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NIST SP 800-119, Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of Ipv6

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NIST SP 800-119, Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of Ipv6 Special Publication 800-119 Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6 Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Sheila Frankel Richard Graveman John Pearce Mark Rooks NIST Special Publication 800-119 Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6 Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Sheila Frankel Richard Graveman John Pearce Mark Rooks C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 December 2010 U.S. Department of Commerce Gary Locke, Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology Dr. Patrick D. Gallagher, Director GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURE DEPLOYMENT OF IPV6 Reports on Computer Systems Technology The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analysis to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the development of technical, physical, administrative, and management standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of sensitive unclassified information in Federal computer systems. This Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL’s research, guidance, and outreach efforts in computer security and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-119 Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-119, 188 pages (Dec. 2010) Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. iii GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURE DEPLOYMENT OF IPV6 Acknowledgments The authors, Sheila Frankel of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Richard Graveman of RFG Security, John Pearce of Booz Allen Hamilton and Mark Rooks of L-1 Identity Solutions (formerly of Booz Allen Hamilton) wish to thank their colleagues who reviewed drafts of this document and contributed to its technical content. The authors would like to acknowledge Tim Grance of NIST for his keen and insightful assistance and encouragement throughout the development of the document. The authors particularly want to thank Mark Carson, Doug Montgomery and Stephen Nightingale of NIST and Scott Hogg for their careful review and valuable contributions to improving the quality of this publication. The authors also appreciate the efforts of those individuals, agencies, and other organizations that contributed input during the public comment period, including John Baird, DREN; Alistair de B Clarkson, nCipher; Vint Cerf, Google; John Curran, ARIN; Terry Davis, Boeing; Francois Donze and Michael Scott Pontillo, HP; Jeffrey Dunn, Chern Liou, and Jeffrey Finke, Mitre; Fernando Gont, the UK Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (UK CPNI); Bob Grillo, US Army; Cecilia Hall, Don Radeke and Joseph Bertrand, USMC; J. Holland, David Leach, Sam Nguyen, M. Roed, Beth Scruggs, D. Wellington and Joe Williams, Aerospace Corp.; Ed Jankiewicz, SRI International; Ralph Kenyon, Caida; Lovell King II, Dept. of State; Joe Klein, IPv6 Security Researcher; Dan Luu, VA; Trung Nguyen, FAA; Carroll Perkins, Serco-NA; and Martin Radford, University of Bristol. iv GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURE DEPLOYMENT OF IPV6 Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................. 1 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1-1 1.1 Authority .................................................................................................................1-1 1.2 Purpose and Scope ................................................................................................1-1 1.3 Audience ................................................................................................................1-1 1.4 Document Structure ...............................................................................................1-1 2. Introduction to IPv6 ....................................................................................................... 2-1 2.1 Early History of IPv6 ...............................................................................................2-1 2.2 Limitations of IPv4 ..................................................................................................2-1 2.3 Major Features of the IPv6 Specification ................................................................2-2 2.3.1 Extended Address Space ........................................................................... 2-3 2.3.2 Autoconfiguration ....................................................................................... 2-3 2.3.3 Header Structure ........................................................................................ 2-3 2.3.4 Extension Headers ..................................................................................... 2-4 2.3.5 Mandatory Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) Support ................................ 2-4 2.3.6 Mobility ....................................................................................................... 2-4 2.3.7 Quality of Service (QoS) ............................................................................. 2-5 2.3.8 Route Aggregation ..................................................................................... 2-5 2.3.9 Efficient Transmission ................................................................................ 2-5 2.4 IPv4 and IPv6 Threat Comparison ..........................................................................2-5 2.5 Motivations for Deploying IPv6 ...............................................................................2-7 3. IPv6 Overview ................................................................................................................ 3-1 3.1 IPv6 Addressing .....................................................................................................3-2 3.1.1 Shorthand for Writing IPv6 Addresses ........................................................ 3-5 3.1.2 IPv6 Address Space Usage ....................................................................... 3-6 3.1.3 IPv6 Address Types ................................................................................... 3-7 3.1.4 IPv6 Address Scope ................................................................................... 3-7 3.1.5 IPv4 Addressing ......................................................................................... 3-9 3.1.6 IPv4 Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) Addressing ........................ 3-10 3.1.7 Comparing IPv6 and IPv4 Addressing ...................................................... 3-11 3.2 IPv6 Address Allocations ...................................................................................... 3-12 3.2.1 IPv6 Address Assignments ...................................................................... 3-12 3.2.2 Obtaining Globally Routable IPv6 Address Space .................................... 3-14 3.3 IPv6 Header Types, Formats, and Fields.............................................................. 3-16 3.4 IPv6 Extension Headers ....................................................................................... 3-18 3.5 Internet Control Message Protocol for IPv6 (ICMPv6) .......................................... 3-22 3.5.1 ICMPv6 Specification Overview ............................................................... 3-22 3.5.2 Differences between IPv6 and IPv4 ICMP ................................................ 3-25 3.5.3 Neighbor Discovery .................................................................................. 3-26 3.5.4 Autoconfiguration ..................................................................................... 3-28 3.5.5 Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU) Discovery .............................. 3-29 3.5.6 Security Ramifications .............................................................................. 3-30 3.6 IPv6 and Routing .................................................................................................. 3-34 3.6.1 Specification Overview ............................................................................. 3-34 3.6.2 Security for Routing Protocols .................................................................. 3-35 v GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURE DEPLOYMENT OF IPV6 3.6.3 Unknown Aspects .................................................................................... 3-36 3.7 IPv6 and the Domain Name System (DNS) .......................................................... 3-36 3.7.1 DNS Transport Protocol ........................................................................... 3-37 3.7.2 DNS Specification Overview .................................................................... 3-37 3.7.3 Security Impact and Recommendations
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