From Disguised Nonsense to Patent Nonsense: Thinking Philosophically

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From Disguised Nonsense to Patent Nonsense: Thinking Philosophically From Disguised Nonsense to Patent Nonsense: Thinking Philosophically by Richard PRING Oxford University 1. Introduction: the ‘analytic tradi- But it is the traditional job of philosophy tion’ of philosophy from Plato onwards to scratch beneath Few university departments of educa- the surface of ‘agreed meanings’ and to tion now offer courses in the philosophy show that what was thought to be clear is of education despite the fact that philoso- in fact very muddled, leading to unaccep- phical problems permeate the educational table consequences. Language, as the phi- questions which we need to address. Poli- losopher Wittgenstein demonstrated, can 2014, 249-261 año LXXII, nº 258, mayo-agosto tical answers to educational problems are so easily ‘bewitch the intelligence by the too often muddled because they have not use of words’, thereby leading to the belief addressed questions about the nature and that life is much less complicated than it division of knowledge, about what is worth really is. A major task of philosophy is to learning, about the relation of theory make people –especially those who think to practice, or about who should control they have the right answer– puzzled, un- española de pedagogía revista learning. Such have always been the pro- sure that they really are right, recogni- vince of philosophy from Plato onwards, sing the need to think more clearly. namely, epistemology (that is, theory of knowledge), ethics (that is, exploring A very good example of this is provided what is good and worthwhile), political by Plato in the Republic (Part I, 338). The philosophy (that is, the exploration of rather arrogant Thrasymachus defines ‘jus- what we mean by justice and the relation tice or right’ as ‘what is in the interest of the of the individual to the political power). stronger party’. Socrates sees a problem in that definition. What is meant by ‘in the in- Of course, we think we know what is terest of’? Socrates enlarges on his puzzle- meant by ‘education’, or by what is meant ment. For instance, Polydamas the athlete by ‘having learnt something’, or by ‘high is stronger than us, and it’s in his interest standards of achievement’ (as in the po- to eat beef to keep fit; we are weaker than litical responses to the four yearly PISA him, but you can’t mean that the same diet international comparison of standards). is in our interest and so right for us?’ 249 Richard PRING Thrasymachus now gets irritated as the tradition of Plato as exemplified in he refines his original definition to embra- the Socratic dialogues. Plato was aware of ce the state or government as the stron- ambiguity in words which played a pivo- ger party. In other words, those in power tal role in the other person’s argument. A are the ones who define what is right and lot hung on a particular and contestable just –which, in fact, would often seem interpretation. By giving counter-exam- to be the case. Socrates presses on with ples, he was able to bring this out –and the possible objections to this definition, (as in the example above) revealed the providing counter examples. Eventually, distinctively moral nature of the discour- Thrasymachus exits in a fit of temper. se on justice. Moreover, that verbal pro- What seemed straightforward had been bing led to deeper questions about the proved not to have been so. nature of the state and its relations to the individual members of the state– indeed, Typical of what is referred to as ‘socra- to the constitution of the Republic and to tic dialogue’ is the constant questioning of the form of education appropriate to the ‘what do you mean?’ Behind the apparent future citizens of the Republic. There is clarity of the words used are different an interconnection of ‘meanings’ through ‘usages’ conveying important differences which we understand the social world of meaning. But Plato (or Socrates) was and act intelligently within it. One task not simply going through the mechanical of the philosopher, and of the philosopher motions of asking ‘what do you mean?’ of education in particular, is to examine whenever someone said something he critically the understandings embodied disagreed with. In most every day con- in the language of the social world which versations, there is no ambiguity and no affect the policy and practice of education. significant disagreement about meaning. It would be odd indeed if, when someone It is within such a tradition that the asked you to sit on that chair, you respon- philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) ded by asking ‘what do you mean by ‘sit’ declared: or ‘chair’’. However, the meaning of many words is ‘contested’. That is, beneath su- «my aim is: to teach you to pass perficial agreement there are deeper dis­ from a piece of disguised nonsense to agreements, too often not recognised in something that is patent nonsense» disputations. The world of education is (1:464) full of them, as I shall illustrate in what follows –for example, what it means to be There is a lot of disguised nonsense in educated, or what counts as having un- what educational policy makers say and revista española de pedagogía revista 2014, 249-261 año LXXII, nº 258, mayo-agosto derstood a scientific explanation, or what in what educational researchers write. do you mean by ‘skill training’. This I shall illustrate though the impor- tance attached to such policies as: first, Much philosophy of education (within the need to produce a more skilled work- what is often referred to as ‘analytic phi- force; second, to distinguish between aca- losophy’ or ‘linguistic analysis’) is within demic and vocational learning and cour- 250 From Disguised Nonsense to Patent Nonsense: Thinking Philosophically ses; third, to raise standards especially in dancer, even of skilled thinkers amongst the light of the PISA international com- whom one would need to include Plato’s parisons; fourth, to improve the quality of Sophists (and there are now courses in teaching. ‘thinking skills’). There are, indeed, overlapping mea- 2. Working through examples nings. But assimilating these uses from different contexts leads to the wrong be- 2.1. Promoting a ‘skilled workforce’ lief that there is more in common than In Britain, as no doubt in most coun- there really is. For example, assump- tries, there is deep concern about the need tions are made about ‘transfer of learning for a more skilled workforce if the country skills’ which permeate different kinds of is to compete successfully in the ‘global thinking. Policies are promoted for the economy’. Too many leave school without development of skills as such in order to qualification and try to enter employment overcome the predicted shortage. Is this without the necessary skills. For this rea- not a case of being deceived by the assimi- son, a report was commissioned by the lation of meanings through the shared use Government to find out what skills were of a word? As Wittgenstein pointed out, needed in the future, how many skilled assimilating the descriptions of the uses workers there were currently, and what of words in this way cannot make the uses must be done to close the gap. There- themselves any more like one another. 2014, 249-261 año LXXII, nº 258, mayo-agosto fore, the consequent Leitch Review (2006), For, as we see, they are absolutely unlike. Prosperity for All in the Global Economy: World Class Skills argued that the eco- Therefore, whether or not the economy nomy by 2020 would require only 600,000 will need only 600,000 unskilled workers by unskilled workers as opposed to the seven 2020 is not an empirical matter (for exam- million today. Hence, the sense of crisis. ple, adding up the number of skills), but española de pedagogía revista However, other research contradicts this, a conceptual one. It all depends on what suggesting that there will remain the se- one means by ‘skill’, and there will be as ven million jobs requiring workers with- many differences of meaning as there are out skills. Who is correct? contexts in which the word ‘skill’ is applied. However, the problem of deciding who Let us take, for an example, the task is correct is partly a conceptual one. Is the of cleaning, in which many are occupied word ‘skill’ being used in the same way? but on very low wages. Is cleaning a si- It would surely have to be so if one is to killed job or not? And if it is classified as add up the number of non-skilled workers a skilled job, is that because it requires to 600,000 or to seven million. So, what one skill or several –sweeping up the dirt, do we mean by a ‘skill’? We talk of a per- removing stains, polishing the furniture? son being a skilled orator (even though If these are separate skills, do they need what he or she has to say is superficial), separate training courses (as well as ex- of a skilled carpenter, of a skilled ballet perience) for the cleaner to be a good clea- 251 Richard PRING ner? It is not clear whether ‘cleaning’ is sense. Hence, the dualism between acade- or is not included in the Leitch Report’s mic and vocational, when examined, does enumeration of the skilled workforce re- not make sense. It is part of the ‘disguised quired by 2020. It all depends on what nonsense’, resulting, first, in the demo- one means. tion of the arts and design and technology from general education for all, second, in the failure to see the kind of intelligen- 2.2.
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