The Constitutional Status of Yukon— a Normative Analysis
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The Difficulty of Amending the Constitution of Canada
Osgoode Hall Law Journal Volume 31 Issue 1 Volume 31, Number 1 (Spring 1993) Symposium: Towards the 21st Century Article 2 Canadian/Australian Legal Perspectives 1-1-1993 The Difficulty of Amending the Constitution of Canada Peter W. Hogg Osgoode Hall Law School of York University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj Part of the Constitutional Law Commons Special Issue Article This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Citation Information Hogg, Peter W.. "The Difficulty of Amending the Constitution of Canada." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 31.1 (1993) : 41-61. https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol31/iss1/2 This Special Issue Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. The Difficulty of Amending the Constitution of Canada Abstract The Charlottetown Accord of 1992 was a set of proposals for amendments to the Constitution of Canada. These proposals were designed to achieve a national settlement of a variety of constitutional grievances, chiefly those arising from Quebec nationalism, western regionalism, and Aboriginal deprivation. The Accord was defeated in a national referendum. In the case of Quebec, the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord, following as it did on the defeat of the Meech Lake Accord, has made the option of secession relatively more attractive, but there are sound pragmatic reasons to hope that Quebec will not make that choice. -
Journals of the Yukon Legislative Assembly 2021 Special Sitting
JOURNALS YUKON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY First Session 35th Legislature 2021 Special Sitting May 11, 2021 – May 31, 2021 Speaker: The Hon. Jeremy Harper YUKON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY First Session, 35th Legislative Assembly 2021 Special Sitting SPEAKER — Hon. Jeremy Harper, MLA, Mayo-Tatchun DEPUTY SPEAKER and CHAIR OF COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE — Annie Blake, MLA, Vuntut Gwitchin DEPUTY CHAIR OF COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE — Emily Tredger, MLA, Whitehorse Centre CABINET MINISTERS NAME CONSTITUENCY PORTFOLIO Hon. Sandy Silver Klondike Premier Minister of the Executive Council Office; Finance Hon. Tracy-Anne McPhee Riverdale South Deputy Premier Government House Leader Minister of Health and Social Services; Justice Hon. Nils Clarke Riverdale North Minister of Highways and Public Works; Environment Hon. John Streicker Mount Lorne- Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources; Public Service Southern Lakes Commission; Minister responsible for the Yukon Development Corporation and the Yukon Energy Corporation; French Language Services Directorate Hon. Ranj Pillai Porter Creek Minister of Economic Development; Tourism and Culture; South Minister responsible for the Yukon Housing Corporation; Yukon Liquor Corporation and the Yukon Lottery Commission Hon. Richard Mostyn Whitehorse West Minister of Community Services; Minister responsible for the Workers’ Compensation Health and Safety Board Hon. Jeanie McLean Mountainview Minister of Education; Minister responsible for the Women’s Directorate OFFICIAL OPPOSITION Yukon Party Currie Dixon Leader of the Official Opposition -
Language Planning and Education of Adult Immigrants in Canada
London Review of Education DOI:10.18546/LRE.14.2.10 Volume14,Number2,September2016 Language planning and education of adult immigrants in Canada: Contrasting the provinces of Quebec and British Columbia, and the cities of Montreal and Vancouver CatherineEllyson Bem & Co. CarolineAndrewandRichardClément* University of Ottawa Combiningpolicyanalysiswithlanguagepolicyandplanninganalysis,ourarticlecomparatively assessestwomodelsofadultimmigrants’languageeducationintwoverydifferentprovinces ofthesamefederalcountry.Inordertodoso,wefocusspecificallyontwoquestions:‘Whydo governmentsprovidelanguageeducationtoadults?’and‘Howisitprovidedintheconcrete settingoftwoofthebiggestcitiesinCanada?’Beyonddescribingthetwomodelsofadult immigrants’ language education in Quebec, British Columbia, and their respective largest cities,ourarticleponderswhetherandinwhatsensedemography,languagehistory,andthe commonfederalframeworkcanexplainthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenthetwo.These contextualelementscanexplainwhycitiescontinuetohavesofewresponsibilitiesregarding thesettlement,integration,andlanguageeducationofnewcomers.Onlysuchunderstandingwill eventuallyallowforproperreformsintermsofcities’responsibilitiesregardingimmigration. Keywords: multilingualcities;multiculturalism;adulteducation;immigration;languagelaws Introduction Canada is a very large country with much variation between provinces and cities in many dimensions.Onesuchaspect,whichremainsacurrenthottopicfordemographicandhistorical reasons,islanguage;morespecifically,whyandhowlanguageplanningandpolicyareenacted -
Translating the Constitution Act, 1867
TRANSLATING THE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867 A Legal-Historical Perspective by HUGO YVON DENIS CHOQUETTE A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Law in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada September 2009 Copyright © Hugo Yvon Denis Choquette, 2009 Abstract Twenty-seven years after the adoption of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Constitution of Canada is still not officially bilingual in its entirety. A new translation of the unilingual Eng- lish texts was presented to the federal government by the Minister of Justice nearly twenty years ago, in 1990. These new French versions are the fruits of the labour of the French Constitutional Drafting Committee, which had been entrusted by the Minister with the translation of the texts listed in the Schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982 which are official in English only. These versions were never formally adopted. Among these new translations is that of the founding text of the Canadian federation, the Constitution Act, 1867. A look at this translation shows that the Committee chose to de- part from the textual tradition represented by the previous French versions of this text. In- deed, the Committee largely privileged the drafting of a text with a modern, clear, and con- cise style over faithfulness to the previous translations or even to the source text. This translation choice has important consequences. The text produced by the Commit- tee is open to two criticisms which a greater respect for the prior versions could have avoided. First, the new French text cannot claim the historical legitimacy of the English text, given their all-too-dissimilar origins. -
Paramountcy in Penal Legislation
OCCUPYING THE FIELD : PARAMOUNTCY IN PENAL LEGISLATION BORA LASKIN* Toronto Among the time-honoured doctrines of Canadian constitutional law none has a more disarming simplicity and none is more ques- tion-begging than the last of the four propositions proclaimed by Lord Tomlin in the Fish Canneries case' and repeated on three subsequent occasions by the Privy Council.2 It reads as follows : "There can be a domain in which Provincial and Dominion legisla- tion may overlap, in which case neither legislation will be ultra vires if the field is clear, but if the field is not clear and the two legislations meet the Dominion legislation must prevail."' The issues raised by this pronouncement are concomitants of federal- ism, familiar in the United States and in Australia, and immanent in the constitutions of the new federal states that have come into being since the end of World War Two.4 Three fairly recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, in each of which there were dissents, illustrate that court's ap- preciation ofthose issues as they emerged in provincial and federal penal legislation. The three cases are sufficiently different from one another in their facts and supporting legislation to provide adequate perspective for an examination of the doctrine of the "occupied field"-the paramountcy doctrine, to use an equivalent-as it pertains to penal enactments. *Bora Laskin, Q.C., of the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. 1 A.-G. for Canada v. A.-G . for British Columbia, [1930] A.C. 111, [19301 1 D.L.R. 194, [192913 W.W.R. -
Product Liability Defense: Preemption in Canada
Product Liability Defence North and South of the Border: Is there such thing as Canadian pre-emption? By Craig Lockwood, Sonia Bjorkquist and Alexis Beale from Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP and Maura Kathleen Monaghan, Jacob W. Stahl and Christel Y. Tham from Debevoise & Plimpton LLP PRODUCT LIABILITY DEFENCE NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE BORDER Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt llp | Debevoise & Plimpton Table of Contents Introduction 3 An Overview of the U.S. Experience 5 The Canadian Experience 9 Recent Developments 15 Conclusion 19 2 PRODUCT LIABILITY DEFENCE NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE BORDER Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt llp | Debevoise & Plimpton 1 Introduction In Canada, most food products, pharmaceuticals, cosmetic products and medical devices are subject to federal regulation pursuant to the Food and Drugs Act (FDA) and other related legislation.1 Similar to the U.S. regulatory scheme, the Canadian regime is administered and enforced by the federal regulatory authorities – most notably Health Canada – responsible for establishing standards of safety for, and regulating and approving the use of, health-related products sold in Canada. However, U.S. manufacturers who sell regulated products in Canada may be surprised to learn that compliance with the FDA and associated regulatory frameworks has not historically served as a defence to product liability claims. In particular, the Canadian regulatory regime has traditionally operated as a ‘regulatory floor,’ rather than a comprehensive code of conduct. Conversely, applicable regulatory frameworks in the United States may prescribe comprehensive codes of conduct that do not leave the regulated entity with any discretion, potentially creating irreconcilable conflicts between the state and federal governments. -
Government of Canada's Digital Policy
Feedback on the Direction for a New Government of Canada Digital Policy By: The Information and Communications Technology Council 116 Lisgar Street, Suite 300 Ottawa, Ontario [email protected] 613-237-8551 Thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback to the proposed Government of Canada Digital Policy. The Information and Communications Technology Council (ICTC) welcomes the opportunity to provide input to this important initiative. It is also important the policy is planned to be an iterative, living policy framework as a static policy is an anathema to all digital initiatives. Government digital initiatives should be conducted in collaboration with private sector leaders to ensure that the expertise in these companies is utilized and that government does not unnecessarily encroach on/repli- cate capabilities existing in the private sector. Feedback on the Digital Policy Proposal: How would you see these proposals improve your life in using Government of Canada services? In the age of data-as-an-economy, eCommerce, A.I, IoT, and smart cities, the government should focus its strategy on being “Digital First”. Such a policy measure will have the beneficial effect of enabling citizens to be more digital savvy and entice companies that transact with government to further adopt technologies and heighten their digital advantage in a global economy. The Canadian government needs to articulate a clear digital services strategy that will enable faster and efficient services by 2023 (for instance) in: e-Identity, e-Health, e-Voting, etc. Such a strategy will provide Canadians and businesses (national & international) with the clarity and confidence that the government of Canada is paving the way for a competitive and advanced economy and society. -
Building Canada's Energy Future Together
Building Canada’s Energy Future Together Building Canada’s Energy Future Together CONTENTS WORKING TOGETHER TO BUILD CANADA’S ENERGY FUTURE 1 ENERGY IN CANADA 3 INNOVATION: Growing the Economy Through Clean Technology 6 INFRASTRUCTURE: Building the Energy System of Tomorrow 10 Clean Electricity: Modernizing Systems and Connecting People 10 Safety and Security of Energy Infrastructure – Pipelines 15 Offshore Oil and Gas Regime 16 Building More Efficient Energy Systems 17 INFORMATION AND DATA: Supporting Evidence-based Decision Making 25 INTEGRITY AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE: Building Public Trust in Resource Development 27 INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ PARTICIPATION: Renewing the Relationship 30 INCLUSIVE GROWTH: Creating Opportunities for All 32 INTERNATIONAL MARKETS: Establishing Canada as a Leader in the Global Energy Transition 34 Canada’s Leadership on the Global Stage 34 Strengthening Competitiveness in Priority Markets 36 North American Energy Integration 37 Opportunities for China 39 Opportunities for India 39 LOOKING AHEAD: A Collective Vision Supported by Collaborative Leadership 40 Building Canada’s Energy Future Together iii Building Canada’s Energy Future Together WORKING TOGETHER TO BUILD CANADA’S ENERGY FUTURE Federal, provincial and territorial governments are working together through the Energy Mines and Ministers’ Conference and the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change (PCF), aligned with priorities under the Canadian Energy Strategy, to build Canada’s energy future. This collaboration is based on a strong foundation of respect for jurisdictional responsibilities, regional diversity and transparency. This report recognizes how governments are working closely together to protect Canada’s energy security; encourage energy efficiency; promote clean energy and innovative technologies; and expand market access of Canadian energy exports. -
The Government of Canada's Regulatory Modernization Agenda
The Government of Canada’s Regulatory Modernization Agenda 1 Environmental Analysis The federal regulatory system impacts almost every sector of the economy and Canadians’ lives… Almost 50 Departments and Agencies have regulatory responsibilities 25K FTEs perform regulatory functions 150-300 regulatory 400 Acts with proposals 2,600 reviewed and Regulations approved annually by Treasury Board …this work requires coordination across departments and among governments, at the provincial, territorial, and international levels. 2 Regulatory Modernization in Canada The Government’s Modernization Agenda Stakeholders have called for the Government to take action to make Canada’s system more agile. Since 2016, TBS has been working to modernize Canada’s regulatory framework Budget 2018 allocated funds to support regulatory modernization work at TBS: Development of an online Funding to support Targeted reviews, over the consultation platform to Canada’s leadership on next three years, of engage Canadians on internal trade at the regulatory requirements regulations to improve Federal/Provincial/ and practices that are bottlenecks to innovation, the transparency and Territorial Regulatory starting with 3 sectors: efficiency of the overall Reconciliation and regulatory process • agri-food and aquaculture; Cooperation Table (RCT) • health/bio-sciences; and • transportation and 3 infrastructure New initiatives from the 2018 Fall Economic Statement (“Mini Budget”) Enhance government capacity to An annual regulatory Create a simpler and more efficient address -
LESSON 2: Governments in Yukon
LESSON 2: Governments in Yukon Canada is a large and diverse country. To serve citizens Members of Parliament (MPs), territorial representatives most effectively, there are three levels of government: are called Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), federal, provincial or territorial, and municipal. Each and municipal representatives are called council members level of government has its own structure of elected or councillors. MPs and MLAs are often affiliated with representatives and appointed officials, and a unique set political parties. of responsibilities. The leader of the federal government is called the The federal government takes responsibility for national prime minister and at the provincial or territorial level, and international matters, the provincial or territorial a premier. In both of these cases the leader of the party government manages regional concerns for their province with the largest number of representatives elected to or territory, and municipal governments take care of local parliament or the legislative assembly assumes the role of matters for their community. the leader of that government. At the municipal level in Yukon, the head of council is called a mayor. In addition, there are other types of government in certain Indigenous communities. Indigenous governments replace, The Yukon territorial government is further divided into overlap, or share certain responsibilities with the government three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. of their province/territory or the federal government. The term self-government refers to a First Nation or The legislative branch creates and amends laws, rules and Indigenous community with control over its own affairs. regulations under territorial jurisdiction. The legislative branch is made up of elected representatives. -
225 Watertight Compartments: Getting Back to the Constitutional Division of Powers I. Introduction
GETTING BACK TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIVISION OF POWERS 225 WATERTIGHT COMPARTMENTS: GETTING BACK TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIVISION OF POWERS ASHER HONICKMAN* This article offers a fresh examination of the constitutional division of powers. The author argues that sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 establish exclusive jurisdictional spheres — what the Privy Council once termed “watertight compartments.” This mutual exclusivity is emphasized and reinforced throughout these sections and leaves very little room for legitimate overlap. While some degree of overlap is permissible under this scheme — particularly incidental effects, genuine double aspects, and limited ancillary powers — overlap must be constrained in a principled fashion to comply with the exclusivity principle. The modern trend toward flexibility and freer overlap is contrary to the constitutional text. The author argues that while some deviation from the text is inevitable due to the presumption of constitutionality and stare decisis, the Supreme Court should return to a more exclusivist footing in accordance with the text. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ............................................. 226 II. THE EXCLUSIVITY PRINCIPLE .................................. 227 A. FROM QUEBEC TO THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT ................. 227 B. THE NON OBSTANTE CLAUSE AND THE DEEMING PROVISION ...... 231 C. CONCURRENT POWERS ................................... 234 III. PITH AND SUBSTANCE AND LEGITIMATE OVERLAP ................. 235 A. INTERJURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY ......................... -
Insights from Canada for American Constitutional Federalism Stephen F
Penn State Law eLibrary Journal Articles Faculty Works 2014 Insights from Canada for American Constitutional Federalism Stephen F. Ross Penn State Law Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/fac_works Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons Recommended Citation Stephen F. Ross, Insights from Canada for American Constitutional Federalism, 16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 891 (2014). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Works at Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARTICLES INSIGHTS FROM CANADA FOR AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM Stephen F Ross* INTRODUCTION National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius' has again fo- cused widespread public attention on the role of the United States Supreme Court as an active arbiter of the balance of power between the federal government and the states. This has been an important and controversial topic throughout American as well as Canadian constitutional history, raising related questions of constitutional the- ory for a federalist republic: Whatjustifies unelected judges interfer- ing with the ordinary political process with regard to federalism ques- tions? Can courts create judicially manageable doctrines to police federalism, with anything more than the raw policy preferences of five justices as to whether a particular legislative issue is