CARRIER STRIKE GROUPS: SATELLITE the FORMATION of SEAPOWER UNMANNED AIRCRAFT and HAWKEYE POWER PROJECTION GROWLERS the U.S

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CARRIER STRIKE GROUPS: SATELLITE the FORMATION of SEAPOWER UNMANNED AIRCRAFT and HAWKEYE POWER PROJECTION GROWLERS the U.S THE SHAPE OF FREEDOM THE SHAPE OF FREEDOM The Shape of Freedom the shape of freedom SATELLITE CARRIER STRIKE GROUPS: SATELLITE THE FORMATION OF SEAPOWER UNMANNED AIRCRAFT AND HAWKEYE POWER PROJECTION GROWLERS The U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Group mission is to achieve and sustain air, sea and undersea control, respond to crises, and protect United States’ interests anywhere, anytime. STRIKE FIGHTERS DESTROYER PROTECTS TRADE ROUTES DESTROYER HUMANITARIAN DESTROYER RELIEF MISSIONS AIRCRAFT CARRIER CRUISER HELICOPTER REPLENISHMENT SHIP PROTECTS UNDERWATER ENEMY SUBMARINE CABLE LINES SUBMARINE SHIPS AIRCRAFT The Strike Group is composed TOTAL CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE 7,500 SAILORS AND MARINES POWERFUL of the right combination of Dispersed system of sensors, intelligence 1 44 THE SEA AND AIR gathering, and active electronic warfare Coordinated network of sensors, weapons ships, submarines, aircraft, and equipment delivers situational awareness NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRCRAFT CARRIER STRIKE FIGHTERS systems, data sharing and intelligence fusion for U.S. forces while denying the enemy personnel to support an extensive to defend against enemy aircraft, ships, any advantage in the electronic spectrum. 1 5 MOBILE submarines, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. GROWLERS range of operations from wartime CYBER WARFARE REPLENISHMENT SHIP STRIKE Provide defense against attacks and deliver 4 combat to peace time presence. Plan, direct, and execute overland strike missions tactical advantages in the cyber realm. 1 FLEXIBLE The Strike Group provides the using large quantities of land-attack missiles and HAWKEYES precision-vguided weapons launched from aircraft, CRUISER credible warfighting capabilities ships, and submarines. LOGISTICS 2 Efficient transfer, handling and storage of parts, 4-6 INDEPENDENT necessary to influence the fuel, weapons, and food. While the carrier offers GREYHOUNDS COMMAND AND CONTROL DESTROYERS sufficient supplies for weeks of operations, the 11 battle space from the ocean Robust, resilient networks that provide real-time system relies on replenishments at sea to enable intelligence necessary to make decisions and adapt even longer station times. 1 SUSTAINABLE floor to space. in a rapidly changing environment. SUBMARINE HELICOPTERS THETHE SHAPE GLOBAL OF FREEDOM REACH AND INFLUENCE OF CARRIER STRIKE GROUPS: MULTI-DOMAIN The Shape of Freedom THE SHAPE OF FREEDOMMULTI-FUNCTIONAL MULTI-REGIONAL A Across the globe, undersea, on the sea, in the air, and on land, the Carrier Strike Group is a self-contained system providing a wide range B of crediblethe shape capabilities, of freedom for as long as it takes C to make a difference. POWERFUL FLEXIBLE Deters adversaries, protects Executes simultaneously several U.S. allies and commerce, missions both as a full Strike and achieves decisive combat Group and as individual ships. victories, when deterrence fails. INDEPENDENT MOBILE No foreign government permission Rapid response to a crisis and required for operations. A MEDITERRANEAN SEA B INDIAN OCEAN (PERSIAN GULF) C PACIFIC OCEAN untethered to one location. In April 2017, two U.S. Navy destroyers, USS In August 2014, after Islamic State terrorists swept In November 2013, the George Washington (CVN 73) Ross (DDG 71) and USS Porter (DDG 78), fired into Iraq, the George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) Carrier Carrier Strike Group delivered food, water and medical SUSTAINABLE 59 Tomahawk missiles at a Syrian airfield U.S. Strike Group was ordered to the region. Within two supplies to the 11 million people left homeless by Executes large force strikes intelligence cited as the source of deadly chemical days, aircraft from the Strike Group were attacking Typhoon Haiyan, the strongest storm to ever make against multiple targets for attack on civilians earlier in the week. the terrorists and providing intelligence reports. landfall in the Philippines. Sailors and Marines days without replenishment. For 54 days the Strike Group was the lone force were critical in distributing supplies and providing combating the terrorists until other U.S. forces search and rescue in isolated areas affected by the could receive permission from other nations for devastating typhoon. access to join the fight..
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