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Deliverability: Trust and Reputation: Data from the Receiver’S Side Deliverability: Trust and reputation: data from the Receiver’s side Marco Franceschetti Head of Deliverability In a nutshell • Founded in 1998, Contactlab offers the end-to-end engagement marketing platform that enables brands to gain insights into the context of each customer and deepen the retail experience by delivering highly personalized digital direct messages across channels based on events, preferences and product lifecycle • Thanks to its technology and digital experts, Contactlab is the strategic partner for commerce- focused companies and fashion & luxury brands to achieve a deeper understanding of customers, to deliver a uniquely relevant messages at every touchpoint of the customer journey and to measure performances with real-time dashboards that display all the relevant data 2 © Copyright 2016 Contactlab © Copyright 2016 Contactlab This document may not be modified, organizedThis document or reutilized may in notany be way modified, without organizedthe express or written reutilized permission in any way of thewithout rightful the own expresser. written permission of the rightful owner. Facts & Figures • More than 15 years of experience and leadership in engagement marketing • 1 HQ in Milano, 4 OFFICES in Europe • 80 MILLIONS of emails sent every day • 6.3 TERABYTE of data handled daily by our systems • + 1000 clients in different industries across the world • In 2014, the entry of P101, the venture capital operator, turns Contactlab into a company limited by shares • Exane BNP Paribas has partnered since 2013 with Contactlab for their digital strategy reports for the fashion-luxury industry • Contactlab has been included for the second time in the Gartner Market Guide for Email Marketing (2015) 3 © Copyright 2016 Contactlab © Copyright 2016 Contactlab This document may not be modified, organizedThis document or reutilized may in notany be way modified, without organizedthe express or written reutilized permission in any way of thewithout rightful the own expresser. written permission of the rightful owner. Our service lines Engagement Marketing Platform: • Data capture & data consolidation • Planning • Multichannel sending • Analytics and Dashboards • Data Analysis Prediction & Recommendations • Customer Survey • Benchmarking • Digital assessment • Digital strategy • Application Development and Integration Services • Deliverability • Campaign Management (creative, production, localization) • Customer survey 4 © Copyright 2016 Contactlab © Copyright 2016 Contactlab This document may not be modified, organizedThis document or reutilized may in notany be way modified, without organizedthe express or written reutilized permission in any way of thewithout rightful the own expresser. written permission of the rightful owner. Contents Trust and Engagement: • Is Phishing targeting the Retail sector? • Phishing and fraud endangering your Brand? Email Reputation: • Why is it important? • How do you know if your Email reaches the inbox? • Inbox data on the Receiver’s side 5 © Copyright 2016 Contactlab This document may not be modified, organized or reutilized in any way without the express written permission of the rightful owner. Is Phishing targeting the Retail sector? “Phishing attacks are on the rise. In the first quarter of 2016, the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) observed more phishing attacks than at any other time in history.” Return Path “Phishing is a criminal mechanism employing both social engineering and technical subterfuge to steal consumers’ personal identity data and financial account credentials. Social engineering schemes use spoofed e-mails purporting to be from legitimate businesses and agencies, designed to lead consumers to counterfeit websites that trick recipients into divulging financial data such as usernames and passwords […]”. Anti-Phishing Working Group “Fighting Phishing: Protect Your Brand, Combat Email Spoofing”. Gartner 6 © Copyright 2016 Contactlab This document may not be modified, organized or reutilized in any way without the express written permission of the rightful owner. Trust and Engagement PHISHING Email as a channel is under attack. More than half of internet users get at least one phishing email per day. (Phishing.org) Customers are 42 percent less likely to do business with you if you are being targeted by a phishing attack, regardless of whether or not they are actually getting tricked into giving up their information. (Cloudmark) The Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) says it observed a Source: APWG Q1 2016 Phishing Activity Trends Report record-breaking 250 percent surge in phishing attacks between October 2015 and March 2016. According to its latest report, the number of unique phishing websites detected in Q1 totaled 289,371, with more than 123,000 of those sites being discovered in March 2016 alone. (Tripwire) 7 © Copyright 2016 Contactlab This document may not be modified, organized or reutilized in any way without the express written permission of the rightful owner. Is Phishing targeting the Retail sector? ““The Retail/Service sector remained the most-targeted industry sector, with 42.71 percent of attacks […]” Source: APWG Q1 2016 Phishing Activity Trends Report 8 © Copyright 2016 Contactlab This document may not be modified, organized or reutilized in any way without the express written permission of the rightful owner. Phishing and fraud endangering your Brand? Email Domain Authentication DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) DKIM checks the message content, deploying digital signatures, which are distributed via the DNS and associates a message to a domain name. http://www.dkim.org/ Sender Policy Framework (SPF) SPF checks whether the sender's IP address is authorized by one of the identified http://www.openspf.org/ Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance (DMARC) Allows to specify a policy for authenticated messages. The "R" of DMARC, reporting, consists in supplying feedback to the author domain https://dmarc.org/ 9 © Copyright 2016 Contactlab This document may not be modified, organized or reutilized in any way without the express written permission of the rightful owner. Phishing and fraud endangering your Brand? DMARC requires alignment between FROM domain (as seen from the user receiver) and either SPF or DKIM. This is the bond of a Brand being ricognisable and the client of the brand. It stands for transparency and supports the building of TRUST. "v=DMARC1;p=reject;pct=100;rua=mailto:[email protected]" If a Spammer abuses your sending domain and you have a valid DMARC record, you will be able to instruct the Receiver to: • Monitor • Quarantine • Reject 10 © Copyright 2016 Contactlab This document may not be modified, organized or reutilized in any way without the express written permission of the rightful owner. Phishing and fraud endangering your Brand? DMARC and the Email Authentication Process Source: https://dmarc.org/ 11 © Copyright 2016 Contactlab This document may not be modified, organized or reutilized in any way without the express written permission of the rightful owner. Phishing and fraud endangering your Brand? Source: dmarcian’s Authentiscope https://dmarcian.com/ 12 © Copyright 2016 Contactlab This document may not be modified, organized or reutilized in any way without the express written permission of the rightful owner. Email Reputation: Why is Reputation important? mail.ru on Reputation: "Reputation is feedback from users and represents the average percentage of complaints about your distributions (clicks on the "Spam" button in Mail's web interface). Reputation is used by our filters to decide whether or not a message is spam. If you have a poor reputation, your mail distributions may entirely or partially blocked, or they may end up in users' Spam folder […]” (http://help.mail.ru/enmail-help/rules/general) 13 © Copyright 2016 Contactlab This document may not be modified, organized or reutilized in any way without the express written permission of the rightful owner. Email Reputation: Why is Reputation important? 1. «we won’t shut you down for spam complaints» 2. «I don’t care where you got your email list from»* 3. «We do not consider unsolicited bulk email to be SPAM» Source: Joshua Greenwood - Bulk Email software 2011 – registered as Spammer from Spamhaus and Spamcop in 2010 (not active in the industry anymore) 14 © Copyright 2016 Contactlab This document may not be modified, organized or reutilized in any way without the express written permission of the rightful owner. Email Reputation: Why is Reputation important? REAL SPAM– harvesting, no opt-in, buying lists of personal addresses, botnets … Anonymous Spam means: Domain registered by anonymous proxy. No Imprint on Website. No further contact information on the email except the website. Order Form on Website, Payment anonymously via Paypal. «The feeling of» SPAM – legitimate bulk email that looks like SPAM: absent or not broken unsubscription process I never gave my consent to this sender Not relevant, not interesting content. Impression of too many emails. Source: Spamhaus What do real SPAM and «look alike» SPAM have in common? Both need to be processed, and therefore represent a cost for the Receiver. Jeopardize the mailbox’s user experience Undermine the ISP’s advertising potential. 15 © Copyright 2016 Contactlab This document may not be modified, organized or reutilized in any way without the express written permission of the rightful owner. How do you know if your Email reaches the inbox? That’s why bulk mailing is always subject to strict
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