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Going Nuclear: The Origins of New Brunswick's Nuclear Industry, 1950-1983.

Adrian Kelly Egbers

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia August 2008

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Appendices Copyright Releases (if applicable) Table of Contents

List of Tables v List of Figures vi Abstract vii List of Abbreviations Used viii Acknowledgements ix

Chapter One - Introduction 1

Chapter Two - The Road to Point Lepreau: Provincial Nuclear Development, 1950-1973 16

New Brunswick's Electrification and Economic Development, 1920-1973 21 Economic Development in Postwar New Brunswick, 1957-1974 27 The Development of Canada's Domestic Nuclear Industry, 1943-1971 39 Conclusion 45 Chapter Three - Going Nuclear: The Political Economy of New Brunswick's Nuclear Development, 1971-1974 47

The Nuclear Decision Makers 52 Early Proposals for Nuclear Power in New Brunswick, 1971-1973 54 The Political Decision, 1973-1974 60 Conclusion 78 Chapter Four - Nuclear Fallout: Public Protest and the "Momentum of Economic Growth" in New Brunswick, 1973-1980 82

The Origins of Opposition, 1974 86 The "Momentum of Economic Growth": Entering the Nuclear Age, February 1975 -May 1975 91 The Maritime Energy Coalition: Challenging the Nuclear Age, 1976-1979 101 Three Mile Island, the Decline of the Nuclear Age, and Economic Realities, 1979-1980 Ill Lepreau II, 1979-1984 114 Conclusion 117

Chapter Five - Conclusion 120

Bibliography 128

IV List of Tables

Table 2.1 Domestic Nuclear Reactors in Canada, 1945-1983 44

v List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Premier Flemming at Beechwood Opening 24 Figure 2.2 Premier Robichaud at Mactaquac Opening 25 Figure 3.1 Hatfield and NBEPC Chairman Beside Nuclear Model, July 1974 70 Figure 3.2 Hatfield in Bricklin at Plant Opening, August 1974 71 Figure 4.1 Antinuclear Protestors Outside New Brunswick Legislature 99 Figure 4.2 The Maritime Energy Coalition Logo 102 Figure 4.3 Nuclear Reaction Cartoon 105 Figure 4.4 Poster For Alternative Energy Fair 108 Figure 4.5 NBEPC Officials Removing Protester From Between Brunneck and Dock Ill Figure 5.1 The Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station 127

VI Abstract

New Brunswick entered the nuclear age in 1974 when Canada was amidst a national energy crisis. When the federal government approved a CANDU nuclear reactor for Point Lepreau, New Brunswick became the third province to develop a nuclear program following Ontario and Quebec. The Point Lepreau project was a regional development initiative that was defined by intra-provincial politics. The New Brunswick

Electric Power Commission had promoted nuclear energy as early as 1961 and pushed for a multi-unit nuclear reactor from 1971 to 1973. Premier Richard Hatfield personally involved himself in the project when he incorporated the nuclear development into his

1974 provincial re-election campaign and pressured the federal government for immediate approval despite the project's minimal socio-economic benefits. The

Maritime Energy Coalition, an environmental protest movement, limited New

Brunswick's nuclear development by changing the public's perception of nuclear energy with the aid of international advocacy groups.

vii List of Abbreviations Used

ADB - Atlantic Development Board AECB - Atomic Energy Control Board AECL - Atomic Energy of Canada Limited CCNR - Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility DOE - Department of Environment DREE - Department of Regional Economic Expansion EAP - Environmental Assessment Panel EARP - Environmental Assessment Review Process EMR - Department of Energy, Mines and Resources GDA - General Development Agreement MEC - Maritime Energy Coalition NEP - National Energy Program NBDFE - New Brunswick Department of Fisheries and Environment NBEPC - New Brunswick Electric Power Commission

Vlll Acknowledgements

I have been continually reminded over the past year about the strengths of my

family members, friends and professors that have all guided me through the Master's research and writing process. I am grateful for Dr. Jerry Bannister's guidance with his

sound advice, creativity and a sense of humor. I would like to thank Dr. Claire Campbell

and Dr. Shirley Tillotson for their interest and insightful suggestions that have

strengthened this project. I am also indebted to my colleagues in the Master's program

who have provided valuable information and comic relief when needed.

I have great appreciation for the staff at the Public Archives of New Brunswick

who led me to the sources with their kindness, expertise, patience and reliable

photocopier. Thanks to all of you.

I am particularly grateful to my family for their love and support over the past

year and Josie Marcille who has provided her care and guidance. I am indebted to all

who have made this a gratifying experience. Thank you.

IX Chapter One Introduction

New Brunswick's introduction to the nuclear age has not been neatly tucked into the folds of Canadian history: it is a continuing debate that inhabits the minds of many

Canadians and has found precedence in our contemporary discussion of energy, politics and the environment. In July 2005 Premier Bernard Lord announced his provincial government would proceed with the $1.4 billion refurbishment of the Point Lepreau nuclear generating station. "It balances environmental concerns with economic development," Lord explained, "it is realistic because it allows us to continue to pursue our objective to ensure diversity and security of our energy supply." The refurbishment began in April 2008 and is scheduled to end in December 2009. Steering clear of the project, the federal government decided not to invest in the refurbishment; New

Brunswick taxpayers will pick up the tab. More recently, in the spring of 2008 Shawn

Graham's new Liberal government in New Brunswick began negotiations with Atomic

Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) to build a second nuclear reactor at Point Lepreau.2

Graham announced the negotiations with AECL were to achieve commitments from the nuclear industry to create jobs and attract investment to the province.3 New

Brunswickers are questioning how their province developed a nuclear program in the

first place and what the environmental and economic consequences are of expanding the

province's nuclear program. For the first time in decades, Canadians are worried about

1 Quoted in Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Powering the Future: Point Lepreau Refurbishment Press Release, "Province to proceed with refurbishment of Point Lepreau," (29 July 2005), p. 1. Rob Linke, "Full Steam Ahead: Liberals ignore their consultant's advice to follow Ontario's lead on second CANDU reactor," The Telegraph Journal, (1 March 2008), p. Al. 3 Ibid., p. Al.

1 energy resources. The conditions in Canada and internationally have encouraged provincial governments and their public utilities to re-examine nuclear energy as a viable energy option that would benefit the provincial economy while at the same time address some pressing environmental issues. New Brunswick's current debate over nuclear energy is strikingly similar to what the province had experienced when it became the home of Atlantic Canada's first nuclear program in the 1970s. However, the manner in which the province originally entered the nuclear age remains largely unexamined.

This thesis confronts the basic question: how did New Brunswick develop a nuclear program at Point Lepreau? The Canadian nuclear industry expanded after the

Second World War as a federally controlled industry. Despite the political orientation of the nuclear industry, New Brunswick's introduction to a nuclear program was defined by the characteristics of provincialism. A rapid shift in Canada's national energy policy

after the 1973 oil crisis encouraged nuclear development within the nation; however, the

strongest push for nuclear technology emanated from the provincially-owned New

Brunswick Electric Power Commission (NBEPC) that planned to develop a multi-unit

nuclear export industry as early as 1961. For over a decade the Power Commission used

its political influence to promoted nuclear energy for the province. The second force was

set in motion when Premier Richard Hatfield personally involved himself in the project.

By 1974 the development of Point Lepreau was the cornerstone of Hatfield's billion

dollar energy program launched as part of his provincial re-election campaign. Hatfield

pressured the federal government when he bypassed the NBEPC and his Cabinet to

directly correspond with the federal ministers responsible for the approval of the Point

See Robert Macintosh, The Approaching Global Energy Crunch: And How Canada Should Meet It (Ottawa: CD. Howe Institute Commentary, 2004), p. 1.

2 Lepreau project. During the federal review process, the federal Department of Regional

Economic Expansion (DREE) warned that if the nuclear program was placed in southern

New Brunswick it could not be justified as a legitimate regional economic initiative.

Despite these warnings, Hatfield continued to pressure the federal government for approval as he strategized for his approaching general election. Finally, on October 9 the federal government approved only a single unit CANDU reactor program for Point

Lepreau. Two days later Hatfield called a general election for November. The provincial politics trumped the federal bureaucratic process when the Point Lepreau project was finally approved even though it was not recognized as a viable development project.

These intra-provincial forces from the NBEPC and Hatfield's government dictated how

New Brunswick acquired a nuclear program.

Public protest and organization also shaped the outcome of New Brunswick's nuclear program. When the federal government approved Point Lepreau in 1974 the

Maritime Energy Coalition was formed to lobby the government, register protests and educate the general public about the economic and environmental consequences of nuclear energy. The Coalition became closely linked to the national and international antinuclear movement and directed its focuses away from regional issues. The protest in

New Brunswick was aided in 1979 when the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster in

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania awoke the public to the dangers of domestic nuclear energy programs. The protest movement's success was unforeseen at the time. Point Lepreau was built and went into operation in 1983, but the NBEPC and provincial government's plan to build a second nuclear reactor to supply an interprovincial nuclear program failed when the Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia governments realized the negative

3 aspects of nuclear energy was a serious electoral issue. The perception of Point Lepreau had been successfully altered. The interprovincial nuclear program was dropped and

New Brunswick's nuclear program was isolated within the province's boundaries.

Members of the public had changed the course of this regional development strategy.

Canadian historians have paid little attention to New Brunswick's nuclear industry. The topic receives only brief mention in surveys of postwar economic development in Atlantic Canada.5 Other academic disciplines have also placed minimal emphasis on Atlantic Canada's introduction to nuclear energy. Only three studies turned to Point Lepreau for a comparative analysis. In 1976, when the construction of Point

Lepreau nuclear station commenced, G. Bruce Doern documented the administrative process and political negotiations of establishing the power plant in his study, The

Atomic Energy Control Board, conducted for the Law Reform Commission of Canada to review the public policy aspects of the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB).6 The case study, a twenty-three page document in the appendix, includes a list of the major negotiations that occurred between the AECB and other groups to permit the

construction of the New Brunswick plant. The sociologist Ronald Babin published The

Nuclear Power Game in 1985 to document Canada's antinuclear movement that

developed in the 1970s in reaction to "the decisions of the technocrats" to establish

5 See Delia Stanley, "The 1960s: The Illusions and Realities of Progress," p. 528; John Reid, "The 1970s: Sharpening the Sceptical Edge," in The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation, eds. Forbes and D.A. Muise (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 491; there is no mention of New Brunswick's nuclear age in Margret Conrad and James Hiller, Atlantic Canada: A Region in the Making (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001); also see History of the Canadian Peoples: 1867 to the Present, ed. Alvin Finkel and Margaret Conrad (Toronto: Pearson Education Canada, 2002), pp. 371-372. See G. Bruce Doern, The Atomic Energy Control Board: An Evaluation of Regulatory and Administrative Processes and Procedures (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1976), pp., 1-85.

4 nuclear power.7 Babin's study uses Point Lepreau for a comparative analysis with other nuclear developments in Ontario and Quebec.8 He briefly examines the bureaucratic decision process of Point Lepreau to argue there was a technocratic basis to which antinuclear and environmental movements in Atlantic Canada responded.9 His analysis is very insightful but lacks an in-depth study of New Brunswick's experience with nuclear development.

Finally, Michael Cow and Susan Machum in Stifling Debate: Canadian

Newspapers and Nuclear Power, use the news coverage of New Brunswick's The

Gleaner and Telegraph-Journal as a case study to compare Canada's media coverage of nuclear development and protest. Their ten-page chapter on Point Lepreau concludes,

"the evidence once again firmly refutes the nuclear industry's claim it has been poorly treated.. .coverage in the New Brunswick papers became more one-sided over the period of our study."10 Besides revealing the politics of New Brunswick newspapers, the study does not delve into the actual social, political, economic or environmental implications of Point Lepreau.

Despite this absence the development of New Brunswick's nuclear program is firmly connected to broader Canadian historiographies. Of most relevance is the literature on Canada's involvement in nuclear development. In 1959 D.M. Lebourdais published Canada and the Atomic Revolution, which celebrated Canada's involvement in a technology that "will do more to change human life than anything else has ever

7 Ronald Babin, The Nuclear Power Game (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1985), p. 23. 8 Ibid, p. 23. 9 Ibid., p. 23. 10 Michael Cow with Susan Machum, Stifling Debate: Canadian Newspapers and Nuclear Power (Halifax: Fernwood, 1993), p. 82.

5 done."" Surrounded by the early stages of Canada's nuclear program, Lebourdais recounts the history of the scientists and politicians who placed the nation in a leading position of the Atomic Age. In 1965 Wilfred Eggleston published Canada's Nuclear

Story, which provided the narrative of Canada's entry into the nuclear age to the development of world-class nuclear reactors. Like Lebourdais' work, Eggleston provides a conservative account which in many ways celebrates the national achievements of scientists and politicians.12 As the nuclear industry matured in Canada and news of nuclear disasters began to reach the public in the 1970s, more critical studies began to appear and the national narrative was revised. By the early 1980s critical histories of

Canada's nuclear involvements became dominant. Gordon Sims' A History of the Atomic

Energy Control Board examines the AECB's involvement in the secret developments of nuclear research to the establishment of the nation's nuclear reactors.13 Ronald Babin's

The Nuclear Power Game provides a critical analysis of the centralized "technocratic" development of nuclear industry in Canada and the radical antinuclear and environmental movement that developed as a response.14 Robert Bothwell's Nucleus:

The History of Atomic Energy Canada Limited chronicles the history of nuclear energy in Canada by examining Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's guidance and negotiations.15 More recently, Michael Mehta's Risky Business: Nuclear Power and

Public Protest in Canada, explores how a small public interest group - Durham Nuclear

Awareness of Oshawa, Ontario - mobilized opposition against the re-licensing of the

" D.M. Lebourdais, Canada and the Atomic Revolution (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1959), p. 1. 12 Wilfred Eggleston, Canada's Nuclear Story (Toronto: Clark Irwin & Company, 1965),. pp.3-11. Gordon H.E. Sims, A History of the Atomic Energy Control Board (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1981). 14 See Ronald Babin, The Nuclear Power Game, p. 1. See Robert Bothwell, Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy Canada Limited (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988).

6 Pickering nuclear power plant in December 1994.16 The work done to date provides a broad narrative of Canada's nuclear history, but provincial nuclear programs that developed in the early 1970s are almost entirely absent from Canadian historiography.

This case study of New Brunswick's development of a nuclear industry is tied closely to the historiography of Canadian regionalism. Before the 1960s Canadian historians found it their duty to articulate the economic and political unity of Canada as it developed from a colony into a nation-state. However, when Canada was celebrating its Centennial year in 1967, Ramsay Cook insisted that the Canadian nationalist framework represented the "great Canadian problem" as "our lack of unity and identity."18 Two years later, Maurice Careless popularized the term "limited identities" when he emphasized Canada must be defined through the "limited identities of region, culture and class."19 Careless noted the ultimate theme of Canada's twentieth century history was not "nation building" but "region building."20 He saw Canada in the context of regional diversity as opposed to national disunity. Cook and Careless were among the first historians to stress the importance of regional perspectives in Canadian history. This concept of regionalism developed throughout the 1970s; however, criticism of the theory also increased when national crises such as the separatist movement in Quebec disrupted national unity. The 1980 Quebec referendum was another sobering event to many

Michael Mehta, Risky Business: Nuclear Power and Public Protest (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2004). 17 Philip A. Buckner, '"Limited Identities' Revisited: Regionalism and Nationalism in Canadian History", Acadiensis, XXX, 1 (Autumn 2000), p. 4.; also see Donald Swainson, "Regionalism and the Social Sciences," Acadiensis, X, 1 (Autumn 1980); Ramsay Cook, Canada, Quebec and the Uses of Nationalism (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995). Ramsay Cook, "Canadian Centennial Cerebrations," International Journal, XXII, 1 (Autumn 1967), p. 663. J.M.S. Careless, Careless at Work: Selected Canadian Historical Studies (Toronto: Dundurn Press Limited, 1990), p. 283. 20 Ibid., p. 290.

7 Canadian historians who had become convinced it was time to reconsider their duty to search for a "national identity."21 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the concept of regional historical perspectives received heavy criticism and the search for the "great national purpose" became the priority for many.

In the twenty-first century historians continue to argue over the value of regional history. In a 2000 edition of the Acadiensis Philip Buckner points out "all identities are socially constructed, and all are fluid and unstable and frequently in a state of re negotiation."23 Buckner, dismissing one hegemonic vision of Canada, argues that the nation's history is about diverse groups of people coming together to form an "imagined community."24 More recently, Gerald Friesen examined the evolution of regionalism to stress that region continues to offer insights into the economic, political, social, and cultural differences. His well-received article argues that "not only federal state and divergent economic interests but also the physical world and the historic bonds of community influence the contemporary understanding of regions in Canada."25

There are practical as well as ideological problems with the concept of regionalism when examining development projects in postwar New Brunswick. The case study of Point Lepreau suggests the provincially-owned NBEPC was the driving force for New Brunswick to develop a nuclear industry. Secondly, the project was integrated so far into the provincial politics of Hatfield's 1974 re-election campaign that the federal bureaucratic decision process was expedited to accommodate the premier's urgent

21 Donald Swainson, "Regionalism and the Social Sciences," Acadiensis, X, 1 (Autumn 1980), p. 147. 22 J. L. Granatstein, Who Killed Canadian History? (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1998), p. 17. 23 Buckner, '"Limited Identities' Revisited," p. 12. 24 Ibid., p. 12. 25 Gerald Friesen, "The Evolving Meanings of Region in Canada," The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 28, No. 3, (September 2001), p. 1.

8 demands for the project's approval. The result was a nuclear program that had minimal socio-economic benefits for the province. This period of history is not about a regional entity; it is about the strength of the control institutions had on development policy and the priorities of provincial party politics. The push for nuclear energy from the NBEPC and the politicization of the project by the provincial government was essentially how

New Brunswick's nuclear industry was shaped. Realizing the implications, the public provided the opposition to the economic and environmental consequences of Point

Lepreau. The aid of international correspondence with antinuclear groups and the international disaster of Three Mile Island limited the nuclear development in New

Brunswick.

In Canada, the theoretical approach to regionalism is often equated with economic underdevelopment. Initially, W.A. Mackintosh proposed the staples theory, which was developed by Harold Innis, to argue that Canada's economic development depended on certain commodities produced in specific regions. In the late 1930s, S.A.

Saunders' The Economic History of the Maritimes defined the region's underdevelopment with the application of the staples theory which came to be known as a classical statement of the Laurentian interpretation of Maritime economic development.26 However, by the 1960s the staples theory was challenged, and its historical generalizations were criticized with empirical scrutiny. In the postwar era, a

Keynesian approach to managing economic development provided the basis for the postwar economic boom that stayed broadly intact until the sharp recession of 1973.

Despite the state's increased participation in the market economy (through federal

S.A. Saunders, The Economic History of the Maritimes (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1984). 9 equalization payments), the Atlantic region still lagged far behind the rest of the country.

Scholars began to reassess the debate, and by the early 1970s Marxist theories of capitalist underdevelopment dominated Atlantic Canadian history and the interpretation of regional disparity. Marxist interpretations connected class and regional conditions of peripheral capitalism, with a special interest in social movements, to show how the exploitative relation of wage labour is reproduced in the regional structure of production

77 and exchange.

The neo-classical theory, which argues for natural economic adjustments, became popular in the 1980s and remains dominant until today. The debate over underdevelopment has increasingly adopted a political perceptive, but still treats the

phenomena as a regional entity. Regionalism is strongly promoted by political theorists.

Surprised at how little the theoretical treatment regionalism has received, Janine

Brodie's The Political Economy of Canadian Regionalism explores the correlation

between region and Canada's spatial economic development. With a focus on the

postwar period, when the Canadian political economy was restructured by state

development strategies, Brodie argues underdevelopment is a "political creation"

whereby the state "shapes the particular spatial contours of a national economy and

national politics." Brodie explains that provinces (as political institutions) cannot be

equated with the concept of region because it conceals, "real and widespread

See Robert J. Brym and R. James Sacouman, eds., Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1979). Janine Brodie, The Political Economy of Canadian Regionalism (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990). Brodie gives special treatment to the First and Second National Policies as defining moments in Canada's spatial politics and economic development, which solidifies the concept of regionalism. 29 Ibid., p. 4.

10 manifestations of transprovincial spatial politics." In the Atlantic Provinces, Donald

Savoie plays a leading role in the contemporary debate over regional disparity. His book

Visiting Grandchildren: Economic Development in the Maritimes presents a strong historical interpretation of the economic development of the Maritimes from the advent of industrialization to present day. He also places a special emphasis on the postwar era when the federal and provincial governments assumed the roles of being the active bodies to counteract regional underdevelopment in the provinces. Savoie argues that

"national political and administrative institutions and relatively self-contained historical accidents, together with events shaped by public policy decisions, have set in motion cumulative processes of self-reinforcing economic decline in the Maritime provinces."

Thus Savoie also handles underdevelopment with a regional approach and emphasizes that it is a political creation shaped by national administrative bodies.

The Point Lepreau project was shaped at the provincial level as opposed to being influenced by the national political and administrative institutions. The NBEPC had a clear mandate to develop a multi-unit nuclear program capable of exporting energy as early as 1961. By the early 1970s, with the increase in world oil prices, the Power

Commission's proposals for nuclear energy were taken very seriously as the national energy policy shifted to adjust to the energy crisis. Hatfield's politicization of the project pressured the federal government for approval of the Point Lepreau project and resulted in a nuclear program that did not have many economic benefits for the province. Our theoretical understanding of postwar regionalism and underdevelopment is founded on a

30 Ibid., p. 16. See Donald Savoie, Visiting Grandchildren: Economic Development in the Maritimes (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), pp. 81-129. 32 Ibid., p. 308. 11 surprisingly limited amount of historical inquiry. Studying the regional economic development projects of the postwar period provides a clearer picture of the political economy of region, province and nation. The development initiative launched to bring

New Brunswick into the nuclear age allows for a unique opportunity to see how a federally controlled industry was introduced to the Atlantic region as a national response to an energy crisis.

Chapter Two, "The Road to Point Lepreau," explores the context of New

Brunswick's postwar electrification in relation to the province's regional underdevelopment. By the early 1950s the publicly-owned NBEPC had a monopoly on power production in New Brunswick. With a "power for industry" model, the utility and the provincial government worked together to expand the energy capacity and economic growth of the province. By the 1960s the Power Commission had become a semi- autonomous provincial institution with a close working relationship with the Liberal and

Conservative provincial governments. During this period, both levels of the state were faced with the task of transforming the social, political and economic structure of New

Brunswick to counteract a trend of underdevelopment. The result was an intense period of state-intervention from provincial and federal governments to integrate the province and its people into the North American market economy. The Canadian nuclear industry was also in a state of change. By the early 1970s Ontario, followed by Quebec, began to develop provincial nuclear programs. As a provincially-owned institution, the NBEPC had unmitigated political influence on the economic development of New Brunswick.

This coupled with the province's state-led economic growth projects and a national

12 nuclear industry that was ripe to develop provincial nuclear programs, paved the road for

New Brunswick's first nuclear program.

The third chapter, "Going Nuclear," examines the political decision process that

led to the development of New Brunswick's nuclear program. This case study of the

Point Lepreau project testifies to the complex nature of postwar regional economic

development. As a response to the 1973 energy crisis, a national energy policy opened

the door for New Brunswick and other provinces to achieve provincial nuclear power

programs with federal funding. The NBEPC applied for a two-unit nuclear program in

early 1974. The political decision process that followed was characterized by provincial

party politics as Premier Hatfield personally involved himself in the project. Hatfield

pressured the federal government for immediate approval of loans and site location to be

Point Lepreau, in southern New Brunswick. The premier's attempt to streamline the

federal decision making process, and the manner in which he presented the project to the

public, directly corresponded with his re-election strategy for the approaching provincial

election of 1974. Through provincial political assertion, New Brunswick was

dramatically changed. Regional economic development in the postwar era was shaped

by not only national policy, but intra-provincial politics such as the influence of

provincial institutions, electoral cycles and re-election campaigns that dictated the shape

and form of regional projects. In other words, regional economic development was

embedded in distinctively provincial politics.

The fourth chapter, "Nuclear Fallout," recounts how the public responded to New

Brunswick's development of a nuclear program. This is examined in relation to other

state-led projects that also received opposition from the people of New Brunswick.

13 Public protest, demonstration and organization against the Point Lepreau project played a significant part in this case study. When citizens learned that New Brunswick was entering the nuclear age, their negative response initially stemmed from issues unique to the province; however, the opposition increasingly adopted national and international characteristics as it became closely linked to the broader antinuclear movement. It was soon realized by all groups that their opinion did not matter to the provincial government and public utility: the project had a momentum which moved faster than the public could respond. This led to the organization of the Maritime Energy Coalition that lobbied the government for public meetings, registered protests, and educated the general public

about nuclear technologies. By 1976 the Coalition was connected to the broader

antinuclear movement and had established international correspondence with renowned

civil advocacy groups in the United States, which in turn characterized their opposition

in New Brunswick. Likewise, the 1979 disaster at Three Mile Island in the United States

provided an extra push for the opposition movement and affected the outcome of New

Brunswick's nuclear development. New Brunswick's nuclear development was

dramatically altered when the plans for a large interprovincial nuclear program were

cancelled because the lack of public support. Regional economic development in

Atlantic Canada was debated and contested within the public realm and had a significant

impact on how the province was formed by development strategies.

New Brunswick was the third and last province to enter the nuclear age when it

received federal permission to build a 635 megawatt CANDU nuclear reactor at Point

Lepreau in 1974. When the Point Lepreau nuclear power plant went into operation in

1983, the total cost of the development was $1.4 billion. Issues of underdevelopment in

14 Atlantic Canada have been classified as a regional experience within the national narrative. Theorists have noted this region of uneven development is in large part a political creation that has had its spatial contours shaped by national politics. Much of what happened during the period when the Atlantic Canadian political economy was reshaped by regional development strategies remains largely unknown. However, when development projects do receive close analysis, our conventional understanding of region and underdevelopment becomes complex. The case study of New Brunswick's development of a nuclear program demonstrates that intra-provincial politics played a larger role than national administrative bodies.

15 Chapter Two The Road to Point Lepreau: Provincial Nuclear Development, 1950-1973

Canada's research and development of industrial nuclear energy was born in the context of a wartime economy when industrial development was predominantly a state endeavour. Canada emerged from the Second World War as one of the world's nuclear leaders. The government directed its effort towards power production for civilian and industrial use. By the late 1960s a national and international nuclear program of research, production, distribution and sales of CANDU nuclear reactors had evolved. In the early

1970s Ontario, followed by Quebec, developed the first provincial nuclear programs with the assistance of the federal government. The third and last province to develop a nuclear program was New Brunswick.

This chapter establishes the context and necessary conditions that led to New

Brunswick's adoption of a nuclear program. It explores three developments: the

expansion of electrification and a public electric utility at the provincial level; the federal

and provincial states' intervention in postwar regional economic development; and the

development of Canada's postwar domestic nuclear programs. These three forces paved

the road for the establishment of a nuclear reactor in Point Lepreau, New Brunswick. By

the early 1970s all the necessary conditions were in place for the New Brunswick

Electric Power Commission (NBEPC) to propose large development projects that would

likely create jobs and promote the province's economic growth. Both federal and

provincial government policy was responsive to the large development projects just as

the Canadian nuclear industry reached a period of growth and fostered the development

of provincial nuclear programs.

16 By the late 1960s the NBEPC became a permanent fixture in the political and economic make-up of New Brunswick. Despite the limited academic inquiry into New

Brunswick's electrification, there are a few key studies that provide a narrative and analysis of this historical development. The two largest themes are the evolving nature of public versus private ownership of electrical development and its relation to the province's economic trends of underdevelopment. Christopher Beach's examination of the Grand Falls hydro-electric project in northern New Brunswick examines provincial electrification and underdevelopment from 1896 to 1930. He notes that the private sector, predominantly the pulp and paper industry, monopolized northern electrification with the support of the provincial government.1 Drawing on H.V. Nelles' study of the politics of electrification in Ontario that concludes small business interests, not industrials or urban monopolists, forced the creation of Ontario's public utility, Beach argues the Grand Falls project was similar as a "struggle to overcome the province's economic and social fragmentation."2 Robert Young provides an analysis of the rise of public power within the province during the postwar years. Drawing a correlation between the politics of power and the province's underdevelopment, Young argues that the principal impetus for economic planning in the 1950s came from the increasingly professional and autonomous power utility rather than the provincial government. The

NBEPC promoted a "power for industry" strategy to foster the growth of the utility and wider public interest.

' For more information see Christopher S. Beach, "Electrification and Underdevelopment in New Brunswick: The Grand Falls Project, 1896-1930," Acadiensis XXIII, 1 (Autumn 1993), pp.60-85; Bill Parenteau, "Woods Transformed: The Emergence of the Pulp and Paper Industry in New Brunswick, 1918-1931," Acadiensis XXII, 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 5-43. 2 Beach, "Electrification and Underdevelopment in New Brunswick," p. 63. 3 R. A. Young, "Planning For Power: The New Brunswick Electric Power Commission in the 1950s," Acadiensis, XII, 1 (Autumn 1982), p. 74.

17 James Kenny and Andrew Secord take a different stance on the province's postwar electrification. Kenny and Secord assert there were greater forces such as "the discovery of base metals in 1953, the Cold War milieu which increased the value of this new resource and the general continentalist orientation in Canadian economic affairs during the era of the Second National Policy."4 National and international forces played a considerable role in New Brunswick's postwar economy, granting the NBEPC only a partial role in the province's economic strategy; however, Kenny and Secord conclude their study at the beginning of the 1960s.The political economy dramatically changed during the 1960s when the provincial and federal governments assumed the leading role in the economic development of Atlantic Canada. New Brunswick's largest capital construction programs were hydro-electric dams built to expand the Commission's production capacity. Young's argument that the NBEPC provided the principal impetus for the province's economic development in the 1950s holds true for the 1960s and early

1970s; however, the NBEPC worked closely with the Hatfield provincial government to influence the province's nuclear development creating a synthesis between the provincial government's development policy and the utility's expansion. The public utility worked closely with the Conservative and Liberal provincial governments to create large-scale projects and promote the economic development of the province. It was the relationship between the provincial government and the public utility that laid the groundwork for large projects intended to stimulate the province's economy. Federal regional economic development policy in the postwar years provided loans from Ottawa for these large-

scale projects.

4 James L. Kenny and Andrew Secord, "Public Power for Industry: A Re-Examination of the New Brunswick Case, 1940-1960," Acadiensis, XXX, 2(Spring 2001), p. 88.

18 The Power Commission, like most provincial utilities, evolved in the postwar years as it expanded and expropriated the private sector's participation in electrical production. Following the Second World War, large-scale hydro-electric projects were equated with industrial development. The NBEPC played decisive roles in the promotion and ownership of the province's largest hydro-electric development projects. By the

1970s the public utility had established a significant role in the province's regional economic development. The NBEPC pushed for New Brunswick's nuclear power program when the opportunity presented itself. Intra-provincial dynamics such as the relationship between the utility and provincial government is how New Brunswick's largest development projects began in the postwar period.

This chapter will also examine New Brunswick's struggle with economic development after the Second World War. Donald Savoie's interpretation suggests historical accidents and postwar national and administrative institutions were the major pitfalls for any significant economic development success in the region. The federal and provincial governments' measures to stimulate the economy of the Maritimes are significant parts of the postwar narrative; however, specific challenges at the provincial level also played defining roles in the New Brunswick's economic future. The first stage of province's nuclear program was closely linked to the shift in postwar provincial and federal economic development policy, but it was also susceptible to intra-provincial dynamics that made the NBEPC's energy programs a priority in the light that they would create economic growth. Understanding this correlation is necessary for establishing the context in which a nuclear program came to New Brunswick. The federal-provincial push to develop New Brunswick opened the door for institutions such as the NBEPC to

19 have full governmental support for megaprojects that would simply result in their own corporate expansion.

The development of Canada's national and international nuclear industry also has to be placed within the proper context. Evolving from a controlled and secret collaboration to develop atomic weaponry during the Second World War, Canada's nuclear power industry maintained a strong degree of state intervention in its national and international programs for civilian nuclear power production. Much of the literature to date has focused on how the federally controlled system during the Second World

War and the early stages of the Cold War. Provincial nuclear programs also developed under the careful guidance of the federal government, but these large-scale programs set up in the early 1970s have received limited academic inquiry. How did they evolve at the provincial level and what were the economic, political and social implications? The final section will examine the evolution of Canada's domestic nuclear programs to place New

Brunswick's nuclear development in context with the rest of the nation. By the late

1960s and early 1970s the NBEPC had a close relationship with the provincial government of New Brunswick. Their relationship was mutually beneficial because the

NBEPC expanded with large hydro-electrical projects and the provincial government gained an electoral advantage from the perception that the political party could successfully develop the province.

20 New Brunswick's Electrification and Economic Development, 1920-1973

The NBEPC was created before the 1920 provincial election as a response to an increased demand for electrical power.5 The Power Commission was modeled on the

Hydro-Electric Commission of Ontario to distribute power to the province's municipalities.6 By the mid-twenties energy production focused on the potential of the

Saint John River. The Liberal Premier Peter Venoit announced his ambitious plans to establish a public, province-wide electric system by tapping the hydro power of Grand

Falls, New Brunswick. During the 1925 provincial elections, Venoit proposed a publicly financed hydro-electric facility at Grand Falls that would be state owned and provide electricity to the consumer at cost.7 The Conservative Opposition was opposed to public ownership and favoured development of hydro-electricity by private firms. Winning the provincial election, the Conservatives sold the right to develop the Grand Falls site to the private forestry giant, International Paper. Public power fell to the wayside and electrical development proceeded in two distinct generation systems. Electrical production in the north was controlled by the pulp and paper industry for industrial purposes.9 The province's southern and central regions received electricity from small producers and the publicly-owned NBEPC. The 1930s witnessed minimal growth in electrical production, especially in regards to publicly owned power. The NBEPC grew

5 R. A. Young, "Planning For Power,"p. 74. 6 To see an fascinating account of the politics of hydro-electrical power in Ontario see, H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forest, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974); Neil B. Freeman, The Politics of Power: Ontario Hydro and its Government, 1906- 1995 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) Calvin A. Woodward, The History of New Brunswick Provincial Election Campaigns, 1866-1974, (Fredericton: Micromedia, 1976), p. 50. For more information see Beach, "Electrification and Underdevelopment in New Brunswick," pp.60-85; Parenteau, "Woods Transformed," pp. 5-43. 9 Kenny and Secord, "Public Power for Industry," p. 88.

21 incrementally in southern regions, acquiring a coal fired thermal plant at Grand Lake in

1935.

When the Second World War ended, New Brunswick faced strong demands for rural electrification and the need to establish a rationalized economic development strategy. Premier J.B. McNair committed his administration to the development of electrical power, especially to rural regions, because of the highly visible nature of power lines and the likelihood of achieving patronage.10 McNair also recognized that an economic development strategy was badly needed. The NBEPC doubled its customers between 1945 and 1948, with the establishment of 1,100 miles of transmission.1'Rapid postwar expansion made evident the shortfalls of the province's electrical production. In

1948 the government expropriated the New Brunswick Power Company's Saint John thermal plant and placed it in the control of the NBEPC. Leading up to the 1948 election,

the Conservative opposition promised public, province-wide electrical development.

Again, the debate about power inundated the provincial election of 1948. When McNair

was returned to power, his government immediately launched reform of the NBEPC.

The headquarters of the Commission were moved to Fredericton and the first postwar

hydro-electric dam - the Tobique Narrows project - commenced in 1950.12

New Brunswick's power development accelerated during the 1950's. When the

Conservative government of Hugh John Flemming was elected in 1952, the provincial

electrical structure changed dramatically. Premier Flemming had a strong sense of

patriotism for his province that was guided by what Margaret Conrad calls a "strong

Young, "Planning For Power," p. 76. " Ibid, p. 76. 12 Ibid., p. 76.

22 drive to reduce poverty of New Brunswickers." With a bankrupt treasury, however,

Flemming pressed Ottawa for funding to the power development on the St. John River, starting with the large-scale Beech wood hydro-electric project. Like McNair, with his

"power for industry" model, Flemming's administration equated future economic development of the province with its hydro-electric potential. The NBEPC was mandated to create a public monopoly of all generation, transmission and distribution within the province.14 The next fifteen years witnessed rapid development of the public utility as it acquired the majority of private and municipal power distributers and expropriated crucial facilities such as Grand Falls from foreign owners. Essentially, the

1950s was an era of 'provincialization' of electrical production within New Brunswick.

The second major change was the development of large hydro-electric projects on the St.

John River with aid from the provincial and federal governments. The Beechwood hydro-electric development project was the beginning of provincial-federal megaprojects associated with electrical development. In 1957 Diefenbaker's government approved a large loan for the Beechwood hydro-electric dam along with a $25 million special adjustment grant for the Atlantic Provinces. The Beechwood Dam was a major controversial electoral issue, but once Flemming finalized the deal, New Brunswick entered into a new era of large capital intensive projects intended to develop the economy while at the same time increasing electrical production. As a result, the NBEPC grew, and accordingly each large-scale development project became a political event.

13 Margaret Conrad, "The 1950s: The Decade of Development," The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation, eds., E.R. Forbes and D. A. Muise, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 404. 14 Kenny and Secord, "Public Power for Industry," p. 97.

23 Figure 2.1 Premier Flemming at Beechwood Opening

Source: E.R. Forbes and D.A. Muise, eds, The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 413.

This fast pace continued throughout the 1960s. When Louis Robichaud became

Premier in 1960, plans for a large hydro-electric project were already underway.

Referred to as the "largest single construction project ever undertaken in the Atlantic

Provinces" in 1966, the Mactaquac hydro-electric dam was to produce 600,000 kilowatts costing an estimated $113,690,000.'5 The government expropriated enough land within the Saint John River Valley to clear a region for a 59 mile lake that consumed approximately 997 private properties.16 The project received grants from the newly established federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE). The hydro electric development also attracted the St. Anne-Nackawick pulp and paper mill in the

New Brunswick Electric Power Commission, Forty-Seventh Annual Report (Fredericton: The Legislative Assembly, 1966), p. 6-7. 16 Ibid.

24 dam's head pond. At the grand opening in 1969, Premier Robichaud and the NBEPC proudly unveiled the new dam in the same fashion as Flemming had in opening

Beechwood. The close and mutual relationship between the provincial government and the public utility was clear.

Figure 2.2 Premier Robichaud at Mactaquac Opening

Source: NBEPC, New Brunswick Electric Power Commission Annual Report (Fredericton: Legislative Assembly, 1969), p.4.

In the shadow of the major investment and development of powerful hydro electric dams, the NBEPC was also proposing a number of other energy options. Despite the practicality of hydro-electric energy, the Saint John River's energy capacity had been fully tapped by the late 1960s. Thermal plants were a constant theme for the commission; however, interests went even further. In 1966, the Atlantic Tidal Power

Programming Board began feasibility studies of the tidal power in the Bay of Fundy, but these plans never really sparked the interests of NBEPC. It was a newer technology that

25 caught the attention of the NBEPC. Nuclear energy, an alternative energy option, had been studied by the Commission as early as 1961. The NBEPC's 1961 annual report stated:

Close attention is being paid to developments in the nuclear power field. The use of such stations in our system does not appear to be justified within the next decade. However, if at any time the cost, reliability and flexibility of nuclear power has economic advantages for the Commission and for the general economy of the Province, we would be prepared to take advantage

Hydro-electric and thermal plants were still the main concentration of the Commission, but if the economic need presented itself, nuclear power was a viable option for the province, according to the Power Commission. Again, in 1967, the NBEPC asserted,

"requirements beyond 1970 are being evaluated and the economic feasibility of nuclear

1J4 energy as a result of larger power pool operations is being actively considered." In anticipation of the possible use of nuclear power, the NBEPC noted that senior personnel attended courses in Canada and the United States to get training in the latest technology.19 The public utility had developed an eager attitude towards the new technology. By 1971 the Commission stated "appraisals will be made of generation sources such as nuclear."20 The following year the Commission augmented its campaign for nuclear energy. "In view of the Province's extreme dependency on foreign fuel sources, both from an availability and cost point of view," the NBEPC urged that

"consideration of nuclear power becomes very important in studies to provide security

17 New Brunswick Electric Power Commission, New Brunswick Electric Power Commission Annual Report, 1961 (Fredericton: The Legislative Assembly, 1961). NBEPC, New Brunswick Electric Power Commission Annual Report, 1967 (Fredericton: The Legislative Assembly, 1967), p. 8. Vbid- NBEPC, New Brunswick Electric Power Commission Annual Report, 1971 (Fredericton: The Legislative Assembly, 1971), p. 11. 26 for the load demands of the future."21 According to the public utility's rhetoric, the electrical "security" of New Brunswick could be achieved with a nuclear program

99 described as an "ecologically 'clean' source of generation."" The NBEPC edged towards nuclear power in the same way it had towards new hydro-electric dams. By

1973 it was evident the utility was a driving force to achieve a nuclear program for the 9"i province. The project required full participation of the provincial and federal governments. The electrification of New Brunswick had changed from a privately owned system to a controlled public utility. By 1957 the utility had become directly involved in

New Brunswick's earliest and largest federal-provincial development projects that resulted in the expansion of the utility. The NBEPC was in the position to influence the political decision process of the province's economic development. This happened to be during a unique period of the region's history when the federal and provincial governments turned their policy towards the development of large-scale projects designed to realign the Maritimes' economy.

Economic Development in Postwar New Brunswick, 1957-1974

New Brunswick experienced dramatic changes in the two decades following the

Second World War. The province was faced with the task of counteracting its regional underdevelopment trend well at the same time adjusting its social, political and economic structure to allow the increased participation of the Acadian francophone population. These two challenges were intimately connected, and largely defined

NBEPC, New Brunswick Electric Power Commission Annual Report, 1972 (Fredericton: The Legislative Assembly, 1972), p. 12. 22 Ibid. See NBEPC, New Brunswick Electric Power Commission Annual Report, 1974 (Fredericton: The Legislative Assembly, 1974).

27 postwar New Brunswick both within the public and political realm. Building in the late

1950s and gaining impressive momentum throughout the 1960s, the province had transformed its state functions and traditional cultural makeup. However, as social ideologies of nationalism and modernity shifted dramatically and the realization emerged that development initiatives had failed to address the major problems, the province found itself at a crossroads by the 1970s.

The socio-economic transformations of the 1940s and 1950s - state-led war economy and postwar boom, government infrastructure expenditures and Canada's implantation of a welfare state - pulled New Brunswickers further into the North

American market economy. However, as the standards of social, economic and cultural participation increased throughout the Canadian nation-state, New Brunswick - and the other Atlantic Provinces - struggled to keep up. The political leaders of the Atlantic provinces found themselves in similar positions. Shortly after Hugh John Flemming came to power in New Brunswick, Atlantic Canada's premiers met in Moncton in

September 1953 to discuss development issues. The meeting called for a royal commission on the economic situation of the Atlantic region and a cooperative effort for the development of industry and resources.24 A year later the Atlantic Provinces

Economic Council (APEC) was formed to "survey, study, stimulate, and co-ordinate activities relating to the economic well-being of the Atlantic provinces." Faced with an election and provincial debts accrued from the establishment of the Beechwood hydro electric project, Flemming contacted his Atlantic colleagues to have another meeting in

24 Conrad, "The 1950s: The Decade of Development," p. 405. The reality of the province's struggle with economic development was reflected in population figures. The population of the Maritimes dropped to 9 per cent of the nation in 1961 from 20 per cent in 1871.

28 Fredericton to create a co-operative action plan. The Atlantic premiers, officials and experts congregated in Fredericton in July 1956. At the conference Flemming expressed his view that Ottawa must provide fiscal aid to assist resource development, regional transportation policy, and a plan to stimulate regional growth.26 The creation of

APEC and the Atlantic Premiers Conference coincided with the report of the federal

Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects chaired by Walter Gordon in which the analysis of regional disparity played a major part. The link between region and underdevelopment was politically recognized.

Despite the similar economic situation the Atlantic Provinces shared, New

Brunswick experienced an increasingly unique situation in the postwar era. The Acadian population represented only 16 per cent of the New Brunswick population in 1871. By

1951 they comprised 40 per cent: the province's francophone population increased by

340 per cent as opposed to 30 per cent for the population of British origin. As the

Acadian population experienced integration in the postwar years it carried with it a demographic and electoral presence recognized by francophone lobbyists and provincial government officials. By the 1950s the Acadian population debated how to balance its traditional autonomist nature while at the same time increasing its integration into the modern economy and state.

When Hugh John Flemming won the 1952 provincial election, the Acadians' demographic trends were beginning to be reflected in provincial politics. Four francophone Conservatives were elected, two of whom were assigned positions as

26 Ibid., p. 408. Joel Belliveau, "Acadian New Brunswick's Ambivalent Leap into the Canadian Liberal Order," in Creating Postwar Canada: Community, Diversity, and Dissent, 1945-75, eds. Magda Fahrni and Robert Rutherdale (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008), p. 64. 28 Ibid., p. 65. 29 ministers. In the Liberal opposition party, ten of sixteen members were Acadian: among them Louis Joseph Robichaud. From a long-time Liberal francophone family, Robichaud

- and other Acadian politicians - began to consciously influence postwar provincial politics. Robichaud was attuned to a liberal philosophy and harboured strong commitment to social justice and state intervention.29 The 1950s also witnessed the

Acadian Deportation's 200th anniversary, spurring strong feelings of Acadian nationalism. Joel Belliveau argues "the organizers conceived this event as a stepping stone to a more modern Acadia."30 Participation was the guiding principle, not the pre war tradition of nationalistic view of Acadian autonomy and isolation. These intra- provincial dynamics began to have an influence on the political economy of the province.

In June 1960, Louis Joseph Robichaud was elected by the people of New

Brunswick as the first Acadian premier. During a decade of rule Robichaud and his

Liberal government legislated some of the most controversial and progressive programs ever introduced to the province. Once in office, Robichaud's administration initiated a commission by Edward G. Byrne to study the fiscal situation in New Brunswick and to recommend what decisive action the Liberals could take. The Byrne Report discovered rural and urban disparities and a fiscal disaster for municipalities throughout the

province. To remedy the severe inequalities, the report recommended the elimination of

the divided municipal and provincial jurisdiction by having the provincial government

assume the administrative and financial responsibilities for education, public health,

See Delia M. Stanley, Louis Robichaud: A Decade of Power (Halifax: Nimbus Publishing, 1984); Richard Wilbur, The Rise of French New Brunswick (Halifax: Formac Publishing, 1989). 30 Belliveau, "Acadian New Brunswick's Ambivalent Leap into the Canadian Liberal Order," p.65.

30 hospital care, social welfare and justice.31 To put the findings of the Byrne report into action, Robichaud's administration prepared a statement of general policy entitled

"White Paper on the Responsibilities of Government," finalized in March, 1965. The document's driving philosophy was clearly stated:

The actions and policies of government must aim towards the objective of guaranteeing acceptable minimum standards of social, economic, and cultural opportunity without in any way restricting maximum opportunities for the individual, the community, or any sector of society.

The White Paper highlighted the statistical discrepancies between New

Brunswick and the rest of the nation as well as the intra-provincial inequalities. The paper focused on New Brunswick's postwar challenges in isolation from the Atlantic region. This document was followed by a series of bills which collectively became known as the "The Program of Equal Opportunity" (PEO).33 In 1965 Robichaud's

Liberals delivered to the province an official languages act, a non-contributory medicare

system, health care, educational and judicial reforms that were inclusive and responsive

to francophone populations in north-eastern New Brunswick as well as other regions of

underdevelopment. The provincial government would be solely responsible for taxation,

health, education, social services, and justice. New Brunswickers - Acadians included -

Stanley, Louis Robichaud, p. 129. White Paper on the Responsibilities of Government, March 4, 1965, p. 1. There is a lot of scholarly work done on The Program of Equal Opportunity. As a general definition, the guiding principle of the PEO program was a relocation of responsibilities and fiscal arrangements between the provincial government of New Brunswick and the province's municipalities and other local bodies. This was intended to encourage all residents of the province to have access to a basic standard of services regardless of the fiscal capacity of their respective locality. Evidently this would address regional development issues in north-eastern New Brunswick. See Robert A. Young, "The programme of Equal Opportunity: An Overview," The Robichaud Era, 1960-70: Colloquium Proceedings (Moncton: The Canadian Institute for Research on Regional Development, 2001), pp. 23-35; Young, "Remembering Equal Opportunity: Clearing the Undergrowth in New Brunswick," Canadian Public Administration 13, no.l (Spring 1987): pp. 88-102. Delia M. Stanley, Louis Robichaud: A Decade of Power, pp. 137-163; Richard Wilbur, The Rise of French New Brunswick, PP- 200-221.

31 now pinned their hopes on the provincial state. Provincial development policy had moulded to New Brunswick's increasingly unique socio-economic demands.

As the 1960s came to an end the hopes of participation and economic development turned into frustration. As the liberal ideology concerning participation in the modern economy and political arena established itself, the content of modern development stalled. Economic disparities and out-migration still persisted in New

Brunswick, especially in the northeast. Despite Robichaud's educational and public services reform, the socio-economic situation within the province changed little. The expected mineral boom in northern New Brunswick in the 1950s never materialized, foreign investment was still minimal, and federal aid was in a state of constant re organization. The initiatives that did take place - such as the development of the

Kouchibouguac National Park on New Brunswick's eastern shore that forcibly expropriated 217 homes despite local resistance - left the population frustrated and confused about state-led economic development. Similarly, the mass expropriation of private property to build the Mactaquac hydro-electric dam in the late 1960s left members of the public angered by the state's economic strategies. In the case of the

Acadians, the late 1960s also presented a resurgence of nationalism. The surge in

Quebec nationalism, which culminated in the election of the Parti Quebecois, added to

New Brunswick's distinct socio-economic tensions.

In 1970 Louis Robichaud's rule came to an end when the province elected

Richard B. Hatfield and his Conservative government. As Hatfield took the helm of New

34 For more on the selection, expropriation, development and management of National Parks in Atlantic Canada see Alan MacEachern, Natural Selections: National Parks in Atlantic Canada, 1935-1970 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 2001). 35 Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud, Richard Hatfield: Power and Disobedience (Fredericton: Goose Lane Editions, 1992), p. 50. 32 Brunswick, the province had reached a crossroads. As the late 1960s demonstrated, statist economic development had faltered. Hatfield, faced with the increasingly fragmented society with a nationalistic francophone population, also had the burden of stimulating economic growth to counteract high unemployment in New Brunswick. The provincial economy had fallen on hard times: unemployment reached 7.5 per cent, compared to 4.7 per cent, the national average.37 At the turn of the twentieth century, the

Atlantic Provinces formed nearly 40 per cent of the Canada's active labour force; by

1971 it had fallen to 4 percent.38 Between 1966 and 1971, New Brunswick experienced an out-migration of 35,233 people.39 Leading up to the election, Hatfield argued that

Robichaud led a "lethargic government" and that the province needed jobs, economic programs, greater opportunities, social betterment and the development of its resources.

Shortly after Hatfield was elected, the economic reality of the province hit hard.

On 1 December 1971 - later dubbed "Black Wednesday" - three of the province's biggest employers in the northeast laid off a total of 1,700 employees. As a result, waves of protests were organized by unions and other local groups, pressuring the industry and provincial government for help. The Conseil Regional d'Amenagement du

Nord (CRAN), a federally funded regional development council, transformed itself during the winter of the mass lay-offs into the francophone political party, le Parti

Acadien (PA). This party lobbied and expressed its concerns about regional

36 John G. Reid, "The 1970s: Sharpening the Sceptical Edge," in The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation eds., E.R. Forbes and D.A. Muise. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 1993), p. 462. 37 Ibid, p. 460. 38 Henry Veltmeyer, "The Capitalist Underdevelopment of Atlantic Canada," in Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada, eds., Robert J.Brym and R. James Sacouman, (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1979), p. 20. 39 Reid, p. 460. 40 Richard Hatfield quoted in Telegraph Journal, (16 June 1969). 41 Belliveau, "Acadian New Brunswick's Ambivalent Leap into the Canadian Liberal Order," p.78.

33 development initiatives throughout the 1970s. The unity of the province had become jeopardized as the division between francophone and anglophone populations widened with economic inequalities.42 The underdevelopment of New Brunswick required a provincially oriented approach to solve its problems.

Hatfield responded to the worsening conditions with an increase in state-planning and encouragement of foreign investment. Pressing for the development of a modern industrial base, Hatfield's government ambitiously searched and invested in numerous projects throughout the province. New Brunswick embarked on the "biggest capital construction program in the history of the province."43 The capital investment was province-wide. Major projects such as the $300-million Coleson Cove thermal power plant and a $200-million expansion of Irving Oil's refinery were underway.44 In 1974,

Hatfield's government had guaranteed loans for an estimated 90 companies in the province.45 In 1973 Hatfield made the province 51 per cent owner of a high-profile sports car manufacturing company Bricklin Canada Limited.46 The largest of these development projects was the NBEPC's proposal for the $900-million two-unit Point

Lepreau nuclear generating plant, which was characterized by the close relationship between the provincial utility and government. Similarly, the federal government was also reshaping its approach to regional economic development.

For an interesting comparative analysis of New Brunswick's stability issues see Edmund A. Aunger, In Search of Political Stability: A Comparative Study of New Brunswick and Northern Ireland (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1981). 43 Arthur Parks quoted in Jackie Webster, "Spotlight on N.B.," The Atlantic Advocate, (October, 1974), p. 36. 44 Esther Crandall, "Major industrial development is still being predicted for Saint John," The Globe and Mail, (25 May 1976), B4. 45 Canadian Press, "Premier's Bricklin Steals the Spotlight," The Telegraph Journal, (23 September 1974), p. 2. 46 See H.A. Fredericks and Allan Chambers, The Bricklin (Fredericton: Brunswick Books, 1977).

34 When Canada came off its war-time production high, the reconstruction and rationalization of the national economy was the preeminent task of the federal government. With the rise of the Keynesian era after the Second World War, economic development increasingly became the responsibility of federal and provincial governments.47 The Diefenbaker government promised the electorate a "New National

Policy" as an instrument "of his intention to redress the chronic imbalance among

Canada's economic regions."48 He outlined his "Atlantic Manifesto" that promised additional money through Atlantic Adjustment Grants, aid to several power projects, and the development of a Canadian Coast Guard.49 This increased state-intervention within

Atlantic Canada and the entire nation would become known as the Second National

Policy.50 With the release of the Gordon Commission Report in 1957 federal officials

"discovered" regional disparities, which created a watershed moment in regional

development policy. The Maritime region played an active role in the Commission,

submitting thirty-three submissions, all exuding the tone of'regional grievance.'51 The

report highlighted the "deepening pattern of uneven development," with special

reference to Atlantic Canada.52

See David A. Wolfe, "The Rise and Demise of Keynesian Era in Canada: Economic Policy, 1930- 1982," in Modern Canada, 1930s-I980s: Readings in Canadian Social History, Volume 5 eds., Michael Cross and Gregory Kealey, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1984), pp. 46-78; also see Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), p. 53; Kenneth Norrie and Douglas Owram, A History of the Canadian Economy (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991), p. 568. 48 Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), p. 178. Janine Brodie, The Political Economy of Canadian Regionalism (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990), p. 163. 50 For more on the First National Policy, the Second National Policy and the Third National Policy see Peter M. Leslie, Federal State, National Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), pp. 4-10. 51 Margaret Conrad, "The 1950s: The Decade of Development," in E.R. Muise and D.A. Muise, eds., The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 407. 52 Ibid., p. 163.

35 Another major regulatory development during this period was the national energy policy. The Diefenbaker government appointed the Royal Commission on Energy - the

Borden Commission - in 1957 to examine petroleum production and marketing. As a result the National Energy Board was created in 1959, followed by the National Oil

Policy in 1961. With the discovery of large oil resources in Alberta and the increased industrial use of the resource in the postwar period, the government established a regulatory process to control revenue and export dimensions. Atomic energy had already received the brunt of government regulation with the establishment of Atomic Energy

Control Board in 1946 and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited in 1952. Energy was essential to the industrial development of Canada.

The post-1957 period witnessed active state intervention in the economic development of the Atlantic Provinces. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s there were a number of federal agencies formed to promote regional economic development. The year 1961 marked the first federal program of regional development when Parliament passed the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Act (ARDA). It was a federal- provincial endeavour to aid agricultural development. The ARDA was replaced in 1966 with the Fund for Rural Economic Development (FRED), which was applied only to

specific regions with widespread low incomes and major problems of economic

adjustment, northeastern New Brunswick included.55 As a distinctly Atlantic approach to

regional development, Ottawa established the Atlantic Development Board (ADB) in

Norrie and Owram, A History of the Canadian Economy, p. 570. Brodie, The Political Economy of Regionalism, p. 165. This period also witnessed a significant elaboration of the Canadian welfare state; between 1965 and 1975, government transfers to individuals increased by over 400 percent. Donald Savoie, Visiting Grandchildren: Economic Development in the Maritimes (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), p. 83. 36 1962 that encompassed all four Atlantic Provinces. The ADB was inspired by the

Gordon Commission and the former New Brunswick premier Hugh John Flemming to rationalize development initiatives in the Atlantic Provinces, only to receive heavy criticism from political observers.56

Regional development in Atlantic Canada increasingly adopted the mandate to introduce manufacturing and heavy industry to the region. This development strategy was largely summarized by Alex Cairncross' 1961 report Economic Development and the Atlantic Provinces. Cairncross alleged that the major reason for regional underdevelopment was the "rapid decline in employment in the resource-based industries of the region."57 As a strategy to avoid this decline, Cairncross suggested

"doubling manufacturing employment (i.e. employment in non-primary industries) in the

Maritime Provinces over the next twenty years."58 To create a stimulus for industry to relocate, the state would need to help with relocation costs, subsidies, tax incentives and capital grants and loans: all at the expense of the taxpayers. The Area Development

Incentives Act (ADIA) and the Area Development Agency (ADA) were developed within the Department of Industry in 1963. As yet another federal attempt at regional development, ADA focused specifically on attracting manufacturing industries.

However, by the late 1960s, as demonstrated in New Brunswick, it was clear the state's role in economic development was faltering. When Pierre Elliot Trudeau became the Prime Minister of Canada in 1968, national unity was his government's central preoccupation. This focus did not solely concentrate on the deterioration of French-

56 Ibid, p. 83. Alex K. Cairncross, Economic Development and the Atlantic Provinces (Fredericton: Atlantic Provinces Research Board, 1961), p. 34. 58 Ibid., p. 34.

37 English relations as demonstrated in Quebec. Trudeau announced, "if the underdevelopment of the Atlantic provinces is not corrected, not by charity or subsidy, but by helping them become areas of economic growth, then the unity of the country is almost as surely destroyed as it would be by the French-English confrontation."59

Donald Savoie notes that there were two defining moments in regional economic development: the 1968 creation of the DREE; and the 1973 overhaul of regional development by turning to provincial governments to shape new initiatives. To help the

Atlantic Provinces become "areas of economic growth," Trudeau established DREE in

1969 to replace the ADB.61 DREE was designed to facilitate the development of modern industries in the regions of the nation that were struggling. With a focus on Atlantic

Canada, DREE would provide regional development incentive programs to arrange federal loans to provincial governments and private enterprise interested in developing a particular development initiative. The department played a significant role in New

Brunswick's economic development during the 1970s. Federal regional economic development took on more of a provincial dynamic in response to provincial governments' accusations that earlier federal support had been "top down." In the early

1970s the federal government introduced the General Development Agreement (GDA) approach, under which the bureaucracies of both levels of government were brought together to plan and implement new development initiatives for the province. With

Quoted in Richard W. Phidd and G. Bruce Doern, The Politics and Management of Canadian Economic Policy (Toronto: MacMillan, 1978), p. 324. 60 Donald Savoie, "Regional Economic Development in Atlantic Canada: The Next Step," in Regionalism in a Global Society: Persistence and Change in Atlantic Canada and New England, eds., Stephen Tomblin and Charles Colgan, (Peterborough: Broad View Press, 2004), p. 108. Savoie, Visiting Grandchildren: Economic Development in the Maritimes, p. 81. Donald Savoie, Federal-Provincial Collaboration: The Canada-New Brunswick General Development Agreement (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1981), p. 2.

38 regards to power development, DREE also became a crucial player. By the 1970s regional economic development had become equally characterized by provincial

dynamics as opposed to just regional. Likewise, the ingredients were right for the

NBEPC to propose large development projects that would supposedly create jobs and

generate economic spin-offs. A nuclear program wouldc likely sound good to both the

provincial and federal governments. The Canadian nuclear industry just happened to be

at a point where provincial nuclear programs were believed to play a significant part in

Canada's future energy production.

The Development of Canada's Domestic Nuclear Industry, 1943-1971

Canada began to play a significant role in nuclear research and development

during the Second World War. The geopolitics of the war brought Canada to the

forefront of the first real concentrated effort to harness nuclear physics.64 By 1941 the

British government was at the leading edge of nuclear research. The British Maud

Committee was mandated to study the implications of atomic research and by July 1941

the committee concluded research could produce an atomic bomb with Uranium 235,

more explosive than any current human creation, and also thermal power for practical

use could be generated by uranium and heavy water in a reactor.65 During the summer of

1942 the British government instructed the French physicist Hans Halban to take his

research team to Canada. Canada's secure geographical location from the war in Europe,

63 Department of Regional Economic Expansion, Annual Report, 1968-69 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), p. 19. 64 Wilfred Eggleston, Canada's Nuclear Story (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1965), p. 3-13. 65 Ronald Babin, The Nuclear Power Game (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1985), p. 30; for a more in- depth explanation of the race to achieve a nuclear chain reaction and atomic bomb see D.M. Lebourdais, Canada and the Atomic Revolution (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1959), p. 18-24; Babin, The Nuclear Power Game, p. 31 -32.

39 uranium resources (second largest to the Belgian Congo), and its proximity to the United

States nuclear research made Canada the perfect candidate.66 By the following summer, the British had achieved a tripartite project with the United States and Canada. On 19

August 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill, with Mackenzie King present, signed the Quebec

Agreement. This agreement allowed for collaborative research to construct an atomic bomb. The two signatories were the United States and Britain; Canada was not a signatory but was involved in its application. The Quebec Agreement created the

Combined Policy Committee (CPC), designed to make multilateral decisions about nuclear research and tripartite cooperation. CD. Howe, Canada's Minister of Defence and Supply, sat on the board to represent Canada's role.

As American research closed in on the creation of an atomic bomb, with the help of Canadian and British efforts, Canada participated increasingly in the development of heavy water reactors. In April 1944, the CPC concluded that a large-scale experimental heavy-water reactor needed to be built in Canada. With the nation's nuclear efforts, an experimental reactor called Zero Energy Experimental Pile (ZEEP) was built in Chalk

River, Ontario. When it began operation in September 1945, it was the first functioning reactor outside of the United States. This was followed by the construction of the

National Research X-perimental (NRX) reactor also at Chalk River which became operational in July 1947.

At the end of the Second World War, Canada had a strong industrial and technical foundation to develop a new energy source that required the nation's vast and unexploited uranium resources. Although Canada was considered to be one of the

Babin, The Nuclear Power Game, p. 31-32. Ibid, p. 34.

40 world's three atomic powers, it began to separate itself from the United States' and

Britain's nuclear policy.68 At the Atomic Conference held in Washington in November

1945, attended by President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and King, Canada established its 'atomic status.'69 It was determined that a United Nations body would be set up to facilitate and monitor the exchange of atomic information for peaceful purposes, to encourage elimination of national atomic weapons, and to establish effective international safeguards and inspection procedures. Thus the United National Atomic

Energy Commission (UNAEC) was established in December 1945. Canada joined with a permanent membership.

The attempt at peaceful nuclear development was pre-empted by uneasy postwar geopolitics. In June 1946 the United States established the McMahon Act, which restricted the information created by American atomic research. Both the United States and Britain were interested in developing their own nuclear weapons capability. Britain began to protect national nuclear information and established a research center for atomic weaponry. In 1949 the U.S.S.R. exploded its first atomic device. The postwar nuclear world had become characterized by the Soviet-American global struggle. Canada chose a different path by limiting its efforts to the development of a 'peaceful program' of practical nuclear energy production. The first legislative steps to regulate national atomic energy were taken in late 1945 by the drafting of the Atomic Energy Bill.

Developed with the careful guidance of CD. Howe, this bill was introduced in the House

Peter G. Mueller, On Things Nuclear: The Canadian Debate (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1977), p. 4. For a comprehensive account see J.A. Munro and A.I. Inglis, "The Atomic Conference 1945 and the Pearson Memoirs," International Journal, XXIX (Winter 1973-74), p. 90-109.

41 of Commons in May 1946. At the second reading, Howe summarized the Bill by

stating "the purpose of the Bill to be based on this resolution will be to encourage research in this field, both public and private, while taking adequate security measures

against the use of the material from which atomic energy is derived as a weapon of

war."71 After the third reading the Bill was passed in the House of Commons and sent to the Senate. In October 1946, it was proclaimed as the Atomic Energy Control Act, with

the following preamble:

It is essential in the national interest to make provision for the control and supervision of the development, application and use of atomic energy, and to enable Canada to participate effectively in measures of international control of atomic energy which may hereafter be agreed 72 upon;

To this end, the act established the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) as the

Canadian government's agency to control and supervise nuclear development. The

Board possessed a range of powers from the dissemination of nuclear information to a

wide range of regulatory authority over "research, mining, production and ownership,

transportation, and use of prescribed substances."73 It would be the governing body that

regulated all future licensing of the nation's nuclear power stations.

The second pillar of Canadian nuclear industry was Atomic Energy of Canada

Limited (AECL), a Crown corporation established in 1952 through the provisions

Gordon Sims, A History of the Atomic Energy Control Board (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1981), p. 22; 71 Quoted in Ibid., p. 23. 72 The Atomic Energy Control Act, 1946, 10, Geo. VI, ch. 37, (August 13, 1946). Sims, A History of the Atomic Energy Control Board, p. 24.

42 provided in section ten of the Atomic Energy Control Act. The responsibility for nuclear energy had shifted from the National Research Council of Canada to AECL. The

crown corporation reported to the Parliament of Canada through the minister of the

Department of Energy, Mines and Resources. As the crown corporation's annual report

announced, the AECL had become "the owner and operator of Canada's major atomic

energy research and development project, for which it is responsible, through the Atomic

Energy Control Board, to the Government and people of Canada."75 The structure for a

civilian atomic energy program was firmly established by the 1950s.

The next task for Government of Canada was to make nuclear power production

economically feasible. In August 1954 the AECL's Power Reactor Feasibility Study

concluded the technology was now available for the design and construction of a

If*

demonstration power plant that was a "necessary step in proving economic feasibility."

AECL began the construction of the Nuclear Power Demonstration reactor (NPD) to

establish an electricity generating plant. This was constructed in close proximity to

Chalk River. The NPD was a tripartite project which included the federal government,

Hydro-Electric Commission of Ontario and Canadian General Electric (CGE).77 The

corporate participation would slowly decline, but the provincial utility would remain

crucial to future development in Canada. The NPD was completed in 1962; the reactor's

use of nuclear fission of uranium, moderated and cooled by heavy water, provided the

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Annual Report: Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 1952-53 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1952), p.5; also see Robert Bothwell, Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). 75 Ibid., p. 6. 76 Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Annual Report: Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 1954-55 (Ottawa: AECL, 1954), p. 2. 7 Babin, The Nuclear Power Game, p. 46.

43 basic elements that would eventually comprise the CANDU reactor (Canadian

Deuterium Uranium).

Table 2.1 Domestic Nuclear Reactors in Canada, 1945-1983

Reactor Type I nits Operational Province

ZEEP Research 1 1945 Ontario

NRX Research 1 1947 Ontario

NRU Research 1 1957 Ontario

NPD CANDU 1 1962 Ontario

Douglas Point CANDU 1 1965 Ontario

Pickering A CANDU 1-3 1971-3 Ontario

Pickering A CANDU 4 1971-3 Ontario

Gentilly 1 CANDU 1 1972 Quebec

Bruce A CANDU 1-2 1977-8 Ontario

Bruce A CANDU 3-4 1977-8 Ontario

Pickering B CANDU 4 1982-6 Ontario

Pt. Lepreau CANDU 1 1983 New Brunswick

Source: Duane Bratt, The Politics of CANDU Exports (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), p. 14

In the early 1960s, with the NPD still under of construction, AECL conducted a preliminary study to determine the profitability of the plant. The favourable conclusions encouraged the government to allow for the construction of the 200 megawatt reactor at

Douglas Point, Ontario. AECL was responsible for the design and construction of the reactor. Ontario Hydro was responsible for the construction of the conventional parts and the operation of the plant. This was the first nuclear plant approved by the Diefenbaker

44 government. Previously, the Liberal government had made every nuclear decision.

Diefenbaker's support for Canadian nuclear industry demonstrated the "non-partisan nature of the development of the atom in Canada."79 The Douglas Point station was the first reactor to be officially named a CANDU; it became operational in 1969.

The development of nuclear power accelerated: in 1969 Ontario Hydro and

AECL decided to construct a large-scale commercial reactor.80 This became the

Pickering complex, thirty-two kilometres from Toronto. Quebec was next; it developed the Gentilly-1 reactor that became operational in 1971. It was swiftly followed by another Ontario reactor named Bruce A. Despite the acceleration of nuclear reactor construction, the majority of nuclear stations remained in Ontario. New Brunswick was the only province outside of Central Canada to adopt a nuclear program when it began the process of acquiring a CANDU reactor in early 1970s. The domestic nuclear industry was in a growth phase when the NBEPC began to express interest in the possibilities of nuclear energy for New Brunswick.

Conclusion

Since its inception nuclear energy has been controlled by the state. In the postwar period the new technology became a crucial form of power production for industrial

Duane Bratt, The Politics of CANDU Exports (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), p. 13. 79 Ibid., p. 13. 80 In addition to the domestic development of Canada's nuclear program, exporting CANDU reactors became a significant part of the Canadian nuclear industry. It was evident in the early 1950s that the nuclear industry, still in its infancy, had sufficient potential in the international marketplace. Canada's unique history of the concentrated development of an electric generating nuclear reactor, coupled with large resources of uranium, gave Canada a complete advantage. In 1956 AECL launched a sales effort targeting a number of developed and developing nations. AECL succeeded in selling reactors and eventually uranium to India, Pakistan, Taiwan, Argentina, South Korea, Romania, and China. A national and international nuclear program of research, sales, construction and operation of reactors was firmly established by the 1960s and fully matured by the early 1970s. Ibid., p. 17.

45 nations. In Canada the technology was adopted by provincial public utilities to produce energy for civilian use while the federal government retained licensing, construction and operating ascendancy. The Power Commission was the main stimulus for some of New

Brunswick's largest development projects in the postwar period. The utility's interest in expanding its electrical capacity was reflected in the regional economic development projects in the 1950s and 1960s. The NBEPC influenced industrial development initiatives in New Brunswick by maintaining a close relationship with the provincial governments that promulgated public ownership and state-led development. Hatfield's policy to promote industrial development to deal with the province's economic inequalities brought his government's policy in tune with the NBEPC's planned expansion. Likewise, the federal government had a new interest in providing funding for projects that would likely develop the province. These changing policies aligned with the proliferation of the Canadian domestic nuclear power programs. All these conditions were necessary for New Brunswick to enter the nuclear age; however, most of Canada's provinces did not develop nuclear programs. There had to be a concentrated effort by the utility to bring this unique form of energy production to any given region. What were the specific forces that put this project in motion? Was this nuclear program a reasonable development project that would stimulate economic growth, or was there other motives behind the establishment of nuclear energy? The details of how New Brunswick entered the nuclear age will be provided in following chapter.

46 Chapter Three Going Nuclear: The Political Economy of New Brunswick's Nuclear Development, 1971-1974

At a press conference on 18 July 1974 Premier Richard Hatfield announced the location of Atlantic Canada's first nuclear reactor. After informing his constituents the reactor would be located at Point Lepreau, on the Fundy coast twenty-four miles south from Saint John, Hatfield announced, "the nuclear development will be the cornerstone of a ten year, billion dollar energy program to be undertaken by New Brunswick." In addition, the energy program consisted of a $80 million dollar expansion of a thermal generation plant in Dalhousie; the purchase of a second nuclear power plant site in northern New Brunswick; a $20 million investment in the Minto-Chipman coal fields; expansion of the Mactaquac hydro-electric dam; and, the possible development of tidal power from the Bay of Fundy.2

July 1974 was not the first time the idea of nuclear power in New Brunswick was presented to the public, nor was it a new scheme hatched by the provincial government and the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission (NBEPC). For the previous three years the public utility, with the political aid of Hatfield's government, had attempted to establish an export-led nuclear industry to service the New England energy market; a heavy water production facility with a nuclear reactor component; and an interprovincial grid and purchase agreement between New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Nova

1 Honourable Richard Hatfield quoted in Angus MacDonald, "N-Plant For Charlotte County; Billion- Dollar Energy Program," The Moncton Times, (19 July 1974), p. 1; also see Cecil Jennnings, "Fundy site chosen by New Brunswick for nuclear plant," The Globe and Mail, (19 July 1974), p. Bl. 2 Ibid.

47 Scotia that would be named the Maritime Energy Corporation. All three proposals failed during the negotiations between the utilities and the governments involved. These

blueprints for nuclear development in New Brunswick need to be discussed to

understand the politics of the nuclear energy program that was announced in late 1974.

International energy politics played a defining role in New Brunswick's 1974

decision to go nuclear. On 17 October 1973 the Organization of Arab Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OAPEC) announced an oil embargo in response to the Yom

Kippur War. The shortage of oil supplies from the Arab petroleum exporting countries

created an oil crisis and forced governments throughout the western hemisphere to

change their national energy policies. Oil security and alternative means of energy

production such as nuclear power were central to Canadian federal policy throughout the

1970s as the nation coped with a fourfold increase in oil prices. It was no accident New

Brunswick finally negotiated a nuclear program with federal funding during a period of

change in national energy politics. The development of New Brunswick's nuclear

program testifies to the broader concept that the early 1970s witnessed the heighten

politicization of energy.

Energy politics also played out at the provincial level but in a much different

form. The provincial energy program to establish a nuclear power station in southern

New Brunswick was incorporated into Hatfield's re-election campaign. His rhetoric and

timing of public announcements about the nuclear program directly corresponded with

his political strategy to gain two seats in a by-election and the preparation for a general

election in the fall of 1974. Letters between Hatfield and the ministers involved in the

final decision reveal that the premier had a personal interest in achieving federal

48 confirmation days before his own important political deadlines. Hatfield's pressure on the federal government directly affected the outcome of New Brunswick's nuclear program. These intra-provincial political events shaped the manner in which New

Brunswick entered the nuclear age. Hatfield also politicized the project to build Bricklin

sports cars in Saint John by driving them around during his re-election campaign.

Regional economic development projects are susceptible to provincial party politics.

The Point Lepreau project was a product of a new federal national energy policy,

provincial electoral political strategy, and the demands of a powerful public utility to

develop a nuclear export industry. By late 1974, the federal Department of Regional

Economic Expansion (DREE) had made it clear that the development of a nuclear

program in southern New Brunswick was an illogical development initiative that would

have little socio-economic benefits for the province. However, the billion dollar nuclear

power program in Point Lepreau was approved by both levels of the state with the

knowledge that it would not significantly add to the economic growth of province.

Two studies have focused on the politics surrounding the establishment of the

Point Lepreau nuclear generating station. In 1976 G. Bruce Doern published a

government report on the Atomic Energy of Control Board that included an analysis of

the Board's role in the licensing process of Point Lepreau in the early 1970s.3 This is

presented in point form in the appendix of the government document. It provides an

insightful narrative from the perspective of AECB but lacks any analysis and does not

examine other external events that affected the outcome of the decision process. The

See G. Bruce Doern, The Atomic Energy Control Board: An Evaluation of Regulatory and Administrative Processes and Procedures (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1976).

49 other work that focuses on the political decision to build Point Lepreau is provided by

Andrew Secord.4 In a chapter of his PhD dissertation he uses the central records of the

NBEPC to examine the politics surrounding the Commission's plan to establish an export-led nuclear industry to achieve corporate growth and expansion. Secord's study is thorough and provides insight into the years before the final Point Lepreau decision was made; however, the study also lacks any discussion of the broader political events that directly affected this particular development project. The 1973 oil crisis, Hatfield's provincial re-election campaign and the unmitigated influence of the NBEPC played significant roles in the development of the nuclear program in New Brunswick. No study, to date, has covered this aspect of provincial nuclear development.

This case study also has implications for the historiography of regional underdevelopment and the ongoing debate over regionalism. The conventional wisdom of regional underdevelopment in postwar Canada emphasizes that self-contained historical accidents and the insufficiencies of federal political and administrative institutions have reinforced a trend of economic decline in the Maritime provinces.5

Furthermore, the role of the province has been diminished in the theoretical

understanding of the political economy of regionalism. Thus to understand regional

economic development in Atlantic Canada, transprovincial politics such as national

political and administrative institutions have received the most attention. In many

4 See Andrew Secord, "Megaprojects in Maritime Canada: A Case Study of New Brunswick Electric Power Commission," Doctoral Dissertation, (Sussex, England: University of Sussex, 1994). See the most current and influential interpretation of regional underdevelopment in the Maritime provinces, Donald Savoie, Visiting Grandchildren: The Economic Development of the Maritime Provinces (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006). Janine Brodie, The Political Economy of Canadian Regionalism (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990), pp. 8-12. 50 respects these are valid conclusions; however, the arguments are supported by a historical narrative limited in scope. In 1965, David Apter wrote "the political party is such a critical force for modernization in all contemporary societies that the particular pattern of modernization adopted by each is quite often determined by its parties."7 With regards to large regional economic development projects, academics still await an analysis of what actually happened within each province during postwar years. When these state-led projects are subjected to historical inquiry, our conventional understanding of postwar underdevelopment becomes multi-layered and complex.

Federal policy influenced the outcome of large-scale development in the energy sector of

New Brunswick, but intra-provincial party politics held a stronger role in the pattern of postwar economic development. Hatfield used the Point Lepreau project in his re election campaign and directly influenced the outcome of the billion dollar project.

Additionally, powerful institutions such as the NBEPC pushed for large development projects even if the province would not gain any socio-economic benefits. DREE was hesitant when it warned that the nuclear power program in southern New Brunswick was not a logical economic project. In short, strong provincial forces which included the public utility's influence and then the provincial government's political objectives worked together to bring New Brunswick into the modern nuclear age. This chapter will establish the political narrative of the development of Point Lepreau in relation to the international and intra-provincial events that defined the project.

7 David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 179. 51 The Nuclear Decision Makers

Federal departments and agencies were the initial decision makers in any national nuclear development strategy. The politics of the nuclear decision process was in constant reorganization during the 1970s; however, the following description best applies to New Brunswick's nuclear development. The federal Minister of Energy,

Mines and Resources (EMR) was responsible to Parliament for anything that involved the Canadian nuclear industry. The Energy Development Branch, within EMR, focused on nuclear power policy. By legislation, the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) and Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) reported to the Minister of EMR. AECL was responsible for Canada's research, marketing, sales, construction and operation of

Canadian nuclear technology. Members of AECL would be included in inter departmental committees designed to facilitate nuclear development proposals that would be decided on by the federal Cabinet Committee. The AECB was responsible for all licensing processes which included proposal, construction and operation stages that all required official confirmation.

The Department of Finance worked in close consultation with EMR to assemble loan packages. These loans were distributed through AECL. For New Brunswick's case,

DREE was involved to ensure the nuclear program would serve the regional economic needs. DREE included their findings in the final approval for any federal funding to the nuclear project; confirmation about federal funding would come from the minister of

EMR. By 1974, the Department of Environment (DOE) had been included in the decision process. With the implementation of the Environmental Assessment Review

Process (EARP) in 1974, an environmental assessment was needed for any federally

52 funded project. As New Brunswick entered into the construction stage of the nuclear reactor, the DOE was responsible for the environmental assessment of the area to ensure

it met federal guidelines. The Point Lepreau CANDU generating station was the first

reactor to be subjected to a federal environmental assessment.

A public utility needs the consent of its provincial government to proceed with

large development projects such as hydro-electric dams or nuclear reactors. The

chairman of the NBEPC represented the utility in the provincial Legislative Assembly,

but the Premier's Office could effectively carry out political negotiations with the federal

government. The NBEPC conducted a number of negotiations with the federal

government and utilities from the United States and Maritimes on their own, but

eventually Premier Hatfield became the conduit between the NBEPC and the federal

government for the promotion of nuclear energy. Hatfield not only became personally

dedicated to the establishment of a provincial nuclear program, but incorporated the

project into his re-election campaign in the fall of 1974. The premier bypassed the

Commission and corresponded directly to federal ministers involved in the nuclear

decision process. Hatfield's rhetoric and correspondence with the federal government

reveals an interesting narrative of the development of nuclear power in New Brunswick.

At the beginning of the process, however, strategy formation and implementation

first emanated from the NBEPC, which maintained close consultation with AECL as it

devised a plan to achieve a nuclear export industry. The three large projects the NBEPC

proposed throughout the early 1970s required the backing of the provincial government

as it went through the nexus of federal departments and agencies. By 1974, the NBEPC

had come a long way before the Point Lepreau generating station received approval.

53 Early Proposals for Nuclear Power in New Brunswick, 1971-1973

It was clear by 1971 that the NBEPC was interested in the development of a provincial nuclear program.8 The utility viewed nuclear energy as a unique opportunity to establish large scale energy exports to the New England market. This interest in exporting nuclear energy to the United States was shared by Atomic Energy of Canada

Limited (AECL). Between 1945 and 1974 Canada's nuclear reactor export industry eagerly established foreign markets for its unique technology of a heavy-water reactor.

By 1972, AECL was aware that foreign sales of CANDU reactors were crucial to the future of the Canadian nuclear program.9 Opposition parties pressured Trudeau's Liberal government to generate nuclear exports. As a result, AECL was in a position to argue that the development of an effective export policy would likely save the Canadian nuclear program altogether.

AECL was interested in the American market and the international acclaim that would result from CANDU reactors supplying the United States' energy demands. This would have a positive effect on the CANDU's international reputation and increase the sales of the technology. As for electrical interconnection to the United Sates, the NBEPC was the only Canadian utility directly connected to the New England market.

Furthermore, New Brunswick's proximity to New England provided an ideal stepping stone to launch a nuclear power export program. By the early 1970s, AECL and the

NBEPC had developed a cooperative effort to bring nuclear power to the province.

Beginning in 1972, the General Manager of the NBEPC, A. J. O'Connor, was a member

8 See The New Brunswick Electric Power Commission, Annual Report, 1971 (Fredericton), p. 11. 9 Duane Bratt, The Politics of CANDU Exports (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), p. 112. 10 Secord, "Megaprojects in Maritime Canada," p. 148. 54 of the Board of Directors of AECL.11 Throughout the mid-1960s the NBEPC played an important role in the evaluation of prototype reactor designs with Canadian General

Electric (CGE) and AECL. Andrew Secord has argued that the utility and Crown

Corporation engaged in "an on-going exchange of information, both personal and strategic, designed to facilitate the nuclear reactor interests in competition with the interests of federal and provincial agencies and the general public." AECL offered valuable advice and tactics to the Power Commission to strengthen their negotiations with the federal government. By the early 1970s, the NBEPC managers had established a close working relationship with the Canadian nuclear industry.

In 1971 the NBEPC proposed to construct two 600 megawatt nuclear reactors in southern New Brunswick expecting to export 800 megawatts of the power to the United

States for the first fifteen years. The proposal was drafted in April 1971 in close consultation with AECL and then presented to the Trudeau's government in December.

An inter-departmental committee was formed to be chaired by the Assistant Deputy

Minister of EMR and members from the Department of Finance and AECL to review the proposal. The potential of exporting Canadian nuclear technology to the United States interested AECL.14 The process of achieving a large-scale nuclear exporting program had been put into action.

As the federal review process continued, the Minister of EMR, Donald

MacDonald, accompanied by the President of AECL, Lome Gray, came to New

11 Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Annual Report, 1972-1973 (Ottawa), p. 2. 12 Ibid., p. 148. 13 See Secord, "Megaprojects in the Maritime Canada," p. 154. 14 Ibid., p. 155.

55 Brunswick to meet with Hatfield. During the March 1972 meeting, MacDonald

indicated Ottawa would be willing to contribute a sizable amount to the development of

a nuclear plant in the province.15 MacDonald and Gray travelled to Nova Scotia to

discuss energy issues with Premier Gerald Regan where it was announced a review

board would to be set up to look into the possibility of integrating tidal power with other

energy sources such as nuclear.

On 30 March 1972, the federal Cabinet Committee agreed to offer 50 percent of

the total cost for two nuclear reactors as a federal loan to be guaranteed by the province

of New Brunswick and a 25 percent equity investment which the federal government

would guarantee.16 Once the agreement was made, the NBEPC began negotiations with

U.S. utilities to forge a market for New Brunswick's future energy production. On 5 June

1972 the plan for a nuclear export industry came up during question period in the

provincial Legislative Assembly. When asked if there was any information about the

project, George Mclnerney, the Chairman of the NBEPC, responded, "we talk about two

units of 600,000 kilowatt hours each, gives us a total of 1,200,000 kilowatt hours, for an

approximate cost of a little less than $600 million... so a large percentage will be surplus

power and will be exported."17 The following day, the provincial newspapers reported

that New Brunswick was on the verge of becoming a nuclear exporting province. With

interviews from L.F. Kirkpatrick, the General Manager from Nova Scotia Power, the

papers also reported Nova Scotia would participate in the project that would export

15 Canadian Press, "Nuclear Plant Proposed," The Telegraph Journal, (1 March 1972). 16 Secord, "Megaprojects in Maritime Canada," p. 160. 17 See The Legislative Assembly of the Province of New Brunswick, Synoptic Report, Volume VI (Fredericton, N.B.: Legislative Assembly, 1972), p. 2383.

56 400,000 kilowatt hours to northeastern United States, allowing the two provinces absorb the rest.18

In November 1972 the project suffered a serious setback. U.S. utilities rejected the NBEPC export proposal. The reasons varied among the twenty-eight members of the

Maine Energy Power Corporation (MEPCO). The problems included general transmission issues, commitments to planned nuclear units in the U.S., and various individual investment strategies.19 The nuclear-export strategy had failed and New

Brunswick lost the rationale for building two nuclear reactors. The NBEPC would still promote the idea of nuclear energy but would have to formulate a new strategy of distribution and sales to make it a viable project for federal funding and attractive for any other parties involved.

The second attempt to establish nuclear power in New Brunswick presented itself during the spring of 1973 when the federal government released a proposal to build a heavy water plant in Quebec, Saskatchewan or Alberta. During a meeting between

AECL officials and A.J. O'Connor, Frank MacLoon and G. Gunter, from the NBEPC, the possibility to combine a 2000 megawatt nuclear steam plant with a 800-ton per year

heavy water plant was discussed.20 Art O'Connor reported that the prospects for nuclear

export to the U.S. had diminished since 1971 because the New England utilities seemed

much more confident that the U.S. government would free the licensing tangle and

See Geoffrey Crowe, "N.B. Could Be Next," The Moncton Times, (5 June 1972); Canadian Press, "Nuclear Power Being Considered," The Daily Gleaner, (6 June 1972); Canadian Press, "N.B. Nuclear Power Plant by 1980?" The Moncton Times, (6 June 1972). 19 Secord, "Megaprojects in Maritime Canada," p. 161. 20 Public Archives of New Brunswick [here after PANB], RS417, 5243-1, "Visit to New Brunswick Electric Power Commission, Fredericton - 22 March 1973," p. 6.

57 nuclear installations would be more commonplace. With influence from AECL, the

NBEPC submitted a proposal to the federal government during the summer of 1973 for a nuclear power plant and a heavy water complex. The proposal stressed that the

Maritimes' power supply depended heavily on imported petroleum fuel that experienced

instability from crude producing countries of the Middle East. It estimated some 75 percent of New Brunswick's electric energy would be generated from this fuel source by

1976. "The exposure of the Maritime Provinces to being completely cut off from

imported fuel sources is becoming broadly recognized," the document warned. The

NBEPC claimed it was for these reasons that the utility had been making every possible

effort to introduce nuclear power into the province. The report stressed the easy

availability of nuclear fuel and should a combined nuclear power-heavy water complex

be awarded to the province it would provide an economic stimulus through the

construction and operation of the plants.24 The total investments were calculated to $412

million, with 75 percent supplied by the federal government and 25 percent through

commercial debt. This proposal varied from the previous nuclear attempt because it

steered away from the export of nuclear energy and focused more on the unpredictability

of foreign oil imports for energy production.

In mid-July, A. J. O'Connor and Chairman J. Stewart Brooks traveled to Ottawa

to present a brief to the federal government on the nuclear power-heavy water complex,

with an outline for federal assistance to New Brunswick for the construction of the

21 Ibid., p. 2. 22 PANB, RS417, 5243-1, "Summary of Presentation to Federal Department of Energy, Mines and Resources: Nuclear Power Plant and Heavy Water Complex for New Brunswick," (6 July 1973), p. 1. 23 Ibid., p. 1. 24 Ibid., p. 1.

58 project. A "dry run" investigation was done for the site location of the proposed nuclear power plant as the Power Commission awaited the federal government's final decision.26 Officials at the NBEPC became more impatient as the summer progressed. In

August O'Connor warned,

The Commission has to make a decision within this year on its next stage of generation. We're happy with a certain percentage of our supply dependent on that Middle East supply. But the Commission feels that, looking into the Eighties, we ought to have some part of that load generation coming from other sources, and nuclear power is an ideal clean source for it to come from.27

The question of where to locate the heavy-water plant turned into a heated political debate in Ottawa. The Defence Minister, James Richardson, warned he would resign unless the federal government's new heavy-water plant would be awarded to his home province Manitoba.28 The federal government realized it had to be awarded to one of the three original applicants or else they would be facing a number of political complications. In December, the NBEPC received confirmation that the government had decided to locate the heavy water plant in Quebec next to the Gentilly reactor with the next site to be in Manitoba or Saskatchewan. The NBEPC had failed a second time to

negotiate a nuclear program for the province. The utility did, however, have an effective

argument of false dependence on foreign oil imports. If the foreign oil imports continued

to escalate the federal government would have to reconsider their energy policy

including the proliferation of domestic nuclear programs.

Canadian Press, "To Present Brief on Nuclear Plant," Telegraph Journal, (11 July 1973). Canadian Press, "N.B. Made Its Pitch With a 'Dry Run' Study," Telegraph Journal, (4 August 1973). Quoted in David Folster, "Mixed Reaction to a Nuclear Idea," Toronto Globe, (4 August 1973). Canadian Press, "Future Staked On Heavy Water Plant?" Moncton Times, (2 November 1973). 59 The Political Decision, 1973-1974

Point Lepreau was a result of the increased politicization of energy in Canada

during the early 1970s. The decision to build a nuclear reactor in New Brunswick was the product of a shift in national energy policy, the influence of the public utility and

provincial electoral politics. The result was a project that would not stimulate the

province's economy, much to the dissatisfaction of key federal departments and the

people of New Brunswick. DREE warned the provincial and federal governments in

meetings and review reports that if the nuclear reactor was placed in southern New

Brunswick it would not be a justifiable project for the economic growth of the province.

DREE's advice was trumped by Hatfield's re-election strategy and the influence from

the NBEPC to have the plant in southern New Brunswick.

On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria invaded the Sinai Peninsula and Golan

Heights and began the Yom Kippur War against Israel. Tensions grew between Arab and

pro-Israeli nations as the dispute continued and successful counter offensives were

carried out. This armed dispute quickly brought into question the security of Middle East

oil imports to the west and whether Arab petroleum producing countries would withhold

oil exports. "Every day that the war goes on," the Minister of EMR, Donald MacDonald,

warned, "there is a greater danger of an interruption of the supply to the Canadian

market." On October 17 these fears became reality when the Organization of Arab

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) announced they would "cut oil exports by 5

per cent every month until Israel withdraws from occupied Arab territories and the rights

Donald MacDonald quoted in David Crane, "Ottawa fears oil shortage if war goes on," The Toronto Star, (9 October 1973), p. 1. 60 of Palestinians are restored." Two days after OAPEC's embargo announcement,

Donald MacDonald had a meeting with Canadian oil executives to devise a contingency plan for Eastern Canada if foreign oil shipments slowed down.

The Atlantic Provinces, Quebec and seven counties in Eastern Ontario relied on foreign oil imports, 25 percent of the total supplied by members of the OAPEC. Eastern

Canada would be affected the most in sectors that required oil imports, including the production of energy. Rising oil prices was more of a concern to the Maritimes than to any other region in Canada. The western provinces were protected by federal legislation that guaranteed them a supply of western crude oil, while both Quebec and

Newfoundland were rich in hydroelectric power. By comparison, Prince Edward Island depended 100 percent on fossil fuels, Nova Scotia 85 percent, and New Brunswick 40 percent for power generation. The provincial governments and utilities were now receptive to the idea of nuclear power and equated the increase in the price of oil to the

Maritimes' economic wellbeing. "Nuclear power has to come," stated the General

Manager of Nova Scotia Power, L. F. Kirkpatrick, "it's the only way the Maritimes can

IT stay in business."

On 6 December 1973, in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Pierre Elliot

Trudeau delivered an energy statement of a "one Canada" oil policy that would secure

Canadian Press, "Arabs Cut Oil Exports by 5% a Month," The Toronto Star, (18 October 1973), p. 1. 31 David Crane and Michael Lavoie, "Ottawa Studies Gas Rationing for Private Cars," The Toronto Star, (18 October 1973), p. 1. 32 Canadian Press, "Maritimes Consider Nuclear Power Source," The Daily Gleaner, (24 December 1973). 33 Ibid.

61 domestic supplies in the time of an energy emergency. Trudeau outlined a policy that would impose oil export controls, an extension of the interprovincial oil pipeline to

Montreal, a freeze on domestic oil prices, a levy and export tax on crude oil, and development of an oil import compensation scheme to protect consumers dependent on imported oil. "The western provinces will have a guaranteed outlet for increased production," Trudeau explained, "and the eastern provinces will be guaranteed security of supply."35 Trudeau's statement also focused on nuclear energy as a central feature to his government's policy. The Prime Minister stated:

The development of nuclear power in Canada presents a third major potential source of energy which may be of considerable assistance in achieving the goal of security and self-sufficiency...In order to reduce the present and future dependence of other provinces on oil for electric energy, the government will enter into discussions with any of them that may be interested in assistance in financing construction of the initial nuclear generating station in each province...The federal government has offered to help finance 50 per cent of capital cost of a new 600 megawatt nuclear power station, both to meet growth of demand in New Brunswick and, by interconnection with Quebec and Nova Scotia, to tie more closely the regional power system in eastern Canada.

The federal government was willing to help finance fifty per cent of a C ANDU nuclear reactor in any province that expressed interest, thus increasing the proliferation of

Canada's domestic nuclear technology to counteract the energy crisis sparked in late

1973. New Brunswick was first in line having expressed a serious interest in a nuclear program since 1971.

See Right Hon. Trudeau, "Energy Supplies Emergency Act," House of Commons Debates: First Session -Twenty-Ninth Parliament, Volume VIII (6 December 1973), p. 8478. 35 Ibid., p. 8478. 36 Ibid., p. 8483.

62 The year 1974 began with a federal-provincial Ministerial National Energy

Conference in Ottawa in the month of January. At the conference the federal government established a formal policy on subsidies for provincial nuclear power projects. In general, nuclear power received considerable attention as government officials discussed strategies to deal with the increasing oil prices. Premier Hatfield reiterated his province's interest in nuclear energy during the second day of the conference when he stated, "we should not allow ourselves to become reliant on a single source, especially oil.'"0 With reference to how the national energy policy encouraged the development of alternatives to petroleum, Hatfield urged Ottawa to provide New Brunswick with further financial assistance. He saw his province's nuclear program as a Maritime project that should be given priority by the federal government.

As a result of this shift in federal energy policy, the NBEPC wasted no time and in early February forwarded to the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) an official letter of intent to construct and operate a two unit nuclear power generating station. The proposal was for a two-unit 600 megawatt CANDU station, planned to start in April

1974, construction in April 1975, first fuel loading and start of operation in 1980 with commercial production beginning by the end of the same year.40 This was the first licensing stage to acquire AECB's approval to legally continue with the planning of the project. In the meantime the NBEPC continued to evaluate sites for the proposed reactor

Government of Canada - Environmental Assessment Review, Environmental Assessment Panel Report to the Minister of the Environment: Point Lepreau New Brunswick Nuclear Generation Station, May 1975, p. 1. 38 Richard Hatfield quoted in Canadian Press, "New Brunswick N-Plant Final Bid May be Accepted," The Moncton Times, (24 January 1974), p. 1. 39 Ibid. 40 G. Bruce Doern, The Atomic Energy Control Board, p. 55.

63 by commissioning the environmental consulting firm MacLaren Associates Limited. By

February, there were five possible sites: four in the north of the province and one in the south. Planning was moving at a fast past.

Because the NBEPC had lost the contract to build the export-oriented nuclear- heavy water complex, the proposal for the new two-unit nuclear generation station had to have the support of Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia to spark the interest of the federal government. New Brunswick had to establish deals with the Nova Scotia and

Prince Edward Island utilities for a jointly owned interprovincial nuclear program. In

February, the Chairman of the commission, Stewart Brooks announced:

Nuclear energy represents reasonable assurance that New Brunswick will escape high oil prices and fuel scarcity in the long term - both Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island have indicated they will participate. We have considerable optimism that we will be constructing a two-unit plant in the near future.41

The NBEPC had begun negotiations with Nova Scotia as early as October 1973. By

1974, the utility proposed two 600 megawatt reactors to be owned jointly by the three

Maritime provinces: the agreement would form the Maritime Energy Corporation. There were, however, difficulties negotiating with the other two utilities and provincial governments. The NBEPC noted the second unit was "contingent on the outcome of current negotiations with neighbouring Canadian utilities."42 Nova Scotia expressed apprehension about the interprovincial reactor, but Prince Edward Island demonstrated a

41 Quoted in Canadian Press, "Nuclear Power Plant Seen In Near Future," The Daily Gleaner, (26 February 1974). 42The New Brunswick Electric Power Commission, Annual Report, 1974 (Fredericton: NBEPC, 1974), p. 18. 64 growing interest in the project. On July 30, PEI's Premier Campbell sent confirmation to Hatfield that his province was interested in participating with New Brunswick with a second nuclear unit at Point Lepreau.44 The negotiations would continue over the next couple years as the two unit nuclear complex would remain an option that the NBEPC would not give up.

Despite the NBEPC's preferences, however, the final shape of nuclear power in

New Brunswick would be determined by Premier Hatfield's political priorities. During the summer of 1974 Hatfield bypassed the NBEPC officials and his Cabinet to interact directly with all the federal ministers involved in the decision process. As Hatfield became personally involved in the negotiations, the NBEPC took on the lesser political roles such as site evaluation reports. 5 The Premier had a clear mandate to finalize a nuclear deal for the province and he was willing to accept a smaller program in order to settle a deal. None of the events throughout 1974 make sense unless this broader context is consulted. For example, Hatfield was preparing his government for two crucial by- elections in August and an unannounced general election for the fall. His announcements of nuclear development for the province correspond directly with his political strategy to get re-elected. This argument is strengthened when Hatfield's other large-scale development projects are considered. The 1974 election was locally referred to as the

See PANB, RS417, 5243-L-l, Letter from Premier Hatfield to Hon. Donald MacDonald, (30 September 1974), p. 2. Hatfield explained the status of participation between the three Maritime Provinces. Nova Scotia was indecisive but Prince Edward Island had made promises to New Brunswick. 44 See PANB, RS417, 5243-L-l, Letter from Premier Campbell to Hon, Donald MacDonald, (30 October 1974), p. 2. This is demonstrated by numerous letters of correspondence between the Premier and Ministers his operational files. 65 "Bricklin Election," because Hatfield toured the province during election time in a

Bricklin sports car that had commenced production during August in Saint John. His timing of announcements concerning this new automotive industry were strikingly similar to those of the nuclear development. Hatfield's politicization of the Point

Lepreau project shaped the outcome of the nuclear program.

On 7 June 1974, Hatfield received a letter from Donald MacDonald stating the federal position on nuclear power for New Brunswick. In the letter, MacDonald explained that a number of meetings had been held between Art O'Connor and Gordon

MacNabb of his own Department concerning government financing and the location of the nuclear power plant in New Brunswick. "While the following statement of the

federal position does not meet all of the prerequisites made by Mr. O'Connor,"

MacDonald wrote, "I believe it does go a long way towards meeting the needs of your

utility to move into the nuclear field."47 Maintaining the federal policy announced by

Trudeau in December 1973, MacDonald confirmed:

The federal government will, subject to the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission meeting certain prerequisites, provide loans through Atomic Energy of Canada Limited to cover 50% of the total cost of a 600 MW CANDU nuclear power plant, with the following general terms and conditions.48

The terms and conditions stipulated that the site for the station had to be approved by

DREE, DOE (for the construction stage only), and AECL; all loans would be guaranteed

by the Province of New Brunswick; and a number of terms for the federal loans,

See H.A. Fredericks and Allan Chambers, The Bricklin (Fredericton: Brunswick Books, 1977). 47 PANB, RS417, 5243-L, Vol. 2, 1975, Letter From Hon. Donald MacDonald to Hon. Richard Hatfield, (7 June 1974), p. 2. 48 Ibid., p. 2.

66 including that 50 per cent, would cover the total cost until the plant was in service.

MacDonald also made it clear his government was prepared to extend similar financing assistance to the development of a second regional reactor at the New Brunswick nuclear power station. This would, of course, depend on the "evidence of an agreement of participation or intent of such agreement among the three utilities," and a number of evaluations concerning energy supply and economic benefits for the province.

MacDonald concluded, "I am aware of the urgency for final agreement on this subject and wish to assure you that we will do everything possible to assist you in expediting the necessary discussions and agreements."51 This direct correspondence with the Minister gave Hatfield a clear understanding of the federal government's position on New

Brunswick's nuclear development. For the time being, they would only finance a single reactor only if the site was approved by the federal departments responsible for the review process.

Determining the provincial site of the nuclear project was imperative to achieve federal permission for financing and to legally proceed to the construction stage. The

AECB was responsible for the site evaluation of New Brunswick's reactor as well as granting permission to proceed to the next step of construction. DREE was responsible for the financial decision by consulting the socio-economic benefits of each site location.

At the provincial level, the NBEPC organized and carried out the site evaluation proposals. On 29 April 1974, the NBEPC submitted a preliminary site evaluation report

4y Ibid., pp. 2-3. 50 Ibid., p. 3. 51 Ibid., p. 3. 67 to the AECB to be evaluated. This site evaluation had five locations proposed by the environmental consultants, MacLaren Atlantic Limited: Point Lepreau, southwest of

Saint John, and Valette Point, Black Point, Quinn Point and Point Caplin, all on the

Chaleur Bay. One location was in southern New Brunswick and the rest in the northeast. The NBEPC favoured the Point Lepreau location because of its proximity to the United States with the interest in exporting nuclear energy if another reactor were to be established in the following years. In June, the AECB granted permission for the utility to submit a "Final Site Evaluation Report." In quick succession, the NBEPC submitted their "2 - 600 MWe Nuclear Power Station Site Evaluation Report, Point

Lepreau" to the Board.54 The NBEPC s proposal was still for a 1200 megawatt unit in hopes the other utilities would finalize an agreement with New Brunswick in the near

future. The report listed all the particulars of the Lepreau site, including surrounding demography and geological details, and promoted the advantages that would result from

having the station located in the south of the province. The AECB received this

document by mid-June. The review process required a long interval to process the site

evaluation. DREE also required time to conduct their economic analysis.55

At this point, the development of a nuclear program in New Brunswick took

some interesting turns. On 18 July 1974, Hatfield made the decision to publicly

announce the nuclear reactor would be built at Point Lepreau as a "cornerstone" of a ten-

Doern, Atomic Energy Control Board, p. 53. 53 Allan Chambers, "Consultants Gave Point Lepreau A Slight Edge," The Daily Gleaner, (25 July 1974), p.13. 54 See Legislative Library of New Brunswick , CA2 NB EPC S32, New Brunswick Electric Power Commission,"2 -600 MWe nuclear power station: site evaluation report, Point Lepreau," (Fredericton, N.B., NBEPC, 1974). 55 For information on the administrative process of licensing see Doern, Atomic Energy Control Board, p. 53.

68 year billion dollar "energy program" to be undertaken by New Brunswick. Hatfield did not have approval from the federal government to announce Point Lepreau as the final site selection or a formal agreement for federal funds. The only slight indication was the letter from MacDonald that stated his government would be interested in funding 50 percent only if a number of terms and conditions were fulfilled - one being, of course, federal approval of the site location. Ottawa was dismayed by Hatfield's reckless decision to announce a project that had not gone through any federal review processes.

"What was given to the press was not given to federal government," complained Jean-

Eudes Dube, the federal Minister of Public Works.57 Dube explained the announcement

CO was "premature" and discarded a "number of federal criteria." DREE, DOE, and the

AECB (who only received preliminary reports) as well as the federal Cabinet, had not

received information on a proposed site for the plant.

If anything, the announcement threatened the entire project. The only way to

understand Hatfield's incentive to make public his "energy program" is to consider the

electoral cycle in New Brunswick during this period. The province anticipated the

Premier's call for a general election throughout the summer of 1974. It was believed that

Hatfield was waiting for the July 8 federal election to pass, but as the summer continued

there was no action made by the premier.5 New Brunswickers did, however, encounter a

See Angus MacDonald, "N-Plant for Charlotte Country; Billion-Dollar Energy Program," The Moncton Times, (19 July 1974), p. 1; Cecil Jennings, "Fundy Site Chosen by New Brunswick for Nuclear Plant," The Globe and Mail, (19 July 1974), p. Bl; Canadian Press, "Reaction to Plant Site In N.B. Mainly Negative," The Moncton Transcript, (19 July 1974), p.13. 57 Canadian Press, "Ottawa Not Consulted," The Telegraph Journal, (23 July 1974). 58 Ibid. 59 See David Folster, "Hatfield Mends Fences," The Globe and Mail, (12 October 1974). The federal election of 1974 returned Trudeau to power with a majority government to the disappointment of Robert Standfield and his Conservative opposition.

69 number of surprising political announcements and events throughout the summer. The first surprise was Hatfield's July announcement that the province was entering the nuclear field with Atlantic Canada's first reactor to be located at Point Lepreau.

Figure 3.1 Hatfield and NBEPC Chairman Beside Nuclear Model, July 1974

Source: The Moncton Transcript, (19 July 1974), p. 14.

On August 6, four hundred people gathered at the Grandview Industrial Park in

Saint John to witness the first Bricklin sports car roll off the assembly of New

Brunswick's first automotive manufacturing plant. The provincial government invested

in the corporation, Bricklin Canada Limited, hoping to establish an export industry of

high-profile sports cars to the United States. At the grand opening of the plant, Hatfield

announced, "Its success will be our success....We're not just building a car. We're

70 building a better New Brunswick." Hatfield used the sports car during his re-election campaign when he drove around the province for two fall by-elections and finally the general election later in November.61 The two by-elections were for two vacant seats, one in Campbellton and the other in York County. The nominating conventions in both ridings received a visit from the Premier in the new sports car. At York County, Hatfield announced, "I would like the world to take another look at New Brunswick, and look upon the things we have...As we put the Bricklin on the market, we put New Brunswick on the map."62 Figure 3.2 Hatfield in Bricklin at Plant Opening, August 1974

Source: H.A. Fredericks and Allan Chambers, The Bricklin (Fredericton: Brunswick Books, 1977), p. 71.

Canadian Press, "First Bricklin Rolls of the Assembly Line," The Telegraph Journal, (7 August 1974), p. 24. The 1974 provincial election was referred to as the "Bricklin Election" because of Hatfield's public appearances with the provincially funded sports car in the two fall by-elections and general election in November. For more information see H. A. Fredericks and Allan Chambers, The Bricklin (Fredericton: Brunswick Books, 1977). 62 PANB, RS857, Container 52745, Bricklin Canada Ltd., - General Correspondence Files, Richard Hatfield, "Address by Premier Hatfield at the York County nominating convention," (28 August 1974), pp. 2-3.

71 On September 30 both ridings voted for the Conservatives, returning the standing in the

58-seat Legislature to 32 for Conservatives and 25 for the Liberals with one independent.

The Conservatives were now in a good position for the general election and the province awaited Hatfield's call. However, he still withheld any sign that an election was coming.

The regional economic benefits of the Point Lepreau project started to become more unclear just as Hatfield took the negotiation process to a new level and pushed for a final answer from the federal government. The delays were mainly coming from

DREE's review of the nuclear project. On September 18, Hatfield and Art O'Connor met in Ottawa with the Minister of DREE, Don Jamieson, to discuss Point Lepreau. The meeting opened with the Premier questioning the delay in receiving the go-ahead from federal departments on the nuclear generating station. The provincial representatives pressured DREE by mentioning if they could not get a decision at this time the only alternative would be to develop an oil-fired, high-cost facility which would put New

Brunswick once again at the mercy of oil imports. Concerned about the economic benefits of the Lepreau site, Don Jamieson asked if the economic benefits would be greater in another part of the province. He explained that his Department saw an opportunity to strengthen the base of the northeast of the New Brunswick economy with this development project.65 O'Connor refuted Jamieson's points when he explained that his Commission already had an agreement assuring the cooperation of Prince Edward

Island and that even without Nova Scotia's participation a second regional reactor might be needed so it "made no practical sense to look at anything other than the Point Lepreau

63 PANB, RS417, 5243-L-l, "Meeting With Hon. Don Jamieson, Ottawa, 18 Sept. 1974," p. 1. 64 Ibid., p. 2. 65 Ibid., p. 2.

72 location at this time." Hatfield argued that it would cost less to develop the Point

Lepreau site. Jamieson responded that he felt a northern site would be equally suitable and there were no significant differences in costs on either site and that "the argument for regional development would obviously fall."67 DREE demonstrated that they believed the plant should be located in northern New Brunswick to maximize socio economic benefits. Hatfield and O'Connor were set on the southern location even if it did not entail a strategic economic development project. The tension was evident between the two levels of government; no agreement was made before the meeting adjourned.

Hatfield also met with Donald MacDonald while in Ottawa. On September 30, the Premier wrote a letter to the minister as a follow up to their meeting. The letter was a form of confirmation that Hatfield and his utility had a deal with Prince Edward Island and were working on contracts with Nova Scotia. Trying to promote the idea that the regional reactor was close to being negotiated, Hatfield wrote, "I believe it is reasonable to suggest that the Commission has made, and is making, reasonable progress to promote more effective regional co-operation."69 Hatfield was clearly attempting to make the southern Point Lepreau location look like it would benefit from a regional nuclear program.

Finally on October 3, DREE completed their socio-economic analysis on the site location of New Brunswick's nuclear power plant. DREE's study strongly recommended

66 Ibid., p. 2. 67 Ibid., p. 3. 68 PANB, RS417, 5243-L-l, Letter from Premier Hatfield to Hon. Donald MacDonald, (30 September 1974), p. 2. 69 Ibid., p. 3.

73 the development be in the north of New Brunswick if it was to be as a justifiable economic development project. DREE stated, "it is concluded that the socio-economic net benefits were clearly much higher at a Northeast location than at the southern location."70 Within the report DREE claimed that the document "Nuclear Power Plant

Development: Assessment of Economic Impact," prepared by the New Brunswick

Cabinet Secretariat was a "spotty" economic analysis that favoured the southern location.71 The Cabinet Secretariat's paper used all of the unemployment in their calculations and thus took no account of frictional unemployment (i.e. the number of people between jobs at a given point in time); second, by using 1971 figures, they disallowed for important relative changes in unemployment between the Northeast and the Saint John area from 1971 on; third, the report disregarded the large gap in participation rates between the northeast and the Saint John area and the significantly lower northern female participation rate. DREE reported, "the potential labour supply available for future projects (including the nuclear power plant) is clearly higher for each of the two north-eastern sites than for the Lepreau Point site," and that, "for the Saint

John site, the majority of labour would have to be brought in from other areas." Thus the southern location was not a viable place to locate the nuclear station when considering the socio-economic benefits. Northeastern New Brunswick had a more viable labour supply and was in much more need of the development project than the industrialized area of Saint John.

/u PANB, RS417, 5243-L-14, Reference Material, Vol. 1, 1974, Department of Regional Economic Expansion, "Socio-Economic Aspects of the Site Selection Decision for the Nuclear Power Station in New Brunswick," (3 October 1974), p. 1. 71 Ibid., p. 2. 72 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 73 Ibid., p. 5. 74 In October, John McNicholas, the executive assistant to Donald MacDonald, demonstrated the federal government's frustration with New Brunswick when he stated:

Originally, the federal government agreed to supply loans up to 50 per cent for the first unit of any nuclear plant built in any province provided the site selected was environmentally sound, safe and contributed to the regional economic expansion. There are no particular benefits in the south of New Brunswick but there are in the north. If the province wants to put a second unit at Point Lepreau, it will have to build it itself.7

The federal government had committed themselves to a least one 600 megawatt reactor with Trudeau's new energy policy. However, the DREE report obviously had an impact on the federal government's decision concerning an additional nuclear unit. Hatfield had been pressuring the EMR for an answer and he finally received one on October 9. In a letter, Donald MacDonald announced his government would provide loans to cover 50 percent of the cost of a 600 megawatt CANDU unit to be constructed at the Point

Lepreau site. However, MacDonald advised the premier the federal government no longer supported the second nuclear power plant because it achieved no regional development objectives. MacDonald apologized when he wrote, "I must express my regret that a more extensive measure of agreement could not have been reached with regard to the northeastern regional development considerations."76 Hatfield and the

NBEPC had received confirmation about the shape of New Brunswick's nuclear program. The NBEPC's export dreams had been cancelled, but a reactor would still be established.

John McNicholas quoted in Canadian Press, "Federal Gov't Unpleased With Economic Aspect of N- Plant Site," The Moncton Transcript, (16 October 1974). 75 PANB, RS417, 5243-L, Letter from Hon. Donald MacDonald to Premier Hatfield, (9 October 1974), p.l. 76 Ibid., p. 1.

75 Once the premier received federal confirmation about the project, he acted quickly. On the same day he received confirmation from EMR, the Premier made a public announcement that New Brunswick was officially entering the nuclear age. His statement read:

This is a historic day for all the people of New Brunswick. Today's announcement marks a great step forward towards the achievement of our economic goals. Approval by AECB and various federal ministries means we can get on with the program. We are the first of the smaller provinces to enter the nuclear age - only Ontario and Quebec have done so before us....To proceed with this program New Brunswick had first to prove the soundness of our financial and economic prospects and, second, demonstrate our ability to manage a technology which is still exceptionally advanced. That New Brunswick met these two challenges so successfully is the true historic significance of today's announcement and gives us more reason for pride and confidence in the future of our province.

Two days following this announcement Hatfield called the long anticipated general election for November 18. The "historical significance" of October 9 was that Hatfield had been delaying his call for an election until he had confirmation from the federal government about the nuclear project. As the evidence demonstrates, Hatfield had pressured the ministers for confirmation about the project despite the set guidelines of

licensing and approval that were required to establish a nuclear program. The federal

government was willing to expedite as many processes they could, including DREE's

warning this was not a project that would help the regional economic development of the

province, in order to maintain their new energy policy and counteract the impending

problems of the energy crisis. The new nuclear program was not the only industry being

Richard Hatfield quoted in Canadian Press, "Point Lepreau Site Approval forN.B. Nuclear Project," The Daily Gleaner, (10 October 1974), p. 1. 76 politicized by Hatfield's re-election campaign. Leading up to the fall general election,

Hatfield toured the back-roads of New Brunswick in an orange Bricklin sports car. In

Fredericton, the Bricklin remained parked outside his residence at the Beaverbrook

Hotel. During the Remembrance Day weekend, Hatfield toured the northwestern ridings of Madawaska County, an unpredictable region known for voting both Conservative and

Liberal. On November 14, Hatfield drove the shiny orange car to the University of

New Brunswick in Fredericton; once again, people crowded around the car and the

Premier.79 Finally, on November 18, the day of the election, Hatfield drove his mother in a white Bricklin to the voting polls in his home riding of Hartland, New Brunswick. By using the car during the by-election earlier in the fall and then throughout the general- election, the political symbolism was evident. The Bricklin, as a symbol of progress,

exemplified the Conservative claim that they would usher the province into the new era

of modern industry. Likewise, the new nuclear power plant for Point Lepreau was

emphasized by Hatfield's rhetoric as a big development for the future of the province.

The politicization of both projects reached a new high during the general election. The

New Brunswick people voted: 33 seats went to the Conservatives and 25 to the Liberals.

The Conservatives gained four seats in northern New Brunswick that had for decades

gone to the Liberals.80 In addition, the Conservatives gained seats in French-speaking

ridings, though Hatfield lost to the Liberals in the Saint John and Moncton areas.81

Hatfield had achieved what he had set out to do: the modern appeal of the Bricklin and

the Point Lepreau project placed the premier and his Tories back into power.

78 Fredericks and Chambers, The Bricklin, p. 61. 79 Ibid., p. 61. 80 Ibid., p. 62. 81 Ibid., p. 62.

77 When Prince Edward Island was informed the federal government was not going to fund the second unit in southern New Brunswick, Premier Alex Campbell sent an

angry letter to Donald MacDonald. "I must state that I am most unhappy with this

decision," Campbell wrote, "since it is against the interest of this Province and is a blow

to our energy development plan."82 The premier argued the second regional reactor was

in the best interest of Maritimes' regional economic development and would cost less

than a single unit. Despite the federal government's final decision, the negotiation for a

second nuclear reactor continued throughout the 1970s and Prince Edward Island came

very close to being in a partnership with New Brunswick's nuclear program. The single

unit nuclear program in New Brunswick evolved out of a larger project to make the

province a supplier of nuclear energy to the Maritime region. The federal and provincial

politics surrounding energy production were the guiding forces in 1974 that established

the Point Lepreau nuclear reactor despite warnings of project's minimal regional

economic capabilities. The result was an isolated provincial nuclear program.

Conclusion

The NBEPC's early interest in nuclear power was in part due to the utility's plan

to export power to the New England market. This interest was shared by AECL because

of the potential market for Canadian nuclear technology in the United States. However,

the utility's first proposal for a large two-unit nuclear generating station, capable of

exporting surplus energy, fell through when the utilities in the United States rejected the

82 PANB, RS417, 5243-L-l, Letter from Premier Campbell to Hon. Donald MacDonald, (25 October 1974), p. 1. 83 This negotiation for an interprovincial nuclear program between Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick will be further explored in Chapter Three. 78 offer. Still eager to establish a nuclear program within the province, the NBEPC proposed that the federal government fund a nuclear reactor-heavy water complex. After careful consideration the project was awarded to Quebec. By 1973, New Brunswick had passed through two large proposal processes to achieve nuclear power. The real push for nuclear power emanated from the provincial utility, not the federal or provincial governments.

When the 1973 oil crisis took hold in North America, governments were forced to make dramatic policy changes to protect their economies as oil prices increased fourfold. The Canadian government froze domestic oil prices and encouraged western oil supplies to be redirected toward eastern Canada. Nuclear energy was promoted during this shift in energy politics. With the promise of federal funding, the federal government encouraged provincial nuclear programs in all the provinces. Dependent on key terms and conditions, New Brunswick now had a good chance of achieving a nuclear reactor.

The NBEPC, with the help of the Hatfield's government, proposed a regional nuclear project that would produce energy for the Maritimes with a two reactor station in southern New Brunswick at a time when the federal and provincial governments had a heightened interest in nuclear power.

Premier Hatfield became deeply involved the project during the summer of 1974 by corresponding directly with the ministers of federal departments. In the letters and meetings Hatfield shared with the ministers, it is evident he wanted immediate confirmation for site location and funding. This urgency resulted in Hatfield's premature announcement to the public that New Brunswick was entering into the nuclear field with the establishment of a nuclear power station at Point Lepreau. The federal government

79 had not given confirmation on funding or location. Hatfield speeded up the decision process so he could have formal confirmation about the nuclear project before calling his fall election. Hatfield was also politicizing the government funded project to build sports cars in Saint John by driving around during the by-elections and then for the general election. On October 9, the federal government informed the premier they would fund a single CANDU unit but not a second one because it did not provide any socio-economic benefits in southern New Brunswick. After announcing this official nuclear program,

Hatfield called a general election. Nuclear development had become susceptible to provincial party politics. Hatfield's involvement in the project shaped the outcome of

Atlantic Canada's first nuclear program.

The Point Lepreau project resulted in a program that did not promote the economic development of New Brunswick, yet the site location in the south of the province was approved. DREE urged the federal and provincial government to locate the plant in northern New Brunswick in order to provide viable socio-economic benefits.

This was trumped by Hatfield and the NBEPC that asserted an interprovincial nuclear export industry would be much easier to develop at Point Lepreau. The federal government only approved a single unit nuclear reactor after Hatfield pressured them for an immediate answer as his own political deadlines for a provincial general election approached. Two days after Hatfield received federal confirmation for the nuclear program he announced the election date. The NBEPC lost their hopes for a large-scale nuclear complex capable of exporting energy, but would propose a second nuclear reactor in the coming years.

80 This billion dollar regional economic project was shaped by the international oil crisis of 1973. Likewise, Hatfield's provincial electoral commitments played defining roles in achieving federal approval for the project. Lastly, the project for a single nuclear reactor went ahead even though it was not recognized as a justifiable economic development project. The project would still have to go through a number of other federal review processes in order to begin construction, but the province was officially on its way to developing a nuclear program. This was how New Brunswick entered the nuclear age. How did the public respond to a large project that could not be justified as a logical initiative to promote economic growth? The following chapter will examine how public protest and organization also influenced New Brunswick's postwar experience.

81 Chapter Four Nuclear Fallout: Public Protest and the "Momentum of Economic Growth" in New Brunswick, 1973-1980

The Point Lepreau nuclear reactor was one of the largest capital construction programs in New Brunswick's history. Premier Hatfield reaffirmed the province's commitment to state-led development projects in the 1975 budget, which clearly

supported a number of large-scale development initiatives throughout the province. The nuclear power program was brought to the province within the context of postwar regional economic development in Atlantic Canada. The federal and provincial

governments provided the policy and funding for the New Brunswick Electric Power

Commission (NBEPC) to expand their energy capacity with a billion dollar program

designed to stimulate the province's economic growth. The public utility and provincial

government, as Chapter Three demonstrated, championed New Brunswick to enter the

nuclear age. This is not, however, the entire narrative. Public protest, demonstration and

organization also helped define New Brunswick's introduction to a nuclear program.

Public opposition raised concerns about the economic and environmental implications

the project could have for their province. With the organization of the Maritime Energy

Coalition, members of the public found a platform to influence the decision making

process of the nuclear program and thereby redefined the project as an illegitimate state

endeavour. The movement was not a regional response: it was a reaction to a provincial

development strategy and defined by the broader national and international antinuclear

movements.

82 Ronald Babin documented Canada's protest and antinuclear movement that developed in the 1970s.1 His book is the only study of the opposition to the Point

Lepreau project. Babin uses Point Lepreau for a comparative analysis with other nuclear developments in Ontario and Quebec.2 He examines the bureaucratic decision-making process of Point Lepreau and argues there was a "technocratic" basis to which antinuclear and environmental movements in Atlantic Canada responded. The book does not include New Brunswick's postwar political and economic context and ignores many crucial events and developments that defined the public's opposition to Point Lepreau.

The public tried to include themselves in the regional development policy for New

Brunswick. Point Lepreau was not the only project that attracted public protest: the development of Kouchibouguac National Park and the establishment of the Bricklin automotive industry in Saint John also garnered public criticism as illogical regional development projects. The concerns of the public varied. A portion of the opposition was not against the nuclear development; rather, they were opposed to the decision to place the plant in southern New Brunswick, consequently excluding northern communities from the job creation opportunities. Other opponents cared more about opposing all nuclear power generation. Sudden international events, such as the Three

Mile Island accident, had a direct influence on the protest movement against the Point

Lepreau project.

The opposition to the Point Lepreau project has implications for the on-going debate over regionalism and underdevelopment in Atlantic Canada. Historians have used

1 Ronald Babin, The Nuclear Power Game (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1985), p. 23. 2 Ibid, p. 23. 3 Ibid, p. 23.

83 key social and political movements to define Atlantic Canada as a region. Ernest Forbes'

Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927: A Study in Canadian Regionalism documents the movement for political and social union of the Maritime provinces as a regional phenomena, sparked by 1920s underdevelopment issues.4 Robert Brym and James

Sacouman's Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada provides a collection of essays focused on specific social movements that define Atlantic Canada as a region marginalized within the national capitalist structure. This Marxist interpretation of the social movements views them as a regional response to capitalist underdevelopment. John Reid's "The 1970s: Sharpening the Sceptical Edge," examines the public's response to state-led development initiatives in Atlantic Canada during the

1970s to argue the opposition groups were part of a larger "regional society."6 None of these studies consider intra-provincial dynamics or the influence of international factors as significant forces in our understanding of regionalism and underdevelopment.

On the other side of the debate, political theorists such as Donald Savoie neglect any substantial analysis of the role social movements played in postwar, state-led development policy and strategy. Savoie's explanation for the Maritimes' underdevelopment during the postwar years is the failure of national political and administrative bodies to provide effective regional economic development policies.

Regional economic development, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, was not exclusively within the realm of national political and administrative institutions. These

4 Ernest Forbes, Maritimes Rights Movement, 1919-1927: A Study in Canadian Regionalism (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1979). 5 Robert Brym and R. James Sacouman, eds., Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1979). 6 John Reid, "The 1970s: Sharpening the Sceptical Edge," in E.R. Forbes and D.A. Muise eds., The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 490.

84 institutions were the leaders in strategies, policy and funding; however, the physical projects that were developed within each province were susceptible to many forces at the provincial level. The protest against the Point Lepreau development project was a

significant part of how New Brunswick developed a nuclear program. However, it was not a movement that can be defined as a regional response. The main protest group, the

Maritime Energy Coalition, had regional participation from groups in the surrounding

provinces, but the movement in New Brunswick was governed by intra-provincial

developments and influenced by national and international antinuclear movements.

Furthermore, the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear disaster in the United States influenced

how people interpreted the Point Lepreau nuclear program and stimulated opposition to

the project.

The narrative of the Point Lepreau nuclear project reveals that the general public

also participated in development projects by protesting the decision to establish the

power plant in southern New Brunswick, making alternative information about nuclear

reactors available to all levels of the public, and lobbying the government for public

hearings on the project. Through protest, demonstrations, organization and international

correspondence, New Brunswick's development of a nuclear program was debated

within the public realm. The victory of the protesters was unprecedented at the time: they

played an important role in stopping the interprovincial nuclear program that would have

developed New Brunswick into a nuclear exporting province for the Maritimes and New

England. With the help of the international community, the message of the opposition

changed the perception of nuclear power in the province by persistently warning of the

significant environmental and economic issues of nuclear technology. As a result of the

85 protest, the NBEPC's plan to make New Brunswick a larger nuclear producer for the

Atlantic provinces failed. Without this narrative the Point Lepreau development initiative is solely a number of fiscal and administrative policies aimed at regional economic development. The following chapter chronicles the remaining narrative of the Point

Lepreau project to include the role of the public in this development initiative.

The Origins of Opposition, 1974

On 5 February 1974 the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) received an

official letter of intent from the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission (NBEPC)

to construct and operate a two-unit nuclear plant with the list of four possible site

locations. The most pertinent criteria for federal loan conditions were site approval by

the AECB and the construction approval from the federal Department of Environment

(DOE).7 The federal review process had officially begun. The AECB required a two to

three month waiting period before full approval. This period was to give the NBEPC

time to conduct a public information program. The first public meetings were scheduled

on 18 and 19 July, 1974. However, a surprise announcement from Premier Hatfield on

July 18 stated New Brunswick was entering the nuclear field with the establishment of a

reactor at Point Lepreau as the main ingredient of a ten year, billion dollar energy

program. Without federal confirmation of the site location or federal funds, Hatfield's

announcement took the people of New Brunswick, as well as the federal government, by

surprise. There had been no input from the public before they received the political

G. Bruce Doern, The Atomic Energy Control Board: An Evaluation of Regulatory and Administrative Processes and Procedures (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1976), p. 53. 8 Angus MacDonald, "N-Plant For Charlotte County; Billion-Dollar Energy Program," The Moncton Times, (19 July 1974), p. 1.

86 announcement that their province was entering the nuclear age. Not surprisingly,

Hatfield's Thursday announcement received a negative reaction from some members of the public. The environmental group, Pollution Probe-Moncton, registered a protest over the government's decision declaring that the nuclear station was both "unsafe and uneconomical at this time."9

Public meetings on Thursday and Friday were held in the aftermath of the provincial government's announcement that a nuclear reactor would be constructed at

Point Lepreau. At the Thursday meeting John Bonne, the mayor of St. Andrews, termed the decision a "disaster because the potential dangers of nuclear power are so great,

something the ordinary person, the people of Point Lepreau and St. Andrews are not

aware of." The Friday meeting was held in Bathurst as a measure to include the

northern regions of the province in the debate. On the North Shore, the disappointment

was centered on the decision not to place the reactor in the north. The people who

attended the meeting were upset on the lost opportunity of job creation with the

construction and operation of the nuclear power plant. "This official announcement is

without any doubt an immense disappointment for the population of the North-East," the

northern editorial Le Voilier reported, "the Hatfield government had an unexpected

chance to develop the North-East economically by setting up this plant in our area."11

The opposition in northern New Brunswick was about the regional issue of

underdevelopment. Likewise, the people at the public information session expressed

9 Canadian Press, "Reaction To Plant Site In N.B. Mainly Negative," The Moncton Transcript, (19 July 1974), p. 13. 10 Canadian Press, "Reaction to Plant Site In N.B. Mainly Negative," The Moncton Transcript, (19 July 1974), p. 13. " William Theriault, "A Not So Surprising Surprise," Le Voilier, (25 July 1974), p. 4.

87 discontent about the inadequacies of their provincial government's regional development policies.

The NBEPC continued their public information sessions throughout July and

August. Similar to the two initial meetings held in July, the sessions only created more public frustration. The Environmental Council of New Brunswick, founded in 1972 to advise the provincial government on citizen concerns relating to the environment, claimed the government's decision entailed "the complete lack of public involvement" and that "there should have been an opportunity for the people of the province to make an intelligent and informal response before a final decision." The concern about the

Point Lepreau nuclear program stemmed from the political issues within the province.

The provincial and public utility were not allowing for the citizens to be included within the decision process.

Attuned to the approaching by-elections in late August and the anticipation for a general election in the fall of 1974, the Liberal Opposition began to voice concerns about the decision process to establish a nuclear reactor. "Based on the only information released to date, there is insufficient data to allow the public to judge the project fairly or in an informed way," Liberal leader Robert Higgins said following a caucus meeting.13

Higgins urged the government to make available to the public sufficient copies of the environmental report, publish all available economic data on the nuclear plant, and schedule public meetings after all technical information and data was made accessible.

"Because co-operation is so essential between the both levels of government in all

12 Ibid. 13 Canadian Press, "Liberals Demand All Information On N-Plant," The Moncton Transcript, (7 August 1974). 88 matters relating to the development of New Brunswick," Higgins noted, "the caucus urges the premier to meet as soon as possible on the nuclear plant site with DREE."

Provincial partisan politics began to bloom as the province neared an election. Higgins had already launched a political attack on Hatfield's decision to fund the development of the Bricklin sports car manufacturing plant in Saint John, which had become a heated political battle leading up to the election.

Members of the public realized they had to organize their efforts in order to be heard by the utility and the provincial government. The first attempt at organization was on Monday, July 29. Various groups concerned about the nuclear decision met in

Charlotte County to discuss the organization of a coalition that would slow down the decision process and construction of the nuclear power plant. With plans to set up a store front in Saint John, the groups already agreed to have an injunction issued to stop the site clearing scheduled to begin in September.16 The protest began to move away from regional concerns about the development of a nuclear program. Jason Paikowsky, an information officer for national group Pollution Probe, was sent from Toronto to New

Brunswick to help organize protest groups into one coalition. After much discussion, in

September, twenty representatives of eight environmental groups met at the Beaverbrook

Hotel in Fredericton to found the Maritime Coalition of Environmental Protection

Associations. The Coalition planned to consider a future course of action, register protests and encourage New Brunswick citizens to challenge the development of a

14 Ibid. 15 See H.A. Fredericks and Allan Chambers, The Bricklin (Fredericton: Brunswick Books, 1977). l6Esther Crandall, "Group Seeks N-Plant Slowdown Until Risks Public," The Moncton Transcript, (30 July 1974).

89 nuclear program in New Brunswick.17 In the following two years, this association would swell in ranks and eventually rename itself the Maritime Energy Coalition (MEC): the main voice of opposition that challenged New Brunswick's nuclear development for the following decade. "This is a people movement," the representatives claimed, "the possibility of legal action is not being ignored. We need an informed public."

On October 9, Hatfield received confirmation that the federal government would fund a single unit nuclear reactor at Point Lepreau in southern New Brunswick. On the same day he announced to the people of the province that they would be the third province in Canada to enter into the nuclear age. Two days later Hatfield called a general election for the province scheduled for November. New Brunswickers were surprised by the lack of participation they were allotted in the decision process for the nuclear development. Nonetheless, a number of environmental assessments and site evaluations for construction license had to be conducted by the federal government throughout 1975 that would surely provide occasions for effective public input.19 The people of New

Brunswick were determined to be included in the provincial debate of this large-scale development scheme.

17 Angus MacDonald, "Group Against N-Plant Location in Maritimes," The Moncton Transcript, (28 September 1974). The associations that attended the founding meeting in September were the Sussex Society for the Public Interest, Jacquet River Environmental Protection Association, Pollution Probe of Moncton, Eel River Mic Mac Band Council, South Shore Environmental Protection Association of Nova Scotia, Concerned Citizens of Albert County, Chaleur Environmental Protection Association and the Saint John chapter of the New Brunswick Conservation Council. 18 Quoted in Ibid. 19 See G. Bruce Doern, The Atomic Energy Control Board, p. 66.

90 The "Momentum of Economic Growth": Entering the Nuclear Age, February 1975- May 1975

The year 1975 was one of disquiet as the members of the public in New

Brunswick realized they were amidst the largest state-led capital construction program in the province's history. From the provincial government's expropriation of families along the northern shore to build the Kouchibouguac National Park to the introduction of a billion dollar energy program centered on nuclear power, the province teemed with large-scale development initiatives. Public apprehension of and protest about these provincial development schemes were abundant and absolute. Stemming from a distinct frustration with provincial economic development strategies, the public played decisive roles in this period of New Brunswick's history.

With Premier Hatfield's re-election in November 1974 the government not only

stayed true to its regional development commitments, it augmented political dedication

to and investment in these projects. At the provincial budget debate in April 1975

Hatfield outlined his government's policy. He began the debate with the announcement

that the federal government had agreed to pay 50 percent of the cost of the relocation

program for residents expropriated from shoreline communities to build the

Kouchibouguac National Park. This federal-provincial project had already prompted

public outcry which culminated in Jackie Vautour's unsuccessful attempt in Federal

Court to render the 1969 proclamation invalid because of improper notice of the

decision. Approximately 1,200 people were removed from the northeastern New

Brunswick site between 1969 and 1976 despite violent confrontations with a number of

See Canadian Press, "Kouchibouguac is a Park Again," The Moncton Transcript, (15 April 1982). 91 residents. Hatfield's 1975 budget confirmed his government's support of these large- scale development projects. Hatfield explained:

This budget was formulated and is being presented at a time of world-wide economic uncertainty which extends to New Brunswick. It is a budget which aims to maintain the momentum of economic growth established in recent years, to assist our people to cope with the worst effects of international economic conditions, and to bring our province through this period of uncertainty with as little dislocation as possible. It is a time of uncertainty, but there are some things we do know with certainty: that unemployment is rising and that inflation is still at an unacceptably high level in New Brunswick as elsewhere.21

Hatfield's phrase the "momentum of economic growth" best explains the nature of the

Point Lepreau development project. The political decision process had a momentum which moved faster than the public could respond.

Hatfield's budget speech also underlined his concern about the spread of partisan politics within the House and in the press with reference to regional economic development projects. Alluding to a number of cases where the Liberals had criticized the Conservative government for faulty development policies, Hatfield turned to the

Point Lepreau nuclear plant. "The opposition complains that our capital investment is not great enough," Hatfield argued, "but the Leader of the Opposition would have us turn a sod on our electric power program which will mean 700 construction jobs at peak in

Dalhousie and 2,000 construction jobs at peak in Point Lepreau."22 The year 1975 witnessed the increase of the Hatfield government's dedication to the development of the southern nuclear program that was met with an increase in protest from the public.

21 Quoted in New Brunswick Legislative Assembly, Synoptic Report of the Proceedings of the First Session of the Forty-Eight Legislative Assembly of the Province of New Brunswick 1975, Volume I, (Fredericton: Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick, 1975), p. 337. 22 Quoted in Ibid., p. 342.

92 The approval of the AECB's construction license was the next stage in developing a nuclear program in New Brunswick. The AECB was not the only regulatory authority involved within this stage of the Point Lepreau development. This licensing process changed in 1974 when the federal government required all projects that received federal funding and involved the use of crown land to have environmental impact assessments.

The federal Department of the Environment (DOE) set up the Environmental

Assessment and Review Process (EARP) that would review all the environmental studies and possible impacts of any given project. In order to carry out these review processes, an Environmental Assessment Panel (EAP) would be assembled with an acting chairman.23 On 17 December 1974, DOE, together with the New Brunswick Department of Fisheries and Environment (NBDFE), issued joint guidelines for the preparation of an environmental impact assessment to be prepared by the NBEPC. The assessment of the

Point Lepreau nuclear power plant was the first federally funded project to undergo the

Environmental Assessment Review Process (EARP). Likewise, it was Canada's first nuclear program ever subjected to the federal environmental assessment. The EAP reviewed environmental reports and data provided by the NBEPC and planned to hold a meeting to include oral and written briefs from the public within their review process.

On 21 February 1975, the NBEPC submitted the "Preliminary Environmental

Impact Statement- Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station," to Environment Canada.24 The

Environmental Assessment Panel reviewed the submission with the aid of DOE

For more on the development and policy of Department of Environment see G. Bruce Doern and Thomas Conway, The Greening of Canada: Federal Institutions and Decisions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). 24 See NBEPC, "Preliminary Environmental Impact Statement- Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station," (Fredericton: NBEPC, 1975). 93 scientists and officials from NBDFE. On March 14, with this preliminary document in the hands of the faderal government, an announcement was made by the federal

Environment Canada Minister, Jeanne Sauve, and the New Brunswick Environment

Minister, Fernand G. Dube, notifying the citizens of the province that they were invited to a public meeting to be held on the environmental effects of the Point Lepreau Nuclear

Generating Station.25 The meeting was scheduled for April 3 at Hazen Hall on the

University of New Brunswick campus in Saint John. The press release stated that the meeting was designed to receive public comments and oral and written briefs that would be seriously studied by the Environmental Assessment Panel. The NBEPC released copies of its environmental assessment to public libraries throughout the province for public scrutiny. However, Premier Hatfield decided to make his own announcement about the project. On March 17, three days after Environment Canada's announcement,

Hatfield mentioned in a television interview that despite the federal environmental hearing, the Point Lepreau project would go ahead. Hatfield made it clear to the public that their input would not affect the outcome of the development of the nuclear program.

Despite Hatfield's announcement, the public meeting held on April 3 was well attended and provided one of the first opportunities for the public to voice their concern about the project. It was clear to officials at the meeting that the public were upset with the manner in which the entire project was being handled. Fifty-eight briefs were received by the Panel from individuals and representatives of various groups in an

This press release is provided in Doern, "The Atomic Energy Control Board," p. 66. 25 These public libraries that received the reports were: Edmunston, Woodstock, Campbellton, Dalhousie, Bathurst, Newcastle, Chatham, Moncton, Sussex, St. John, St. George, St. Andrews, St. Stephen, Deer Island, Campobello, Grand Manan, Northhead and Fredericton. See Doern, The Atomic Energy Control Board, p. 66. 94 approximate ratio of 5 to 1 against the project.28 The groups who presented briefs against the project included the Conservation Council of New Brunswick, Sussex Society of

Public Interest, South Shore Environmental Association, Chaleur Environmental

Protection Association, Citizens Against Nuclear Energy, Pollution Probe Moncton, and the Voice of Women from both Fredericton and Moncton. These groups stated they represented numerous people. The over-riding themes of the briefs were the validity of the NBEPC's load projections and environmental assessment; the economics of nuclear power versus other means of generation; the likelihood of accidents and the problem of radioactive waste storage; and the dissatisfaction with the opportunities provided for the public participation. The purpose of the meeting was also questioned by the public in response to Hatfield's earlier announcement that public input would have no effect on

the outcome of the project. In two instances Jeanne Sauve was criticized for allegedly

not carrying out the review process as originally announced.

A major complaint the NBDFE encountered at the public meeting was that the

project economics were inadequate. The Department confessed, "NBEPC has never

publicly justified its need for major blocks of generation such as the Lepreau Nuclear

Environment Canada, Point Lepreau New Brunswick Nuclear Generation Station: Environmental Assessment Panel Report to the Minister of the Environment, (Ottawa: Fisheries and Environment Canada, 1975), p. 2. 29 Provincial Archives of New Brunswick [here after PANB] RS417, 5243-L-13, Public Correspondence, "Report to Honourable Fernand G, Dube, on the Public Meeting on the Lepreau Nuclear Plant," (16 April 1975), p. 1. It is important to note all these groups were members of the Maritime Coalition for Environmental Protection also referred to as the Maritime Energy Coalition (MEC). For a complete list of all individuals' names that presented briefs at this meeting see the appendage at the back of the above document. 30 Ibid., p. 2. Environment Canada, Point Lepreau New Brunswick Nuclear Generation Station: Environmental Assessment Panel Report to the Minister of the Environment, p. 2.

95 Plant." Commenting on the inadequacies of the NBEPC environmental assessment, the

NBDFE stated, "our staff were concerned about the quality of the impact statement and it was the general consensus that a better report could have been prepared using the available data."33 Both the quality and availability of information was clearly a problem that the public and officials recognized. DOE authorities, however, excused the insurmountable number of problems by concluding that the environmental areas of primary concern, which the meeting was ultimately designed to review, received

"relatively little attention."34 Problems other than environmental fell to the wayside as both the federal and provincial Departments of Environment determined interim reports would be on-going and they would address environmental concerns before major

construction decisions were made. The validity of the Point Lepreau project as a

provincial economic initiative to develop New Brunswick's economy was of great

concern to the public.

The meeting also received some positive briefs concerning the Point Lepreau

project. These briefs argued that the nuclear project was a positive development for the

economy of the province. The groups who presented in favour of the project were the

Electric Service League, City of Saint John, Saint John Board of Trade, the Institute of

Electrical and Electronic Engineers and the New Brunswick Development Corporation.

As the New Brunswick Department of Environment reported, the positive briefs centered

PANB, "Report to Honourable Fernand G, Dube, on the Public Meeting on the Lepreau Nuclear Plant," (16 April 1975), p. 3. 33 Ibid., p. 2. 34 Ibid., p. 4. The environmental questions raised at the April 3 meeting were addressed in Environment Canada, "Point Lepreau New Brunswick Nuclear Generation Station: Environmental Assessment Panel Report to the Minister of the Environment."

96 mainly on the need for more jobs in New Brunswick and the relationship between cheap power and economic growth. The briefs stated that nuclear power was an economical

•5/- and safe source of energy. The presentations were delivered by groups that would clearly benefit from the construction of the plant in the Saint John region. The Saint John

Board of Trade, for example, was an organization of some 800 business people involved in advancing the economic activity and development of the Southern New Brunswick area. Their brief to the Environmental Assessment Panel attempted to counter the arguments made by opponents of nuclear energy. The Board confessed they were "not scientists and certainly are not experts on the question of nuclear power," but were in favour of the Point Lepreau Power Generating Station. The Board stated: The New Brunswick citizens working for the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission are responsible and concerned about the environment of this Province. We believe members of the Provincial Government are dedicated to improve the quality of life of our citizens and would not recommend or support a project which presented serious dangers to the environment or the citizens of New Brunswick.

The entire brief was a list of non-evidentiary beliefs that the nuclear decision makers in

Canada and internationally had the best interests in the safety of their populations and that nuclear power was a safe and economical option for energy supply. There was a clear connection between these supportive groups and the NBEPC. Following the public meeting the general manager of the Power Comission, A.J. O'Connor, wrote a letter to the President of the New Brunswick Development Corporation, James Addison. "The contents of your brief besides being factual would, I believe, be of interest to the Panel in their knowledge that you and other members of the public supported the project,"

36 Ibid., p.2. 37PANB, RS417, 5243-L-13, Public Concern, "Submission to the Environmental Hearings on Point Lepreau, Presented by the Saint John Board of Trade," (3 April 1975), p. 3. 97 O'Connor praised, "please accept my appreciation for your part in presenting this side of

TO the discussion before the assessment panel and the public."

Both levels of the state made it clear that public concern about this particular development project was of no consequence. The public indentified the provincial government and public utility as the main institutions to protest against. On 18 April

1975, one hundred anti-nuclear demonstrators confronted Premier Hatfield on his way into the afternoon sitting of the Legislative Assembly.39 They demanded that the government hold a public hearing or a public debate on nuclear development in the province. Hatfield told them that they had their public hearing and refused to agree to a date for the public debate.40 The demonstrators had come prepared with a legal document that requested the government to sponsor an open debate on the nuclear project and a legal petition with 31 pages of signatures. Both these documents were presented to the Legislative Assembly. "The purpose of today's demonstration is to draw attention to and point out the need of the manifold effects which would accompany the acceptance of nuclear technology on behalf of the people of the province," the demonstrators' presentation read.41 The 31 page petition presented to the Legislative

Assembly was signed by all the opponents to "oppose the building of nuclear power plants in the Maritimes until they have been proven to be safe, economical and

PANB, RS417, 5253-L-13, Public Concern, Letter to James Addison from A. J. O'Connor, (10 April 1975). 39 Canadian Press, "Anti-Nuclear Group Confronts Premier," The Globe and Mail, (19 April 1975), p. 15. 40 Ibid. 41PANB, RS417, 5243 - L - 14, "A Presentation to the Honourable Members of the Legislative Assembly Province of New Brunswick on Behalf of the Interested and Concerned Residents and Citizens of the Present Generations and all Residents and Citizens of all Future Generations," (18 April 1975), p. 1. This was presented by the members of the Maritime Coalition of Environmental Protection Associations.

98 necessary." The document that requested the government for an open debate on the project had an appendix with information about other nuclear politics both within

Canada and internationally. These included the recent leakages at the Pickering nuclear

facility in Ontario and Premier Barrett government's rejection of a nuclear program in

British Columbia.43 The demonstration lasted for three hours before dispersing.

Figure 4.1 Antinuclear Protesters Outside New Brunswick Legislature

Source: Nuclear Reaction: The Maritime Voice Against Nuclear Power, (Winter 1975-1976)

Although the construction licensing process was still in its preliminary stages,

and arguably encountering serious issues raised by the public, Premier Hatfield

pressured the federal government for a final decision. Hatfield used his political position

to bypass all levels of provincial and federal administration and engaged in a direct

PANB, RS417, 5243 -L - 14, "Maritime Coalition of Environmental Protection Associations: Petition," (18 April 1975). 43 PANB, RS417, 5243 - L - 13, Public Concern, "Requests from the New Brunswick Division of the Maritime Coalition of Environmental Protection Associations: Presented to the Government of New Brunswick Friday, April 18, 1975," (18 April 1975), p .4. The document also included lists of groups and locations of sources that would aid any government official to locate material about the dangers of nuclear power production. It shows the level of research and planning that was involved to create this document for the Legislative Assembly. 99 dialogue with the Minister of Environment Canada. On 23 April 1975, in a telegram to

Jeanne Sauve, Hatfield stated his concern about the slow decision process for a

construction licence when he wrote, "the lengthy and unexpected delays in receipt of the

construction license for the Point Lepreau Generating Station are seriously affecting the

critical construction schedule for the reactor building... I am asking for your assistance in

expediting those actions which will facilitate the immediate release of the construction

license."44 Hatfield's provincial pressure had an effect on Ottawa. On 2 May 1975,

Environment Canada sent a telex to the NBDFE that confirmed Jeanne Sauve had

accepted the conclusions and recommendations of the EAP and that the Department "has

no objection to the installation of a single-unit, 600-megawatt, pressurized heavy-water-

type reactor." 5 There were, however, a number of recommendations that needed to be

followed to ensure the safety of the environment, mostly pertaining to data collection

and design guidelines. These recommendations were released later in May with an

address to the public about any of the environmental concerns raised at the April

meeting. On Monday, May 6 in the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly the chairman

of NBEPC, Edison Stairs, announced the province was officially going to construct a

nuclear power plant at Point Lepreau.46 On May 8 the AECB publicly issued their

approval to construct a nuclear reactor in New Brunswick.47 The message moved the

44PANB, RS417, 5243-L, Volume 2, 1975, Telegram From the Honourable Premier Hatfield to the Honourable Minister of Environment, Jeanne Sauve, (23 April 1975). This telegram was also wired to the Minister of Energy , Mines and Resources, Donald MacDonald. A day later it was sent to the General Manager of NBEPC, Art O'Connor. 45 PANB, RS417, 5243-L, Volume 2, 1975, Telex to Honourable Brian Barnes, Deputy Minister of Tourism and Environment, from Environment Canada, (2 May 1975). 46 Canadian Press, "Green Light: New Brunswick Nuclear Power Station Status Official," The Moncton Transcript, (6 May 1975). 47 See PANB, RS417, 5243-L, Atomic Energy Control Board: News Release, "Construction License Issued for Nuclear Power Plant in New Brunswick," (8 May 1975), p. 30. province into the nuclear age and placed the federal stamp of approval on the NBEPC's objective to go nuclear despite the arguments over sites, the economic benefits and protests from concerned citizens and environmentalists. The provincial debate whether the province would establish a nuclear program was closed.

The Maritime Energy Coalition: Challenging the Nuclear Age, 1976-1979

The group which provided the most persistence and continued to voice their

opinion was the Maritime Coalition of Environmental Associations. In 1976 the coalition

renamed itself to the Maritime Energy Coalition (MEC) because "the name is more

accurate since we are opposing nuclear energy and promoting renewable energy

alternatives."48 The MEC did not operate in isolation from other organizations opposed

to nuclear energy. It developed during a period of environmental, economic and political

awareness of nuclear energy within Canada and internationally. The coalition maintained

a steady correspondence with scientific organizations opposed to nuclear power in the

United States. These communications provided the main source of information and

support which aided them in their opposition to the technology in New Brunswick. In

1974 the MEC established a close relationship with the Union of Concerned Scientists of

48 PANB, MC326, Maritime Energy Coalition, MS 1B2, MEC Correspondence, 1976, "Maritime Energy Coalition: Summary of Annual Meeting, March 14, 1976," (14 March 1976), p.l.

101 Figure 4.2 The Maritime Energy Coalition Logo

., ^>nEtU; > NK: . V 1- \' r > X sM VI I ^^, X "J im9&^K

/w. 7s| J \ '

Source: PANB, MC326, Maritime Energy Coalition, MS1-MS6 Bl. the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Massachusetts.49 The correspondence between the two organizations exchanged information concerning nuclear development in both Canada and the United States. The Union of Concerned

Scientists supplied the MEC with a range of scientific information on the hazards of nuclear programs in the United States and established lines of correspondence between the coalition and some of the foremost American anti-nuclear organizations. These organizations included Ralph Nader's group, Critical Mass, a civil advocacy group, and

See PANB, MC326, Maritime Energy Coalition, MS1B1, MEC Correspondence, Letter From Mary F. Keith of MEC to the Union of Concerned Scientists, (30 October 1974). 102 Dr. John W. Gofman's Committee for Nuclear Responsibility in California. By 1975 the MEC was "increasingly well organized" to oppose the final stages of the nuclear development in New Brunswick.51 The MEC had the appearance of a regional movement; however, the international influence from anti-nuclear groups shifted its focus more towards specifically nuclear issues.

Lobbying the government to provide public meetings was one of the MEC's strategies to oppose the nuclear decision. With the failure to stop the federal issuance of the construction license for the Point Lepreau project, the MEC and individual members of the public lacked any formal outlet to express their concern about nuclear energy to the federal and provincial governments. With site location, funding and construction approval already granted, public input was no longer needed to proceed with the nuclear program. The MEC had to lobby for public hearings and register demonstrations to express their concern to both levels of the state and the public utility. By June 1975, members of the MEC had organized a private meeting with the president of the AECB,

J.H. Jennekens. The meeting was to be centered on "plant safety" and was not intended to be like the "highly charged head-on confrontations with Power Commission at the larger public meetings." 52 On 25 June 1975, members of the MEC met with Jennekens

PANB, MC326, The Maritime Energy Coalition, MS1B1 - MEC Correspondence, Letter From the Union of Concerned Scientists to the Mary F. Keith of the Maritime Energy Coalition, (18 December 1974). 5IPANB, MC326, The Maritime Energy Coalition, MS1B1 - MEC Correspondence, Letter From the Maritime Energy Coalition to the Union of Concerned Scientists, (13 May 1975). There were plans to organize a national coalition, launch a large demonstration in Ottawa, send a delegation to Ottawa, visit every member of the legislature and give lectures to the Chambers of Commerce to express opposition to the nuclear program. For information of this strategy formation see PANB, MC326, The Maritime Energy Coalition, MS1B1 - MEC Correspondence, Letter to Tom Murphy of the MEC from Mary Keith, (7 May 1975). 52 PANB, MC326, The Maritime Energy Coalition, MS1B1 - MEC Correspondence, Internal Letter to Tom Murphy of the Maritime Energy Coalition, (11 June 1975), p. 2. and other AECB officials in Saint John. During the meeting, the AECB officials were presented with a large amount of information and publications about reactor safety issues.53 The information was from American anti-nuclear organizations supplied to the

MEC by the Union of Concerned Scientists. Jennekens was enthusiastic about all the information and concerned about the issues of nuclear safety raised by the MEC representatives.54 It was clear the Board was unaware of the resistance to nuclear energy

in the United States and recognized the MEC had strong ties to these groups and was set

on challenging every step of nuclear development in New Brunswick. The meeting

provided a chance for the federal government to realize there was still strong and

organized public opposition to this particular regional development project in New

Brunswick. This meeting was followed by the formation of the national Canadian

Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility (CCNR) on July 4. The CCNR was founded by Dr.

Gordon Edwards and Dr. Fred Knelman of Concordia University in Montreal to oppose

the development of nuclear technology in Canada. Throughout 1976, the MEC was a

member of the CCNR and was in close consultation with the national group.55

Informing the public about nuclear issues and providing an opportunity to discuss

alternative means of energy production became central to the MEC's protest movement.

Lobbying for public meetings and registering protests were futile as the construction of

the power plant was well underway by 1976. The MEC opposed the nuclear

development initiative by releasing the periodical entitled Nuclear Reaction: The

PANB, MC326, The Maritime Energy Coalition, MSI Bl - MEC Correspondence, Letter to the Union of Concerned Scientists from the Maritime Energy Coalition, (13 August 1975). 54 Ibid., p. 2. 55 See PANB, MC326, MSI B4, The Maritime Energy Coalition - Correspondence, Letter From Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility to the Maritime Energy Coalition, (20 June 1978). Maritime Voice Against Nuclear Power, which informed the New Brunswick public

about national and international events surrounding the proliferation of nuclear energy.

The publication also provided readers with updates about the Point Lepreau project,

contact information of organizations opposed to the development and announcements of

events promoted by the MEC.

Figure 4.3 Nuclear Reaction Cartoon

iT't-t. ALL. I&E youKs BOMS ^BUT you'LL HAVE TO WATCH "THIS FELLOw« •

Source: Nuclear Reaction: The Maritime Voice Against Nuclear Power, (Winter 1975- 76),p.4.

The Coalition's publication criticized the environmental, economic, and political

aspects of the nuclear development project and in turn provided information about

alternative means for energy production. All these critiques were supported with

information about international events concerning nuclear development. The

105 environmental issues raised within the newspaper ranged from the impact that the construction and operation the plant would have on the surrounding environment to the nuclear hazards the local population could encounter. The authors of the paper used examples from the United States to strengthen their arguments. For example, the paper reported in the summer of 1975 that biologists of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission had estimated that as many as 6 million blueback herring were killed at the Surrey nuclear plant in Virginia during three months of operation in 1973.56 Highlighting the fact that the Lepreau nuclear reactor was the first CANDU to ever use ocean water as a coolant, the paper stressed, "similar effects can be expected if the proposed Point

Lepreau Plant is constructed."57 Warning local residents of Chance Harbour, Dipper

Harbour, and Maces Bay, the paper reasoned that "any exposure to radiation or thermal pollution could seriously affect the balance of life and destroy the livelihood of the

CO people that live from the sea."

The authors of Nuclear Reaction updated their readers about international political protests against governments and utilities that supported nuclear energy programs. These movements included the violent citizens' protest against the development of a nuclear program in Wyhl, Germany which resulted in a 28,000 person occupation of the construction site in 1975; the 1977 Clamshell Alliance that occupied the construction site of the Seabrook nuclear power plant in New Hampshire resulting in the violent arrests of 1414 demonstrators; and Sweden's government encounter with

MEC Member, "Thermal Shock Kills Fish," Nuclear Reaction: The Maritime Voice Against Nuclear Power, (Summer, 1975), p. 1.

58 Ibld- MEC Member, "Living Under the Shadow of Point Lepreau," Nuclear Reaction: The Maritime Voice Against Nuclear Power, (Winter 1975-1976), p. 2. anti-nuclear protestors in 1976 which lost their re-election on the nuclear issue. With the use of this publication, the public of New Brunswick were linked to the international debate surrounding the opposition to nuclear energy. The movement was not about regional grievances any longer; it had adopted international anti-nuclear characteristics.

It was this dynamic that gave the MEC a unique edge and connected the Coalition to the broader international movement.

The MEC's planning and organization of the annual Alternate Energy Fairs brought the provincial debate further into the national and international dialogue of antinuclear opposition. The first festival organized and sponsored by the MEC was the

1976 May-Day Energy Festival held at Long Reach on the Kingston Peninsula in New

Brunswick. The event was billed as an "Anti-Nuclear Alternate Energy Festival," which received five thousand visitors.60 With a range of speakers who lectured on energy issues and exhibits of alternative energy resources, Nuclear Reaction reported the "people of

New Brunswick and the Maritimes are a long way from being sold on nuclear power."61

The 1977 Alternate Energy Fair expanded both in size and significance. It had become a two day event held at the University of New Brunswick campus in Fredericton which attracted prominent scholars and leaders from the alternative energy and social justice fields. The speakers at the fair included Dr. Fred Knelman, a chemical engineer and co- founder of the CCNR; Dorothy Rosenburg of the Montreal Citizens Movement; Dr.

Harry Swain, a Senior Advisor of the Renewable Energy Resource Branch in the

See Nuclear Reaction: The Maritime Voice Against Nuclear Power, (1976, 1977, 1978). 60 MEC Member, "The May-Day Energy Festival," Nuclear Reaction: The Maritime Voice Against Nuclear Power, issue no. 3. (1976), p. 3. 61 Ibid. Department of Energy, Mines and Resources; and Dr. John Todd, co-founder of the New

Alchemy Institute and the Prince Edward Island "Arch Project." Rosenburg delivered a lecture entitled "The Anti-Nuclear Movement in Canada," followed by Knelman's

"Problems With Nuclear Development in Canada."63 The international nuclear debate was prominent throughout the festival.

Figure 4.4 Poster for Alternative Energy Fair

JB1 ¥If HAY 1ST LONG REACH Bf9LK +WHM. &SUnt9S WflTllkflNB* WAcrtUNmtve CNtft&v tMfusis *9t»tr RIDE , PICNIC mm$, om mm •SKAKCRft. PHKhO^ m ff'5 M4 r«cc t

Source: PANB, MC326, Maritime Energy Coalition, MSI B4.

The following year the Alternate Energy Fair expanded to a three day event held

at the Universite du Moncton that attracted an even larger group of prominent scholars

and anti-nuclear leaders.64 By 1978, the MEC had a renowned and well attended festival

Nuclear Reaction: The Maritime Voice Against Nuclear Power, issue no. 4. (1977), p. 11. Ibid., p. 13. Nuclear Reaction Nucleare, issue no. 5. (Spring, 1978), p. 14.

108 that directly opposed the development project of nuclear energy in New Brunswick exposing the public to national and international leaders in the antinuclear movement.

The opposition to the Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station boiled over in

1977. It began with the MEC's presentation "Energy Options for New Brunswick" presented to the Legislative Standing Committee on Energy on 26 January. This 22 page brief critiqued the NBEPC by stressing the utility could level off consumption and eliminate the need for costly new generating stations. It was clear that the committee - with three representatives from the Power Commission - was not enthusiastic about the presentation.66 The brief was another futile attempt to voice concern about the project in the void of official meetings and public information sessions. It was received by the

Committee; however, there were questions whether it should be sent to the NBEPC for closer examination.

Meanwhile, the construction of the Point Lepreau nuclear reactor continued at the site location despite some set-backs.68 On 21 July 1977, the protest culminated in physical confrontation. In mid-afternoon on July 21 at the construction site, media and

NBEPC officials gathered to witness the arrival of the ship, M.V. Brunneck, and its

MEC Member, "Maritime Coalition at the Legislature," Nuclear Reaction: The Maritime Voice Against Nuclear Power, issue no. 4. (1977), p. 15. 66 See PANB, MC326, Maritime Energy Coalition, MSI A, MEC Correspondence to MEC Members, 1976-1978, Letter from the MEC to MEC Members, (31 January 1977), p. 1. The Chairman of the Standing Committee on Energy, Rev. David Bishop, asked the presenter of part 1 of the brief if he had been living in New Brunswick very long because of his strong American accent. The Chairman than stated the presenters were lucky to be able to appear before the Committee, and that in some countries they would not be allowed to. "The disgust and shock which we felt among ourselves was shared by some of the Committee members...." the MEC described. 67 Ibid., p. 2. 68 The set-backs included theft, vandalism, suspected arson, and low productivity at the construction site. The NBEPC made a resolution in the Legislative Assembly to "urge the government to appoint a commission of inquiry under section 2 of the Inquiries Act...." see Synoptic Report of the Proceedings of the Second Session of the Forty-Eighth Legislative Assembly of the Province of New Brunswick, 1976, Volume 1, (Fredericton: Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick, 1976), p. 51.

109 cargo of a 270-ton nuclear reactor "calandria." The ship was delivering the reactor vessel from the manufacturer in Montreal to Point Lepreau on the Bay of Fundy. To the astonishment of the onlookers, protesters with four rubber rafts appeared out of the woods and paddled out to position themselves between the approaching ship and the dock.69 The six men and two women in the rafts deliberately tried to form a human blockade. Eventually they were wedged between the ship and the dock, filling some of the rafts with water, but the demonstrators still managed to prevent the calandria from being unloaded. A press release issued by the demonstrators stated:

We are unarmed, and have absolutely no intention of acting in anything but a peaceable manner. Furthermore, we do not intend to commit any acts of destruction against the calandria, the boat, the dock or any other property. The reason that we're here is because the calandria is symbolic of New Brunswick going into the nuclear age.70

It took several hours before RCMP officers and NBEPC officials forcibly removed the demonstrators from their position between the dock and ship. The demonstrators continued their vigil on land until 8 pm before ending their protest. They were all members of the MEC who had been trained by "nonviolent social change activists" earlier in June to be well prepared for "future action."71 The Brunneck's delivery of the reactor offered the perfect opportunity for a nonviolent demonstration. The media documented the event, providing the rest of New Brunswick another example of the opposition to the development of a nuclear program within the province. The

"Pointe Lepreau 1977," Nuclear Reaction Nucleate, issue, no. 5. (1978), p. 10. Quoted in Ibid., p. 10. It is obvious by the wording of this quote that the demonstrators were directly connected to the MEC. 71 See PANB, MC326, Maritime Energy Coalition, MS1B3, MEC Correspondence, Letter to MEC members concerning the nonviolent workshop, (25 May 1977). 110 demonstrators physically created a blockade between their province and the large-scale nuclear development project. This was the culmination of the protest against the

construction of the Point Lepreau nuclear power plant. By 1979, another international

event would sweep North America changing the perception of nuclear energy forever.

Figure 4.5 NBEPC Officials Removing Protester From Between Brunneck and Dock

Source: Nuclear Reaction Nucleaire, issue, no. 5. (1978), p. 10.

Three Mile Island, the Decline of the Nuclear Age, and Economic Realities, 1979- 1980

The public's opposition to Point Lepreau lost its steam by 1978 and early 1979 as

the realization set in that nothing would stop the establishment of the provincial nuclear

program. The Three Mile Island nuclear disaster in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on the 28

March 1979 reshaped the world's perspective on domestic nuclear programs and pulled

111 the protest against Point Lepreau further away from any form of provincial or regional issues.72 By April 1979, the protest against Point Lepreau was almost entirely driven by the international disaster at Three Mile Island. The meltdown in Harrisburg caused an environmental disaster that resulted in broad public awareness of the hazardous effects nuclear reactors could inflict on a particular region. Nuclear power quickly adopted a new classification as a dangerous technology that could cause large-scale disaster.

The Three Mile Island disaster had a direct impact on the public of New

Brunswick as they witnessed the final stages of a nuclear program being established in their own province. Premier Hatfield, aware of a quickly approaching wave of opposition, made a public announcement to address the Three Mile Island accident and its implications for New Brunswick's nuclear project. Hatfield stated:

From what we know to date regarding this incident, the CANDU reactor being built at Point Lepreau would be capable of coping with the events which initiated the incident at Three Mile Island... As a result of the above conceptual and design differences, we feel confident that a sequence of events similar to that occurring at Three Mile Island could not occur at Point Lepreau.

The premier's rhetoric had little effect. His office was flooded with letters from concerned citizens, groups, political parties, businesses, organizations, and churches. The

72 See "Radiation Leaks from A-Plant in US," The Globe and Mail, (29 March 1979), p. 1. Not long before the disaster occurred the popular movie China Syndrome was released that was based on the nuclear meltdown of a power plant. 73 For more information on the details of the nuclear accident see Office of the Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Investigation into the March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island Accident by the Office of the Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission," (Washington, D.C: U.S. NRC, 1979). 74 Quoted in PANB, RS417, 5243-14, Electric Power - Nuclear Reference Material, "Comments on Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant at Harrisburg, PA," (1979). pp. 1-3. 112 letters arrived from all across the country. By 1980, the protest against Point Lepreau was fully revived and had a new range of concerned citizens in the opposition movement. On 24 March 1980, Hatfield and the Power Commission received a resolution from the St. Stephen Presbyterian Church that requested "an immediate halt to construction on the Point Lepreau Nuclear Generation Station and a moratorium on all nuclear power development."76 On 16 March 1980, outside the Beaverbrook Hotel in

Fredericton - Hatfield's residence of choice - an elderly couple, Jim and Kathleen

Bedell, demonstrated "as a token of commitment in this time of crisis" against the

77 nuclear development with a hunger strike.

As public opposition augmented, Hatfield had to deal with other problems concerning the nuclear program. The NBEPC had run out of funds to continue the construction of the plant. The economics of the project had experienced major problems.

On 5 February 1980, Hatfield sent an urgent letter to the newly elected Prime Minister,

Joe Clark, and the federal Minister of Energy, Mines, and Resources, Marc LaLonde.

The letter stated, "we need, and believe we deserve, interim action from your government to at least provide an extension of federally-shared funding for the project on the basis of its full cost."78 The original stipulations were that the federal government would loan 50 percent financing to the project with a limit of $700 million, but this

To view these letters see PANB, RS417, 5243-13, Electric Power-Nuclear Public Response. 76 PANB, RS417, 5243-13, Electric Power - Nuclear Public Response, Resolution sent from St. Stephen Presbytery and United Church of Canada to Premier Hatfield and NBEPC, (24 March 1980). 77 PANB,RS417, 5243-13, Electric Power - Nuclear Public Response, Jim and Kathleen Bedell's demonstration statement, (16 March 1980). 78 PANB, RS417, 5243-1, Electric Power - Nuclear General, Letter from Premier Hatfield to Prime Minister Joe Clark, (5 February 1980), p.l. This letter was followed up with a formal proposal entitled "A Proposal for Federal Government Support for the Point Lepreau Project," which outlined all the same problems and solutions.

113 ceiling was reached in October 1979. The Point Lepreau project had spent its budget with still three more years of construction left before the plant could begin operation.

"The matter, I assure you, is of the greatest urgency to this government and to the citizens of this province," Hatfield concluded.79 A formal proposal was forwarded to the federal government that estimated the 630 megawatt reactor would cost in the range of

$1.1 to $1.2 billion.80 In response to the urgent requests, Marc Lalonde agreed Hatfield had "some real problems, in the short run, in respect to the Lepreau station," but reassured the premier his department was giving the situation urgent consideration.

The opposition to Point Lepreau became wide-spread when the international disaster of Three Mile Island awoke the public to the consequences of nuclear energy.

The public's concern about Point Lepreau had become defined by external factors that truly had nothing to do with the social, political or economic dynamics of New

Brunswick. In addition, the main group of the movement, the MEC, had increasingly adopted national and international characteristics to oppose the Point Lepreau project.

Did the protest movement affect the outcome of the regional economic strategy to introduce New Brunswick to the nuclear age?

Lepreau II, 1979-1984

The opposition to Point Lepreau experienced mixed success. Lepreau was built

and put into operation in 1983, but the NBEPC's plans for a larger nuclear program were

79 Ibid., p. 2. See PANB, RS417, 5243-1, Electric Power - Nuclear General, "A Proposal for Federal Government Support for the Point Lepreau Project," (7 February 1980), p. 2. 81PANB, RS417, 5243-1, Electric Power - Nuclear General, Letter from Marc Lalonde to Premier Hatfield, (21 April 1980).

114 cancelled. As the protest built against the Lepreau project with a new impetus from the

Three Mile Island disaster, the NBEPC's plans for a second reactor and the creation of the Maritime Energy Corporation with an interprovincial nuclear power sharing program continued. By January 1979 New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island had laid a $36 million cable across the Northumberland Strait to connect the grids of the two provinces and an agreement was signed for Prince Edward Island to buy nuclear power from New

Brunswick.82 Premier Campbell's government expressed a mixed message about nuclear power in the search for alternatives to petroleum energy production. Aware of the increasing opposition to nuclear power, Campbell turned his government's policy towards the research and development of alternative energy resources with the 1975 creation of the Institute of Man and Resources (IMR), an organization designed to develop practical systems for alternative energy and self-sufficiency for Prince Edward

Islanders.83 However, the 1979 deal to purchase nuclear power from New Brunswick and the earlier interest in sharing the costs of the second reactor at Point Lepreau, labelled

Campbell's government as pro-nuclear. Because of the MEC's influence on the public's perception of nuclear power, backed by the timing of the Three Mile Island disaster, nuclear energy was a crucial electoral issue in the three Maritime provinces. When an election was called for March 1979 in Prince Edward Island, in the aftermath of the

Three Mile Island disaster, the Conservative opposition leader Angus MacLean promised that if elected, his government would not purchase nuclear-generated electricity from

See PANB, RS427, 5243-1, Electric Power-Nuclear General, Letter from Hatfield to Minister of EM&R, (3 July 1979). See Alan MacEachern, The Institute of Man and Resources: An Environmental Fable, (Charlottetown: Island Studies Press, 2003).

115 New Brunswick. MacLean won the election and called off all deals with New

Brunswick to participate in the financing or purchasing of nuclear energy. The previous year, Nova Scotia had a general election that placed John Buchanan's Conservative government in power. Buchanan also backed away from the Maritime Energy

Corporation deal, leaving Premier Hatfield and his province isolated with the only nuclear program in Atlantic Canada.

The victory of the protesters was unforeseen. They played an important role in stopping the interprovincial nuclear program that would have made New Brunswick a nuclear hub for the Maritime region and likely New England. The message of the opposition tainted the development of nuclear power in the province by delivering information to the public about the significant environmental and economic issues that arose in the international community. Likewise, the international disaster of Three Mile

Island allowed for the last push to oppose the technology. Both levels of the state and the

Power Commission still managed to bring New Brunswick into the nuclear age with a

635 megawatt nuclear reactor: a program that never was truly desired by the Power

Commission. The hopes to develop a multiple-unit reactor complex capable of exporting energy never got off the ground. New Brunswick was left alone with its new nuclear program and had nowhere to export any of the surplus energy.

Nuclear power had shifted in the eyes of the public due to the efforts of

concerned members of the public, access to national and foreign activist groups,

environmentalists and international events that redefined nuclear energy. The

David H. Martin and David Argue, Nuclear Sunset: The Economic Costs of the Canadian Nuclear Industry (Ottawa: Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, 1996), sec., 3.3. 116 development of another nuclear program had no political worth; in fact, it was to be avoided entirely after the Lepreau debacle. The utility still pushed for another reactor, but the political support by 1982 had been exhausted. The perception of large-scale regional economic projects can be changed by the public to the point where a once praised development strategy such as nuclear power can end up representing a failed economic growth policy. The public were aware the project had no environmental or economic benefits for their province and opposed every step of the development project.

However, this does not define the opposition movement against the Point Lepreau project as a regional response. By 1976, the MEC, the main group that led the protest movement, was providing the public with information about international antinuclear movements and corresponding with groups in the United States to fuel their own opposition in New Brunswick. The response to the project no longer had socio-economic concerns about the underdevelopment of the province and the marginalization of northern communities.

Conclusion

When the announcement was made that the plant would be built in southern New

Brunswick, groups in northern New Brunswick criticised the decision because they believed their region was in more need of the development project. As the federal government began the review process for the construction approval of the plant, it became clear the well organized activities opposed the project. The lack of public participation were problems identified by protesters and government officials at the public hearings. Despite these problems, however, the federal government approved the

117 construction license for the plant. Concerned members of the public no longer had any formal forum to be included in the development process of the nuclear program. The organization of the MEC in late 1974 acted as a group that lobbied the government for public meetings, registered protests and educated the public about the nuclear development in the absence of any governmental panels or meetings. The Coalition effectively developed a dialogue with government and nuclear development officials to express their environmental and economic concerns about the project. This organization grew throughout 1976-1977 and established close links to anti-nuclear and civil advocacy groups in the United States. Additionally, the Coalition published the periodical Nuclear Reaction to inform the people of New Brunswick about the international economic and political issues surrounding the development of the nuclear energy. The Coalition also sponsored and organized the Alternate Energy Fairs to provide a forum for the public to be introduced to the issues of nuclear technology

delivered by experts from the national and international antinuclear movement. The New

Brunswick public began protesting against the Point Lepreau project with concerns that

ranged beyond the province and region. Despite these efforts, the construction and

investment in the nuclear plant continued.

The demonstrations culminated in 1977 when protestors physically placed

themselves between the province and the nuclear age with rubber rafts that blocked a

ship delivering the nuclear reactor to the Point Lepreau construction site. After the

blockade, the protest declined as demonstrators realized the construction would continue

despite their efforts. By 1979, the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster in Harrisburg,

Pennsylvania, stimulated the public's opposition against Point Lepreau. This opposition,

118 in addition to earlier protests, added to the dismissal of the second nuclear reactor and interprovincial nuclear program. This international event enabled all levels of the public to be concerned about the safety of the nuclear program as it entered the final stages of construction.

Despite the non-participatory nature of federal-provincial regional development, concerned citizens still organized and delivered their concerns and opinions to government officials in an attempt to affect the outcome of the development policy. The individuals who participated in the protest movement against the Point Lepreau project played decisive roles in the public perception of the development project. As New

Brunswick emerged into the nuclear age with its first nuclear program, it also had developed the first large-scale environmental organization that effectively prevented the nuclear Point Lepreau project from ever being interpreted as a logical regional economic development initiative.

119 Chapter Five Conclusion

This thesis explained New Brunswick's introduction to the nuclear age, by establishing the context in which the project was proposed and tracing the political negotiations that established the nuclear program. The nuclear program was the cornerstone of Premier Richard Hatfield's multi-billion dollar energy program designed to expand the energy capacity and economic growth of the province. The correlation between the energy sector and the province's economic development has precedents in

New Brunswick. It was the postwar period when the New Brunswick Electric Power

Commission (NBEPC) developed a close relationship with the provincial government to launch the province's largest capital construction programs in the form of hydro-electric dams. By 1961, the NBEPC had developed an interest in nuclear energy. With the aid of

AECL, the NBEPC began proposing plans to incorporate the technology into the province's system. By the early 1970s the Commission was pushing for a multi-unit nuclear complex to generate electricity for export to New England. This plan, along with a proposal for a nuclear, heavy-water facility, failed in the negotiation stages. The 1973 oil crisis changed national energy politics for governments in the West. Pierre Elliot

Trudeau's federal government implanted a federal policy that would gain control over

western Canadian oil supplies to secure these resources for domestic use. In addition, the

federal government directed its policy to encourage the proliferation of nuclear energy

by offering loans to any province interested in developing a nuclear program. The

NBEPC immediately applied for a nuclear program in early 1974. At this point Hatfield

personally involved himself in the Point Lepreau project by corresponding directly with the federal ministers involved in the decision process. Hatfield used his position as the premier of New Brunswick to pressure the federal government for immediate confirmation on the federal approval and funding for the project. The premier's concern about the timing of the project was characterized by the two provincial by-elections in

August 1974 and an unannounced general election in November. Likewise, Hatfield's political announcements of the Point Lepreau project correspond directly with his re election strategy: the energy program was a demonstration to the public his government had the policy to handle the energy crisis.

The federal review process stalled when the Department of Regional Economic

Expansion (DREE) argued the construction of a nuclear reactor in southern New

Brunswick would have minimal socio-economic benefits and that the plant should be placed in the north of the province. During meetings and written correspondence it was clear Hatfield, with the influence of the NBEPC, was set on building the reactor at Point

Lepreau. The project was not a viable economic development initiative, but Hatfield, with his own political deadlines to meet, continued to pressure the federal government for approval. Federal confirmation was received on October 9. Two days later Hatfield announced that the province would go to the polls on November 18. Intra-provincial politics, not transprovincial or national forces, influenced the economic and political

structure in this key episode of postwar regional development. The influence of publicly-

owned provincial institutions and the re-election strategies of a provincial government

defined how New Brunswick entered the nuclear age. Conversely, national institutions

played a more hesitant role and expressed concern about the viability of the nuclear

development in New Brunswick. Public demonstrations and organization against the Point Lepreau project branded the nuclear program as an irrational development initiative. Neither level of the state allowed for any substantial public participation in the project; however, when public hearings were carried out, it was clear a portion of the public were against the development of the nuclear program because of provincial environmental and economic issues. As a result, members of the public and interest groups formed the Maritime

Energy Coalition to lobby the government for meetings, register protests and educate the citizens about the environmental, economic and political consequences of a provincial nuclear program. By 1976, the Coalition was connected to the national and international antinuclear movement by establishing lines of correspondence with public advocacy groups in the United States. The Coalition also published the periodical Nuclear

Reaction that informed the public about antinuclear protest movements around the world and used these international issues in the opposition against Point Lepreau. It was no longer just a about provincial issues. This opposition was aided by the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster in the United States that made the world realize the negative consequences associated with domestic nuclear power programs. This brought the protest further into the international movement against nuclear proliferation and augmented the protest against Point Lepreau.

The success of the protest movement against the Point Lepreau project was largely unknown at the time. The NBEPC and provincial government were negotiating a deal with Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia to have an interprovincial grid supplied by a large nuclear energy station at Point Lepreau, New Brunswick. The negotiations fell through when Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia governments realized the electorate

122 perceived nuclear energy as negative for the environment and economy of their provinces: with the election of two new administrations in Prince Edward Island and

Nova Scotia, the interprovincial nuclear deal was dropped. Hatfield stood alone in the effort to bring his province into the nuclear age. The people's apprehension and opposition to state-led development initiatives played defining roles in New Brunswick's postwar period. However, this was not a movement specific to its region: stemming from provincial issues the opposition movement increasingly became more concerned about

international antinuclear issues.

What occurred at the provincial level during the development of New

Brunswick's nuclear program defined the project. The provincial institution, the NBEPC,

pushed for a nuclear program which was finally incorporated into Hatfield's provincial

energy policy and announced to the public in 1974. The nuclear program was influenced

by Hatfield's re-election campaign and the continuing stewardship of the NBEPC. The

federal government was pressured to approve the program even though it was known the

project did not have many socio-economic benefits. These political players decided the

course New Brunswick would take within the nuclear age.

Did the Point Lepreau nuclear generating station justify its role as a regional

economic development project? The voices of opposition, which included DREE, were

right when they warned the project was not in the best socio-economic interests of the

province. In fact, Point Lepreau was not needed at the time it was ready for service in

1983 because the NBEPC already had a capacity surplus of approximately 1000

123 megawatts.1 The total for the Point Lepreau plant reached $1.25 billion when it began operation in 1983. The building of the facility created approximately 2000 temporary construction jobs; however, by 1989 once the plant had been in operation for roughly six years, it only employed 438 workers with a majority of the positions requiring a background in nuclear physics, engineering or other highly technical prerequisites associated with the nuclear industry.2 To justify the reactor the NBEPC had to continue with their plan to achieve a second nuclear reactor despite the demise of the interprovincial nuclear program. In a 1980 assessment of the province's energy capacity, the Commission tried to sell the idea that a single unit at Point Lepreau would have a significant stabilizing effect on rates for New Brunswick and that a second reactor would remove "the electrical consumers from the insecurity of foreign oil supplies." In

February 1983, the NBEPC and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) became joint owners of Maritime Nuclear, a crown corporation that promoted the construction of a second CANDU reactor in New Brunswick, dedicated to the original plan to export nuclear energy to the United States.4 Maritime Nuclear launched the proposal to build a second reactor at the Point Lepreau site for exporting energy south of the border. In 1983 the proposal for Lepreau II was already going through the review process of the federal

Environmental Review Panel, the report was published in 1985.5 The panel made a number of preliminary recommendations, but conclude the project could "proceed

1 Chris Wood, "New forecasts cloud N.B. nuclear future," The Globe and Mail, (October 21, 1981). David H. Martin and David Argue, Nuclear Sunset: The Economic Costs of the Canadian Nuclear Industry (Ottawa: Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, 1996), sec, 3.3. 3 See PANB, RS417, 5243-14, Electric Power - Nuclear Reference Material, G.L. Titus, NBEPC, "Current Assessment of the Need for Point Lepreau Capacity," (22 August 1980). p. 3. 4See Province of New Brunswick and the Government of Canada, Second Nuclear Reactor Point Lepreau, New Brunswick: Report of the Environmental Assessment Panel (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985), p. 5. 5 See Ibid.

124 without significant adverse effects."6 The review did not address the issue of economic viability for the second reactor.

By 1983, the political support from the provincial and federal government was no longer what it used to be. The public's opposition to nuclear energy and the Three Mile

Island disaster made the government careful about their support for the technology.

Lepreau II was scrapped because of the obvious reluctance from the provincial and federal government to provide subsidies.7 By 1980, Canadian energy policy entered a new era when the federal government ratified the National Energy Program (NEP). After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the already inflated world prices of oil doubled. Domestic politics were saturated with issues of energy taxes, oil and gas prices and the state of the national economy, when Joe Clark's Conservative government delivered their first budget in December 1979. It was immediately defeated in the House of Commons, followed by the regionally charged federal election that returned the Trudeau Liberals to power in February 1980. Trudeau responded to the energy crisis with the NEP, which implemented a number of policies to establish federal ascendency over western oil supplies for domestic oil security. The NEP created controversy and separated Canada between West and East to the point that the program needed to be updated by 1982. This was accompanied by the drop in world oil prices throughout the 1980s. The era of energy crisis came to an end.

However, the legacy of New Brunswick's nuclear program continues. In January

1998, the NBEPC opened its transmission system to allow parties to wheel energy

6 Ibid., p.3. 7 Martin and Argue, Nuclear Sunset, sec, 3.3. 8 The Government of Canada, The National Energy Program, 1980 (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1980). through the province. This change also enabled the province to export energy to external destinations. In 2001, New Brunswick released the White Paper on New Brunswick

Energy Policy to provide a framework for the period 2001-2010, which allows the province to fully participate in a competitive energy market by expanding the "efficiency and development" of the its energy sector. As a result of this policy, the Electricity Act passed by the legislature in April 2002 restructured the NBEPC and opened the wholesale and retail market for large industrial customers connected to the transmission system.10 The Electricity Act restructured the Power Commission into four publicly- owned operating companies, the New Brunswick Power Nuclear Corporation being the one of the four that promotes the province's nuclear future. The policy from the provincial government is preparing New Brunswick to be a large stakeholder in the nuclear exporting industry. The close relationship between the Power Commission and provincial government is where the policy originates. The Point Lepreau power plant has been in operation for approximately three decades. In 2005 the provincial

government made the political decision to refurbish the reactor for $1.4 billion.

Likewise, the on-going attempt to develop a second nuclear reactor for New Brunswick

has found new enthusiasm from Shawn Graham's provincial government who states it is

a perfect opportunity to create jobs and allow for foreign investment in the province.

Political decisions are currently being made to steer the province further into the nuclear

age. As history has demonstrated, it is likely the public utility and provincial government

will achieve their goals and once again alter the course of New Brunswick's economic

development.

9 The National Energy Board, Outlook for Electricity Markets, 2005-2006 (Calgary: Public Service and Supplies, 2005), p. 60. 10 Ibid., p. 60. Point Lepreau continues to be a living history as opposed to a relic of Canadian heritage. With increasing oil and gas prices, a booming oil industry in the West, resurgence in environmental concerns and the talk of a new carbon tax, New

Brunswickers are experiencing similar conditions as those of the 1970s energy crisis.

Their province is still struggling with the problems of economic development in northern regions and continues to lose its young population to job prospects in other regions of the country. It is within this context that their provincial government is eagerly pursuing the development of a nuclear export industry in southern New Brunswick that will commit the province to another large-scale project having little effect on the economic growth of the province.

Figure 5.1 The Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station

Source: Province of New Brunswick - Government of Canada, Second Nuclear Reactor Point Lepreau, New Brunswick: Report of the Environmental Assessment Panel, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1985)

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