MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XXV, NO. 4, WINTER 2018 UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Shahram Akbarzadeh Dr. Ahmed is a Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization at Deakin University, Australia. He is the author of Regionalism and Regional Security in South Asia: The Role of SAARC (Routledge, 2013). Prof. Akbarzadeh is Research Professor of Middle East & Central Asian Politics and Convenor of Middle East Studies Forum (MESF) at the Alfred Deakin Institute. Among his latest publications is The Politics and International Relations of the Middle East: Crisis Zone, with K Baxter (Routledge 2018). cholarship on Pakistan’s relations dynamic has significant bearing on Paki- with its neighbors predominantly stan’s policy on Iran and sheds light on focuses on India, Afghanistan behind-the-scene dynamics that are often and, most recently, China. Little overlooked. Sresearch is conducted on relations between Since its beginning in 1947, the rela- Pakistan and Iran. This is an obvious tionship between Iran and Pakistan has gap, given the cultural and religious links transformed significantly. At first, “Iran between these two neighbors that share a was a friend and brother.”5 There was 909-kilometer border.1 Their relationship significant bilateral cooperation in cul- is often viewed as peripheral to Pakistan’s tural, economic and security matters; for relations with the United States, Saudi Ara- example, Iran provided moral and material bia, India and Afghanistan.2 A prominent support to Pakistan in its 1965 and 1971 source on Pakistan’s foreign policy, Abdul wars against India.6 Pakistan was a front- Sattar’s Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947- line U.S. ally during the Afghan-Soviet 2016: A Concise History, does not even War (1979-88) and this affected Pakistan- dedicate a subsection to Iran.3 Further- Iran relations.7 According to Sattar, “The more, little attention has been given to the Iranian media perception of Pakistan as a impact of domestic factors on Pakistan’s proxy for U.S. interests in the region was foreign-policy choices. Although some painful to Pakistanis, who value Iran as a scholars have explored the role of identity,4 friend and a fraternal neighbor.”8 During the interplay between domestic consid- the 1980s, Pakistan’s closeness to the Gulf erations and external behavior remains Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, along understudied. As will be argued below, this with Islamization, triggered a sectarian © 2018, The Authors Middle East Policy © 2018, Middle East Policy Council 86 AHMED / AKBARZADEH: PAKISTAN’S RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN divide at home.9 The U.S.-led “War on Ter- interviewees who had given prior per- ror,” which brought Pakistan and the Unit- mission to be named in outcomes of this ed States together, added to the trust deficit research are given attribution. between Islamabad and Tehran. Currently, the level of economic cooperation is far OVERVIEW below its estimated potential, and there is In 1947, Tehran was quick to estab- no defense cooperation. Despite the often lish brotherly relations with Pakistan, publicized rhetoric on both sides referring becoming the first country to recognize to the other as a “brotherly state,” there its independence from the British Empire. have been skirmishes along the borders, Following the visit by Pakistan’s prime accusations of cross-border terrorism, an minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, diplomatic rela- Iranian general threatening Pakistan with a tions were established in 1948.11 The shah surgical strike, and an Iranian drone being of Iran was the first state leader to visit shot down in Pakistan.10 We argue that Pakistan — in 1950 — and, according to ideas and perceptions of national identity Abdul Sattar, he “was given a memorable have a direct bearing on how Pakistan welcome by enthusiastic crowds.”12 “Iran views Iran and makes sense of regional was a natural ally and role model for geopolitics. Pakistan in being a secular, centralized To address the central question under- and western-oriented state.”13 A major pinning this research, it is vital to directly opportunity for collaboration between Iran engage with members of civilian and mili- and Pakistan was provided by the U.S.-led tary institutions in Pakistan. The need for Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), a mix of civilian and military participants created in 1955. In an interview for the was felt due to the historic influence of the present study, one of Pakistan’s former Pakistani army in foreign-policy mak- defense secretaries, who wished to remain ing. To that end, comprehensive fieldwork anonymous, stated that CENTO was a involving 30 face-to-face interviews was crucial factor in further strengthening carried out in Islamabad during June-July Pakistan-Iran ties. While CENTO paved 2017. Participants belonged to a variety of the way for cooperation in security mat- fields: (1) three former and three current ters, the desire for economic cooperation ambassadors of Pakistan; (2) three retired was realized through the creation of the generals (one three-star and two two-star); Regional Cooperation for Development (3) seven researchers from prominent think (RCD) in 1964 among Iran,14 Pakistan and tanks; (4) seven academics with expertise Turkey.15 As a dependable ally, Tehran in Pakistan’s foreign policy; (5) two media mediated reconciliation between Afghani- personalities; (6) three members of local stan and Pakistan when tensions surfaced nongovernmental organizations working on during the 1960s owing to differences Shia-Sunni dialogue at the grassroots level; over the Durand Line demarcation.16 Teh- and (7) a member of Pakistan’s chambers ran had also provided material and moral of commerce. In some cases, there was an support to Pakistan in its 1965 war with overlap of the participants’ background and India. Particularly, in response to concerns experience. The interviews lasted 60-90 from India, the shah of Iran said, “Iran has minutes each and were conducted using a no aggressive intentions… But it will not semi-structured questionnaire. Only those accept any attempt to liquidate Pakistan.”17 87 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XXV, NO. 4, WINTER 2018 Relations between Iran and Pakistan tiously observed, “According to Pakistani remained friendly following the 1979 Ira- security analysts, there is Iranian funding nian revolution, which was soon followed and support in Afghanistan.”23 There have by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Iran been reports of Iranian funding to local and Pakistan opposed the Soviet move and, NGOs, media institutions and Pashtun- throughout the war, aided the anti-Soviet majority groups, including Hezb-e-Islami Mujahedeen to varying degrees. However, and the Taliban.24 Contrary to claims by the changing dynamics in Afghanistan Tehran,25 one think-tank researcher with a affected Pakistan’s relations with Iran. military background from Islamabad said Islamabad’s support for the Sunni Taliban that Iran supports the Taliban. He went government (1996-2001) brought India on to link his argument with the example and Iran closer in an anti-Taliban coalition of Mullah Mansour,26 who was killed in a (e.g., supporting the Northern Alliance).18 U.S. drone strike in Pakistan while return- This put Tehran and Islamabad in two ing from Iran. opposite camps. Pakistan supported the Contrary to the claim of a former Taliban, which sprang from Pashtun areas Pakistani defense secretary that there has of Afghanistan, and Iran backed the North- been no military cooperation between Iran ern Alliance, comprised largely of non- and Pakistan since the Islamic Revolution, Pashtun groups such as Tajiks, Uzbeks, there is evidence suggesting occasions of Turkmen and Hazaras.19 significant cooperation in this area. During The 2001 U.S.-led action in Afghani- the 1990s, there was some collaboration in stan created new tension between Iran and defense; for example, Pakistan provided Pakistan, as Tehran saw Pakistan’s sup- nuclear technology to Iran, and the two na- port for the military operation as facili- tions jointly produced Al-Khalid tanks. tating the presence of U.S. forces in the Clearly, Pakistan’s role in the U.S.-led region. In subsequent years, Pakistan, Iran war in Afghanistan has been a critical fac- and Afghanistan met to address areas of tor in relations between Iran and Pakistan. potential conflict, but the tripartite sum- An Islamabad-based analyst revealed mits have failed to generate convergence that Shamsi airbase in Balochistan, bor- among the stakeholders.20 The situation is dering Iran, has long been under UAE complex; Pakistan continues to advocate control and sublet to the United States for the Taliban’s inclusion in the future for launching drone strikes and reconnais- of Afghanistan and plays a major role in sance operations in the region, including bringing the Taliban to dialogue forums, to Iran. Former ambassador Fauzia Nas- such as a dialogue hosted by Islamabad reen elaborated on the post-9/11 alliance between the High Peace Council of between the United States and Pakistan: Afghanistan and the Taliban in Murree in “After 9/11, the relations between Iran and 2015.21 But Iran views this as a “re-Tali- Pakistan have deteriorated due to the U.S. banization” of Afghanistan and a ploy by using airbases in Pakistan, for example, the Pakistan to keep its sphere of influence.22 Shamsi base to fly drones in this region.” This unfaltering assessment is not news Pakistan’s geostrategic partnership with to Pakistani leaders. Many respondents in the United States has also been having this study turned the accusation back at spillover effects on economic cooperation Iran. For example, Taimur Shamil cau- between Iran and Pakistan.27 88 AHMED / AKBARZADEH: PAKISTAN’S RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN A convergence of Pakistan’s foreign continued funding of anti-Shiite groups in policy with that of Saudi Arabia, Iran’s Pakistan.