof the completepresentation ia availablefrom the author. '-McConnell, K. E. and V, J, Norton. f980. An Evaluation of Limited Entry and Alternative FisheryManagetnent Schemes. In: LirniredFrtrry as a Fisheryllfanugement Toof. R. B, Rettig and J. 3. C. Ginter, editors. Seattle:University of WashingtonPress.

40 limit on overall productivecapacity, probably in an operating environmentof multispeciesand multipurposefisheries, rather than solving the problemor providing a singlepoint optimum. Alternative managementmeasures should be devisedto deal with thejoint production problems.

THE EFFECT OF LIMITED ENTRY ON BYCATCH ISSVES

DOROTHY M. LOWMAN, Western Pacific Fishery Management Council, Honolulu, Hawaii

ABSTRACT Licenselimitation programstheoretically can limit the numberof fishermenor vesselsin a fisheryto a level which optimally harveststhe resource.However, in the Americansystem of fisherymanagement, the processof policymaking does not allow for a "benevolentdictator" to set an optimal fieet size. Developmentand implementationof a licenselimitation programhas usuallyrequired the perceptionof a crisisby fisheryparticipants. By the time this crisis is recognized,overcapitalization has occurred to the point wherethe numberof participantsfar exceedsoptimal fleet size. The minimal numberof licensesacceptable will be that numberwhich grandfathersin enoughparticipants to makethe programpolitically feasible. In fisheries such as the West Coast salmon fishery, this acceptancelevel is far abovethe optimal fieet size. In thesecases, existing bycatchissues will continue. Capital stuffing will gradually increaseeffective effort, intensifying the racefor hsh and relatedbycatch problems.Limited access may slow down this process but will not in and of itself solve bycatch problems. A managementregime which effectively addressesbycatch issues may useseveral management tools. In this context,one can makea case that license limitation could be an important tool in creation of an effective bycatchmanagement regime. Limited entry would definethe effort pool for short rangeplanning and negotiationpurposes. The effectivenessof licenselimitation programsin promotinga climate wherecooperative negotiation can be usedto developbycatch manageinentregimes increases as the numberof participantsin a fishery

'A transcriptof the comp!etepresentation is availablefrom the author.

41 is reduced. Allocation and bycatchdecisions are intricately intertwined. The processof makingallocation and bycatch decisions varies from fishery managementcouncil to counciland fishery by fishery,These differences in approachcan be illustrated through comparison of the annual regulatoryprocess for theWest Coast salmon fishery, the allocation of West Coastsablefish trawl and fixed gearfisheries, the North Pacific "BycatchCommittee," and gear confiicts in theHawaiian pelagic fisheries.

LIMITED ENTRY BETSY ANDREWS, SeaGrant ExtensionProgram, University of California, Davis

DISCUSSION SUMMARY Limitedentry systems use the restriction of fishingeffort to addressa broadrange of managementobjectives, including conserving fish stocks, increasingeconomic efficiency, and addressing equity concerns. The establishmentof a discretegroup of fishingunits, most often individuals or vessels, is the core of limited entry systems, Limited entry doesnot directly addressbycatch and discard problems.Management tools such as gear and seasonal restrictions affectcomposition of thecatch; limited entry seeks to controlthe level and compositionof effort, Theprimary value of limitedentry with regardto joint catchis the formationof a discretegroup of fishermen, A definedpool of participantscan sirnphfy implementation of othermanagement tools, Underlimited entry, managers know the level of short-termfishing effort and havean identifiablegroup to negotiatewith concerningmore selectivecontrols on bycatch.Fishermen with permitshave a proprietary interestin the future of the fishery and, in theory,a morestable economic environment in which to make decisions. Theadvantages of a limitedentry system begin to disappearas the level of effort rises. The behaviorof individuals within the group is greatlydependent on the visibility of eachfishermen to therest of the group and thus to the sizeof the group, Sincelimited entry systemsare usuallyestablished well afterfishing effort becomesexcessive, the initial allocationis often the sameas the fieet sizeunder open access, The numberof fishingvessels is mostoften controlled, rather than fishing

42 power, Overcapitalization often continues since the incentive remains for each vessel owner to constantly upgrade his vessel to catch more fish more quickly. The early unregulated U.S. involvement in the Alaskan groundfish fishery shortly after passageof the MagnusonFishery Management and Conservation Act is an example of a small group of fishermen who were able to work cooperatively to self-police their bycatch, However, in almost all fisheries in which limited entry has been used, the initial allocationof permitshas been large and well beyondthe biological and economic optimum for the fishery. California's salmon fishery is an excellent example of a limited entry allocation which "grandfathers in" overcapacity,although joint catchis not a seriousproblem in this fishery. The value of limited entry systemsin managingfor joint catchis that they provide a defined effort pool. Limited entry does not specifically addressmanagement of joint catch. The benefitof limited entry to both managersand fishermendissipates as the numberof participantsand the level of capitalization in the fleet increase.

LIMITED ENTRY

SMALL GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS

Participants: Doug Gordon, Dorothy Lowman, John Richards, Court Smith, Ed Ueber. Summarizer: Court Smith Limited entry programsaffect joint catchesindirectly. Effective limited entry clarifies the identity of the group of fishermen and can enablethem to deal constructivelywith joint catchproblems. Limited entry can also help in developinginterest in the fishery's future and increasethe willingnessof participantsto deal with problemsthat are in the long-term best interest of the fishery. We definedeffective limited entry as a programthat prevents overcapitalization.Fishing capacity should be equalto or lessthan the amount required to take the sustainable yield. Moratoriums and limited entry fisheries in which capacity is more than what is needed to take the sustainableyield will not be successfulin handlingjoint catchproblems. Limited entry cannotbe introducedinto alreadyovercapitalized fisheries and be effective. In an alreadyovercapitalized fishery, license fees and different classesof licensesmay be more effective in reducingthe number of people fishing, Most limited entry programs in effect are for relatively

43 homogeneous,single speciesfisheries, such as surf clams in New Jersey; abalone, salmon, sea urchins, and herring in California; sea urchin» in Oregon;and NorthwesternIsland bottornfish in Hawaii. Eachfishery has different joint catchproblems. Eachrequires a separateset of specific goals for dealing with joint catch. Because limited entry maintains a known group of continuing hshermen, it makes joint catches more manageable. Since limited entry assuresfishermen of continued participation, they have incentives to improve the fishery over the long term. Limited entry doesnot prevent use of other management tools, such a» seasons,area closures, quota~, bycatchpools, mesh size, prohibited species, and individual transferable quotas. With a morestable population of fishermen,introduction of managementtools to control joint catchmay work better, With limited entry, fishermenare likely to be more professional,and this facilitates creation of voluntary codes of practice. With any programto managejoint catch,managers niu»t recognize that changewill be the norm. Marketswill createdifferent demands, Natural variation will affect the abundance and location of fish stock», Fishermenwill invent new fishing techniquesthat influencejoint catches. It is unlikely that any single set of management measureswill work continually without adjustment. To deal with change, managers and the industry must recognizethat all the desirablefacts will neverbe available. There has to be trust and willingness to experiment. Dealing I with changerequires adequate data on markets,fish stocks,and fishing patterns.Values relating to privacy and laws aboutconfidentiality make gatheringthe requireddata difficult, Obtainingadequate data also requiresthe resourcesfor collection andanalysis. Some of the data required to managejoint catch problenis include information about vessels and catching technologies. We need to know the capacityof the fishing fieet andto project future changesin capacity. Even with limited entry, innovative fishermen will increase their catchingcapacity. The relationshipof catchingtechnology and fishing patternsto the speciesinvolved in joint catchneeds to be understood. The structure of the fieet, the incentives driving fishermen, and the annualcycle of fishing are important. What are the socioeconomic dimensions of catch distribution, innovation, and movement of the fishermen?Are therepractical or institutional constraintson the approachestaken to joint catch? Sincea stablegroup of fishermenwho are willing to work togetherfor the long-termwelfare of the fishery is one of the assetsof limited entry, education and team building may be needed to realize this benefit. Fisheriesdo not operateindependently. Limited entry fisheries interactwith other openaccess, limited entry, and quota hsheries,These interactionsinvolve competitionbetween groups of fishermen.We must understandand take in o accountthe placeof limited entry in the scheme of ail relatedfisheries in formulating approachesto joint catchproblems. Limited entry as a managementapproach can havethe effect of restricting innovation and change. It can restrict movement and adjustmentsbetween fisheries. Becauseof this, limited entry is very difficult to use in multispecieshsheries and wherethere are many interactionswith other fishing activities. Limited entry programs,and management programs in general, that focus on smaller and more geographicallyconsistent management untis will bemore successful. Gearmobility and mobility betweenfisheries increase joint catch problems, Fisheriesthat take placeover a very shorttime worsenjoint catch,bycatch, and over-catch. Typically fishery management, especiallylimited entry, gives a franchisein the fishery to someand not others. Those disenfranchised will act in their own self-interest. Whatis the best placeto introducea managementchange" ,ls it at the federal,regional, state, or local levels? Who hasthe responsibilityfor introducingmanagement programs? Fishery management requires people to balance biological and human dimension». One of the human pressuresis to want theproblem fixed now, Usually patienceand more time is required.

Recommendations 1. The fishingcapacity of'the fleet needsto be known and future change» in capacityprojected, 2. Limited entry can createa relativelystable group of participants and createincentives for maintainingthe long-termviability of the fishery, Theseadvantage» should be usedin cooperatively attackingjoint catchproblems, 3. Managementagencies should design and conductlife history and monitoring projectsrelated to joint catchescooperatively with industry, 4. We must mproveunderstanding of how limited entryfisheries interactwith other openaccess, quota, or limited entry fisheries. 5, Eachlimited entry fishery is likely to requireits own specific methodsfor dealing with joint catchproblems.

45 6. The costof collectingand analyzingdata on joint catch management,aswell as the effects of jointcatch regulations on theindustry, needs to be understood. INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS BYCATCH AS A COMPONENT OF AN INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTA MANAGEMENT REGIME: THE NEW ZEALAND SITUATION DOUGLAS B. GORDON,American High SeasFisheries Association, Seattle, Washington

ABSTRACT' Bycatchis pervasivein all fisheries,In a quotafishery, fish caught outsidethe quota are bycatch. With theconsideration by certainU.S. fisheriesof new managementregimes, such as continuedopen access, licenselimitation, andindividual fishing quotas,the crafting of an appropriatebycatch component is necessary,Bycatch assumes many forms and relatesto full accountability,full utilization, andconsideration of foregonebenefits to theindividual, the fishery, and to thenation. Bycatchreduction touches on everyaspect of themanagement and conservationregime. Theseinclude: l! goalsand objectives,! understandingof the problemsfor which thereare solutions and acceptanceof problemsfor whichsolutions appear partial or currently unavailable,! legislationand regulations,! enforcementby the agencyand compliancebehavior of the industry,! the industry complexand its prosecutionof thefishery from harvestto market,and ! researchand developmentboth in biological stock and into gear technologyand gear'sbehavioral interaction with the stocksunder different conditions attd times. We can learn a greatdeal by examininghow New Zealandis handlingbycatch within its recentlyimplemented individual transferable quota/quotamanagement system ITQ/QMS!. The New Zealand system servesas a world fishery managementlaboratory and may provideuseful cluesto both managersand fishermenin the United Statesand elsewhere as they wrestlewith the following questions.Which is the bestfishery managementregime for our fishery?And how might we deal with our multitude of bycatchproblems within that regime? New Zealand'sbycatch problems include: I! how to fish more cleanlyin a multi-speciesbottom and off-bottom ground fishery, ! how to avoid overcatchof targetand nontargetspecies, ! gearconIIicts in competitionfor species,! smalland damaged fish, ! forfeitureand quotabalancing, ! highgrading, discards, targeting, and dumping, and A transcriptof thecomplete presentation is available from the author. ! accountabilityof all withdrawalsunder the total allowablecatch. Otherbycatch issues include: I! widerproblems of full utilization,! wastedisposal, ! habitatprotection, ! reductionof fish kill by gear design,and ! changesin fishermenbehavior culminating in evolving written voluntary industry codesof practicecovering various fisheries,

MULTISPECIES FISHERY CHALLENGES WITH INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS ITQS!

CHRISTOPHER M. DEWEES, Sea Grant Extension Program, Departmentof Wildlife andFisheries Biology, University of California, Davis

ABSTRACT' Under ITQs, bycatchand discardproblems are at the level of the individual fishermen as well as the entire fleet. Obtaining aggregate landingsin multispeciesfisheries that have total allowablecatches that do not matchthe catchmix is problematic. Individual fishermenwith limitedquota and a strongdesire to maximizerevenues have motivation to discard lower-valued fish or fish for which they do not have quota. In theory, ITQs provide bycalchsolutions through trading of quota. New Zealand'sthree-year ITQ experiencereveals multispecies fisheries problemswith highgrading,discards, total allowablecatch overruns, and total allowable catch underruns, Highgradingoccurred primarily in the snapperfishery, wherelarge pricedifferentials existed. The problem has lessened considerably as fishermenchanged methods to targetvaluable export marketsand also found alternative markets for lower grade fish. Bycatchis still a problem. Most official and unofficial solutionshave beenindustry initiated. The most severeproblem was in the hoki/hake/lingfishery. Methodsused in dealingwith New Zealand bycatchproblems include; ! carrying 10 percentunder- or over-quota into the next year,! buying or selling quota,! fishing "on behalf" or quotaleases, ! surrenderingcatch to thegovernment for a nominalfee, ! trading off of economicequivalents through the government,! misreportingcatches, ! underreportingor black marketsales, 8! changingfishing methods,and 9! changingtotal allowablecatch

'A transcriptol' the completepresentation is availablefrom the author.

49 estimates. Some idea» to consider in dealing with multispecies fishery challengesunder ITQs include: l ! restrict ~ellingback of bycatchto governmentat beginningof scheme,! create"rnultispecies ITQ baskets"based on historical catch mix, ! build in fiexibility to deal with variations in stock size, ! encourage fiuidity in ITQ market, ! improve TAC estimates, and ! deal with price differentials by establishing separateITQs for each price level.

ITQS AND THE BYCATCH PROBLEM

JAMES E. WiLEN, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of California, Davis

ABSTRACT' The adoptionof ITQs in New Zealandfisheries i» a radicaland exciting departurefrom conventionalfisheries management, A question which naturally arisesat this point is: what can we infer from the New Zealandexperience about how ITQs might affect bycatchif adoptedin Pacific coast fisheries? Unfortunately, with only a few years' experience in the New Zealand case, it is not perfectlyclear which characteristics of the new systemare transitionaland which will persistas the industry and managersfine-tune Pe system. Two points seemworth noting at this juncture. First, it is importantto realize that the fishing technologyand methods that currently exist on the Pacific coast are themselvesproducts of theexisting managementstructure. Most fisheriesevolve througha processthat is initialky relatively unrestrictedopen access towards one best characterized as restricted: either restricted open accessor restricted closed access, Regulators typically create and adapt methods that restrict fishermen'sbehavior and technologyin order to preventhsh stocksfrom being overharvested.Season and areaclosures and gear/technology restrictionsare the chief instrumentsused for this objective. Simultaneously, fishermen create and adapt new vessel/gear designs and fishing methodsto circumventregulatory restrictions. Thus,there is nothing inherentlyefficient about the existing fleet configurationand its fishing methods,including the rate of bycatch,harvest distribution, etc.

'A transcriptof the completepresentation is availablefrom the author.

50 In fact,it is likely thatthe mass-contact, nonselective fishing with high bycatch!that dominates Pacific coast groundfisheries results more from quota-based,short-season open access competition than from any inherenttechnological superiority of trawls. Thecorollary to this is that tryingto predictwhat might happe~ with a radicalrestructuring of management such as adoption of ITQs!is boundto surpriseus. We cannoteven take as given that existing boat/gearconfigurations and fishingmethods will evenbe viable.An ITQ basedgroundfishery may becomposed mainly of longline vesselstargeting individual species ratherthan mixed-species trawl vessels. What is clearis thatITQ systemscompletely alter incentives, specifically by givingfishermen the ability to reapthe rewards of moreprofitable fishing methods, technologies, etc. A secondimportant point is thatthe typical focus on production efficiencymay be misguided,Most supporters of ITQs andother moves awayfrom openaccess structures! have typically fixed attention on the reductionsin coststhat might be possible, In fact, the largestgains may comeabout by increasingthe inarket value of thesame quantity of fish. For example,since ITQs eliminate much of theincentive for therace to catch fish, the industrycan stretchthe seasonout, sell a largerproportion in lucrative fresh markets, and maximize the quality of delivered fish with bettermethods of handlingand preserving them. The market,in turn,may adapt to theyear-round availability of fishwith higherand less variableprices. This would give fishermenadded incentive to move awayfrom low quality,mass contact, mixed species methods and attendanthigh bycatch! towards more direct methods. Evidence for this is alreadyemerging in theNew Zealand case. In somefisheries formerly dominatedby compressedtrawl harvests of mixedspecies, the fleet is now largelylong-line and species directed over a muchlonger season. In some cases revenues have increased threefold for roughly the same quantities of fish. Bothof thesepoints give credence to theidea that a radicalchange in managementinstitutions will giverise to a radicalchange in fishing technology,fishing methods, and market structure. It wouldbe naive and almostcertainly wrong, therefore,to simply extrapolatewhat we see now as a future scenario. What is certain is that ITQs alter the incentive systemfacing fishermen in a dramaticway, enabling them to adoptcost- savingand price-enhancingmethods and move away from the raceto simplycatch as many fish as possible, The small bit of evidencewe do haveon the specificsof thesenew methodsindicates that bycatch problemsare certainly reduced if not yeteliminated! under ITQs.

51 In fact,it is likely that the mass-contact,nonselective fishing with high bycatch!that dominates Pacific coast groundfisheries results more from quota-based,short-season open access competition than from any inherenttechnological superiority of trawls. The corollary to this is that tryingto predictwhat might happen with a radicalrestructuring of management such as adoption of ITQs!is bound to surpriseus. We cannoteven takeas giventhat existingboat/gear configurations and fishingmethods will evenbe viable. An ITQ basedgroundfishery may becomposed mainly of long line vesselstargeting individual species ratherthan mixed-species trawl vessels,What is Hear is thatITQ systemscompletely alter incentives, specifically by giving fishermenthe ability to reapthe rewardsof more profitablefishing methods, technologies,etc, A secondimportant point is that the typical focuson production efficiencymay be misguided. Most supportersof ITQs and other moves awayfrom openaccess structures! have typically fixed attention on the reductionsin coststhat mightbe possible.In fact, thelargest gains may comeabout by increasingthe market value of thesame quantity of fish. Forexample, since ITQs eliminatemuch of the incentivefor therace to catchfish, the industry canstretch the seasonout, sell a largerproportion in lucrative fresh markets,and maximize the quality of deliveredfish with betterinethods of handlingand preserving them. The market,in turn,may adaptto theyear-round availability of fish with higher and less variableprices. This would give fishermenadded incentive to move awayfrom low quality, masscontact, mixed speciesmethods and attendanthigh bycatch! towards more direct methods, Evidencefor this is alreadyemerging in theNew Zealandcase. In somefisheries formerly dominatedby compressedtrawl harvests of mixedspecies, the IIeetis nowlargely long-line andspecies directed over a muchlonger season. In some casesrevenues have increased threefold for roughly the same quantitiesof fish. Bothof thesepoints give credence to theidea that a radical changein managementinstitutions will giverise to a radicalchange in fishing technology,fishing methods, and marketstructure. It would be naive andalmost certainly wrong, therefore, to simplyextrapolate what we see now as a future scenario. What is certain is that ITQs alter the incentive systemfacing fishermen in a dramaticway, enabling them to adoptcost- savingand price-enhancing methods and move away fromthe race to simplycatch as many fish as possible.The smallbit of evidencewe do haveon the specificsof thesenew methodsindicates that bycatch problemsare certainly reduced if not yet eliminated!under ITQs.

51 INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS AND JOINT CATCHES BONNIE MCCAY, Departmentof HumanEcology, RutgersUniversity, Princeton, New Jersey

DISCUSSION SUMMARY The individual quotasystem of management,in which each participantin the fisheryreceives the right to harvesta fixedor proportionalshare of a total allowablecatch, has become widespread. Onerecent survey reviews twelve suchsystems in Atlantic Canada,the GreatLakes, Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand.' Another individual quota systemin the surf clam and oceanquahog fishery of the U.S. East Coast may soon begin, and the North Pacihc Fisheries Management Council is consideringindividual quotas. Someof thosesystems also allow the quota holder to lease,buy, and sell quotas. Theseare called "individual transferablequotas" ITQs!. In our discussionabout implicationsof managementfor discardsand joint catches,we usually referred to the two interchangeably. The individual quotasystem can be castin two seemingly contradictoryways: I! as a latestage in an evolutionaryprocess toward privatizationof marineresources, and 2! as a wayfor the peopleof a nation to gain value from their commonproperty through the resource rentals that accrue. Questions remain, and vary between nations and cultures,about the political acceptabilityand meaning of this system. A major social issuearising wheresuch privatization has taken place or is being consideredis how to protectthe interestsof native groups,isolated coastal communities, and others who may be disadvantaged in a system that allots rights with few constraintson transferabilityto individuals, Community quotasare now appearingin New Zealandand Atlantic Canadaand are being discussedfor the north Pacific, A major ecologicalconcern about individual quota managementis the incentive it creates for high-grading, or culling the catch so only the more valuable fish or shellfish are actually brought in and counted againstan individual quota. In New Zealand,which manages28 species with ITQs, the bycatch/jointcatch problem is very evident. ITQs do not solve the problems of multispecies fisheries inanagement and may intensify some of them. Individual quotas motivate fishermen to cheat,

~B. Muse and K. Schelle. 1989. Individual Fishermen's Quotas: A Preliminary Review of SomeRecent Programs. 3urteau: Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Comtnission.

52 dump, and highgrade in their efforts to increase the value of their property rights. Discards and joint catches become individual fisherman issues, not fleet issues, but in the aggregate they affect the entire system by over- or under-running total allowable catches TACs!. In theory, individual quota management also has greater potential for dealing with the problem by changing the incentive structure for individuals. For example, to maximize value the fishing firm may decide to change its gear to reduce bycatch and increase selectivity for a valued species. A well-designed individual quota systein can also make it possible for fishing firms to keep some flexibility, given natural variation in fish stocks and the mix of aggregate catches, while remaining accountable by using provisions to roll over portions of annual quotas to the next year or to trade quota after the fact. Laws against discards and laws requiring the landing of all fish caught are important for accountability, but can be very difficult and costly to enforce. The challenge remains to build accountability for bycatchand discardsinto the managementsystem, but the potentialis there. Other approachestaken so far include forfeiture of bycatch for which one does not have quota, and monthly quota balancing by purchase or lease of quota. Small and damaged fish, if counted against quota, can be dumped. The rule is "do what you want but it counts against your quota," If followed, this rule should improve accountability and responsibility, Thediscards an'd joint catchproblem with individualquotas is most usefully viewed as a problem of cost. It is the cost of avoiding undesirablebehaviors given the incentivescreated by an ITQ system. Included should be the costs of accurate information, both as they affect the accuracy of TAC estimates and as they affect accessto information such as in the NZ electronic trading system the coinplexity of that system has transaction costs above what most smaller fishing firms are willing io pay!. One focus is on ways to reduce the costs. Another is to change the incentive structure, so costs and benefits once exteirialized or easily passedoff to othersor future generationsare broughtback to the individual. A properly designedindividual quotasystem, particularly an ITQ system, should, in theory, do just that. The challenge of designing individual quota systems that reduce bycatchand discardsalso calls for active and effectiveparticipation by membersof the industry. Legitimacy of a systemis improvedby participation;the New Zealandsystem may be a model,although not all fishermenfelt fully informedand fairly representedin the process. Finally, a danger with individual quota management is that it will

53 intensify the highly competitive,individualist natureof many commercialfisheries and work againstcooperation in resourceuse and management.Participation in managementmay help counter this trend and may help engendera senseof sharedresponsibility, but it also has thepotential of creatingan adversarialclimate or, worse,one of mutual distrust. The challenges for fishing industries and managers are great.

INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS

SMALL GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS Participants:Bonnie McCay, SamPooley, Steve Turner, Wally Pereyra. Surnmarizers;Bonnie McCay and Chris Dewees The group identified threegoals of ITQs. A primary goal was economicefficiency throughthe reductionof costs end of the "racefor fish"! and the motivation to maximize pricesreceived far the catch, A secondgoal was to increasethe benefitsto the nationthrough resource rentals and efficient utilization of fish resources. A third goal was industry's paymentof resourcerentals in exchangefor thecertainty of exclusiveharvest rights of a proportionof thetotal allowablecatch. Finally, ITQs couldreduce the costs of managementif controlsother thancatch monitoring are removed, A generalproblem with ITQs is that some resourcesare not includedin the ITQ system.If thesenon-ITQ resourcesare part of the bycatch,it will be difficult to managebycatch underITQ schemes. The groupdiscussed the likelyeffects of ITQs on bycatch. We noted increasedmotivation to highgradeone's catchto land only the most valuableportion of the catchbecause fishermen will want to maximize revenuesunder ITQs. However, ITQs also give increasedopportunities to reducediscard of bycatchby ! providingcapability to buyor lease morequota to cover bycatch,! reducingthe race for the fish, which allowsfishing when and where bycatch is lessof a problemor the useof moreselective gear is economicallyfeasible, and ! providingincentive to reducecosts due to cu!ling, The groupalso felt thatITQs will increasepressure for high quality stock assessments. Total allowable catch TAC! figures are critical in determiningparticipants' individual quotas. Industry is challenging TACs under New Zealand's ITQ system. Estimatesof TACs will be mostdiflicult in multispeciesfisheries or whenspecies abundance is interrelated.

54 Under ITQ», compliance with bycatch and discard regulation» could increase or decrease. ITQ owners should have a strong interest in the future health of thc resource becausethey stand to profit from increased resource abundance.On the other hand, ITQ ownership could become concentratedin a few hands,and thesecompanies' hired skipperswould have little motivation to comply. If important bycatch specie»were included in an ITQ scheme, it i» tnore likely that bycatch could be allocated efficiently, Non-target organisms such a» marine mammals, turtles, and birds could be included in ITQ systems, but it would be difficult to determine values and tradeoffs.

Recommendations 1. We need improved and more timely stock assessments, We need improved understanding of relationships betweenspecies. 2. We need research to improve understanding of recruitment processes, especially ef feet» of environmental vanable». Total allowable catche» TAC»! for short-lived species, such as squid, are especially difficult to set. 3. We need methods for determining unobserved mortality resulting from injury by gear, stress from culling, ctc. 4. We should optimize the use of social scientists in the study of ITQ effects. Examples of socioeconomic research needs include: I! handling non-monetary values of bycatch e.g., mammals!, ! measuring distributional and cultural effectsof ITQs on communities, ! determining how to value bycatch, ! dealing with windfall profits e.g., quota auctions!,and S! developingand measuring effects of incentives for reduced bycatch under ITQs.

55 g8>-f54